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Abstract 
 
This study is a social history of communists in wartime Rome. It examines 
a decisive change in Italian communist politics, as the Partito Comunista 
Italiano (PCI) rose from a hounded fraternity of prisoners and exiles to a 
party of government. Joining with other Resistance forces in the Comitato 
di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN), this ‘new party’ recast itself as a mass, 
patriotic force, committed to building a new democracy. This study 
explains how such a party came into being. It argues that a PCI machine 
could establish itself only by subduing other strands of communist 
thought and organistion that had emerged independently of exiled Party 
leaders. This was particularly true in Rome, where dissident communists 
created the largest single Resistance formation, the Movimento Comunista 
d’Italia (MCd’I). This movement was the product of the underground that 
survived across the Mussolini period, expressing a ‘subversive’ politics 
that took on a popular following through the disintegration of the Fascist 
regime. Standing outside the CLN alliance and the postwar democratic 
governments, it reflected the maximalism and eclecticism of a communist 
milieu that had persisted on the margins of Fascist society. In the 
Occupation period this dissident movement galvanised a social revolt in 
the borgate slums, which would also trouble the new authorities even after 
the Allies’ arrival. Studying the political writing of these dissidents, their 
autodidact Marxism and the social conditions in which it emerged, this 
study reconstructs a far-reaching battle to redefine communist politics. 
Highlighting the erasure of the dissidents’ history in mainstream narration 
of the Resistance, it argues that the repressed radicalism of this period 
represented a lasting danger to the postwar PCI and the new Republic. 
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Preface 
 
This study is a social history of communists in wartime Rome. It centres on the 
period between the Wehrmacht invasion on 8 September 1943 and the Allies’ 
arrival in the capital on 4 June 1944. These nine months were a decisive turning 
point in the development of Italian communism, as the Partito Comunista Italiano 
(PCI), rose from a hounded fraternity of prisoners and exiles to a party of 
government. The partito nuovo created through the Resistance was quite unlike 
the Communist Party that had succumbed to Fascism two decades earlier. 
Joining with other Resistance forces in the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN), 
Palmiro Togliatti’s party cast itself as a mass, patriotic force, committed to 
building a new democracy. So, too, was the PCI’s social profile radically altered, 
as young Italians without past communist affiliation now flooded into its ranks. 
 
This study focuses on the other side of the partito nuovo’s formation: the communists 
who rejected Togliatti’s approach. For the PCI’s party machine to take form, its 
cadres had to impose their leadership over a series of communist movements that 
had emerged outside of their control. This was particularly true in the Italian capital, 
where dissident communists created the largest single Resistance formation. Their 
Movimento Comunista d’Italia (MCd’I) was the product of the underground that 
survived across the Fascist period. Standing outside of the CLN alliance, it expressed 
the maximalism and eclecticism of a subversive milieu that had long been detached 
from Party leaders. In the Occupation period and after it galvanised an unruly social 
revolt in the borgate slums, a proletarian rebellion that clashed with the PCI’s politics 
of ‘national unity’. 
 
Central to our research is the autodidact Marxism that flowered within this milieu, 
expressed in papers and pamphlets, bulletins and handwritten polemics. A militant 
minority used this worker-writing to endow its activity with a grand historic mission 
and a global perspective, even despite its long isolation from the international Left. 
This thinking drew on earlier Italian communist politics as well as a subculture that 
had evolved across the Fascist period. As this study shows, these militants’ texts 
often bore the mark of the conditions of repression in which they were produced. Yet 
this autodidacticism also stood in defiance of the political illiteracy that Fascism had 
sought to create. It embodied workers’ and artisans’ 
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attempt to free themselves from the condition of those consigned only to follow 
leaders and execute commands. 
 
These Roman militants’ pursuit of a class-war and revolutionary agenda set them 
in sometimes sharp opposition to other anti-fascists. In the Occupation period the 
demands of self-preservation compelled a degree of cooperation among all 
clandestine militants, whether resisting Nazi raids or sheltering the endangered. 
Yet in rejecting the idea of a common national interest, the dissident-communists 
strongly opposed both the CLN alliance and the democratic governments that 
followed.1 After Liberation they like other dissident partisans continued to build 
their armed bands, waging expropriations and blackmail, occupying public 
buildings and even extorting Allied supplies. As Nazi-Fascist2 tyranny gave way 
to a new government of ‘national unity’, this intransigence drew these militants 
into open conflict with the new authorities. 
 
The Roman dissident movement did not create any lasting political force. 
Paralysed by Nazi repression and criminalised under the Allies, it represented a 
Resistance that did not shape the new Republic. Yet even in defeat, its militants 
left an enduring legacy. The repression of partisan radicalism and a botched 
defascistisation process left behind bitter weeds of disappointed hope; 
‘unfinished business’ that repeatedly returned to the centre of Italian public life. 
Making their own turn to the underground, new generations of armed militants 
continued to destabilise the Republic into the 1970s. A study of this history thus 
sheds light on the tensions at the origin of the postwar PCI and the Republic 
itself. It highlights the subversive culture that developed across the Fascist era 
and then re-emerged in the war period and beyond. 
 
Each chapter of our study focuses on this fight to shape the Italian communist 
movement as it emerged from two decades of repression: 
 
Chapter One frames this study historically, explaining the blinkers that both 
official Resistance remembrance and PCI self-mythology have placed on existing 
 
 
 
1 ‘Antifascismo’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 5, 30.4.1944.  
2 Nazifascismo, the common Italian term for the overlapping rule of Benito Mussolini’s  
Fascist régime (the formally independent Repubblica Sociale Italiano, widely called the Salò 
Republic in reference to its de facto capital) and Adolf Hitler’s control of the country, 
occupied by Nazi Germany from 8 September 1943 onward. 
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understandings of wartime communism. It outlines a research perspective 
focused on worker-militants’ own strategies for transforming Italian society, and 
not just the decisions of professional politicians. It emphasises the generational 
divide between the traditions inherited from earlier working-class radicalism, 
and the new model of Party organisation forged in the interwar Comintern. 
 
Chapter Two examines the culture of the Roman communist underground in the 
early phases of the Second World War. It highlights the culture clash between the 
intellectual fellow-travellers drawn into the orbit of Togliatti’s party during the 
Popular Front era, and the proletarian underground that had survived across 
Fascism. This chapter highlights the effects of the Fascist experience on this 
clandestine milieu, including the spread of a millenarian cult of Stalin, outside of 
and in tendency opposed to the PCI’s new strategy. 
 
The clashes among the Roman communists become more sharply defined in 
Chapter Three, which spans the 45 Days between the palace coup against 
Mussolini and the German invasion. The liberalisation period following Marshal 
Badoglio’s appointment allowed the formation of the political movements that 
would go on to shape the Resistance. This chapter explains how the PCI’s 
‘national unity’ policy hardened it against the dissident MCd’I. 
 
The German invasion marked the beginning of a harsh Occupation regime, and 
Chapter Four turns our focus to the social conditions in which armed bands now 
emerged. Exploring the differences between the slum proletariat in Rome’s 
peripheral borgate and the industrial working class of the North, we explain how 
their respective forms of mobilisation related to communists’ differing 
conceptions of ‘class struggle’. This focus on the particular forms of social revolt 
on Rome’s periphery allows us to explain the relative strength of the dissident 
communists in these areas compared to all other Resistance forces. 
 
Chapter Five takes on a more international dimension, with the Anglo-Americans’ 
January 1944 arrival at Anzio, 35 miles south of the capital. For many anti-fascists 
these landings offered hope that Liberation was close at hand. This chapter explains 
how this prospect drove tensions within the anti-fascist coalition, as the parties 
advanced their rival visions of the next government. This is also informed 
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by a study of the Allies’ efforts to impose order on the democratisation process in 
the ‘laboratory’ of the liberated South. 
 
Chapter Six focuses on the effect of repression on the Roman Resistance, 
focusing on the counter-insurgency that struck in February-March 1944 as the 
Allies’ march toward the city was halted. In particular, it highlights the contested 
place of terrorist tactics in communist strategy, and the increased opposition to 
their use in the face of devastating Nazi reprisals. It argues that this wave of 
repression succeeded in demobilising the Roman Resistance. 
 
Chapter Seven revolves around Togliatti’s ‘Salerno Turn’, as he led his party and 
its allies into government. It argues that the Turn embodied the overlapping of 
the PCI’s new democratic approach with its ongoing Soviet inspiration, allowing 
the Party to unite widely varying political sensibilities. It highlights how 
communists both within and outside the Party sought to reconcile Moscow’s 
diplomatic moves with their understanding of their own strategic possibilities. 
 
The controversy over the ‘Salerno Turn’ again poses the question of what 
potential communists really had to transform an Italy liberated thanks to Anglo-
American invasion, and Chapter Eight explains why Rome did not see a popular 
insurrection upon the Allies’ arrival. It explains that the weakness of Resistance 
movements in the capital was compounded by the new institutional deal and the 
Allies’ own efforts to prevent social unrest. 
 
Chapter Nine proceeds into the post-Liberation period, with the disarming of the 
partisans and the formation of Ivanoe Bonomi’s Allied-backed ‘government of 
national unity’. It highlights the tensions between the CLN parties in 
government, the state machine inherited from Fascism, and the armed bands 
continuing to operate on the Roman city periphery. This allows us to see how a 
new Republic built itself on the pacification of social unrest. 
 
Finally, the concluding Chapter Ten explores the echoes of the so-called ‘Red 
Resistance’ in the culture of the postwar Italian Left. Tracing the continual 
remergence of militant anti-fascism and the politics of insurrection, it points to 
the disappointed hopes of the Resistance period that continued to fuel political 
violence. It thus presents repressed partisan radicalism as an enduring factor for 
instability in Togliatti’s new party, as in the new Republic. 
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This study begins, however, by examining the role of Resistance commemoration 
in Italian public life. 
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A note on sources 
 
This study focuses on the political and strategic debates among communists in 
the war period, and thus draws heavily on their public press; internal bulletins; 
and organisational reports. 
 
The MCd’I did not have any institutional heirs to preserve its records, and much 
of its archive was destroyed upon its dissolution. The most substantial set of 
documents from the movement is that collected by Silverio Corvisieri, author of a 
1967 essay on Bandiera Rossa nella Resistenza romana. His archive, deposited at the 
Museo Storico della Liberazione in 2014, includes the documentation collated by 
Francesco Cretara in the immediate wake of Liberation. It features minutes of 
some of its committee meetings; its press and internal bulletins; and postwar 
conference proceedings. While this archive offers a limited view of the MCd’I’s 
internal organisation, it does include the reports that each of its armed bands 
were asked to produce after Liberation, detailing their activities. These were 
produced for the sake of seeking official recognition for MCd’I partisans, and 
thus list its members in each zone, the partisan actions to which they laid claim, 
and histories of their activity by band leaders. 
 
Diaries by militants offer further insight into the mood of the times, as do the 
personal archives of figures such as Otello Terzani (at the Biblioteca Comunale di 
Follonica), Matilde Bassani Finzi (Unione Femminile Nazionale), Gerardo Bruni (at 
the Fondazione Basso) and Rosario Bentivegna (at the Archivio Storico del Senato). 
Terzani’s archive also preserves the internal documentation and press of the 
Armata Rossa, a militia closely linked to the MCd’I. This study also draws on a 
wide array of memoirs and militant histories written by other figures active in 
the Roman and Italian Resistance. Given the distance of time I was not able to 
rely on collecting oral testimony as the basis for my study. I did however 
interview the surviving MCd’I militants Modesto di Veglia, Osvaldo Schiavoni 
and Renato Fratini (each members as teenagers) and also had repeated meetings 
with the veteran GAP partisan Mario Fiorentini. I also drew on the testimony 
collected by Alessandro Portelli (for the Circolo Gianni Bosio) as well as the Lazio 
region’s Banca della Memoria. 
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Given the MCd’I’s limited historical imprint, this study relies greatly on sources 
produced by those outside observers who sought to control or repress its activity. 
In particular, this means the official records at the Archivio Centrale dello Stato 
(ACS). This archive is home to the police reports produced under the Salò 
Republic (RSI). While these records do not extend across the entire Occupation 
period, they are an important source on the growth of armed bands and their 
action in the capital. They also include some of the MCd’I’s own internal 
documents and organisational reports, seized by police. The Interior Ministry 
archive spanning both the Fascist and postwar period includes a welter of 
documentation on the political, economic and social situation in wartime Italy. 
The Casellario Politico Centrale features personal files on ‘subversives’ (and in 
many cases, their only surviving photograph). This is also useful in 
reconstructing the history of the circles at the origins of the MCd’I during the first 
years of World War II. Another source for reconstructing the dissident 
movement’s activity and internal clashes are the records from the postwar trials 
of its militants, as well as of the spies in its ranks. These documents appear in 
both the Archivio di Stato di Roma (ASR) and the files of the Allied Control 
Commission. This latter archive, together with the National Archives at Kew, 
documents Allied plans for occupied Rome and its view of partisan movements. 
 
This study also draws extensively on sources produced by the PCI, held at Rome’s 
Istituto Gramsci. The Fondo Mosca and Fondo Direzione Nord cover its national 
leadership bodies, and Fondo Agostino Novella its sections in the Lazio region. The 
Archivio Partito Comunista includes both correspondence between the Rome and 
Milan PCI leaderships and a wider array of documentation on the Party’s local 
sections. These archives together offer a rich documentation of the internal life of the 
wartime PCI as well as a close observation of dissident communists. However, they 
focus more on the PCI’s own political dynamics and relations to other parties than 
the activity of partisan bands. Resistance institutes around Italy offer further 
important sources on the PCI’s partisan activism. In Rome this includes the Museo 
Storico della Liberazione and IRSIFAR, in Milan the INSMLI, in Sesto San Giovanni the 
ISEC, and in Turin the ISTOREC (with the Fondo Arturo Colombi offering special 
insight into the PCI’s internal life). These institutes are also useful sources of 
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Resistance press, and in 2017 INSMLI published its entire archive from the 
clandestine period online. 
 
This study does not draw on primary sources from the German Occupation 
forces, except insofar as these also exist in RSI archives. Lutz Klinkhammer’s 
L’Occupazione tedesca in Italia and Amadeo Osti Guerrazzi’s forthcoming La 
persecuzione degli ebrei a Roma. Carnefici e vittime are key works on the machinery 
of Occupation. The history of the role of Soviet representatives in Occupied Italy 
remains to be written, although the volume Dagli archivi di Mosca. L'Urss, il 
Cominform e il PCI (1943-1951), edited by Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, does 
cite some among these officials’ reports on the Italian situation. 
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Chapter One 
 
What remembrance forgets 
 
1.1. Myths and martyrs 
 
Lusty cries of Duce! Duce! echoed around the square facing Rome’s city hall on 
election night 2008, as Fascist-saluting crowds hailed the capital’s first far-Right 
mayor since World War II.1 With extremists chanting Mussolini-era slogans long 
into the night, elderly veterans of the Resistance reacted with consternation, 
protesting the police’s failure to enforce the ban on Fascist symbols. Faced with a 
potentially explosive situation, Rome’s new first citizen Gianni Alemanno opted 
for a gesture of reconciliation, as he sought to distance himself from his most 
hard-line supporters. Within days of his poll triumph, Alemanno announced 
plans to pay tribute at the Fosse Ardeatine caves, where SS officers murdered 335 
anti-fascists and Jews on the afternoon of 24 March 1944. 
 
The mayor’s plans to visit the ‘Monument to the Martyrs’ did little to placate his 
opponents, who highlighted his past activism in the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale 
Italiano (MSI).2 As MSI youth leader in 1989 Alemanno was notoriously arrested 
while leading a protest against a remembrance service at Nettuno’s Allied war 
graves. The erstwhile Fascist had declared this commemoration of US troops 
‘offensive to the memory of the thousands’ of Mussolini-loyalist troops who ‘fell 
for the dignity of the Patria’ in resisting Allied invasion.3 Despite the mayor’s 
belated embrace of democratic politics, Resistance veterans’ groups labelled his 
planned appearance at the Fosse Ardeatine a shallow PR stunt, cynically 
designed to restore his tarnished legitimacy. 
 
Alemanno’s visit went ahead despite protests, with the ANFIM4 president Rosetta 
Stame5 charged with guiding him around the execution site. Like most Resistance 
 
 
 
 
1 ‘Festa AN tra cori e braccia tese’, La Repubblica, 29.4.2008.  
2 From the late 1970s to the early 1990s Alemanno was a leader of the most radical wing 
of the MSI, whose main theorist was his father-in-law Pino Rauti. This party was created 
in 1946 by former officials of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana, the Nazi-puppet government 
that formally ruled German-occupied Italy from September 1943 to April 1945.  
3 Quoted in Giuli 2007, p. 38. 
4 National Association of Italian Martyrs’ Families.  
5 Her father Nicola Ugo Stame, a member of the MCd’I, was killed at the Fosse Ardeatine: 
see Chapter 3.1, and the obituary in MCd’I 1944c. 
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memorials, the Monument closely links partisan ‘martyrdom’ and Italian 
nationhood. The mausoleum is decked out with tricolore flags, Catholic trinkets 
and military medals; the curators tell visitors that it was in fact the SS’s victims 
who ‘fell for the Patria’ at the hands of Italy’s ‘centuries-long enemy, Germany’. 
As well as commemorating the dead, the display also offers a more enduring 
message. Concluding the tour, Stame pointed Alemanno’s attention to a strip of 
paper bearing the last scrawled words of one murdered captive, Tigrino Sabatini: 
‘Don’t forget what we died for, don’t exploit our death!’6 
 
For Alemanno’s critics, the symbolism was clear. La Repubblica lamented that 
Sabatini’s posthumous words expressed ‘what was, indeed, happening’,7 underlining 
the demise of the ‘zero-tolerance anti-fascism’ of decades past.8 This cordon sanitaire 
had dissolved together with the First Republic9 in the early 1990s, allowing the ‘post-
fascists’10 to enter the mainstream for the first time since the war. The divides of the 
Resistance period nonetheless remained a key motif of Italian public life. When 
Rome’s new mayor condemned ‘the crimes committed by all sides in the civil war’,11 
his opponents retorted that this left him outside the ‘national community’ forged in 
the Resistance.12 Defending the old constitutional-arch 
 
 
 
6 ‘Alemanno celebra le Fosse Ardeatine’, La Repubblica, 6.5.2008. Sabatini’s words are 
displayed at the caves although he was in fact executed at the Forte Bravetta six weeks 
after the Fosse Ardeatine atrocity.  
7 Ibid.  
8 I.e. the parties that wrote Italy’s 1947 Constitution and effectively bounded the limits of 
republican legitimacy (if not parliamentary representation) from the early 1960s until the 
early 1990s.  
9 An informal term for the political order created after Liberation and which fell apart in 
the early 1990s, with the explosion of the main ex-Resistance parties. While the PCI 
dissolved in response to the failure of ‘actually-existing socialism’, the Christian-
Democrats and Socialists were destroyed by a corruption scandal called Tangentopoli 
 
(‘Bribesville’), which came to public awareness from 1992 to 1994. Though this was a crisis of 
parties rather than the constitutional order itself, the subsequent period, dominated by the rise 
of Silvio Berlusconi’s new Right (Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà) and the gradual 
transformation of most of the centre-Left into the Partito Democratico is often known as the 
‘Second Republic’.  
10 In 1994–95 the MSI and right-wing factions of the now-obsolete Christian Democrats 
merged into the Alleanza Nazionale. In the 1994 general elections, held during the merger 
process, the party stood as MSI-AN, and it was in this guise that Alemanno entered  
Berlusconi’s coalition. Most of the AN would join the media magnate’s Popolo della Libertà 
in 2009.  
11 ‘“La Resistenza non si discute” ma Alemanno tace sul fascismo’, L’Unità, 6.5.2008. My 
emphasis.  
12 For a variety of anti-fascist responses to the affair see ‘Alemanno la memoria è un dovere’ 
and ‘Alemanno celebra le Fosse Ardeatine’, La Repubblica, 6.5.2008; ‘“La Resistenza non si 
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slogans,13 they insisted that partisans like Sabatini had not died for one side in a 
civil war, but for Italy herself. 
 
Arousing the passions so typical of wartime memory, this affair also revealed a 
collective blind spot. The historical revisionism so characteristic of Italy’s 
‘Berlusconi years’14 here once again forced the Left into a defence of Resistance 
values, insisting that the ideals of this ‘Second Risorgimento’15 must remain the 
very basis of the national community. However, no one was moved to ask what 
Sabatini really had ‘died for’, or precisely what ‘exploitation’ he intended to warn 
against. This was perhaps unsurprising in the context of a modern media 
hubbub. Even on the Left, Resistance values are most often understood through 
the pronouncements of intellectuals and statesmen; rather less discussed is the 
thinking of partisans like this forgotten tramworker. 
 
When we do study Sabatini’s history we find a quite different kind of Resistance 
politics. The clandestine press that he helped produce tells us not of amor patria or 
even a thirst for democracy, but the ambition to found a ‘Soviet republic on Italian 
soil’.16 This is all the more important when we consider that his Movimento Comunista 
d’Italia (MCd’I’) was no mere ‘splinter group’,17 but Rome’s very largest partisan 
force, rallying some three thousand militants in the Nazi-ruled capital.18 
 
 
discute” ma Alemanno tace sul fascismo.’, L’Unità, 6.5.2008; and Alessandro Portelli’s ‘Il 
fascismo del senso comune’, il manifesto, 28.5.2008  
13 Alemanno celebra le Fosse Ardeatine’, La Repubblica, 6.5.2008 
 
14 Berlusconi was prime minister 1994–5, 2001–6 and 2008–11, and even when not in 
government succeeded in polarising Italian politics around his own person. Beyond 
bringing former Fascists into the political mainstream, Berlusconi was notorious for his 
provocative jokes trivialising the Mussolini period.  
15 See Pavone 1959. This notion held that while Italy had remained fragmented after the 
Wars of Unification (the ‘first’ Risorgimento, waged by a Piedmont-based élite), the 
Resistance had truly succeeded in uniting the nation across class, regional and political 
divides. This idea of the need for a ‘second Risorgimento’, a key theme of wartime PCI 
propaganda, was in fact originally taken from philosopher Giovanni Gentile.  
16 ‘In linea’, Bandiera Rossa [henceforth, BR], 5.10.1943.  
17 Portelli 2003 quite mistakenly refers to the MCd’I as a ‘PCI splinter group’. This is 
telling of the general difficulty in reflecting on this movement’s history, in particular 
given that Portelli is one of the most insightful students of the construction of historical 
memory, and elsewhere in this same work speaks critically of the historiographical 
tendency to collapse the history of the Italian workers’ and revolutionary movements into 
a ‘disorganised pre-history of the PCI’.  
18 This estimate is based on the MCd’I’s own membership records, as distinct from the 
postwar list of recognised combatants that the Associazione Nazionale dei Partigiani Italiani 
(ANPI) finished compiling in August 1945. Neither set of numbers is wholly reliable, 
compromised as they are by Resistance participants’ multiple allegiances and the 
circumstances in which these registers were produced. Whereas the MCd’I’s band  
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As one police report warned just weeks before the Allies’ arrival, this movement 
had ‘the secret aim, together with the other extreme-Left parties, of seizing 
control of the city, overthrowing the monarchy and government and 
implementing a full communist programme while the other parties are 
preoccupied with chasing out the Germans’.19 
 
Sabatini and his comrades expounded this programme in no uncertain terms. 
Their clandestine newssheet Bandiera Rossa claimed the legacy of ‘a shining path 
of thinkers, apostles and martyrs’ that dated back to the very origins of the 
socialist ‘faith’.20 It prophesied the imminent advent of socialism in Italy, a 
‘revolutionary situation which the European proletariat has been awaiting for a 
century’.21 Sabatini’s comrades sharply attacked all who blocked ‘the proletariat’s 
march to redemption’; the ‘old defenders of private property who now change[d] 
their names, and for a while at least, their attitudes’22 in order to preserve Italian 
capitalism.23 The proletariat could have ‘no community of action or of ideology’ 
with the Italian ruling classes: to ‘hold off the class struggle until the future’ was 
to ‘drug the masses with the illusion of freedom’.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
commanders authored its internal lists, the official records issued by the ANPI were 
based on individuals’ requests for accreditation at its various Rome offices, either for 
themselves or for relatives. While the ANPI list thus attributes some 2,548 recognised 
combatants to Bandiera Rossa and Armata Rossa, many hundreds of other members are 
listed only according to their local area, the particular band in which they operated, or 
even parties they joined between Liberation and the compilation of the list. This points to 
the broader problem of overlapping identities and organisations, stemming from the 
fragmentary character of wartime politics: not all partisans maintained a constant activity 
in a single organisation across the whole Occupation and then remained in its ranks after 
Liberation. These caveats considered, this list does nonetheless hint at the scale of the 
MCd’I’s armed organisation; by comparison, ANPI lists 2,336 combatants as belonging to 
the PCI, its Garibaldini and Gruppi d’Azione Pattriotica; 897 for the republican-socialist 
Partito d’Azione; 1,451 for the Partito Socialista Italiano d’Unità Proletaria; 744 for the 
combined forces of the Movimento Cattolico-Comunista and liberal ex-premier Ivanoe 
Bonomi’s Democrazia del Lavoro; and 671 for the Democrazia Cristiana.  
19 Notizie sui partiti della concentrazione di sinistra’, 8.5.1944, copy in FGPCI/62/1362–  
1364. 
20 ‘Serena intuizione’, BR, 22.10.1943.  
21 Ibid. The messianic tone of the movement’s press was exemplified by its continual 
reference to communism as ‘the Ideal’ or ‘faith’.  
22 ‘Partiti e nomi vecchi e nuovi’, BR, 15.10.1943.  
23 Note also ‘Chiarificazione’, and ‘Perchè collaborare?’, BR, 5.10.1943. See Chapter Two for 
militants’ analyses from before July 1943, foreseeing the royalist coup against Mussolini. 
24 ‘Moniti’, BR, 15.10.1943. 
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This ‘intransigence’25 also set these militants in opposition to the new Communist 
Party leadership. They rejected the Party’s pursuit of a policy of ‘national unity’, 
first in the CLN coalition and then in the Allied-backed government. In practical 
terms the dissidents did work together with partisans of other political hues, in 
the interests of solidarity and defence against repression.26 Yet their movement 
was also governed by a politics that prioritised the antagonism among class 
interests over the clash between nations. In Sabatini’s terms, while Lenin ‘turned 
war into revolution’, Party leaders enrolling partisans in the CLN were ‘sending 
revolutionaries off to fight the war’.27 This class-war politics was concretised in 
the attempt to build an Italian ‘Red Army’, and the campaign of reprisals and 
expropriations that continued even after Liberation. 
 
Sabatini was executed on 3 May 1944, without ever seeing the ‘sun of the future’ rise 
over Italy. The months and years after his death saw not an Italian re-run of October 
1917, but the defeat of his comrades’ hopes. The Occupation period took a heavy toll 
on the movement, with its 186 fatalities including six of its fifteen-strong leadership. 
Torn apart by months of Nazi reprisals, bitter internal factionalism and a paralysing 
lack of structure, the Roman dissidents were gravely 
 
 
 
25 ‘In linea’, BR, 5.10.1943 described as its programmatic bases: ‘(Integral) Marxist socialism, 
intransigent tactics, and the revolutionary conquest of power – Soviet constitution of workers 
by hand and by brain’. A positive self-identification with ‘intransigence’ had a long history on 
the left wing of the Socialist Party and then in Amadeo Bordiga’s PCd’I. 
 
26 See Chapters Four, Six. From Martin Broszat onward many historians of Nazi Germany 
have distinguished between Resistenz – non-engagement with the régime aimed at self-
preservation, ranging from mass workplace absenteeism to the efforts of institutions like the 
Church to protect their autonomy – and the Widerstand that made more assertive efforts to 
attack Hitler’s authority. Though some Italian historians use the term guerra di liberazione [war 
of liberation] to emphasise the military character of the anti-fascist struggle and its parallels 
with other national-liberation movements, the term Resistenza remains far more widespread in 
common parlance, as a way of describing a vast range of anti-régime activities and forms of 
disobedience. While the present study lays great emphasis on different anti-fascist formations’ 
competing social agendas as well as the class struggles that continued even after the collapse 
of the Mussolini régime, it does assume that in a loose sense the MCd’I’s history belongs to 
that of a wider ‘Resistance’ movement, albeit a fragmentary and politically divided one. 
Arturo Peregalli has written both of the ‘Left Wing Opposition in Italy During the Period of 
the Italian Resistance’ (Revolutionary History, Vol. 5, No. 4) and of ‘The Other Resistance’ (in 
his 1991 book L’Altra Resistenza). The former description seems more appropriate to far-Left 
forces standing outside the partisan struggle (with groups like Prometeo in Milan seeing this 
latter as inevitably subordinate to 
 
Western and Soviet imperialism), whereas ‘the Other Resistance’ refers to communist 
movements who did join the armed Resistance but attempted to give it an alternative 
political direction.  
27 Quoted in Chilanti 1969, p. 49. 
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weakened even before the Allies’ arrival. This organisational crisis was 
aggravated after Liberation, as the incoming authorities moved to break up its 
militias and press. As Ivanoe Bonomi’s new ‘government of national unity’ 
moved to disarm the dissident partisans, their movement soon collapsed. 
Dissolving in 1947, it left behind no lasting organisation. 
 
Dominated by the main postwar parties, Resistance remembrance had no place for 
the Roman dissident movement. The Fosse Ardeatine mausoleum venerates its fallen 
fighters, commemorated by plaques and street-signs around the capital. But the 
MCd’I itself is consistently ignored. The Museo Storico della Liberazione honours the 
CLN parties and even the monarchist Resistance while ignoring the forces to the 
coalition’s Left. This is a blindspot common to all other memorials in the capital, 
whose official historians are similarly quiet on Rome’s largest partisan force.28 This 
owes not to any lack of sources, but rather to an ideological focus on the effort to 
unite Italians across class and political divides. Directed at asserting the Republic’s 
roots in the CLN pact, the ‘constitutional arch’ narrative silences the history of 
movements who stood outside of this coalition. 
 
This mythology left its mark on Resistance historiography as well as the 
remembrance industry proper. The romantic idea of a ‘people united in arms’ 
provided something of a collective alibi after the Fascist period, in particular 
expressing the PCI’s identification with a national history. Faced with right-wing 
attacks on the partisan war’s darker episodes, this narrative sought to defend the 
Resistance’s patriotic character. This was difficult to reconcile with the history of 
those formations who openly advertised their particularist agenda, expressing 
not only their own maximalism but also the limits to CLN universalism. The 
defeat of Sabatini and his comrades stands in defiance of republican mythology. 
It points not to the unity of patriots across political divides, but a battle among 
different Resistance forces to impose their stamp on the new Italy. 
 
 
 
 
 
28 This typically takes the form of referring to Bandiera Rossa’s partisans’ contribution to a 
general Resistance movement, but without discussing their political ideas. In 1996 
Roberto Gremmo issued a self-published volume on Bandiera Rossa; having agreed to host 
a presentation of the book the Museo Storico della Liberazione pulled their permission on 
the same day as the planned talk. The reasons given for the cancellation were 
straightforwardly political, with the museum’s curators accusing him of failing to 
represent the ‘unitary’ character of the Resistance. 
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A pacification process at the end of the war sought to leave behind past 
antagonisms, closing the Fascist ‘parenthesis’ in Italian history.29 Bracketing off 
the ventennio meant forgetting the records of thousands of judges, army officers 
and party hierarchs now serving the Republic, and indeed many of the 
intellectuals flooding into the PCI. It meant forgetting that the prime minister 
who led Italy’s first ‘government of national unity’ had in the early 1920s so 
appeased the rising Blackshirts that Antonio Gramsci could term him ‘the true 
organiser of Italian Fascism’.30 It meant forgetting that the head of the Pubblica 
Sicurezza attending the first commemoration of the Fosse Ardeatine massacre had 
spent two decades hunting down ‘subversives’. And it meant forgetting that a 
‘martyr’ like Tigrino Sabatini had not ‘fallen for his country’, but died fighting in 
a movement that stridently opposed the idea of a common national interest. 
 
It was in these circumstances that the monument erected in 1949 displayed 
Sabatini’s final appeal to historical memory. The tricolore-hued memorial ignored 
this worker’s own politics as it recruited him to a litany of national heroes. With 
the history of conflict thus replaced with bland patriotic mythology, figures of 
radically opposite intent could try and claim his memory as their own. Visiting 
the Fosse Ardeatine six decades later, Gianni Alemanno offered but the most 
egregious example of this, as he declared ‘Resistance values’ ‘the property of all 
Italians’. Asserting his mainstream credentials with a hollow tribute to the 
Resistance, Rome’s new mayor had brought the trivialisation of this history full-
circle. Recognition of Sabatini’s ‘values’ did not long survive his comrades’ 
defeat. With the collapse of the ‘First Republic’, the same fate now befell the 
parties of the constitutional arch. 
 
1.2. The PCI’s partisan legends 
 
Doubtless the leading proponent of the constitutional-arch narrative in postwar 
years was the PCI, which closely identified with its formative Resistance 
 
 
 
29 Benedetto Croce’s notion of the ventennio as an aberration from the normal path of 
liberal progress is rather ironic given his own changeable attitudes, actively supporting  
Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922 before turning to the opposition and co-authoring an anti-
fascist intellectuals’ manifesto in 1925. Even after the fall of Fascism, he quixotically supported 
the monarchy in the 1946 institutional referendum. His status as a leader of anti-fascism was 
little-recognised by the MCd’I, whose postwar newspaper L’Idea comunista sharply ridiculed 
his ‘intellectual masturbation’ (‘Basta con questa “Croce”!’, 30.9.1945). 
 
30 ‘Bonomi’, l’Ordine Nuovo, 5.7.1921. 
  
23 
 
 
experience. Bearing an imposing popular-culture and intellectual influence,31 its 
evolving self-depiction heavily shaped mainstream portrayals of the Resistance 
even after its 1991 demise. The PCI’s concern to defend the Resistance legacy was 
evident from the start of the Cold War, as a party countering anti-communist 
attacks on its patriotism emphasised its role in building a national cause that 
united all classes. Defending the centrality of ‘Resistance values’ to Italy’s 
republican institutions, the Party painted the anti-fascist struggle in duly 
politically-correct terms, repudiating its more sectarian and maximalist aspects in 
favour of democratic and ‘national-spirited’ sentiments. Rebutting accusations 
that it was a tool of Russian foreign policy, from the mid-1950s the PCI also 
moved to airbrush its past of a now-embarrassing Stalinism.32 
 
The Party’s patriotic-hued presentation of the Resistance was delimited by the 
boundaries of its so-called Gramscian strategy. In this perspective, the working 
class (as ‘represented’ by the PCI) would accrue a hegemonic role in national life 
by leading broad progressive movements, identifying its cause with the Italian 
people rather than sharply asserting its ‘particularist’ class interests. If this 
approach nominally derived from Gramsci, it was more the PCI’s Resistance 
strategy that shaped its framing of the late Sardinian’s writings. This was evident 
in Togliatti’s 1949 edition of the Prison Notebooks, portraying Gramsci as a ‘great 
Italian’ while downplaying elements of his outlook that stressed grassroots 
democracy and working-class autonomy from bourgeois politics. This 
‘nationalised’ Gramscianism coloured Resistance histories by Party leaders like 
Luigi Longo, Pietro Secchia and Giorgio Amendola, as well as more ‘scientific’ 
studies by Party-loyalist scholars such as Roberto Battaglia33 and Paolo Spriano.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Ajello 1997a and 1997b offer a general study of the PCI’s influence among intellectuals.  
Gundle 2000 is a fine study of relationship with popular culture and the challenge to this 
from across the Atlantic.  
32 Ajello 1997a, Zaslavsky 2004.  
33 As Cooke (2011, p. 54) aptly notes, citing another former Actionist comrade of 
Battaglia’s, this book both reflected his past loyalty and the new one he was taking on. 
Stigmatising the dissident Left in the manner Battaglia does was a way of asserting his 
PCI allegiance, even as he was critical of aspects of his new Party’s record.  
34 These two authors, who respectively produced the standard works on PCI history and 
the Resistance of their time, were themselves both veterans of the CLN-attached Giustizia 
e Libertà partisan units. 
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As unbroken Christian-Democratic rule suggested that the ‘Italian road to 
socialism’ had reached a dead end, by the 1960s the PCI came under fire from a 
burgeoning New Left.35 The impasse fed the rise of extra-parliamentary and even 
armed-struggle movements, frontally clashing with the Italian state.36 Party 
historians responded by contrasting the PCI’s wartime successes with the record 
of Greece’s KKE, whose insurrectionary bid for power had led it into an 
unwinnable civil war.37 Far from giving ground to these leftist critics, 1970s PCI 
leader Enrico Berlinguer emphasised the CLN-era roots of his ‘historic 
compromise’, seeking the alliance with the Christian-Democrats that could return 
his party to government. Remaining a communist and not social-democratic 
party even after Berlinguer’s death, it was the collapse of the Eastern Bloc that 
finally prompted the PCI’s liquidation into the ‘Democratic Party of the Left’. 
With its heirs now won to the political wisdom of Messrs Blair and Clinton, the 
Gramscian-Togliattian tradition was itself quietly buried.38 
 
The fall of the West’s largest Communist Party also dissolved the internal 
solidarity of its great Christian-Democratic rival, and the ensuing breakdown of 
the postwar order drove a surge of revisionist narratives.39 Lucio Magri lamented 
 
 
 
 
 
35 As Cesare Bermani notes, the so-called ‘movements of ‘68’ had their forebears in the 
revolt against prime minister Fernando Tambroni’s 1960 attempt to lift the cordon sanitaire 
against the fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano, with his unstable Christian-Democratic 
government relying on its support in parliament. Tambroni ultimately backtracked in the 
face of rioting and armed demonstrations: see Bermani 1997, and also Panvini 2014 on the 
effect on far-Right culture.  
36 For classic studies of this period see Lumley 1990 and Wright 2017. Wright 1998 offers a 
unique account of new Left historiography of the Resistance.  
37 Chapter XVI of Spriano 1975 is entirely devoted to this question. It amply demonstrates 
the British role in suppressing the Greek communists and the differences between KKE 
and PCI strategy. More difficult to find is any evidence that events in Greece themselves 
determined PCI leaders’ decisions, more than offering a post facto justification of the 
Salerno Turn once the scale of the KKE’s defeat was clear. Spriano refers obliquely to 
Togliatti’s reference to the ‘Greek case’ at a 7 April 1945 PCI national council meeting, 
which is also cited by Agosti 2008, p. 162. The PCI leader here referred to the dangers of a   
‘Greek outcome’, warning of the dangers of ‘a violent clash, an armed conflict between the 
armed forces of the anti-fascist front and the forces of the old police and the army led by anti-
democratic elements’. See also the references to the Italian Resistance and the ‘Greek scenario’ 
in Sereni 1971, his piece in Critica marxista III/2, and the response in issue III/4 by Lelio Basso. 
On the KKE and the Greek Resistance see Eudes 2010 and Fontaine 2012. 
38 Liguori 2009 is a particularly useful account of its collapse. 
39 If many of these ‘revisionist’ studies were of a hard-Right or at least anti-communist bent  
– such as the works of Giampaolo Pansa, largely devoted to identifying spectacular 
‘crimes’ committed by partisans – such analyses lie beyond the scope of our study. 
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that the fall of a PCI now deemed a mere ‘fifth column for Moscow’40 and the 
scorn heaped on ‘First Republic’ more generally had fed an unreflective counter-
tendency ‘to portray the Resistance as a spontaneous, undifferentiated popular 
epic’, free of such connotations.41 Yet even this postmodern turn only repackaged 
a mythology that had long airbrushed the Resistance of its more divisive aspects. 
The clear standout work in this period was Claudio Pavone’s A Civil War,42 
notable as a left-wing historian’s43 study of ‘morality in the Resistance’ that 
deeply reflected on partisans’ motives as well as those of their Fascist opponents. 
Its enthusiastic reception reflected this scholar’s own particular merits, but also a 
climate in which the old parties could no longer impose their narrative. 
 
For the upholders of the PCI’s Gramscian-Togliattian tradition, this had long meant 
skating over the class-war militancy and cult of Stalin rampant throughout wartime 
communist ranks. Seeking to identify the Resistance with a patriotic interest and not 
any ‘class-particularist’ agenda,44 most historians attached to the PCI crudely wrote 
out of existence the communists who did not join the CLN alliance. Roberto 
Battaglia’s totemic 1953 Storia della Resistenza italiana devoted just one line to the 
‘anarchoid and Trotskyist [sic!] Bandiera Rossa’;45 while Giorgio Amendola’s 
introduction to 1965’s Il sole è sorto a Roma recognised that ‘it is impossible to write 
the history of the Roman Resistance without an objective study of Bandiera Rossa’s 
activity’,46 this ANPI-sponsored47 volume like Piscitelli’s 1967 Storia della Resistenza 
romana and De Simone’s 1994 Roma città prigioniera made no reference to its politics.48 
These studies simply took for granted the PCI’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Magri 2012, p. 45.  
41 Ibid.  
42 In his work Pavone outlines three parallel class, civil and national wars in 1943–45, but 
the publisher chose the name A Civil War over the author’s own preferred title Essay on 
Morality in the Resistance in order to draw attention to his book’s controversial content.  
Historically only far-Right accounts seeking to relativise the two sides of the conflict had 
described the Resistance as a ‘civil war’, though Pavone’s study did go some way toward 
weakening this association.  
43 As a young man Pavone had in fact been active in the liberal-socialist Resistance in Milan. 
44 See Chapter Four.  
45 Battaglia 1964, p. 202.  
46 ANPI 1965, p. xiv.  
47 Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d’Italia, the country’s main Resistance veterans’ 
organisation.  
48 ANPI 1965, Piscitelli 1967, De Simone 1994. 
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conception of class struggle in terms of industrial workers’ mobilisation in the 
national, anti-Nazi cause. 
 
A study of the Roman dissidents’ history is particularly useful for correcting this 
perspective. These militants strongly rejected the CLN’s politics of ‘national unity’, 
even before Togliatti’s ‘Salerno Turn’ led his party into Badoglio’s cabinet.49 Like 
dissident currents around Italy, the MCd’I denied that class-collaboration could be a 
first step on the road to socialism: for this Roman-centred movement as for Turin’s 
Stella Rossa50 or Naples’s ‘Red’ CGL union,51 Togliatti’s talk of national unity meant 
not his party imposing a proletarian stamp on this coalition,52 but rather the taming 
of class struggle to suit the Party’s bourgeois and institutional allies. While historians 
have long debated the real motives for Togliatti’s pact with Badoglio, it is striking 
how little this shift surprised dissident-Marxists at the time. Many of these militants 
had detected the logic of such a turn ever since summer 1943.53 For those who saw 
this cross-class coalition as opposed to the basic principles of ‘class politics’, the PCI’s 
direction of travel was clear. 
 
By war’s end cadres had largely succeeded in marginalising such dissent, but by the 
1960s the Party again faced sharp criticism of its Resistance strategy.54 The view that 
the PCI had missed a historic opportunity gained traction on the ’68-era extra-
parliamentary Left, which accused Togliatti of sacrificing the ‘Red Resistance’ on 
 
 
 
49 See Chapter Seven.  
50 For a specific study on this movement see Lambert 1979, and the relevant section in 
Peregalli 1991. It is also usefully discussed in Luraghi 1958. Turin PCI organiser Arturo   
Colombi’s papers at Turin’s Istoreto (IPR/AC), as well as the records of the Il Lavoratore 
group in the Alto Milanese (ISEC/V) are useful sources for any study of this movement; 
Lambert appears not to have consulted these latter.  
51 See Chapter Seven. On this movement see Giliani 2014, and the relevant section in 
Peregalli 1991.  
52 The MCd’I press never used the concept of ‘hegemony’ but this was a key element of the 
PCI leadership’s thinking, having been a central theme of Antonio Gramsci’s Quaderni del 
Carcere (written 1929–35 but first published in 1949, as abridged by Togliatti). In 1965 the 
libertarian socialist Lelio Basso produced a highly insightful critique of the PCI Resistance 
strategy, explaining that ‘notwithstanding the working-class movement’s preponderance in 
the Resistance in terms of its leading organisational role, it was our opponents who managed 
to hegemonise it politically’ (Basso 1965, p. 19). On Basso’s Milan Resistance group, the Fronte 
Proletario Rivoluzionario, and its links to the MCd’I, see Chapter Three. 
 
53 Note e.g. the articles ‘In linea’ and ‘Perchè collaborare’ in the 5 October 1943 first issue 
of Bandiera Rossa: these pieces not only asserted that the CLN ‘national unity’ policy 
effectively tied the workers’ parties to Badoglio, but backdated this collaboration to the 
whole period since the 25 July coup d’état. 
54 On the ‘continuity of state’, see Bermani 1997. 
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the altar of national unity.55 In 1960, militants protesting a government 
dependent on far-Right parliamentary backing raised the rallying-cry ‘the 
Resistance continues’; the following decade saw armed groups explicitly imitate 
the PCI partisan units of the previous generation, amidst the tragic political 
violence of Italy’s ‘Years of Lead’.56 Certainly, the idea of recuperating a 
Resistance militancy channelled into institutional compromise satisfied the ’68 
Left’s search for the ‘original sin’ of PCI conservatism. Yet as a historical 
narrative, it tended to overlook the record of those wartime communists who had 
tried, in vain, to advance a strategy different to Togliatti’s.57 
 
Seeking to expose ‘Stalinist betrayals’ of decades past, these critiques tended to 
focus on the decisions of PCI leaders rather than partisans themselves. Evading 
the question of why the ‘betrayed’ did not organise around alternative strategies, 
such accounts rarely confronted the limits of the dissident movements that did 
emerge. A partial exception was journalist Silverio Corvisieri’s 1967 essay 
Bandiera Rossa nella Resistenza romana. Making often powerful criticisms of the 
PCI’s cavalier approach to historical truth, the autonomist’s search for a counter-
narrative however led him to skate over the dissidents’ own Stalinist mores, and 
the reasons for their political defeat. This also reflected a broader problem facing 
any student of wartime Italian communism. While Party cadres produced 
hundreds of volumes of Resistance memoir and history, dissident movements 
left far more fragmentary sources, offering no similarly organised picture. For the 
’68 Left it was more politically productive to critique PCI leaders’ own narrative 
than to piece together the history of short-lived dissident milieux. 
 
Even insofar as dissidents’ archives offer a different kind of political history, we 
should also question exactly what – and whom – their texts represent. Two decades 
 
 
 
 
55 See e.g. Quazza 1966; Del Carria 1970.  
56 The original ‘GAP’ set up by the PCI during the armed struggle were in fact called the 
Gruppi d’Azione Pattriotica, in conformity with the Party’s ‘national-unity’ strategy, 
whereas Feltrinelli’s Guevarist militants replaced the word ‘patriotic’ with ‘partisan’.  
57 Also telling was the centrality to this debate of heretical PCI grandee Pietro Secchia. If 
many on the ’68 Left were excited to hear Secchia speculate at a quarter-century’s 
distance that that the Party might have achieved more in the Resistance, they seem to 
have taken less interest in the dissident-Marxist currents that a younger Secchia had 
grimly smeared as ‘the Gestapo’s mask in communist ranks’, in a November 1943 
catechism for the Party’s Milan journal – see his grotesque ‘Il sinistrismo: la maschera 
della Gestapo’, La Nostra Lotta, November 1943. 
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of Fascism strongly militated against working-class Italians being able to 
understand the world and disseminate their ideas. Even as Fascism’s collapse 
allowed a flowering of revolutionary movements, clandestine conditions 
aggravated Leninist currents’ tendency to concentrate authority in the hands of 
small groups of cadres. Such factors make it difficult to gain a representative 
picture of grassroots communists’ views. Police sources often provide useful 
perspective on their activity, but also bear a strong tendency to identify 
‘ringleaders’ and chains of command with popular mobilisation. It is clear that 
these Roman militants sympathised with ration-starved women storming 
bakeries and the displaced families squatting abandoned buildings. It is rather 
more difficult to establish how far these latter, or even the movement’s own 
recruits, understood their activity in terms of its explicit political project. 
 
The militants at the centre of our study were an unusually radicalised minority, 
expanding their political horizons even as they rallied others under their banner. 
Alessandro Portelli quite rightly doubts that the average partisan, perhaps semi-
literate and in his58 early twenties, really opted for one unit over another after 
comparing their different manifestos.59 A similar critique of politicised readings 
of partisan identity also appears in the work of Santo Peli,60 who likewise draws 
focus toward the everyday concerns and impulsive aspirations that shaped 
Italians’ Resistance activity. However, any sweeping claim of ‘mass political 
illiteracy’61 represents a certain blindness to the militants who did look beyond 
their particular situations, and the determination of some of the humblest Italians 
to educate themselves politically. If disbanded soldiers formed a clandestine 
‘communist school’ at Grotta Rossa in autumn 1943, and young draft-resisters 
maintained armed communist cells even after Liberation, clearly theirs became a 
‘partisan’ engagement even in the most politicised sense. 
 
Drawing at length on handwritten polemics, clandestine bulletins and newspapers 
by forgotten authors, our study focuses precisely on the autodidact Marxism that 
developed in this milieu. In this sense it departs from that trend of Italian social 
history which prefers to detach popular behaviours from more expressly political 
 
 
58 Around ninety percent of recognised partisans were men. 
59 E.g. Portelli 2003, pp. 82–3, 122.  
60 Peli 2006. 
61 Ibid., p. 5. 
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organisation. In looking beyond the history of party-political identification, studies of 
Resistance memory and class identities have made important contributions to our 
understanding of Italian social history.62 Yet this also runs the risk of confirming the 
subaltern in their position as anonymous masses, made historically important by 
force of numbers rather than dignified by their ideas.63 Ironically, this can even mean 
belittling working-class people’s more conventionally political horizons, excluding 
them from an intellectual world reserved to professional politicians and party cadres. 
Only integrating social history with the tools of political history can we properly 
investigate the intellectual life of such circles. 
 
Studying this autodidact Marxism is also key to understanding the strands of 
communism that were cut off by Togliatti’s partito nuovo. In these militants’ writings 
we uncover ideas widely apparent in contemporary sources yet absent from the 
Italian Marxist canon. How many scholars know that one of Rome’s leading partisan 
commanders, a carpenter who left school aged 13,64 termed the CLN the ‘National 
Front for the Salvation of Institutions’?65 That one electrician wrote polemics against 
industrial reconstruction, arguing that Italy should become the ‘garden of a Soviet 
Europe’?66 That a little-known graphic designer maintained that Wehrmacht soldiers 
were potential ‘class brothers’ even after SS officers massacred dozens of his 
comrades – or that some German conscripts even joined partisan ranks?67 The Italian 
Marxist canon venerates Antonio Gramsci’s democratic-spirited sentiment that ‘all 
men are philosophers’68 – strange, then, that 
 
 
 
62 Notably Bermani 1997; Passerini 2009 and 1996.  
63 Particularly interesting is the reflection on the theme of ‘representativeness’ in Jacques 
Rancière’s preface to his Proletarian Nights (Rancière 2012). Far from suggesting that the 
worker-writing at the centre of his study is ‘representative’ of the general working class, 
he instead defends his differentness from any tendency to idealise the masses and their 
subaltern culture before contact with politics. For such a view is to police the boundaries 
of who has the right to practice philosophy; in its own way, it maintains the view that  
‘people like that are the more to be admired the more they adhere strictly to their collective 
identity, ... becom[ing] suspect, indeed, the moment they want to live as anything other than 
legions and legionaries, when they demand that individual wanderlust which is the 
monopoly of “petty-bourgeois” egoism or the illusion of the “ideologist”’’.  
64 Mucci describes his youth in an oral history project carried out by Alessandro Portelli: 
CGB/FAP/Mucci. 
65 ‘Carte in Tavola’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 27.7.1944.  
66 Poce 1947.  
67 See Chapter Four.  
68 Gramsci insightfully establishes a distinction between the function of philosophy, 
inherent to human experience, and those whose social role it is to be philosophers. He 
highlights that the room for ‘specialism’ in this field is particularly limited: ‘The principle 
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so few historians contemplate the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Roman proletariat 
who did not happen to share PCI leaders’ ‘Gramscian’ politics. 
 
1.3. From underground to dissent 
 
This study frames the Roman dissidents’ history as part of a wider battle to shape 
Italian communism. This conflict involved far-reaching disputes over questions 
as diverse as military tactics, party organisation, and even forecasts on Stalin’s 
intentions for postwar Europe. A constant theme of this study is the way in 
which these polemical concerns shaped, and were shaped by, the Resistance 
mobilisation itself. Without doubt, these autodidacts’ analyses will frequently 
strike today’s reader as arcane or founded on glaring misconceptions; often their 
reasoning imitated the quirks of the few books or pamphlets that they had to 
hand, hidden in mattresses and chicken coops across Mussolini’s rule. Yet the 
fact that their analyses are so fragmentary and rough-edged itself has much to 
tell us about wartime Italian communism. Far from reciting a catechism handed 
down from Stalin, or even renowned oppositionists like Leon Trotsky or Amadeo 
Bordiga, their politics expressed a communist culture that had for two decades 
developed largely isolated from the international Left. 
 
In this sense, their idiosyncrasies reflect a peculiarity of Italian communist history. 
While the Comintern ‘Bolshevised’ all its national sections over the 1920s, 
transforming them into near-monoliths subordinate to Moscow’s line, in Italy this 
process was stunted by Fascist repression.69 At the moment of its 1926 demise the 
Party remained a composite force, with a mounting faction-fight between Amadeo 
Bordiga and Antonio Gramsci cut short before any final split could take place. 
Bolshevisation continued apace in the Paris-based centro estero, as cadres forced into 
French exile expelled Bordiga and his allies for their alleged ‘Trotskyism’.70 
 
 
 
must first be established that all men are “philosophers” that is, that between the 
professional or “technical” philosophers and the rest of mankind, the difference is not 
one of “quality” but only of “quantity”’. Gramsci 1971, p. 347  
69 Secchia 1970 attempts to portray an ongoing Party activity into the 1930s. Yet it was 
impossible to create a ‘Bolshevised’ organisation without there being a continuous 
clandestine leadership in Italy. Only in 1941 was such a centro interno formed. 
 
70 A term of abuse in the interwar Comintern, applied to dissidents of all kinds regardless of 
their particular criticism of the Party line, or their association (or lack thereof) with Leon 
 
Trotsky. A means of enforcing party discipline, the ‘Trotskyist’ charge implied that the 
dissident’s ‘real’ reason for opposing the Party line was support for fascist conspiracies to 
undermine the USSR (as were absurdly imputed to Trotsky), all the more dangerous 
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This but was the deed of a phantom apparatus, unable to organise on home soil 
or even to distribute a clandestine press. Despite its efforts to purge its prison 
and exile organisations of dissidents, it never managed to forge a Bolshevised 
Communist Party on the peninsula. With those militants who remained ‘at 
liberty’ in Italy cut off from the Comintern throughout the 1930s, PCI cadres 
instead had to impose their new line during the Resistance itself. 
 
Impeding this ‘Bolshevisation’ process was an underground foreign to the centro 
estero and its popular-front policy. ‘National’ communism came to Italy from the 
outside, stemming not from the underground but from Stalin’s concern to isolate 
Nazi Germany. The 1935 Comintern Congress compelled all Communist Parties 
to subordinate their policy to building cross-class, national alliances against 
Hitler. Exiles like Togliatti and Luigi Longo helped build such coalitions in 
France and Spain, but had almost no opportunity to do so in Fascist Italy itself.71 
In advocating a national front72 with liberals and conservatives upon their return 
in 1943–44, they thus met with the resistance of militants inexperienced in such 
alliances and bemused by the Party’s newfound moderation. While for French 
communists the wartime alliance policy marked the resumption of the 1935–39 
People’s Front, Italian-based militants never previously drilled in Comintern 
discipline proved far less prepared to bend to this ‘class-collaborationist’ line – or 
the cadres advocating it – than were their PCF confrères.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
because of their leftist ‘disguise’. In reality, the genuinely ‘Trotskyist’ (Left 
Opposition/Fourth International) tradition was weaker in Italy even than other Western 
European countries, given not only the strong presence of other autochthonous dissident 
currents, but also the fact that the PCd’I was crushed by Fascism before the Stalin-Trotsky 
clash had reached its culmination. For works on Italian Trotskyism and the Stalinist 
hounding of dissidents see Francescangeli 2005, and Revolutionary History Vol. 5, No. 4.  
71 However, the Togliattians certainly did try to exploit splits in the ruling class, through 
work in Fascist student organisations: see section 2.2.  
72 Barth Urban 1986 sharply counterposes the ‘national’ and ‘popular’ front, emphasising 
the progressive social goals of this latter. It would be more accurate to point to the 
different sensibilities that could be contained within a popular-frontist vision, reflecting 
its emergence in the context of rising Nazi power. It was at once a means of uniting 
subaltern layers not reducible to the working class, and a means of denying the 
patriotism of Nazi-collaborationist elements of domestic ruling classes. It asserted the 
radical elements of national traditions while also serving as the basis for alliance with 
even conservative interests opposed to Nazi Germany’s rising power.  
73 A point made by Barth Urban 1986. 
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For this reason, our study is deeply rooted in what Luigi Cortesi has called a 
‘proletarian-communist’74 underground – an antagonistic subculture perpetuated by 
veteran worker-militants and a more amorphous ‘subversive’ milieu. Unable to 
create formal organisations until deep into Fascism's war-crisis, this subculture 
survived in isolation from Party structures across the 1920s-1930s, sustaining 
militants’ faith in the ‘sun of the future’ even when open revolt was impossible. As 
Giorgio Amendola later recalled, this enduring underground impeded returning 
centro estero cadres’ efforts to refound Italian communism on a more gradualist, 
‘national’ basis, with ‘almost all the groups with which the [Party] Centre entered 
into contact [in 1941–42] proving sectarian and extremist in orientation, and thus 
motivated neither to understand nor accept its political initiatives’.75 Even 
unorganised expressions of dissent posed problems to cadres’ authority, from the 
reticence of ‘old comrades [who had] stuck firm to sectarian positions across long 
years of repression’76 to the sudden influx of ‘over-enthusiastic’ youth ‘knocking on 
the door of the Party’ in hope of ‘doing like they did in Russia’.77 
 
While Party leaders were Stalinist in training, most of the organised opposition they 
faced was itself imbued with an enthusiasm for the USSR. 78 The cult of Stalin could 
even feed such dissent. PCI cadres attempted to tar their rivals by association with 
Leon Trotsky, the ultimate anti-hero of the Comintern imaginary. Yet the largest 
dissident movement proclaimed its own ‘distinctly philo-Soviet character’, claiming 
to uphold ‘Marx and Engels’s theory, as realised by Lenin and Stalin’,79 and even 
named its youth wing COBA in homage to Stalin’s teenage nickname.80 Lacking 
direct ties to Moscow, it was precisely its militants’ ignorance of the 
 
 
 
 
74 Cortesi uses both the terms ‘spontaneous’ and ‘proletarian’ communism 
interchangeably. This use of the word ‘spontaneous’ is problematic in defining 
‘spontaneity’ only negatively, i.e. in terms of the absence of Party cadres, thus implicitly 
relegating other worker-militants’ political ideas to a more instinctive or automatic level 
of consciousness. Considering that most of the originators of clandestine groups in the 
war years had past experience of party and trade-union militancy, and given their 
evident focus on reading and discussing Marxian texts, this seems like too sweeping a 
dismissal of their political intelligence.  
75 Amendola 1973, p. 136. 
76 ‘Lettera di Luca alla direzione’, 25.1.1944, IPR/AC/3.  
77 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November   
1943: APC/7/2/14, p. 4. 
78 See Chapter Two. 
79 ‘In linea’, BR, 5.10.1943.  
80 See Chilanti 1996. 
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Kremlin’s role in determining PCI strategy that allowed them to champion Stalin 
as bearer of the revolutionary traditions of 1917 while condemning Togliatti as a 
mere ‘opportunist’. Little-aware of Moscow’s real political initiatives, its militants 
instead used the distant ‘workers’ fatherland’ as a cipher for their own 
projections. Combined with an unfavourable view of Togliattian gradualism, 
such idolisation of the USSR made ‘doing like in Russia’ the watchword of an 
idiosyncratic dissident Stalinism. 
 
Fed by Red Army successes on the Eastern Front, the cult of Stalin peaked at the 
very moment that Italian communism was itself most fluid and undisciplined. 
Everywhere in Europe, long-defeated communists felt that history was turning in 
their direction; such euphoria was particularly strong in an Italy where 
‘communist consciousness was being reborn’81 after twenty years of Fascism. 
Wartime communist ranks were heavily coloured by triumphalism, 
millenarianism, and often a sectarianism borne of the belief that the ‘long-
awaited moment’82 of socialist transformation was now at hand. Such illusions 
even affected the PCI’s own members: organisers in Rome and Turin each 
complained to superiors that they were struggling to convince local branches that 
‘national unity’ was no mere ‘ruse’ before the Party ‘jettisoned its bourgeois 
partners and seized power’.83 Where PCI leaders proclaimed the Party’s 
‘democratic’ and ‘patriotic’ credentials, the ‘spirit of separation’ that drove its 
foundation in 1921 lived on in militants’ continued belief in Italy’s Soviet future. 
 
Animated by similar enthusiasms, the MCd’I fancied itself the bearer of a destiny 
foretold not only by Soviet advances but also the Leninist creed of ‘turning 
imperialist war into civil war’. It proclaimed that the conflict would ‘inevitably’ 
produce opportunities like the one that had been ‘missed’84 in the biennio rosso at 
the end of World War I.85 If this taxonomy of war and revolution was based on 
analogies with Bolshevik experience more than more contemporary realities, it 
was not limited to these militants alone. On the day that the Wehrmacht invaded 
 
 
 
81 Ibid. 
82 Behan 1987.  
83 A phrase used in ‘Lettera di Luca alla direzione’, 25.1.1944, IPR/AC/3. On this 
sentiment in Rome, see ‘Rapporto sulla 2° zona’, December 1943, FGAN/87/262–70. On 
this idea of doppiezza, see section 7.6 as well as Di Loreto 1991.  
84 ‘Orizzonte rivoluzionario’, BR, 22.10.1943.  
85 The ‘two red years’ of strikes and factory and land occupations, 1919 to 1920. 
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Poland, the Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas told his alarmed comrade that 
past imperialist conflicts were to thank for the 1871 Paris Commune, the soviets of 
1905 and the October Revolution.86 Even the Nazi-Soviet Pact, so offensive to 
anti-fascist fellow travellers, met with other, more positive reactions on Italy’s 
communist underground: bulletins spoke excitedly of the ‘Western imperialisms’ 
destroying each other in an attritional stalemate before the Soviet ‘bulldozer’87 
moved in to ‘Bolshevise’ Europe. 
 
In the West such predictions proved unrealistic. Even an Italy beset by deep 
military and social crises only superficially resembled the Russia of a quarter-
century previously. The Western Allies were in fact taking decisive measures to 
stabilise European capitalism, and the fall of Fascism heralded not the ‘final crisis 
of capitalism’ but its democratic renovation. This meant elements of institutional 
continuity, genuine reforms, and an international context blocking more 
fundamental social change. Yet while the Roman dissidents were merely 
dogmatic in their Leninist definition of Fascism as the ‘last stage of bourgeois 
dictatorship, they also showed greater insight when they looked beyond this 
passive-teleological view of history. More than any other Resistance force, they 
sharply delineated the political competition among the anti-fascists seeking to 
impose their stamp on a new Italy. Militarily speaking, partisans played a small 
auxiliary role in the Allied liberation of Italy. Yet the clashes of this period 
decisively shaped the country’s new democratic politics. 
 
In this sense, Togliatti’s partito nuovo was the great winner of the Resistance. It played 
a leading role in the armed struggle, building a mass, legal Communist Party in a 
Western country. An organisation of a few tens of thousands during Fascism’ s rise 
and for two decades surviving only as a fraternity of prisoners and exiles, by the end 
of the 1940s the PCI was the second party of Italian democracy, with some two 
million members. Not only the size of this partito nuovo differentiated it from the 
Communist Party founded at Livorno in 1921. The Togliattians had replaced 
Amadeo Bordiga’s intransigent PCd’I of old with a truly ‘mass party’, shaped by a 
new generation of members and leaders; a ‘Popular- 
 
 
 
86 Dedijer 1961, p. 269. 
87 See the four bulletins conserved in ACS/PS/1942/65,  principally  Bollettino  no. 5,  
4. 11.1939, p. 2, ‘Francia’. 
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Front’ beast built on the Comintern model, proudly vaunting its democratic and 
patriotic values even as it built its own organisation on the most hierarchical 
lines. With even its reforming ‘Gramscian’ hues heavily filtered through its 
leaders’ long apprenticeship in Stalin’s Comintern, this was a party unlike 
anything previously existing on Italian soil. 
 
Togliatti’s partito nuovo would become near-synonymous with Italian Marxism in 
the postwar period, and the PCI a structuring element of Italy’s new republican 
order. Yet by no means were the Party cadres of the Resistance years simply 
colonising virgin territory. All over Europe during the Second World War, 
Communist Parties arose from clandestinity to fight Nazism, but nowhere as in 
Italy had an underground survived so long cut-off from Party organisation, and 
nowhere else did dissident movements so doggedly challenge the authority of 
‘official’ Party leaders.88 The creation of a partito nuovo meant not only the 
channelling of a scattered underground into more organised structures, but the 
suppression of historic traditions of sovversivismo, anti-statism and class 
autonomy that once again raised their head in 1943–45. Ignoring this wartime 
battle over the fate of Italian communism, mountains of works of Resistance 
history have overlooked a vital turning-point in the development of the Left. Our 
study’s aim is to highlight what they have obscured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 The most evident exception would be Georges Guingouin, a partisan leader in the 
Limousin who came into conflict with PCF leaders. This is a case where the Resistance 
mobilisation itself drew militants into conflict with the Party, as opposed to pre-existing 
political divisions in the manner of Trotskyist or Left-Communist dissent against the 
Communist Parties. Guingouin would after his expulsion from the PCF adhere to Titoite 
positions, and, as Grenard 2014 shows, create a dissident ‘back-story’ for himself, dating 
back to the start of the war. There was also a maximalist opposition in some sections of 
the Budapest KMP, led by Démeny Pál. Different were the cases of Greece’s KKE and 
Yugoslavia’s KPJ, where the Party apparatus itself came into conflict with Moscow as a 
result of their more aggressive Resistance strategies. 
  
36 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
‘You just wait till Stalin gets here…’ communist conspiracies in Rome, 1939–42 
 
 
 
 
The resurrection of communist consciousness in Italy is the privilege of no man. 
The indomitable will of the few who had the courage to profess their own faith 
under Fascist tyranny, the undeniable triumph of the Soviet experience, the 
destruction of the Fascist bourgeoisie’s capacities to govern, and the need to see 
with our own eyes the end of the causes of this barbarism, the direct consequence 
of the whole organisation of global capitalism; all this determined the formation of 
groups of the faithful, at first isolated, then ever more compact, in all Italy. 
 
MCd’I programme, ‘The Higher Path’ 
 
 
 
 
On 27 February 1942, a brewer was arrested after his lodger’s outburst in a 
butcher’s shop bordering the Vatican. The previous afternoon, a Fascist 
functionary had witnessed a woman launching a volley of abuse at the régime-
supporting proprietor: ‘The brewer says we’ll soon see the smile wiped off your 
face, when Stalin comes and sorts it all out!’1 The Axis advance on the Eastern 
Front had already begun to falter, and clearly made an impression on certain 
Romans. Fortunately for the Fascist tripemonger, the Soviet generalissimo never 
made it to Italy. The soldiers who captured Rome in June 1944 came from the 
United States and Britain, and not the Soviet Union. These troops were, however, 
joined by an Armata Rossa of Romans’ own creation:2 a partisan militia in which 
this brewer himself fought.3 Its name expressed a paradox: a ‘Red Army’ 
commanded neither by Moscow, nor even the Italian Communist Party. 
 
Like most Roman communists in the Occupation period, the brewer belonged to a 
formation that militants created independently of PCI leaders. Their armed 
Resistance only began with the Wehrmacht invasion in September 1943, when PCI 
cadres were still returning from prison and exile. Yet a communist underground had 
already begun to reorganise at the very start of the war. In their attempt to 
 
 
1 27.2.1944 report in ACS/PS/1942/65/6.  
2 Cf. Armata Rossa 6.6.1944, 14.6.1944; Chapter Eight.  
3 ANPI/Database Partigiani. 
  
37 
 
 
create a ‘new party’, PCI cadres had to impose their leadership over movements 
that had already emerged separately. As Chapter Two demonstrates, in Rome 
this produced a sharp culture clash between older militants who represented the 
politics of the proletarian underground, and the young intellectuals linked to the 
PCI’s exile organisation. Where the students led by Giorgio Amendola embraced 
this Party’s patriotic anti-Nazism, the workers and artisans of independent circles 
remained intransigent and maximalist. 
 
It was from such workers’ circles that a Movimento Comunista d’Italia (MCd’I) 
emerged outside of the Party’s control in summer 1943, as the largest formation of 
the Roman Resistance. Its programme boasted that its founders’ had maintained their 
‘indomitable will’ through the dark years, claiming the mantle of an unbroken 
tradition. In maintaining this ‘faith’, they had kept the communist idea alive even in 
isolation from exiled and jailed Party cadres. Fascism had cut them off from the 
Comintern, of whose activity they knew little. But life under the regime had also 
changed their own outlook, which did not stand still at the party line of the pre-
Fascist years. Their marginalisation in Fascist society and the ruling class’s unity with 
the regime had combined to harden them in their maximalist intransigence. Reacting 
against Fascism’s demonisation of the USSR and dramatisation of the ‘Bolshevik’ 
threat to Italy, these dissidents also developed a fantastical mythology of Soviet 
socialism and Stalin personally. 
 
What this created on the underground was a ‘movement-Stalinism’ distinct from the 
Party’s own ‘régime Stalinism’.4 It venerated Stalin, without being bound by the 
discipline that Soviet policy imposed on the Communist Parties. Ignorant of 
Moscow’s directives, these militants instead used the ‘workers’ fatherland’ as a 
cipher onto which to project their own utopianism. This had messianic elements 
insofar as Red Army successes were read as a sign of the ‘advent’ of socialism. But as 
Fascism headed toward collapse, this triumphalism also fed new communist 
 
 
 
4 I draw these terms from Renzo de Felice’s counterposition of fascism as an organised régime 
and fascism as a movement in society. Note also MCd’I’s own explanation of the distinction 
between Movement and Party amidst the reconstruction of Italian communism: 
‘We are for the moment called a Movement and not a Party, because we want the Party to 
emerge from the unanimously expressed will of all the Italian Movements that follow the 
same principles. If the workers who follow our Movement do so, because they are 
attracted by a doctrinal position they find more precise than another, this is not a 
privilege to boast about or a right to impose any pre-eminence’: MCd’I 1944b, p. 4. 
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organisation. This was notably expressed in the creation of the Scintilla [‘Spark’] 
group, and in June 1942 the first clandestine press in wartime Rome. Its 
laboriously produced clandestine bulletins – handwritten, copied and circulated 
among the underground – expressed these militants’ desire to rebuild the Party 
upon their own initiative. Yet this brought conflict with the cadres who really 
were in contact with the exiled leadership. 
 
2.1. The writing on the wall 
 
For such organisation to emerge, ‘subversives’ needed a crisis in the regime. They 
drew confidence from the Axis’s very first military setbacks. As the Blitz against 
London drew to its unsuccessful conclusion in May 1941, one state informant 
overheard lifelong communist Salvatore Tardioli advising customers in his 
Ariccia bar that ‘if what the [Italian] radio said about the bombing-raids were 
true, not only would London be no more, but there wouldn’t be a single hen left 
in all England’.5 Tardioli was detained along with nineteen associates including 
veteran peasant-unionist Mario De Lisio, reported for proclaiming ‘you shouldn’t 
believe the papers … communism keeps making headway and we’ll soon see the 
day when it dominates Europe’.6 January 1942 saw the arrest of twelve 
railworkers who frequented a hat-seller’s in the district bordering Termini 
station. The owner revealed under interrogation that his friends Tolstoi Meloni 
and Adriano Dolfini had ‘discussed the prospect of Soviet victory even in front of 
unknown customers, exalting communism and its advent in Italy’.7 
 
These fraternities typified the subculture that captured police attention in these first 
two years of conflict: mostly male workers who discussed war news in shops and 
bars, and sometimes shared Marxist or anarchist literature, but without formal 
organisation.8 Certainly, ‘a long period of dispersion had spread fear, despair and 
mistrust in the old comrades’ ranks’,9 dissuading them from contacting other schedati 
[police-registered ‘subversives’]. Future Armata Rossa commander Otello Terzani, a 
vintner in Rome after his 1935 return from confino [internal exile], recognised that 
while his bar ‘was an ideal meeting-place for anti-fascists and 
 
 
5 ACS/PS/1943/80/Ariccia, p. 7.  
6 Ibid., p. 14. 
7 ACS/PS/1942/65/14. 
8 E.g. ACS/PS/1943/79/Bottiglieria del Gambero; ACS/PS/1943/79/Giuseppe Degni.  
9 From the biography of Scintilla co-founder Ezio Lombardi in MCd’I 1944c. 
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comrades old and new … for the OVRA [secret police] it became like Dionysus’s 
Ear’.10 Yet for militants jailed or exiled for their beliefs, the war also offered hope 
of upheaval. Through the Great Depression and the invasion of Ethiopia, anti-
fascists had longed for a crisis that could break Mussolini’s grip over Italy. 
Military reverses in Greece and on the Eastern Front now struck a greater blow to 
the Duce’s authority than anything that had gone before. 
 
This led to a resurgence of communist propaganda, whose sources were rarely 
detected. In a November 1943 report a Lazio PCI organiser noted how despite the 
lack of Party organisation in 1941–42, isolated militants produced their own 
‘small-local propaganda … with wall writings and the display of red flags on 1 
May, 7 November and other revolutionary dates’.11 Pro-Soviet sentiments 
dominated the ‘subversive’ propaganda recorded by Roman police. A bridge in 
Ariccia was emblazoned ‘Death to Mussolini/We are hungry/Down with 
Germany/Long live Lenin and Communism’;12 a sign hung from the Colleferro 
PNF headquarters declared ‘Long live the workers – unite/Long live comrade 
Stalin and his allies/ Comrades, we oppressed poor shall soon be free/Death to 
the Duce and Fascism/Long live international Bolshevism’.13 In Rome’s city-
centre, the quarter-century anniversary of the October Revolution saw Piazza 
Vittorio littered with black cards bearing the word ‘Imminent!’ under a hammer-
and-sickle; a poem on the reverse read ‘Hunger is raging/Our bones start to 
shake/Red flags will be flying/Not long to wait!’14 
 
Strikingly evident in these slogans was the contrast between communists’ exaltation 
of Soviet successes and their own lack of organisation. Epitomising such veneration 
of the ‘workers’ fatherland’ was the injunction ‘addavenì Baffone!’ (‘Mr. Moustache has 
to come!’), implying that the forces commanded by Stalin could sweep across Europe 
and deliver socialism even in the absence of working-class rebellion.15 Clearly 
expressing a surplus of messianism over measured prediction, 
 
 
 
10 Terzani n.d., pp. 138–39. Dionysus’s Ear was a mythical fourth-century-BC jail in a 
Sicilian cave, whose acoustics allowed for easy surveillance. 
11 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November   
1943: APC/7/2/14, p. 4.  
12 ACS/PS/1942/65/Scritte sovversive/12.4.1942. 
13 ACS/PS/1942/65/Scritte sovversive/7.12.1942.  
14 ACS/PS/1942/65/Scritte sovversive/10.11.1942. 
15 Cf. Pavone 1991, pp. 404–6. 
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this slogan was also symptomatic of subversives’ reliance on outside powers 
undermining the Fascist régime on their behalf, translating the ‘revolutionary 
defeatism’ of old into blind faith in Red Army success. Tellingly, such wall writings 
appeared not only after the Soviets’ February 1943 victory at Stalingrad indicated the 
likelihood of ultimate Allied victory, but even after much more partial victories like 
the January 1942 defence of Moscow – certainly a loss of face for Mussolini, but 
hardly reason to think that the Red Army was about to cross the Alps. 
 
Such propaganda’s ‘defeatist’ sentiments did not yet tally with efforts to organise 
collective action. A web of Fascist informants worked energetically to record all 
such signs of communist activity, but provided Rome police-chief Amadeo Palma 
with little cause for concern. His 30 June 1942 report to the Interior Ministry 
deemed the activity of ‘subversives and anti-fascists … absolutely minimal and 
irrelevant’; 16 three months later it remained ‘of little significance’.17 Throughout 
his dossiers, Palma was rather more troubled by the ‘threat to public order’ 
created by bread riots in poorly-provisioned peripheral areas, with hundreds-
strong crowds of women rowdily demanding their overdue rations18 as well as 
the benefits due to conscripts’ families. Although Palma’s reports detailed 
substantial continuity in food supplies, the questore noted that a chaotic 
distribution system left Romans on fixed incomes, the poor and those in outlying 
districts particularly unable to purchase their daily bread. 19 
 
As Palma emphasised, these riots had no outwardly anti-fascist content. Yet the 
worsening food situation risked fuelling a wider breakdown of régime authority, 
driven by military defeats in North Africa and the Eastern Front. Entering the war in 
June 1940, Mussolini had promised swift successes. But as rations shrank and Italians 
grieved for ever-more dead sons, husbands and brothers, wartime sacrifice seemed 
like a permanent state of existence. The longer the struggle continued, the more 
Fascist leaders replaced talk of the fruits of conquest with demands for disciplined 
resilience. Interrogated by police in January 1942, Esquilino hat-shop conspirator 
Adriano Dolfini remarked that after the Battle of Moscow Hitler’s initial boasts of 
easy successes over a ‘feeble’ USSR had given way to recognition 
 
 
16 ACS/PS/1942/76/Roma/30.6.1942, p. 7. 
17 ACS/PS/1942/76/Roma/30.9.1942, p. 4.  
18 ACS/PS/1942/76/Roma/30.6.1942, p. 8. 
19 ACS/PS/1942/76/Roma/30.9.1942, p. 5. 
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of ‘the Soviet colossus’s capacity to resist’;20 by September the police-chief 
worried that Romans had noticed the Führer ‘asserting the invincibility of the 
Axis more energetically and categorically than the prospect of victory ... showing 
that the path to success is still long and wracked with grave difficulties’.21 
 
While the women mounting these bread riots had not themselves needed formal 
political organisation, signs of régime turmoil did also fuel defeatist propaganda. 
In his December 1942 report, police-chief Palma could note ‘a reawakening of 
anti-fascist activity in the capital, which can be explained by the fortunes of war 
operations and the persistent economic disruption resulting from the state of 
conflict’; there was ‘even a consequential attempt to create an anti-fascist 
organisation among workers and intellectuals’, leading to 27 arrests.22 Yet the 
men who fell into police hands on 2 December 1942 did not merely define 
themselves as ‘anti-fascists’, out of mere opposition to the regime. As Palma 
explained in a personal memo to Mussolini, the arrestees were attempting to 
recreate the Communist Party banned since 1926. Indeed, ‘deluded that the 
Régime will soon meet its end when, as they expect, the conflict results in Axis 
defeat’, they were ‘now organising and producing communist propaganda’.23 
These militants were not just waiting for Fascism’s military defeat, but beginning 
to build a movement that could shape a new Italy. 
 
Even as reverses on the Eastern Front and in North Africa undermined Mussolini’s 
authority, ‘subversive’ circles still faced a powerful security apparatus. The Fascist 
effort to tear up the roots of communist organisation itself encouraged political 
divides. Not only did militants run the gauntlet of Fascist repression, but the 
disorder generated by police disruption of their communications also fuelled the 
emergence of competing centres of authority, each seeking to assert its own political 
leadership. The communists arrested in the final month of 1942 were members of two 
separate organisations, including both the ‘workers’ and intellectuals group’ (linked 
to the centro estero, i.e. the exiled Communist Party leadership in Paris belonging to 
the Comintern) and the independent Scintilla circle. These groups’ disagreements 
centred on such important questions as what 
 
 
20 ACS/PS/1942/65/14. 
21 ACS/PS/1942/76/Roma/30.9.1942, p. 5.  
22 ACS/PS/1942/76/Roma/31.12.1942, p. 7. 
23 ACS/PS/F1/68/198/026198. 
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form revolutionary organisation should take, what the objectives of the anti-
fascist struggle should be, and what communist strategy on Italian soil was most 
compatible with Soviet foreign policy. 
 
The exchanges among these small Marxist fraternities did not initially translate into 
public activity, and were primarily conducted by way of face-to-face discussions 
rather than written documents. Yet the texts that they produced – some of which 
were seized by police, and thus preserved in state archives – have much to tell us 
about wartime communist culture and the political conditions in which the PCI now 
re-emerged. Though long ignored by a Resistance historiography short on analysis of 
wartime communists’ political debates, these documents show us not only that these 
embryonic Marxist circles contemplated their long-term objectives right from the 
start of the conflict, but that even in autumn 1942 they anticipated the potential 
strategic consequences of clashes between the USSR and the Anglo-Americans. In the 
early war years these communists were not able to mobilise masses of Romans 
against the régime. But it was the clandestine political networks that they built in this 
period that provided them a platform to lead the armed struggle from September 
1943 onward. 
 
Reading these autodidacts’ texts, we can see the lack of justification for 
Resistance historians’ fixation on exiled anti-fascist leaders and silence over the 
activity of Roman communists who were not ‘professional revolutionaries’. 
These militants’ debates were crucial in laying the political basis for the Roman 
Resistance. They established the fundamental divide between those who believed 
in the immediate possibility of seizing power, and those who instead favoured a 
broad alliance strategy. As we shall see, militants’ sense of strategic possibility 
was also shaped by differing views of the international context and the Allies’ 
role in shaping the new Europe. This, in turn, reflected their connection to exile 
organisation and the militants who had spent the interwar period in contact with 
the Comintern. Seeking to contextualise the underground circles that emerged in 
the capital in 1939–42, we shall now briefly explain how the exiled Communist 
Party apparatus evolved across the Fascist period, leading up to its first 
clandestine cell in Rome during the Spanish Civil War. 
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2.2. The long journey through Fascism24 
 
The Fascist régime’s 1926 ban on the Communist Party of Italy (PCd’I) was 
highly effective, preventing it from maintaining clandestine structures on Italian 
soil. Since the Party’s foundation in January 1921 its members were subject to 
deadly Blackshirt attacks, with an often-allied police repression only increasing 
as the King appointed Mussolini premier in October 1922. Liberals and 
conservatives in the new coalition hoped to ‘domesticate’ the Fascists within the 
establishment, but the 1924 crisis following the assassination of Socialist MP 
Giacomo Matteotti soon proved their naivety. The democratic parties’ weak 
reaction to his murder emboldened PNF radicals, and the Duce soon proceeded 
to crush all opposition. The result was 1926’s authoritarian ‘Exceptional Security 
Law’, forcing most communist cadres into prison or exile. With the PCd’I almost 
totally destroyed, a sharp separation emerged between exiled leaders – founding 
a Paris-based centro estero under the wing of the French Communist Party (PCF) – 
and thousands of communists remaining on home soil, cut off from these cadres 
and unable to engage in collective organisation. 
 
The reduction of the PCd’I to a rootless exile apparatus facilitated its rapid 
subordination to Stalin’s policy. This was most evident in the svolta (‘turn’) of 1930– 
32, as the centro estero attempted to send ‘everyone back to Italy’ to whip up rebellion. 
Taking little account of the régime’s real strength, this policy earned no concrete 
results, with the average cadre crossing the Alps lasting just seventeen days before 
arrest.25 The centro estero’s turn was motivated not by Italian underground initiative 
but the Comintern’s ‘Third-Period’26 theory. This insisted that the Great Depression 
would ‘inevitably’ produce a revolutionary wave in the West to accompany the 
Soviet régime’s own domestic consolidation. The PCd’I thus decried an imaginary 
united front of counter-revolutionaries stretching from 
 
 
 
24 The title of Zangrandi 1962, on dissident-Fascist youth.  
25 Bertelli 1980, p. 41.  
26 In Stalin’s schema, the ‘First Period’ was the revolutionary wave that coincided with 
the end of the First World War, with the creation of workers’ councils across Russia, 
Germany and Hungary; meanwhile, the ‘Second Period’ of 1923–27 was a time of retreat 
for the European revolutionary movement and the consolidation of ‘socialism in one 
country’ in the USSR. Having defeated his domestic opponents, in 1928 Stalin announced 
the arrival of the ‘Third Period’ of renewed offensive, with the Communist Parties abroad 
now virulently attacking social democracy (or, in Third-Period argot, ‘social fascism’) as 
the main obstacles to revolution. 
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Fascists to the reformist socialists now labelled mere ‘social-fascists’. This 
voluntarist stance ignored not only Mussolini’s success in weathering the Wall 
Street Crash, but also their own earlier analysis of the divisions that had eased 
Fascism’s road to power.27 
 
In this sense, the centro estero’s activity after 1927 was less important for its 
sporadic attempts to form clandestine structures in Italy as for its effect in 
galvanising a Stalinist leadership in the exile organisation. This was particularly 
evident in the conduct of Palmiro Togliatti, who used the svolta to justify the 
expulsion of dissidents. He insisted that for the Italians to have opposed Stalin’s 
policy would simply have meant the Soviet ‘brother party’ ‘imposing a [new 
Italian] leadership from the Left, with a few lads from [Moscow’s] Lenin 
School’.28 Yet this conformity with Stalin’s positions was also the means by which 
Togliatti and his entourage entrenched their rule over the PCd’I, expelling all 
critics of Comintern policy in its remaining exile and prison organisations. 
Notably excluded were the Party’s founder Amadeo Bordiga (as well as those 
who refused to join ritualised condemnations of his ‘treachery’), and central-
committee member Pietro Tresso,29 who led a tiny Trotskyist opposition from 
Paris until his murder at the hands of French Communist partisans in 1943.30 
 
Faithfully obeying Stalin’s policy zigzags, the Third-Period svolta was followed by 
another sharp strategic turn. Far from the Depression-era attacks on ‘social-fascist’ 
reformists, the popular-front policy adopted in 1935 advocated united action with all 
forces willing to oppose Adolf Hitler. After the disastrous svolta, this new turn was 
doubtless a relief for the Togliattians. While all Communist Parties took a similar 
position faced with the rise of a belligerently anti-Soviet régime in Berlin, popular-
frontism in many respects tallied with an analysis PCd’I leaders had already made of 
Fascism’s rise in Italy. Ever since the 1926 Lyon Theses,31 Gramsci, Togliatti and their 
co-thinkers had argued that the Party’s ‘sectarian’ hostility 
 
 
 
27 Notably the Lyon Theses of 1926, which tended to see the Party’s failings in this earlier 
period precisely as a result of its sectarianism and rigid hostility toward ‘infiltration’ by 
other class forces.  
28 Cited in Agosti 2004, p. 97.  
29 On his murder, see Azzaroni 1962 and Broué and Vacheron 1997. See also his own 
cutting analysis of the about-turns of Stalinist anti-fascism, Tresso 1938.  
30 Francescangeli 2005 is the standard study on interwar Italian Trotskyism.  
31 Gramsci and Togliatti presented this document to the PCd’I’s 1926 exile congress.  
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toward other democratic forces in 1921–22 had helped allow Mussolini to defeat 
a divided opposition. The new Comintern line was an extended version of this 
more gradualist outlook, through which the Party could seek to escape its 
isolation and lead wide layers of the population in a stage-by-stage process of 
social transformation.32 
 
The Seventh Congress’s call for broad anti-Nazi fronts allowed PCd’I cadres to renew 
ties with Paris-based socialist and liberal exiles, but attempts to build popular-front 
alliances within Italy were highly speculative.33 Central to its strategic outlook was 
Palmiro Togliatti’s understanding of the firmness of Fascism’s social base among the 
working class and peasantry, and thus the need to try and produce fissures within 
the ruling élite itself.34 Centro estero propaganda smuggled across the Alps into Italy 
thus not only pointed to the régime’s failure to live up to the demagogic slogans of its 
1919 programme, but also expressed a more nationalistic anti-Nazi sentiment, 
insisting that Italy’s ‘legitimate territorial interests’35 were better served through 
alliance with Britain and France than by ties with Adolf Hitler, a rival to Rome’s 
designs on the Balkans.36 This abandonment of the Party’s previously sharp anti-
imperialism also reflected the collective-security and Russian foreign-policy 
dimension of ‘popular-frontism’, placing total priority on building an international 
bloc against Nazi Germany and its accomplices even if this meant silencing other 
aspects of communist policy. 
 
The svolta introduced Stalinist discipline to PCd’I ranks. Popular-frontism brought a 
much sharper political break. The Party now arrived at forms of organisation far-
removed from its initial class-war agenda. This was apparent in its search for 
intellectual fellow-travellers in the late 1930s,37 as it sought to drive a wedge 
 
 
32 Gramsci discussed these themes at length in his 1929–35 Prison Notebooks: however, 
none of these texts were published until 1949, and only a handful of exiled and 
imprisoned PCI leaders had any knowledge of their contents. Without doubt Togliatti’s 
wartime policy represented a serious distortion of Gramsci’s analysis, encrusting it with 
an uncritical approach to parliamentary democracy.  
33 See Tresso 1938 for a forensic (and sharply critical) analysis of PCd’I exile press in these 
years.  
34 Notably his lectures to the young PCI exiles in Moscow in the first third of 1935: 
Togliatti 2010.  
35 Lo Stato Operaio, 1936, April, ‘Per una politica estera del popolo italiano’; 1936, August, 
‘Per una politica di pace’.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Spain was itself a key testing-ground for the Popular-Front strategy, with the official 
Soviet policy of ‘non-intervention’ in the Civil War, together with the Stalinist PCE/PSUC’s 
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between Mussolini and the students organised in the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti.38 
The littoriali – régime-organised cultural, intellectual and sporting contests – were a 
particularly happy hunting-ground for this operation, not least as they provided an 
arena for open philosophical debates. It was through these littoriali that men in their 
early twenties like Mario Alicata, Antonio Giolitti, and Antonello Trombadori were 
first drawn into the Rome student circle cultivated by the centro estero. While a 1936 
‘Appeal to our Blackshirt Brothers’39 signed by Communist Party leaders was 
unusual for its rhetorical embrace of the social reforms promised by Fascism’s 
original programme, this was but the extreme expression of a centro estero policy 
premised on producing splits within régime organisations. 
 
In building a Roman cadre group the Party recruited contacts from non-
communist backgrounds rather than older militants. Whereas new Party 
structures in the industrial North were piloted by exiles sent back across the 
Alps, the centro estero’s connection with Rome was more tenuous, and it seems it 
considered these intellectuals more receptive to its new approach than long-
isolated militants. The Rome student circle was first linked to Paris via the thirty-
year old Giorgio Amendola, son of a liberal MP murdered by Blackshirts in 1926. 
At first it was not avowedly Marxist, but instead started out from a Crocean-
idealist outlook, while also reviving Fascist ideologue Giovanni Gentile’s onetime 
talk of a ‘Second Risorgimento’ to cohere an Italian nation left fragmented after the 
1860s Wars of Unification.40 Keen to use all possible means to reach disaffected 
intellectuals, the Amendola group continued to write for legal publications like 
 
 
 
efforts to restrain the more revolutionary aspects of the fight against Franco, reflecting the 
desire to weaken Western anti-communism by playing down the spectre of a ‘Red Spain’. 
The Stalinists’ alliance with liberal and reformist forces in the Negrin government and the 
concomitant repression of the Spanish revolutionary Left are well analysed in Broué 2005. 
This policy failed not only to defeat Franco but also in its aim of currying favour with 
British and French conservatives, who in their majority maintained a policy of appeasing 
Nazi Germany, rather than allying with the USSR against it.  
38 Theorised in Lo Stato Operaio, 1936, October, ‘Per un movimento giovanile italiano’; ‘A 
voi, uomini di cultura’.  
39 This document called for ‘national reconciliation’ under the Fascist programme of 1919: 
see ‘Per la salvezza dell’Italia riconciliazione del popolo italiano!’, Lo Stato Operaio, 1936, 
August. Probably written by Ruggero Grieco, its force was multiplied by the fact that it 
was signed by over a hundred named Communist Party leaders.  
40 This was a classic implementation of the Comintern Seventh Congress’s call for 
communists to ‘pick up the national flags dropped by the imperialist bourgeoisie’, and 
during the war the PCI press would often refer to the Resistance as a ‘Second 
Risorgimento’. On this formula, cf. Pavone 1959. 
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Primato, Roma Fascista and La Ruota, projecting a cultural-political outlook only 
subtly hinting at criticism of the régime and its Nazi ally. 
 
This patient effort to nurture Rome’s dissident student milieu was badly 
disrupted in August 1939 by news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which caught PCd’I 
leaders completely by surprise. While Italian exiles staged a ‘national conference’ 
in Paris just one week before the Pact, at which they had reaffirmed their loyalty 
to the strategy of broad anti-Nazi alliances, Stalin now forced them to abandon 
this line. For years the Communists had attacked London and Paris for appeasing 
Hitler, calling for rearmament and alliance with the USSR. Moscow and its 
satellites now stood for peace with the Führer, one-sidedly blaming ‘the City of 
London’ for starting the war, and denouncing as imperialist the very states who 
now resisted German expansionism. The Italian leadership like its sister parties 
struggled to mount such an abject U-turn. Not only did Stalin’s deal with Hitler 
trash previous efforts to stir dissent among Italian intellectuals, but it also 
prompted French government repression against the centro estero. The PCF was 
banned and the Italian exiles under its protection arrested, including Togliatti. 
 
It was amidst this atmosphere of embattled Soviet loyalism that the schoolteacher 
Ferdinando Amiconi and young doctor Aldo Natoli produced five typewritten 
bulletins over autumn 1939. This pair, from Avezzano one hundred kilometres east 
of Rome, were the only Italian-based militants to travel to France for the ‘national 
conference’. Thus having met leading cadres just days before the Pact was 
announced, they bore considerable authority during their early exchanges with the 
Rome student group. However, while this bulletin was the sole PCd’I publication to 
reach the capital in the immediate aftermath of the Pact, they produced these texts 
independently of the cadres who had been arrested by French police at the end of 
August. Not until April 1940 would the Paris-based leadership produce any 
clandestine press of its own, with the Lettere di Spartaco written by Togliatti after his 
release from jail.41 Reflecting the pair’s own thinking as well as what they gleaned 
from the French press (including as concerned the PCF’s positions), these 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding Togliatti’s release see Agosti 2008, pp.  
150–58. 
  
48 
 
 
bulletins combined the Comintern’s latest arguments with these young men’s 
own more ad hoc rationalisations. 
 
In justifying the Pact, Amiconi and Natoli drastically contradicted the Party’s earlier 
popular-front strategy.42 While imitating Comintern emphasis on Moscow’s ‘peaceful 
instincts’, they idiosyncratically suggested that Stalin’s deal with Hitler was a ‘ploy’ 
to destabilise Europe’s political order.43 Citing Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov’s argument that a British-French victory would ‘lay the groundwork for the 
capitalist countries to reach an agreement to fight their great common enemy, the 
proletariat, and thus the USSR’,44 the Avezzano pair explained that ‘to avert this 
threat the Soviet Union is using German capitalism, helping it diplomatically and 
economically’.45 Although referring to less bellicose Comintern watchwords such as 
Stalin’s success in ‘liberating Poland’s national minorities’ by destroying Warsaw’s 
‘fascist’ régime (in partnership with Hitler…) Amiconi and Natoli attached their own 
millenarian hopes to his strategy. They deemed it ‘wholly aimed at … bringing the 
proletarian revolution to all capitalist countries, everywhere establishing the Soviet 
system’,46 while gleefully citing French press scaremongering that ‘Stalin’s goal is 
world revolution, the immediate Bolshevisation of all the countries where he 
exercises authority!’47 
 
These hosannahs for Stalinist strategising met with an icy response among the 
Roman students, who were little-interested in fantasies of Red Army-imposed 
‘Bolshevisation’. Giorgio Amendola’s brother Pietro was alarmed that ‘with the 
blindest and most absolute faith in the Soviet comrades’, Amiconi and Natoli 
‘presented the German-Russian pact not only as a sort of force majeure imposed on the 
USSR … but as Stalin’s cunning move to play the imperialist powers off against one 
another … and thus to prepare the Europe-wide advent of communism on their 
ashes’.48 Some disillusioned members of the Amendola group now left to join a rival 
liberal-socialist current (linked to Giustizia e Libertà; later Partito d’Azione)49 
 
 
 
42 See Amiconi 1977, pp. 316 et sqq. 
43 Bollettino, 5, 4.11.1939, ‘Situazione estera’ (in ACS/PS/1942/65).  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Bollettino no. 1, 4.9.1939, p. 1, ‘Situazione estera’.  
47 Bollettino no. 5, 4.11.1939, p. 2, ‘Francia’.  
48 Vittoria 1985, p. 83. 
49 Vittoria 1985, p. 84. 
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whereas those who remained rallied around a ‘middle position’ proposed by 
Amendola’s other brother Antonio, emphasising Britain and France’s perfidy in 
refusing to ally with the USSR against Hitler, but holding that Stalin’s ‘tactical’ 
decision had no bearing on Italian militants’ continued anti-fascism.50 This 
compromise, hammered out in a meeting at Mario Fiorentino’s home in May 
1940,51 largely succeeded in holding the Rome student circle together, despite the 
arrests that soon followed its contacts with the Avezzano group.52 
 
The shifting patterns of war soon rendered these divides obsolete, as the invasion 
of the USSR returned the Party to a straightforwardly anti-fascist position. Like 
their counterparts abroad it now sought to build a broad anti-Nazi front 
analogous to the London-Moscow alliance. This ended the split between the 
Amendola circle and its smattering of working-class contacts like mechanic 
Pompilio Molinari and decorator Roberto Forti, whom it had during the Pact era 
accused of taking ‘Trotskyist’, anti-Soviet position.53 It moreover sealed its 
alliance with another circle it had previously stigmatised as ‘Trotskyist’, the 
Gruppo d’Unificazione Marxista founded by students Corrado Noulian and Rosario 
Bentivegna.54 Given these alleged Trotskyists’ rapid merger into the PCd’I’s new 
‘workers’ and intellectuals’ group’, it seems that despite their rejection of the 
Pact-era line they shared little of Trotsky’s deeper critique of the Communist 
Parties. For these young men of little political training but attracted to the PCd’I 
by its anti-fascist record, the Hitler-Mussolini attack on the USSR instead 
provided the moment to close ranks and organise a broad anti-fascist opposition. 
 
Responding to a renewed anti-fascist pact between Communist, Socialist and 
liberal exiles, Rome’s ‘workers’ and intellectuals’ group’ also cast its net wide in 
search of allies. As with the centro estero’s late-1930s efforts to infiltrate Fascist 
student milieux, these young men’s implementation of the popular-front strategy 
focused on exploiting divisions within Italy’s existing élites rather than any kind 
of anti-capitalist or working-class agitation, and in this sense also reflected their 
social proximity to bourgeois and even aristocratic circles. A report by Marco 
 
 
 
50 According to Franco Rodano, quoted in Vittoria 1985, p. 85.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Cf. interrogations in ACS/PS/1943/79/19/21.  
53 Vittoria 1985, p. 90. 
54 Bentivegna 2011, pp. 82–85. 
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Cesarini Sforza and Mario Alicata written for the Party’s centro interno (founded by 
Umberto Massola in Milan at the end of 1941) thus carried rumours that the liberal-
socialists had ‘won the sympathy of [Marshal] Badoglio, now detached from the 
monarchy’, and also referred to ‘vaguer talk of an accord with the Vatican’.55 
Describing the liberal-socialists as ‘substantially a wait-and-see party … principally 
concerned with discussing what will happen after the conflict’, they proposed that 
the communists reach a political accord with this current based on mobilising for 
‘wide democratisation’ as well as ‘defending the independence of Italy and Europe 
from any eventual Anglo-American oppression’.56 
 
Moreover identifying the emergence of anti-fascist currents within the religious 
hierarchy and the Azione Cattolica ecclesiastical movement57 – soon to become 
important allies in the PCI’s efforts to attract Christian Left support58 – Cesarini 
Sforza and Alicata nonetheless lamented the fact that this dissent was a ‘cadre’ 
and not ‘mass’ phenomenon.59 Such rhetorical emphasis on popular mobilisation 
reflected the political ambition of a ‘Second Risorgimento’, with the mass of the 
nation combining to refound the Italian state, independent of either German or 
Anglo-American influence. However, it was little-expressed in these young 
intellectuals’ own activity in this period, limited as it was to seeking individual 
contacts in a cloistered philosophical and literary milieu. Indeed, for security as 
well as political reasons, the group attached to the centro estero via Amendola was 
positively distrustful of veteran working-class militants in the capital; an attitude 
further reinforced in December 1942, as police arrested a dozen of its members 
together with leading exponents of the Scintilla circle.60 
 
2.3. Scintilla 
 
In the characteristically lusty tones of its programme The Higher Path, the MCd’I 
boasted of having ‘arisen Marxistically [sic!] from the revolutionary wave begun 
by the Lyon riots of 1831’.61 Its autodidact leaders took pride in their continuity 
 
 
 
 
55 ACS/PS/F1/68/198/027752, p. 1. 
56 Ibid., p. 4.  
57 Cf. ACS/PS/F1/68/198/0295.  
58 Cf. Casula 1976, Malgeri 1982. 
59 ACS/PS/F1/68/198/027752, p. 5.  
60 Vittoria 1985, p. 99. 
61 MCd’I 1944b, p. 6. 
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with a century-old, international communist movement. The name of its first 
nucleus, the Scintilla group formed in 1940,62 was the Italian translation of Iskra 
[‘Spark’], title of the newspaper founded by Lenin in 1900. In an atmosphere of 
Tsarist repression and the mass imprisonment and exile of Russian socialists, 
Iskra had worked to galvanise isolated study groups into a revolutionary party 
with a common programme;63 as Italy entered the fray in World War II, Scintilla 
similarly sought to rally scattered underground militants in a re-established 
Communist Party.64 Quickly establishing groups among railworkers, the state 
statistics agency, and the postal service, Scintilla was centred on a handwritten 
and copied newspaper, the only communist publication in the capital in 1942. It 
was a key expression of the Roman underground, and a focal point for 
discussions among anti-fascist circles who now began to regroup their efforts. 
 
Despite Scintilla’s focus on timeless acquired truths of Marxism, its members were 
mostly workers and artisans rather than intellectuals. Key figures included tram 
engineer Tigrino Sabatini, a veteran of the PCd’I and the anti-fascist Arditi del Popolo 
militia;65 young San Lorenzo carpenter Orfeo Mucci, son of an anarchist bakers’ 
organiser;66 cobbler Ezio Lombardi, a Rome PCd’I leader expelled from a confino 
organisation on ‘security grounds’ in 1930;67 septuagenarian lawyer Raffaele de Luca, 
a former anarchist who served as Socialist mayor of Paola in 1921;68 postman Ernesto 
Sansone; Christian-socialist graphic designer Francesco Cretara, later co-editor of 
Bandiera Rossa;69 florist Agostino Raponi, a veteran communist from the Abruzzo 
region who joined the PCI prison organisation after his arrest;70 Socialist statistician 
Pietro Bàttara;71 grenadier captain Aladino Govoni, son of a futurist poet;72 and 
Socialist journalist Ezio Villani.73 The only female 
 
 
 
62 L’Idea Comunista, 2.12.1945, p. 2, ‘Come vidi “Scintilla”’; CGB/FAP/Mucci/26.  
63 Lenin 1900. 
64 L’Idea Comunista, 2.12.1945, p. 2, ‘Come vidi “Scintilla”’.  
65 Cf. Guzzo 1945, p. 56; Chilanti 1969, p. 49; 1971, p. 210. On this formation see 
Francescangeli 2000; Behan 2002.  
66 CGB/FAP/Mucci/17–24.  
67 ACS/CPC/2817/2835. 
68 ACS/CPC/1711. 
69 ACS/CPC/1532; see obituary in ‘Un lutto dei comunisti rivoluzionari’, Bandiera Rossa 
(newspaper of the Trotskyist Gruppi comunisti rivoluzionari), May 1964.  
70 Cf. Raponi 2012. 
71 ACS/PS/F1/68/198/077849.  
72 CGB/FAP/Govoni. 
73 ACS/CPC/5423. 
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member, Anna-Maria Enriques, was a Christian-socialist sacked from her job at 
the Tuscan capital’s state archives in 1938 because her father was a Jew.74 Of these 
ten just six would survive the war. 
 
The conspiracy that formed in 1940 did not immediately turn to public agitation, but 
began by establishing the political basis of its clandestine organisation. Scintilla 
members met at Cretara’s studio to discuss reading materials typical of Rome’s 
communist circles in the early war years,75 including pre-Fascist-era issues of the 
Communist l’Unità and the Socialist Avanti!, the Vatican’s Osservatore Romano,76 John 
Reed’s Ten Days That Shook The World, as well as politically-themed novels like Jack 
London’s Iron Heel and Maxim Gorky’s Mother.77 The group was unaware of 
Gramsci’s prison writings (only published in 1949) and seems not to have had access 
to texts detailing the clashes between Stalin and Trotsky, though each of the Russian 
rivals’ works had legally appeared in Italy at different points in the 1930s.78 
According to Orfeo Mucci – a stalwart defender of the MCd’I’s legacy in the decades 
after its collapse79 – Scintilla however sharply distinguished itself from the Amendola 
circle: ‘We were communists on the side of [Amadeo] Bordiga’s integral, Leninist 
Marxism, unlike those communists who tended toward social democracy ... and who 
tried to break up the Fascist Party from within’.80 
 
Mucci’s invocation of the Party’s original tradition reflects a trope widely present in 
dissident-communist thought, invoking one’s loyalty to an abandoned, original 
tradition.81 Yet the underground’s communist culture was more governed by its 
 
 
74 Cf. ANPI/Anna-Maria Enriques.  
75 Note the near-identical set of novels and newspapers found by police at Aleandro  
Casadio’s house in January 1940: ACS/PS/1942/65/00185/18.1.1940. Mario Fiorentini 
(interview with DB, 10.4.2013) recalled young PCI members’ discussion of Iron Heel and 
Mother, as did Mario di Berto in his interview with Lidia Piccioni (1984, p. 116).  
76 Among the legal press, the Osservatore Romano most commonly reproduced articles 
from foreign press agencies, and its moral pronouncements often implied a certain 
political critique of the régime.  
77 CGB/FAP/Mucci/26; MCd’I, unnumbered, 1945, MSdL/FSC/26/89.  
78 The texts were authorised or banned at different points in tandem with the regime’s 
attempts to antagonise or show openness to the Soviet leadership. Hence even such a major 
publisher as Mondadori could distribute a translation of Trotsky’s My Life in Fascist Italy. 
79 Cf. e.g. ‘Orfeo, scampato al massacro grazie al coraggio della moglie’, Il Messaggero,  
3. 8.1996; his interview in the 14.9.1996 edition of Rifondazione Comunista’s newspaper  
Liberazione, ‘Una Bandiera Rossa a Roma’ and his letter in its 4.7.1997 issue, ‘Partigiano di 
Bandiera Rossa, mi autodenuncio’; or his comments in Bermani et al. 1998.  
80 CGB/FAP/Mucci/26.  
81 In Broué 1995, this French Trotskyist historian counterposes the PCI’s exiled Stalinist 
leaders to ‘the true party, the party that had survived Fascism and continued to live on in  
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continued identification with the revolutionary end goal than any kind of 
political or organisational continuity. In the absence of clandestine structures, the 
Roman underground was unable to follow the political journey of the Togliattian 
cadres based in Paris and Moscow, and in this sense, an Italian ‘periphery’ did 
indeed grow apart from the Comintern ‘centre’. But the two clandestine 
newssheets produced under Mucci’s direction in June and October 194282 also 
show the changes that the Fascist experience produced within this undergound. 
Their view of international politics and anti-fascism diverged considerably not 
only from exiled cadres’ policy, but also from the assumptions of the early 
Communist Party. Cut off from both the Comintern and mass political activity, 
they created an idiosyncratic Stalinism of their own. 
 
The first of these handwritten and copied bulletins sought to rationalise Stalin’s 
foreign policy, deemed part of a revolutionary strategy despite its concessions to 
Realpolitik. Appearing once the invasion of Russia was already well-underway, this 
June 1942 publication was sharply critical of communists who had ‘mechanically’ 
abandoned their principles in response to the Hitler-Stalin pact. There had been no 
need ‘to bow to the swastika’;83 even if ‘the USSR had no choice but to adopt a 
position contrary to the principles of communism’, this ought not make communists 
abroad ‘lose their bearings, confusing Soviet raison d’état for the interests of the 
Communist International’.84 Its author ‘Sator’85 insisted that Italian communists were 
not ‘Moscow’s agents’, but also justified Soviet compromises in sympathetic terms. 
Scintilla explained that while ‘in no way do we disavow the efforts of the Russian 
communists, who have acted within circumstances imposed upon them … the 
relations between Russian Bolshevism and Italian communism must be understood 
not as a matter of subordination, but simply of international collaboration among 
proletarian movements’.86 
 
 
 
 
 
the workers’ districts and the villages’. At most this can be meant in terms of mythology, 
for the party itself clearly did not survive in any organised way; it would, indeed, be 
more accurate to say that it repeatedly ‘resurfaced’ than that it ‘continued to live on’. 
82 ‘Primo incontro con Chilanti 3.6.1966’: MSdL/FSC/26/22. 
83 Scintilla, 1, p. 8, ‘Il comunismo in stato d’accusa’..  
84 Ibid.  
85 Corvisieri asserts that ‘Sator’ was Pietro Báttara’s pseudonym. ‘Sator’ was the sole 
name in this issue, but one of four appearing in the second. 
86 Scintilla, 1, p. 7, ‘Il comunismo in stato d’accusa’. 
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Scintilla’s view of the International thus little resembled that developed by 
Bordiga at the beginning of the Comintern’s activity. Even as general secretary, 
Bordiga strongly opposed the autonomy of national Communist Parties, and 
instead insisted that the Comintern should impose a common discipline over all 
its sections. Haunted by the nationalist fragmentation of European socialism 
upon the outbreak of World War I, Bordiga argued that only the formation of a 
worldwide party could prevent the International’s sections from 
‘opportunistically’ embracing their own states’ particular interests. He was thus 
quick to note Russian raison d’état taking over the Comintern, and predicted that 
Moscow’s wish for peace with capitalist countries would drive it to curtail the 
other parties’ revolutionary militancy. At the 1926 Comintern Enlarged Executive 
he denounced this ‘involution’ to Stalin’s face, and proposed that the world’s 
communists should take collective control of the USSR in order to subordinate its 
policies to the interests of the International. This argument naturally cut no ice 
among the Comintern’s Stalin-loyalist leaders. But it remained central to Left-
Communist readings of the link between Soviet ‘socialism in one country’ and 
Western Communist Parties’ ‘reformism’. 
 
Conversely, while Scintilla pointed to the Realpolitik behind Kremlin foreign policy, it 
saw no contradiction between recognising this and pursuing its own ‘intransigent’ 
agenda in Italy. It was in fact at pains to justify Stalin’s policy. This was evident in its 
October 1942 issue’s attempt to square its revolutionary goals with the Anglo-Soviet 
treaty sealed in May. It noted that Stalin and Churchill’s agreement ‘not to interfere 
in other states’ internal affairs might make some think’ that the Soviet leadership was 
‘giving up the very basis for Comintern policy’. Stalin did indeed dissolve the 
Comintern just seven months later, as an overture to the Western Allies. But for 
Scintilla, this proved that ‘the Comintern’s Russian leaders trust in the maturity of the 
communist movements in each country, who must rely above all on their own forces 
to carry out the revolution’.87 This reading collapsed Stalin’s Realpolitik into Marx’s 
emphasis on working-class self-emancipation: ‘The ideal links between the Russian 
workers and the world 
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proletariat are indissoluble, but in each country ... the revolution must be the 
conscious, voluntary act of the workers themselves’.88 
 
Scintilla adopted a timeless tone, with each of its two issues89 framed in terms of 
Marxism’s basic precepts rather than the immediate political situation in Fascist 
Italy. This second edition however also insisted on the need for concrete 
organisation. This allowed it to distinguish itself from certain subversives’ 
messianic conceptions of the Red Army bringing socialism to Italy from the 
outside. A whimsical article entitled ‘When Baffone [‘Mr. Moustache’ – Stalin] 
gets here…’ mocked those who hoped for liberation from afar. The piece began 
by invoking ‘how many times we’ve all heard our workmates talking about: 
When Baffone gets here…! Whereas the middling capitalists and the small ones, 
too, are waiting… Till the English get here!’90 It criticised the passivity of such 
‘waiting for the Redeemer, without lifting a finger’, when workers must instead 
think and organise for themselves. This apparently libertarian focus on self-
activity was nonetheless immediately rerouted into veneration of Stalin: ‘If these 
people realised that Baffone himself has always desired and preached that each 
people find within itself the capacity to rally to the socialist Association, then 
they would be ashamed to expect manna from Heaven’.91 
 
For Scintilla, true internationalism lay in Italian communists working to build a 
revolutionary movement in their own country, rather than relying on the Soviet 
leadership for ‘fraternal assistance’. Italy’s fate after its ‘inevitable’ military defeat 
would be defined not by the question of whether ‘the English’ or the Red Army 
arrived first, but rather the masses’ fight for their own interests; the author 
‘Martello’ [‘Hammer’], thus begged ‘pardon from [his] Abyssinian friends for 
 
 
 
88 Ibid.  
89 Mucci claimed in a postwar interview with Alessandro Portelli that Scintilla was a 
weekly, a claim disproven by the numbering of the only two issues apparently published 
before the police crackdown: namely, one in June and one in October 1942. Even if there 
is some possibility that it produced other materials (and its Perugia branch did issue a 
separate leaflet in October), it is scarcely conceivable that such a small clandestine group 
could have produced publications at such a rate; in fact, even to produce two clandestine 
papers, laboriously handwritten and cyclostyled, was some achievement in a period 
where there was no other such anti-fascist press in Rome. This is quite probably a simple 
conflation of Scintilla with Bandiera Rossa, whose paper did appear weekly in October and 
November 1943.  
90 Scintilla, 2, p. 2, ‘Quando verrà Baffone…’  
91 Ibid. 
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saying that to wait for liberation on others’ initiative is a nigger attitude’,92 albeit 
one with precedents in Italian history dating back to ‘the crowds under Nero’s 
balcony clamouring for bread and circuses’.93 Nonetheless, far from pouring cold 
water on the idea that Red Army forces might indeed reach Italy, Scintilla 
insisted that Mr. Moustache’s intervention would not alone guarantee the advent 
of communism. Rather, the organised proletariat had to prepare to welcome him: 
‘When Baffone gets here, will he find a people inferior to those of the Kazakh 
steppes and the Yakutian tundra, or a mature people capable of realising the idea 
that he represents ... a people that sought and defends its own redemption?’94 
 
Again written by hand and then cyclostyled, albeit resembling a newspaper 
format more than did the previous issue, the October 1942 Scintilla’s stated 
intention was to lay the basis a restored Communist Party in Rome. At the same 
time as defending ‘intransigent’ positions, Scintilla also appealed for other groups 
of subversives to join its ranks, on the basis of a common commitment to 
working-class solidarity and anti-capitalism. The article ‘We’re talking to you’95 
thus addressed a series of other dissident milieux, arguing that the old divisions 
on the Left were now senseless. With ‘parliamentarism now obsolete’, Socialists 
had to recognise their ‘unity of purpose’ with communists; Catholics, much like 
those misguided souls expecting the advent of Baffone, had to ‘fight and conquer 
good on Earth’ rather than await the Redeemer; and if anarchists were right to 
‘fear that any type of authority is a mask of tyranny’, they had to ‘come to terms 
with the reality’ that only ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ could ‘shape today’s 
mankind into the free mankind of tomorrow’.96 
 
While Scintilla’s veneration of Stalin and insistence on its Marxist ‘science’ might 
seem likely to alienate anarchists, libertarians like San Lorenzo watchmaker Renato 
Gentilezza and Sicilian tailor Gabriele Pappalardo did in fact join together with its 
militants in August 1943. They became two among the MCd’I’s most prominent 
organisers. There was no specifically anarchist formation in the Roman 
 
 
 
 
92 Thus curiously implying that Abyssinia (Ethiopia) had indeed been ‘liberated’ thanks 
to Mussolini’s invasion and overthrow of its indigenous-slaveowner régime.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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Resistance, but the movement’s relative openness allowed each of these militants 
to re-establish alliances they had forged with grassroots communists in the Arditi 
del Popolo militias of 1921–22.97 So, too, did numerous socialists and Catholic-Left 
militants join the movement, as the appeal in ‘We’re talking to you’ had 
intended. As in the case of the anarchists, it seems that they represented an 
alternative sensibility committed to the MCd’I’s immediate practical agenda, 
rather than assimilating the Stalinist politics that dominated every page of both 
Scintilla and Bandiera Rossa.98 From the outset, the movement was thus marked by 
a contradiction between the positive attitude to Stalin so characteristic of the war 
period, and its militants’ roots in the various different historic currents of the 
Italian Left. 
 
Scintilla’s bombastic references to an ‘integral’, ‘scientific socialism’ reflected a 
both generational and political clash with the Amendola group. As Francesco 
Cretara recalled in 1945, the circle’s early contacts with these students 
‘determined a sharp opposition between us, principally because it was clear that 
the latest Party directives did not correspond to the fundamental traditional 
conceptions of the communist movement’.99 This same appeal to historic 
traditions informed a October 1942 Scintilla article on the rigours of clandestine 
organisation, insisting that communists must be able to carry out ‘the Party’s 
perennial directives’ without having to ask leaders for direction.100 The idea that 
such timeless instructions had already been received served to discredit the new 
stance taken by the Amendola group. Scintilla did not only consist of veteran 
worker-militants: with issue two it also made contacts beyond Rome, creating a 
satellite circle in Perugia around student Riccardo Tenerini. This latter’s 
propaganda however similarly combined laudatory references to Stalin’s USSR 
with an invocation of Italian communism’s class-war legacy.101 
 
 
 
 
97 On Pappalardo’s activity, see ‘Un direttore irresponsabile’, Sicilia libertaria, 1.6.2005; 
and the newspaper he edited, Il Vespro Anarchico.  
98 Only sporadically, and in hesitating terms, did the movement’s press reject ‘blind’ 
adherence to the Stalinist model; the only open criticism came after the war in a 
‘discussion article’ by a militant in disagreement with the leadership. See section 9.5.  
99 Unnumbered 1945 typescript, MSdL/FSC/29/87, p. 1. 
100 Scintilla, 2, p. 4, ‘Manuale del comunista’.  
101 A clandestine tract distributed by Tenerini proclaimed ‘Now the second war is coming: the 
revolutionary war, where the proletariat must defeat the capitalist world. … The hour of the 
liberating revolution is near… Long live Stalin, long live the workers’ fatherland, the 
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In a sharp culture clash, the militants of Scintilla vehemently rejected the 
authority of the Amendola students, whom they dismissed as ‘tied to aristocratic 
circles and the Savoy monarchy’.102 Cretara recalled his comrades’ shock at these 
novices’ imperious claim that ‘their Party line was directed by Moscow and thus 
could be neither discussed nor critically adapted’,103 as well as the language of 
heresy-hunting to which they resorted. In his account, with ‘the negotiations 
broken off … the PCI hierarchs, displeased with us … subjected us to vicious 
attacks and accusations of “Trotskyism”’.104 Stunned at being treated so high-
handedly by these ‘aristocratic intellectuals’,105 the Scintilla co-founder lamented 
that ‘in response to our reservations and protests over their statements we were 
told that we had no right to discuss the supreme directives but only to accept and 
implement them’.106 Throughout the Resistance worker-militants resisting the 
control of new Party cadres made similar expressions of political dissent, using 
this same combination of both class and generational terms: Turin organiser 
Arturo Colombi equally bemoaned ‘the old comrades’ unwillingness to take 
orders from kids’, ‘having stuck firm to extremist positions across these long 
years of repression’.107 
 
The centro estero’s recruitment efforts among student circles conformed to the 
Comintern’s popular-front strategy, but also isolated the Roman PCI from its 
historic social base.108 Accounts by both dissidents and the Roman students speak 
of a sharp culture clash: figures like Mario Alicata, Aldo Natoli and Rosario 
Bentivegna each recount spending their cloistered formative years in almost total 
 
 
 
 
Soviet Union. Long live the Partito Comunista d’Italia, long live the Communist 
International’. Quoted in Spriano 1973, p. 146  
102 Unnumbered 1945 typescript, MSdL/FSC/29/87, p. 1.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid.  
105 Described in ‘Primo incontro con Chilanti 3.6.1966’, MSdL/FSC/26/22. 
106 Unnumbered 1945 typescript, MSdL/FSC/29/87, p. 1.  
107 ‘Lettera di Luca alla direzione’, 25.1.1944, IPR/AC/3.   
108 Secchia (ed.) 1974, p. 437 notes: that ‘the effectiveness of the action carried out by the  
PCI in Rome was undermined by the weakness of its organisation’. As well as having to 
face the capital’s ‘particular social and economic conditions’ (see Chapter Four), the Party 
grew ‘suddenly, and in a disorderly fashion, only after 25 July. Before 25 July only a few 
groups of students and intellectuals were connected to the Party’s centro interno operating 
in Milan, and they had few contacts with the working-class base. Numerous groups of 
communists formed in the various neighbourhoods, but often closed in a sectarian and 
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ignorance of working-class Romans’ lives.109 This picture comes into yet sharper 
relief when we note the family connections linking new Party leaders like Giorgio 
Amendola and Antonio Giolitti to Italy’s traditional élites: this latter’s 
grandfather Giovanni was Italy’s dominant parliamentarian from the 1890s to 
World War I, his name becoming a byword for the corrupt horse-trading of the 
‘Giolittian’ era.110 Most of the members of this ‘workers’ and intellectuals group’ 
came from two grammar schools. While many hundreds of longstanding worker-
militants did ultimately join the Roman PCI during the Resistance, this circle’s 
social narrowness clearly compounded the Party’s difficulties appealing to 
militants like the members of Scintilla. 
 
Scintilla sought to prove its importance to the Party by displaying the strength of 
feeling among the Roman underground. To this end it attempted a survey of this 
undergound, showing a spirit of openness bordering on recklessness. Issue 2 was 
accompanied by a ten-point questionnaire for its readers to reflect on, posing 
such questions as whether they should collaborate with ‘non-communist currents 
in the struggle against Fascism’; if it was better to produce ‘propaganda for the 
masses unaware of our ideas’ or focus on educating themselves; and what 
practical advice ‘experienced communists’ could offer.111 Posing as an 
intermediary between ‘the Party’ and the ‘comrades insistently asking what its 
programme is’, Scintilla claimed that ‘communist groups’ answering these 
questions would ‘allow us to solidify and intensify our relations with groups of 
comrades and allow the Party to know our movement’s real situation’.112 In truth 
it had no direct contacts with the Party leadership, beyond the Amendola group. 
 
Arresting the Scintilla militants at the beginning of December, police informed 
Mussolini of an attempt to reconstitute the Communist Party. In publishing a 
newspaper that proclaimed itself the organ of the long-suppressed PCd’I, the 
militants behind Scintilla had taken an organisational step beyond all other Roman 
communist circles, few of whom had done more than meet to discuss war news or 
 
 
 
 
109 Lombardo-Radice 2005; Alicata 1976; Bentivegna 2011.  
110 Giovanni Giolitti, prime minister 1892–93, 1903–5, 1906–9, 1911–14, 1920–21. In 1922 he 
voted for full powers to Mussolini. Amendola’s father Giovanni was also a liberal but 
took a firmer anti-fascist stance, and was murdered by Blackshirts in Cannes in 1926.  
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paint slogans on walls and bridges. Nonetheless, the police responsible for 
monitoring these militants overestimated its contacts and ability to cause trouble, 
with the worsening military and economic situation putting the régime on alert 
against all those who might try to exploit its crisis. Scintilla as yet remained a tiny 
propaganda group, and its opposition to the official Party line would soon 
condemn its militants instead to embark on the difficult route of building a 
dissident movement. Scintilla believed itself nucleus of a Communist Party that 
was yet to be rebuilt. Its first contacts with the Amendola group showed the 
opposition this would face. 
 
2.4. The British ‘bulldog’ spurned 
 
Limited to the Roman underground and not yet engaged in mass mobilisation, 
these autodidact Marxists saw their activity in terms of a global political drama. 
Scintilla idolised Stalin’s Soviet Union, but emphasised the need for Italian 
workers to organise their own communist movement rather than simply wait ‘till 
Stalin gets here’. This posed the question, unanswered in either issue, of what 
would happen if and when the Western Allies occupied Italy. In November 1942, 
with Mussolini still clinging on to power and few hints of popular rebellion 
against the régime, some Scintilla members were already considering what effect 
Anglo-American landings might have for Italian communists’ strategy. This was 
an issue of decisive importance for all those who sought to turn the crisis within 
the Fascist régime into a further-reaching social revolution. This was discussed in 
a remarkable polemic entitled ‘Buldog’ (sic), written in the wake of Scintilla’s 
second issue. Police discovered the anonymous typescript in Ezio Villani’s home 
during the crackdown on the group.113 
 
Offering sharp insights into the key strategic problems that the Roman communists 
would face in 1943–45, this polemic was written in reaction not only to the second 
issue of Scintilla but also news of recent political upheavals across the Mediterranean. 
Speculation on Allied plans was concentrated by events in Algiers. As the Anglo-
Americans occupied Algiers, former Vichyite prime minister François Darlan 
defected to their side, and London and Washington then recognised him as governor 
of French North Africa. These events across the water 
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demonstrated not only Italy’s vulnerability to invasion, but also the means by 
which former Nazi-collaborationists disillusioned by Axis setbacks might 
attempt to hold on to power. As such, the Allied landings in Algeria brought 
closer both the end of the Mussolini régime, and the prospect of the Great Powers 
imposing a new order in the Mediterranean. ‘Buldog’ sought to determine ‘What 
advantages will world communism in general, and Italian communism in 
particular, draw from the Anglo-Americans’ and Russia’s victory?’114 
 
‘Buldog’ characterised World War II as a ‘struggle among the imperialist powers 
for world domination’ with ‘the USSR alone dragged in by foreign aggression’.115 
It warned of the Allies’ malign intentions. ‘[T]oday’s promises may soon be 
forgotten after victory’, just like the English ‘perfidy’ after World War I, when 
‘Mr. Balfour said it was the war of heaven against hell, and his colleague Bonar 
Law added that ... “We won’t increase our territory by a thumb’s width”’, and 
yet ‘England took over three million square kilometres of territory and 
hegemony over the seas’.116 This document thus represented a counterpoint to 
Scintilla issue 2’s uncritical celebration of the Anglo-Soviet agreement not to 
interfere in defeated states’ domestic politics.117 It instead predicted a cold war 
among the victorious powers: ‘Will the USSR’s alliance with the Anglo-
Americans last? We mustn’t kid ourselves! The USSR’s alliance with the two 
peoples who own most [sic] of the world’s territory and wealth is a fleeting 
illusion. When the armed conflict is finished, there will begin an economic, 
political and propaganda war between the Anglo-Americans and the USSR’.118 
 
In its emphasis on Western duplicity, this 1942 document often reads like a precursor 
to postwar Communist critiques of the Marshall Aid reconstruction programme 
offered by the USA to European nations. ‘Buldog’ reasoned that ‘The Anglo-
Americans’ first act of peace will be to offer loans and goods on credit to all the 
countries impoverished by war ... The nations who accept financial aid ... will fall 
under the imperialists’ economic influence, and it is proven that economic 
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115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Scintilla, 2, p. 1, ‘Il patto URSS Inghilterra e USA’.  
118 ACS/PS/F1/68/198/026745. 
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influence generates political influence’.119 But despite implicitly recognising that 
the Western Allies would likely shape Italy’s postwar reconstruction, ‘Buldog’ 
stopped short of admitting that this doomed its hopes of socialist revolution. If 
‘on 26 May [1942], the USSR and Britain sealed a treaty of alliance’ stating that 
they agreed ‘not to aspire for territorial conquests for themselves, and not to 
interfere in other states’ internal affairs”’ then the authors expressed their ‘hope 
that this will be respected for Italy, too. We have to hope so. If not, our possibilities 
of revolution will be compromised for a long time’.120 
 
A section entitled ‘Who will help us make the revolution?’121 warned of the 
dangers the Western Allies posed. It emphasised these states’ support for the 
White forces in the Russian Civil War of 1918–21, and warned that ‘those who 
attempt a transition to a socialist economy will inevitably provoke the hostility of 
the Anglo-American bourgeoisie’ against its ‘mortal enemy, communism’. Even 
in the face of this threat, it was mistaken to expect ‘material aid’ from the USSR: 
‘having borne the greater burden of the war’ it would ‘not be able to oppose 
anything to the imperialists’ economic policy, other than communist 
propaganda’.122 Hence ‘Italian proletarians waiting on Russian help to make the 
world revolution are living with the fairies. For our revolution we cannot count 
on the USSR’s help and must beware Anglo-American political and economic 
opposition. Who’ll help us make the revolution? Nobody’.123 For ‘Buldog’, the 
‘only hope’ that the Western Allies would not attack the ‘countries attempting 
communism’ after the predicted ‘fall of Germany’ was the possibility ‘that having 
won the war the English and American bourgeoisies will be so tired of blood and 
destruction that they’ll decide to lay down their arms’.124 
 
As well as invoking the Russian Civil War as evidence of the dangers of foreign 
intervention, these militants framed their own immediate situation within the 
terms of 1917. In this perspective, in Italy in 1942 as in Russia a quarter-century 
previously, a ‘February’ breaking with the old régime would have to be followed 
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by an ‘October’ of socialist revolution. ‘Buldog’ highlighted the imminence of this 
first turning point, as the royalist and military establishment prepared their own 
break with Fascism’s core leaders: ‘it is probable that with the war lost there will 
be a first revolution (headed by democrats or army officers) that though crushing 
fascism will conserve intact the bourgeois system that rules our nation’. 125 This 
conservative plan would, however, pose wider questions of state power: ‘It is 
probable that the [House of Savoy] will make common cause with 
revolutionaries of whatever tendency. The royals and their successors will be 
ever-ready to make deals to save the crown. We must do everything possible so 
that this barbarous medieval invention called monarchy is eliminated ... one less 
obstacle for the second revolution, a step toward socialism’.126 
 
Buldog thus read the realities of the Italian situation through the taxonomy of 
Russia’s two revolutions. As in 1917, the war was lost and the regime’s downfall 
inevitable: the question was what change could now follow. It was clear that 
ruling-class forces breaking with Mussolini’s leadership would try to limit the 
fallout of the crisis, and attempt to place themselves at the head of an anti-fascist 
alliance. For Buldog, communists must use this ‘February’ as a stepping stone to 
their ‘October’: while it was now ‘wasted breath to speak ill of Fascism, and for 
us communists it will be a tiresome effort to have to fight the Fascists’, the ‘goal 
in the first revolution [would be] to try and bring down the monarchy’. This 
intermediate goal was conceived as a step toward the ‘October’ that would 
follow; for the ultimate enemy was not Fascism, but the entire social system that 
supported it. As the authors concluded, ‘We can summarise  in two words our 
faith, which must serve as our guide in the coming struggles: ABOLISH 
CAPITAL’.127 
 
2.5. ‘From the clandestine grouplet to mass work’ 
 
The centro estero warned against such ‘blathering’ about the postwar scenario, and 
insisted on the priority of mobilising all possible forces against Fascism. This was 
itself a strategic decision, born of the Popular Front period. The party would join a 
broad democratic front and support the pro-Allied and ‘patriotic’ cause, while 
refraining from the radicalism that might give other parties a pretext to exclude it 
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from the anti-fascist coalition. During the Resistance the need for harmonious 
relations with bourgeois allies would prevent the Party from aggressively 
asserting its own particular goals. In service of this strategy, it also had to combat 
those communists who sought to heighten an anti-capitalist as well as anti-fascist 
antagonism. As part of its effort to discredit its leftist opponents, the PCI accused 
these other communists of being attesisti, the partisans of ‘all talk and no action’ 
who discussed the ‘right moment’ to act while refraining from the practical 
efforts that might bring it closer. In ironic deference to this argument, Buldog’s 
treatise on the possibility of socialist revolution in Italy was subtitled ‘Chatter’. 
 
Defending the centro estero’s line against such dissidents, in November 1942 
Mario Alicata and Franco Rodano authored the polemic ‘From the clandestine 
grouplet to mass work’. It bore a classic theme of Togliatti’s own approach, 
prioritising mass mobilisation rather than the assertion of a specifically class-war 
programme. The Communist Party of the early 1920s had been intransigent in its 
‘spirit of separation’, even at the cost of isolating itself from other anti-fascists. 
These young intellectuals were instead critical of any dogmatic ‘purism’ that 
denied revolutionaries an influence on immediate events. Alicata and Rodano 
thus lambasted ‘doctrinaires’, for whom ‘all that matters is explaining their own 
doctrine – the correct idea – to people with wrong ideas. Their principal activity 
is putting out “manifestos” – in this crisis of Fascism, Italy is brimming with 
manifestos! – each of which founds a new party or restores the “real party” ... 
 
resolving down to the last detail the problems of “tomorrow”’.128 ‘Once the manifesto 
is written, it’s not hard for the doctrinaire to find ten, twenty, a hundred people who 
think the same: hence, a clandestine group. But then what?’129 
 
Alicata and Rodano’s circle itself had only around thirty members, and was not yet 
involved in mass agitation. But they sought to convince their contacts that this 
should be their central priority. ‘Rousing classes to action’ was a different matter to 
recruiting individual communists with ‘doctrinaires’ manifestos’.130 These latter ‘shed 
no light on these classes’ experiences or needs, no help overcoming their weakness, 
no concrete weapons for struggle: therefore, they do nothing, carrying 
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on as they were’.131 They portrayed ‘self-referential’ clandestine activity – preparing 
‘webs of contacts in this or that city’ for action ‘when the benevolent God called 
England or the USSR or Badoglio comes and strikes the “deadly blow” that prepares 
the terrain for the Redemption of the masses’132 – as a passive, wait-and-see 
approach, reflecting not the ‘great, national parties’ of the future, but the impotent 
isolation to which repression condemned anti-fascists. Talk of organising veteran 
militants to exploit an ‘opportunity’ provided by outside intervention was ‘the 
vocabulary with which thousands of Italian anti-fascists “doing” politics ... 
 
with their sterile game of encounters and contacts, have studied how best to 
imitate the snake that devours its own tail’.133 
 
This polemic was directed not just against Scintilla. It also targeted circles such as the 
liberal-socialists, whom it also accused of designing blueprints for the future rather 
than working to stir masses of Italians against the régime. Later recounting this 
episode, Scintilla’s Francesco Cretara claimed that the intellectuals’ real interest was 
to close down the space for critical reflection, thus asserting their own unchallenged 
leadership.134 In his view, while the PCI did indeed wish to ‘mobilise’ the masses, 
these latter would only serve as foot-soldiers for a Party that had already decided the 
purpose and strategy of their activity on their behalf. As such, the working-class 
Italians the PCI organised would not be the conscious defenders of their own 
interests, but merely a kind of social ballast helping Party leaders to build their 
influence. In this sense, these intellectuals’ pointedly anti-intellectual focus on 
agitation – prioritising ‘rousing the masses to action’ over ‘discussing the problems of 
tomorrow’ – clearly marked a significant break with 
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the Party’s original emphasis on schooling working-class cadres in a communist 
programme.135 
 
Already at this early stage of reorganisation, Alicata and Rodano’s critique of 
‘doctrinaires’ ‘revolutionary in words alone’ contained in nuce the ideology of the 
Togliattian ‘new party’. In this perspective, the Communists would not organise 
around an immediately revolutionary programme as in the 1920s, but rather help 
to build a democratic Italy allowing the Party freedom of organisation. This 
polemic therefore foreshadowed the basic strategic divide of the Resistance 
period. In this view, the arguments posed in Scintilla reflected the same 
‘doctrinarism’ and ‘particularism’ that had hobbled the opposition to Fascism 
after World War I. The working class instead had to assert its role in a ‘national’ 
coalition, a protagonist of a ‘Second Risorgimento’ that would secure 
independence and democracy. For their leftist rivals, conversely, alliance with the 
liberals who had ruled Italy before Mussolini could only mean preserving Italian 
capitalism at its moment of greatest crisis. This would mean giving up the 
‘opportunity’ to fight for power on the model of October 1917. 
 
2.6. From Mussolini to Stalin 
 
While these two communist tendencies both sought to overcome the political 
inheritance of 1920s Italy, they also recruited intellectuals from a very different 
movement who also rejected the old liberal order: namely, Fascists. For the most part 
the individuals concerned were young men born around the time of World War I, 
who thus came to consciousness deep into the Mussolinian ventennio, and first 
engaged politically in régime-promoted philosophical and cultural forums. The 
littoriali and the welter of journals published in the Fascist period were not simply 
instruments of ‘totalitarian’ indoctrination; for their debates also partly expressed the 
régime’s internal contradictions, and indeed the gap between its stated modernising 
objectives and the conservative realities of 1930s Italy. It was this that allowed the 
Communist Party to fish for its new ‘ruling class’ of leaders like Trombadori, Alicata 
and Ingrao among Fascist student organisations; a switch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 ACS/PS/F1/68/198/0704, p. 8. 
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of intellectuals’ allegiances that became both more clear-cut and more 
widespread as the régime entered its war-crisis.136 
 
For Scintilla’s Orfeo Mucci, it was a point of honour that his comrades rebuffed such 
tainted ‘opportunists’.137 The reality was rather more complex. The Amendola circle 
was dominated by young men drawn from the Fascist student milieu, and the more 
proletarian Scintilla group refused to accept these precocious ‘aristocratic’ 
intellectuals’ leadership. Yet after twenty years of Fascism no mass political project 
could simply reject all who had participated in régime organisations. Mucci’s 
comrade Felice Chilanti (from October 1943 co-editor of Bandiera Rossa), had from 
1934 to 1942 been an enthusiastic exponent of ‘Left-Fascist’ theories, and like the 
Rome PCI’s new intellectual élite had written for journals edited by Mussolini’s key 
lieutenants. Certainly, Chilanti was exceptional insofar as the MCd’I recruited only a 
handful of former Fascist intellectuals.138 Yet each of his political affiliations from 
1930s Left-Fascism to his 1960s Maoism bears considerable analogy with Bandiera 
Rossa’s idolisation of Soviet socialism, providing a striking example of how 
enthusiasts for ‘revolutionary’ régimes could project their own ideals onto such states 
rather than merely passively accept their ideologues’ catechisms. 
 
Born to a peasant family in Rovigo five months before Italy entered the Great War, 
Chilanti came to Rome as a teenager to study agronomy, and from 1934 worked as a 
writer for the farming union’s in-house journal. He was soon drawn to Giuseppe 
Bottai and Edmondo Rossoni, syndicalists who viewed Fascism as a social revolution 
and systemic alternative to capitalism. With no socialist relatives or ties of friendship, 
the young Fascist journalist was instead educated in a politics that criticised régime 
policy only abstractly and which was based on elaborate reinterpretations of the 
Duce’s ‘myth’. For example, after Mussolini’s 14 November 1933 speech on 
corporatism attacked ‘bourgeois’ values – here referring to the ‘conservative spirit’ of 
middle-class Italians who baulked at hard work and wartime sacrifices – the Fascist 
Left took the Duce’s comments as a cue to discuss how to dissolve economic class 
divisions in general.139 The impossibility of criticising the specifics of Mussolini’s 
day-to-day policy favoured such an exchange of ‘grand plans’ for Fascism, with a 
 
 
136 Zangrandi 1962; Chilanti 1969; Serri 2005; Buchignani 1998. 
137 CGB/FAP/Mucci/26.  
138 The other key example is Guido Piovene, a novelist: cf. Gerbi 2012, and Chilanti 1996. 
139 E.g. Chilanti and Soave 1938. 
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régime intolerant of organised opposition instead becoming the focus of a range 
of competing and irreconcilable social agendas. 
 
These tensions also expressed the discrepancy between what Mussolini’s biographer 
Renzo de Felice termed ‘régime-Fascism’ and ‘movement-Fascism’: the gap 
separating the Duce’s pragmatic raison d’état from the panoply of hopes placed in 
Fascism by its grassroots supporters, often favouring a fuller ‘totalitarian’ assault on 
the royal, military and Church establishment. Chilanti’s syndicalist comrades were 
themselves impatient at Fascism’s failure to realise the ambitious social objectives of 
its 1919 programme, known as Sansepolcrismo: a ‘Left’ current of Italian Fascism, 
never suppressed outright in the manner of ‘Strasserite’ Nazism. While their 
publications like Lavoro Fascista, L’Ordine Corporativo or Primato did little to shape 
régime policy, being read only by a narrow intellectual élite, they did pose major 
philosophical questions over Fascism’s long-term goals: did it have universal values? 
Were Fascists in favour of the abolition of money and the state? Could colonised 
Ethiopia be a sandbox for trialling a ‘proletarian cooperativist’ economy?140 If these 
circles were infiltrated by an anti-fascist fronda [internal opposition] and also 
involved afascisti [non-fascists] of little definite political conviction, they were 
broadly hegemonised by sincere Fascists seeking to expand the régime’s socially 
reforming character. 
 
This ‘modernism’ affected even Mussolinian intellectuals’ view of the ‘great 
experiment’ in Russia, from Curzio Malaparte’s 1929 visit to Moscow to ex-
communist Nicola Bombacci’s review La Verità, published with Mussolini’s backing 
from 1936 onward.141 Chilanti even wrote an October 1939 piece for Gerarchia142 – the 
most ‘official’ Fascist journal, nominally edited by Il Duce himself – with a glowing 
review of the 1934 book The Triumph of Fascism in the USSR,143 which argued that 
Stalin had abandoned ‘internationalist Marxism’ in favour of ‘Mussolini’s black 
Bolshevism’. Published just five weeks after the Hitler-Stalin Pact, this article 
echoed James Burnham144 and Bruno Rizzi’s145 analyses of the worldwide  
 
 
 
140 On Ethiopia, cf. Il Bò, III/19, 15.11.1937, p. 1, ‘Giustizia sociale’; for wider discussion, cf.  
Zangrandi 1962; Parlato 2008; Serri 2005. 
141 Named after the Soviet Pravda.  
142 Gerarchia, October 1939, pp. 692–93, ‘Stalin contro la democrazia’.  
143 Bertoni 1934.  
144 Burnham 1941. 
145 Rizzi 1939. 
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tendency toward ‘total’ plannerism, although Chilanti interpreted this change 
favourably as the path to social justice and the end of alienated labour.146 While 
his associates included former communists like Bombacci and Lo Stato Corporativo 
editor Vittorio Ambrosino,147 this syncretic politics was far from inherently anti-
fascist: Bombacci was executed in 1945 for his role as the Salò Republic’s Labour 
Minister, while Ambrosini was a fascist parliamentary candidate in 1958. 
 
The quixotic Ambrosini was Chilanti’s partner in perhaps the most radical of all 
Left-Fascist projects, a revolutionary circle founded in January 1941 revolving 
around the newspaper Domani [‘Tomorrow’]. Appearing every three weeks, 
Domani characterised Italy’s mobilisation against the Western democracies as the 
opportunity for Fascism both to destroy these ‘capitalist imperialisms’ and 
accelerate its domestic social revolution. The editorial staff, which also included 
future novelist Vasco Pratolini, however grew increasingly despondent at the 
progress of the war; himself sent to the front in Albania, Chilanti was alarmed by 
conscripts’ total apathy toward the social radicalism that he identified with the 
Fascist war effort.148 Nonetheless, Domani did soon attract the attentions of the 
philo-Nazi poet Ezra Pound, who became a frequent participant in discussions of 
Fascist economic and cultural policy at Chilanti’s Via Frattini residence. Chilanti 
later recalled Pound’s bemusement at the ideas of his ‘anarcho-fascist’ friends, 
whose noisy criticisms of bourgeois elements of the régime saw Domani’s right to 
publish suspended in October 1941, after its ninth issue.149 
 
Domani’s ultimate undoing was its botched conspiracy to assassinate Foreign 
Minister Galeazzo Ciano, in its attempt to eliminate a régime ‘conservative’ and thus 
‘impose an energetic socialist policy on Il Duce’.150 Betrayed by an informant, the plot 
quickly collapsed, with the conspirators each arrested on 22 March 1942. ‘Is this the 
onset of anti-fascism?’ Ciano asked in his diary entry on the failed attack.151 Not 
quite: Chilanti had long nurtured hopes in a socially-revolutionary 
 
 
 
 
146 Chilanti and Soave 1938. 
147 A former commander of the Arditi del Popolo.  
148 Chilanti 1972a 
149 Chilanti 1972b. 
150 Ciano 1980, p. 602 
151 Ibid. Also mentioned in Pound’s Pisan Cantos, LXXVII/177–82. 
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Fascism, and only after his arrest did he repudiate the régime and its record. 
Where numerous intellectuals including the members of the Amendola circle had 
started playing a doppio gioco [hedging their bets] in the late 1930s, and in postwar 
years insisted that they had broken early and decisively with Mussolini, Chilanti 
(much like Ruggero Zangrandi)152 resisted the temptation to deny his sincere 
youthful Fascism.153 Nonetheless, the self-described ‘anarcho-fascist’s’ 1942 arrest 
and the collapse of Domani did mark his final estrangement from régime circles, 
forcing him into confino on the island of Lipari. The exiled journalist now came to 
project his utopian ideals onto the Red Army resistance at Stalingrad, falling into 
line with his Croatian cellmates.154 
 
This was but the start of Chilanti’s long journey through the Left, in a career 
marked by a continuing inability to fold to organisational discipline. Rejected for 
PCI membership in Lipari, upon reaching Rome in August 1943 he instead 
approached Bandiera Rossa, and on account of his journalistic skills155 soon 
became co-editor of its newspaper. After the war he departed for the PCI, before 
becoming a Maoist, and then entering the New Left Avanguardia Operaia in 1971. 
In a memoir appearing that same year, he lamented having backed quite so many 
failed revolutionary projects: ‘I sat at the bar and wondered – so who was I? I 
never did capture Mussolini in 1942, I never did stick a gun to his back… and nor 
did I get to wipe out Rome’s big capitalists in Rome on the morning of Liberation 
with my Bandiera Rossa comrades’.156 In this sense, Chilanti’s Stalinist epiphany at 
Lipari157 was barely less ill-fated than his earlier Fascist utopianism. Nonetheless, 
if Chilanti was in many senses an unusual figure, his idolisation of a series of 
‘revolutionary’ régimes points to important broader traits of wartime Italian 
political culture. 
 
While the Stalinist or Fascist ‘leader cult’ is widely identified with totalising 
authoritarian power, its contradiction lay in the fact that the idolisation of Stalin or 
 
 
 
152 Zangrandi 1962.  
153 Chilanti 1969; Chilanti 1972b.  
154 ‘I knew nothing about Bordiga, but during the battle of Stalingrad my fellow Croat 
confinati and I greeted each other by quietly chanting Volga, Volga. Stalin was the hero of 
our divided lives’: Chilanti 2004, p. 68.  
155 Primo incontro con Chilanti 3.6.1966’: MSdL/FSC/26/22.  
156 Chilanti 1971, p. 29. 
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Mussolini158 meant millions of people projecting their own aspirations onto a 
single figure. The cult thus embodied myriad interests the leader could never 
reconcile, being at once the source of authority and the cipher for the competing 
myths created by those vesting their faith in him. 159 This was partly resolved by 
the various psychological means of rationalising the idol’s failings, from the 
‘movement-Fascists’ who believed that the King and Church were obstructing 
Mussolini’s social revolution, to the outcast communists who wrote to Stalin 
from the Gulag pleading for him to intervene against the lowly officials they 
blamed for their supposedly ‘mistaken’ punishment. A similar logic governed 
Scintilla militants’ rejection of Togliattian authority, for they refused to believe 
the Amendola group’s claims to be following ‘orders from Moscow’ precisely 
because its positions so sharply contradicted their own Soviet mythology. For 
these militants, the USSR was not just a ‘beacon of socialism’ irradiating outward, 
but a screen onto which they projected ideals of their own creation. 
 
Such idolisation of the ‘workers’ fatherland’ was especially boundless on the Italian 
underground, isolated from the Comintern across two decades of repression. Where 
exiled Party leaders loyally followed Stalin’s policy zigzags, the Italian subculture 
developed its folk mythology of the USSR free of the political constraints that 
Moscow imposed on its satellites. If, as Cortesi explains, most underground 
communists saw recent Soviet history ‘only through the prism of Fascist propaganda, 
which they simply turned on its head’160 they venerated not Soviet society such as it 
really was, but as a ‘site for the projection of class feelings and aspirations’ opposite 
to Fascist Italy.161 Mussolini’s anti-communism itself fed their cult of the USSR, 
allowing them not only to dismiss even accurate press reports of Stalinist atrocities as 
mere Fascist propaganda, but also to interpret Il Duce’s attempts to paint all 
opposition as ‘communist’ as evidence of rising Soviet power. Scintilla issue 1’s 
headline spoke of ‘Communism stand[ing] accused’. Its ‘defence’ case answered a 
 
 
 
 
 
158 Indeed, given that religious idols are not a power unto themselves, but human artefacts 
that men invest with the authority to rule over them, we might say that Mussolini or Stalin 
were ‘idols’ precisely insofar as the cult was outside of their own control. 
 
159 The Latin root of ‘cult’, colere, means both ‘to cultivate’ and ‘to worship’; it can be 
taken to mean an active, creative process as well as mere obedience.  
160 Cortesi 1999, pp. 418–19. 
161 Ibid. 
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‘prosecution’ that posed the alternative: fascist New Order or ‘the Bolshevisation 
of Europe’?162 
 
As the Red Army began reversing the Axis onslaught, long-defeated militants 
imagining that the ‘time to settle accounts’ was finally at hand voiced a Soviet-
inspired maximalism exceeding even the intentions of PCI leaders. To refashion 
De Felice’s terms, just as cadres’ ‘régime-Stalinist’ defence of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact in August 1939 had shocked students previously attracted by 
Soviet anti-fascism, the Togliattian ‘national front’ with liberals and 
conservatives after June 1941 contradicted the ‘movement-Stalinist’ faith in the 
immediate ‘advent’ of socialism. The strategic duplicity that came naturally to 
exiles trained in defending Kremlin foreign-policy was still effectively unknown 
to an Italian underground who had always abstractly idolised Stalin more than 
they actually conformed to his policy turns. In this sense, we can distinguish 
underground militants’ ‘untarnished philo-Sovietism’ from the more cynical 
view of Party officials who knew Stalinist duplicity first-hand.163 Already by the 
start of the war this contradiction had begun producing ‘movement-Stalinist’ 
tendencies outside of Party cadres’ control. 
 
As we have seen, such tensions in wartime communist culture were evident 
already in Rome’s very first clandestine circles. A Soviet-inspired triumphalism 
widespread even among those communists who criticised merely messianic 
hopes of Red Army intervention. We have seen the paradox that while these 
conspiratorial networks each idolised Stalin’s USSR, they were riven by sharp 
political divisions as well as numerous militants’ refusal to accept official Party 
cadres’ authority. Scintilla and the Amendola group were not yet mass 
organisations, and after the December 1942 police crackdown their activity was 
much reduced. But if, as they both agreed, communists could not just passively 
await the Allies’ arrival, then their competing strategies could have a real impact 
on shaping the new Italy. As we shall see in Chapter Three, the German invasion 
brought a social crisis in which their organisations could prosper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Scintilla, 1, ‘Il comunismo in stato d’accusa’.  
163 Barth Urban 1986. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Out of clandestinity – and back again 
 
25 July and the fall of Fascism came. The monarchy thought it could get rid of 
Mussolini and happily continue as before, with Vittorio Emanuele handing 
control of the government to his ally Badoglio. The parties now felt liberated 
from the grip of Fascism. We, conversely, turned our cells into combat cells, 
ready for when … the war would officially be over, in order to fight against the 
Germans and the residues of Fascism, and above all against capitalism. 
 
San Lorenzo MCd’I commander Orfeo Mucci, 1995 interview1 
 
 
 
 
On 25 July 1943 Vittorio Emanuele III sacked Benito Mussolini, completing a 
decisive split in the Italian ruling class. Previous months had seen both 
revolutionary conspiracies and dissident élites preparing for the Duce’s downfall, 
as competing oppositions prepared to exploit the crisis of régime authority. Yet 
only in summer 1943 did a breach finally open up in the self-proclaimed 
‘totalitarian’ state, as Italy’s royalist-military establishment moved to free itself of 
Mussolini’s disastrous leadership. Starting with the US landings in Sicily on 10 
July, the two months concluding with the Wehrmacht invasion were indeed 
‘weeks when decades happened’,2 as the fallout of a two-decade régime pitched 
the country’s traditional institutions into chaos. With Italy rapidly divided 
between not only Allied and Axis invaders but also two warring national 
governments, anti-fascists now began to build a counter-power of their own. 
 
In Chapter Three we shall see how the Roman Left developed from small 
conspiratorial circles into movements able to mobilise thousands in armed struggle. 
Again we shall highlight the connections between the international context, domestic 
Italian politics and communists’ view of their own activity. After surveying the 
proximate causes of the 25 July coup, we shall explore ruling-class efforts to stabilise 
the Italian political situation, and the cautious sympathy they 
 
 
 
1 Orfeo Mucci, interview for Regione Lazio, Banca della Memoria, 1995, available online 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlSyH9tiFZY  
2 An apocryphal Lenin quote, originating in Györgÿ Lukács’s Lenin: A Study in the Unity 
of his Thought. 
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earned among the Allied leaderships. Noting that Badoglio’s government was 
slow to introduce liberalising measures, this chapter shows that the new régime 
effectively allowed the anti-fascist parties greater freedom of organisation while 
failing to consolidate its own legitimacy with any decisive change of political 
direction. This ambivalence set the political tone for the Resistance movements 
that followed the 8 September Wehrmacht invasion. 
 
The events of summer 1943 not only encouraged the formation of the MCd’I, but 
created the political vacuum in which its ideas could take root. While March-
April saw major strike waves in the great factories of Turin and Milan, largely 
initiated by these cities’ renascent PCI cells,3 there had been no such social revolt 
in Rome, where communist organisation was yet to recover from the December 
1942 régime crackdown, and workplace agitation absent. Only after the palace 
coup against Mussolini, leading to the gradual release of most political prisoners, 
could Scintilla and the ‘workers’ and intellectuals’ group’ return to building their 
clandestine networks. Yet this did not mean that working-class Romans watched 
the unfolding crisis merely passively, or that their responses were conditioned 
only by hatred of the Fascist dictator. As a look at the city’s San Lorenzo district 
indicates, even the Roman proletariat’s less formally-organised ‘class politics’ left 
it distrustful of many now claiming to be its liberators. 
 
3.1. The war comes home 
 
The US Air Force’s bombing of San Lorenzo on 19 July 1943 was the first aerial 
assault on the capital. Already nine days earlier Anglo-American forces had 
established a toehold in Sicily, threatening to invade the Italian mainland; on 14 May 
Flying Fortresses had wreaked havoc at the port of Civitavecchia, 80km west of the 
capital. Many observers nonetheless assumed that Rome was to be spared such 
destruction. Just as other bombed-out populations resented the city’s seeming 
immunity,4 Father Libero Raganella recounted San Lorenzo residents’ sceptical view 
of the drill exercises organised by the district’s septuagenarian UNPA air-raid 
wardens.5 19 July would tragically explode such complacency. Raganella’s diary 
describes ‘a deafening roar, the ground shaking like an earthquake even as the first 
 
 
 
3 See Mason’s (2008) essay on the March 1943 strikes.  
4 Discussed in Petrella 2016. 
5 Raganella 2000, p. 91. 
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note of the siren was still sounding’. 6 A thousand tonnes of American bombs 
claimed 1,600 lives in San Lorenzo alone: the priest witnessed ‘a scene like the 
end of the world, nothing to be seen but rubble and collapsed buildings, and the 
human lives buried underneath’.7 
 
This San Lorenzo cleric would later publish his diary under the title Without 
asking what side they’re on,8 expressing his pastoral vocation to assist those in 
distress regardless of their ideological or military allegiances. Yet few could fail 
to see the political significance of this human tragedy. The night after the Allied 
attack, Blackshirts painted the ironic words ‘THE LIBERATORS’ WORK’ on 
buildings around the district, attempting to whip up animosity against the 
Anglo-Americans; police-intelligence sources report the spread of rumours that 
the ‘plutocratic democracies’9 had targeted San Lorenzo precisely because it had 
a reputation as a ‘Red’ district.10 Many sanlorenzini saw further evidence for this 
conspiracy theory in the fact that President Roosevelt had publically committed 
to keep USAF planes away from the Holy See: why could he not extend the same 
concern to ordinary Romans?11 
 
This idea of a neighbourhood unjustly punished for Mussolini’s actions gained 
such currency locally that some seven decades later Scintilla co-founder Agostino 
Raponi’s daughter Franca could write ‘It’s worth remembering that the bombing 
of San Lorenzo struck against a neighbourhood and a community that had 
strenuously resisted Fascism, with the Allied incursions claiming some 1,600 
victims. This was no normal military occurrence – the Red Army victory at 
Stalingrad and the Anglo-American landings in Sicily had already shown that the 
war was won’.12 We might doubt that American commanders were aware of this 
population’s radical past; the bombers in any case targeted not San Lorenzo but a 
series of nearby rail yards, claiming 1,400 lives outside of the district. However, 
the popular myth that the Americans deliberately attacked a ‘Red area’ that had 
 
 
6 Raganella 2000, p. 93.  
7 Raganella 2000, p. 95. 
8 Raganella 2000: Senza sapere di che parte stanno.  
9 Though this term for the USA and Britain was initially drawn from Fascist propaganda, 
it soon became part of leftist discourse and popular parlance in general.  
10 Discussed in Piccioni 1984, pp. 142–3.  
11 Of course, this was not simply a matter of preferring churches to people as an attempt 
to avoid gifting a propaganda coup to the Axis powers and antagonising Catholics. 
12 Raponi 2011. 
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‘never given in’ to Mussolini certainly does tell us of sanlorenzini’s pride in their 
neighbourhood’s ‘subversive’ traditions, upholding a locally-rooted class identity 
connected to great questions of international politics. 
 
The notion of a ‘Red’ San Lorenzo was built around a mythologised ‘long resistance’, 
rooting class identity less in the world of labour than in the district’s alienness from 
the Fascist ‘national community’. After actively opposing Mussolini’s coup, a 
stubborn minority of sanlorenzini continued in passive resistance such as removing 
their children from Fascist mass organisations, failing to contribute to the ‘wedding 
rings for Ethiopia’ initiative,13 or perhaps ‘raising a glass for the jailed comrades’ on 
May Day.14 While many jobs required Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) membership – 
for instance at the ATAG public-transport authority, a major employer in a district 
standing between Rome’s two largest railway stations – some refused to join.15 In 
1939 San Lorenzo operatic tenor Nicola Stame was arrested on-stage during his 
rehearsals for Puccini’s Turandot because he would not take a PNF card.16 He would 
later become a local MCd’I commander. Though such resistance was far from 
unanimously or consistently observed,17 the defiance shown by some sanlorenzini 
concentrated a collective sense of class pride and local belonging, hardening as war 
conditions worsened. 
 
We can see the political importance of these myths when we consider the widely-
asserted claim that San Lorenzo was the only neighbourhood in Italy to resist the 
‘March on Rome’. The details of this story as commonly retold – with women 
throwing pans of boiling water over the invading Blackshirts from rooftops on the 
Via Tiburtina, before Arditi del Popolo militants opened fire to force the squadristi’s 
retreat – in fact referred to disruption of a Fascist-stewarded funeral procession five 
months earlier, the last time locals had routed the PNF streetfighters.18 Yet this 
conflation of local history with events of grander political significance reinforced the 
idea of San Lorenzo as a constant source of insubordination; a community that 
resisted Fascism even as other Italians bowed to its authority. This oppositional 
 
 
13 A bid by the regime to extract precious metals by popular contribution. 
14 Discussed at length in Piccioni 1984.  
15 Ibid.  
16 See Alessandro Portelli’s interview with Stame’s daughter Rosetta: CGB/FAP/Stame.  
17 In fact far from consistently opposing all aspects of régime policy, Stame had fought on 
the Fascist side in both Ethiopia and Spain. 
18 Piccioni 1984. 
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identity took on fresh meaning after the 19 July 1943 bombings, sealing the 
population’s definitive rejection of a hopeless war. Implicitly identifying all true 
sanlorenzini as anti-fascists,19 the collective alibi of the ‘long resistance’ not only 
highlighted the injustice of the US Air Force’s attack, but also burnished worker-
radicals’ credentials as representatives of the community as a whole. 
 
Politically-engaged militants were only ever a small minority of San Lorenzo 
residents, but their concerted activism heavily shaped the culture of a 
neighbourhood only first built in the 1880s. A local working-class movement first 
took shape with the anarchist and socialist meeting-halls, clubs and co-operatives of 
the late nineteenth century, in which independent artisans and small shopkeepers 
came together with Southern migrant labourers seeking employment in Rome’s 
booming construction trade. Mainly led by autodidacts and populated by the semi-
literate, this emerging movement was not simply a local emanation of the Left parties 
organising nationally; rather, it was strongly coloured by a kind of folk sovversivismo, 
a quasi-religious utopianism, and an instinctive hostility toward institutional 
power.20 This did not mean a total rejection of party organisation: most of the San 
Lorenzo workers’ circles did affiliate to the Partito Socialista Italiano upon its 1892 
creation, with some then voting (largely en bloc) to join the Communists in 1921. But 
if the PCd’I focused its efforts on giving a lead to the unionised factory workers of 
Italy’s Northern cities, San Lorenzo’s ‘subversives’ were far less easily disciplined in 
a cadre party. 
 
This autonomous sovversivismo was most apparent in the Arditi del Popolo movement 
of 1921–22, with the PCd’I office on the Via dei Sardi – inherited from older anarchist 
circles – serving as a key mobilising hub, despite Party leaders’ ban on members’ 
involvement. Defying prime minister Ivanoe Bonomi’s attempts to suppress the AdP 
as well as national PCd’I and Socialist officials’ deprecation of this anarchist-hued 
movement, hundreds of sanlorenzini took up arms to defend their area from 
Blackshirt streetfighters. This militancy was remembered long after Mussolini’s 
coming-to-power, thanks not only to popular legend but also the individuals 
connecting different generations of armed struggle. San Lorenzo AdP 
 
 
19 In conversations with elderly San Lorenzo residents during my research I was 
repeatedly told that any local Fascists ‘must have’ come from outside the neighbourhood.  
20 Only in 1912 was ‘universal suffrage’ introduced for the one-quarter of Italians who 
were male and aged over 30. 
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leader Renato Gentilezza, a watchmaker who led a 1924 armed assault on the 
district’s Fascist headquarters,21 was central to its MCd’I cell from August 1943 
onward; his fellow anarchist Celestino Avico, owner of a gravestone workshop 
bordering the Verano cemetery, fashioned explosives for the Resistance-era Armata 
Rossa as for the anti-fascists of 1921.22 Orfeo Mucci, son of a turn-of-the-century 
anarchist bakers’ leader and himself a child witness to the Arditi del Popolo,23 
remained an iconic figure of the sanlorenzino Left from the 1930s to the 1990s. 
 
This idea of a ‘long resistance’ provided the political underpinning for two 
enduring popular myths about the bombing of San Lorenzo. Firstly, it fed the 
notion that given sanlorenzini’s historic opposition to Mussolini, 19 July 1943 
marks part of the neighbourhood’s anti-fascist tradition rather than a mere 
tragedy resulting from the war. Telling in this regard is the paradoxical 
remembrance of the US Air Force’s victims as ‘martyrs of the Italian Resistance’, 
with the local branch of partisan veterans’ association ANPI still today holding 
its annual commemorations on this anniversary. Secondly, already in July 1943, 
the notion that in punishing an ‘anti-fascist community’ for the Duce’s war, the 
Allies had made clear their indifference or even hostility toward this population: 
that as in 1922, sanlorenzini would themselves have to fight for their freedom. In 
claiming that the USAF deliberately targeted a ‘Red area’, sovversivi emphasised 
working-class Romans and the Anglo-Americans ultimately had opposing 
interests, even as the Allies brought Fascism to near-collapse. Such was the 
terrain in which Bandiera Rossa’s anti-establishment ideas now began to take root. 
 
3.2. The overthrow of Mussolini, and the ’45 Days’ 
 
The 19 July Allied bombing of Rome not only brought calamity for the people of San 
Lorenzo, but also marked the end of Italian élites’ tolerance of the Mussolini régime. 
Relations between the royalist-military establishment and the Duce had worsened 
across three years of setbacks in North Africa and the Balkans, and by the time of the 
24 July Fascist Grand Council tensions had reached breaking-point. Although the 
Duce began this leadership summit with an address insisting that he 
 
 
 
21 Piccioni 1984.  
22 Bentivegna 1983, pp. 64–8, describes this Armata Rossa commander also supplying 
explosives to the GAP.  
23 Described in his interview with Alessandro Portelli in CGB/FAP. 
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could still achieve an honourable outcome to the war, it soon became apparent 
that his lieutenants had called the meeting precisely because they were now hell-
bent on ousting the failed imperial adventurer. Passing a motion of no-
confidence in the Duce at 2 a.m. on 25 July, the Council voted 19 to 8 to hand 
control of the war effort to the King; when Mussolini headed to the palace later 
that morning, Vittorio Emanuele III had him arrested and taken to prison in an 
ambulance. The septuagenarian monarch now appointed Marshal Pietro 
Badoglio, conqueror of Ethiopia in 1935–36, as his new prime minister. 
 
Both the international situation and mounting turmoil on the home front encouraged 
Italian élites’ final break with the Duce. One key flashpoint was the March-April 1943 
strike wave in Turin and Milan, clearly indicating the potential for social unrest. 
Adolf Hitler himself criticised Mussolini’s failure to clamp down harder on this 
revolt in the Northern factories, noting that he had ‘always said that in these cases 
those who show any weakness are lost’.24 Yet the ‘intransigence’ the Führer 
recommended was exactly the approach that conservatives like the King and 
Marshal Badoglio repudiated on 25 July. While Mussolini advocated a fight to the 
last man against the Allied armies now overrunning Sicily, his erstwhile ruling-class 
supporters also understood that this was not the only path open to them. Military 
retreat on all fronts, chronic power shortages, and a mounting food crisis all posed an 
immediate danger to social stability, with the régime unable even to deliver Italians’ 
890 calories of daily rations.25 To save the state itself, it was imperative to reach a deal 
with the invading powers. 
 
At January 1943’s Casablanca Conference the UK and US leaderships had apparently 
ruled out any prospect of a truce with Italy, demanding that the Axis states offer 
their unconditional surrender. Yet the defection of Algeria’s Vichyite governors the 
previous month had also shown a willingness to deal with even authoritarian élites 
who broke with Hitler. Seeking to save themselves from Fascism’s crisis, Italian 
royalist circles grasped at this apparent opportunity. Just as the November 1942 
landings in North Africa led local Vichyite bosses to abandon Marshal Pétain, it was 
the Allied incursions in Sicily that forced the hand 
 
 
 
24 Quoted in Behan 2009, p. 43.  
25 Massola 1973 usefully reconstructs the rations situation, including in the Northern 
cities in the months before the 1943 strike wave. 
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of plotters in Rome, who after ousting the Duce on 25 July immediately began 
overtures for an armistice. Notwithstanding their ‘unconditional surrender’ 
policy, Roosevelt and Churchill were prepared to cooperate with Badoglio. By 30 
July the President had told US media that he would negotiate with whoever 
‘could best give us first, disarmament and second, assurance against chaos’,26 
noting in a wire to 10 Downing Street that such deals would doubtless provoke 
complaints from ‘the same element that made such a fuss over North Africa’.27 
 
Cautious over Badoglio’s real intentions, the Allies nonetheless hoped that he could 
extricate Italy from the war in an orderly fashion. Churchill warned his Foreign 
Secretary that while Rome would have to make a ‘formal act of submission’, it was 
important to avoid ‘harping on about “unconditional surrender” with no prospect of 
mercy held out even as an act of grace’, for this ‘may well lead to no surrender at 
all’.28 The British Prime Minister told Roosevelt that he was ‘not in the least afraid’ of 
‘seeming to recognise’ the post-coup régime, if this meant a deal that could ‘undue 
burdens on our troops’: the King and Badoglio not only had the authority to 
demobilise Italy’s military, but also stood against ‘chaos, Bolshevisation and civil 
war’.29 This concern to prevent social disorder in Italy seems to have figured centrally 
in Churchill’s lenient attitude toward the Badoglio government: he warned Roosevelt 
that the country ‘had turned Red overnight’ after ‘twenty years of fascism’, which 
had ‘obliterated the middle class’; there was now ‘nothing between the King, with 
the patriots who have rallied around him, who have complete control, and rampant 
Bolshevism’.30 
 
In this same transatlantic missive Churchill emphasised that the 25 July coup had 
sparked ‘Communist demonstrations which had to be put down by armed force’,31 
with the popular reaction to the Duce’s downfall extending to looting, attacks on 
government property, and jail-breaks including the escape of over a thousand 
inmates from Rome’s Regina Coeli prison. The new régime had deposed Mussolini 
not least in order to keep the state intact, and it acted decisively to prevent 
 
 
 
 
26 ‘President Roosevelt to Prime Minister, 30.7.1943, cited in Churchill 1951, p. 59.  
27 Ibid.  
28 ‘Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary’, 9.8.1943, Churchill 1951, p. 91. 
29 ‘Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt’, 31.7.1943, Churchill 1951, p. 59.  
30 ‘Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt’, 5.8.1943, Churchill 1951, p. 89. 
31 Ibid. 
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Fascism’s crisis sparking wider disorder. On 26–27 July troops broke up rallies in 
Milan, Florence, Turin, La Spezia and Sesto Fiorentino; nine workers were shot 
dead in Reggio Emilia, together with 23 members of a crowd gathering outside a 
Bari jail to demand anti-fascist prisoners’ release.32 Popular-culture portrayals of 
25 July typically focus on street celebrations fêting the King’s dismissal of 
Mussolini, yet the two days of unrest that followed saw 87 people killed.33 
Despite Badoglio’s private determination to end the war, as armistice talks 
continued he maintained a façade of loyalty to Berlin, declaring in his radio 
address to the long-suffering Italian people that ‘the war goes on’. 
 
Even in maintaining an outward rhetoric of continuity Badoglio was not merely 
intransigent, and after suppressing ‘subversive’ protests the new régime also 
made liberalising measures in an attempt to shore up its authority. This included 
an effort to co-opt representatives of democratic parties into the government, 
with the King’s confidant Ivanoe Bonomi – 1921-22 prime minister and himself 
one of the actors behind the Badoglio coup34 – serving as an intermediary 
between the new régime and the traditional anti-fascist politicians. Convening 
three meetings of Christian-Democrat, Liberal, Socialist, Communist and Partito 
d’Azione leaders in Rome from 27 to 31 July, the liberal grandee Bonomi made 
clear the new authorities’ intention of breaking up the National Fascist Party and 
securing an armistice with the Allies. On 3 August these parties’ leaders entered 
talks with Badoglio in search of official recognition and the release of political 
prisoners. These requests were granted, and the government also agreed to allow 
the formation of state-supervised trade unions, appointing representatives of the 
PCI, Socialists and Christian-Democrats as ‘labour commissars’ to survey 
working conditions in the Northern war industries. 
 
These democratic parties termed themselves a Comitato delle Opposizioni (Cd’O), 
and during the ‘45 Days’ between 25 July and the 8 September German invasion 
they maintained a difficult co-operation with Badoglio. The PCI’s Giorgio 
Amendola proposed to the other parties that they invite Badoglio to form a 
‘national-unity’ government, in which the Marshal would remain Minister of 
 
 
 
32 Peregalli 1991, p. 13.  
33 Ibid.  
34 See Bonomi 1947, his diary of this period. 
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War,35 but this proposal was sunk by the republican opposition coming from the 
Socialists and Actionists. Concerned to maintain a common front, the Cd’O 
parties thus refused any discussion of cabinet posts, in response to which snub 
Badoglio stopped informing them of the progress of armistice negotiations. The 
committee thus maintained a somewhat ambiguous position across the 
remainder of the 45 Days, issuing barbed public statements demanding that the 
government sue for peace, yet collaborating with Badoglio in creating state-
supervised trade unions. The régime that had bloodily suppressed popular 
demonstrations in the wake of the coup had not formally incorporated the 
democratic parties, but had tamed possible sources of rebellion. 
 
3.3. The Rome PCI after 25 July 
 
Badoglio’s overtures to anti-fascist forces found an unlikely ally in the 
Communist Party leadership, whose cadres sought a broad anti-Nazi alliance. In 
this sense, the Party’s ultimate decision to join the King’s government – the turn 
that Togliatti announced upon his return from Soviet exile in March 1944 – was 
far from what one Trotskyist historian has called the replacement of a ‘class-
struggle’ strategy with one of ‘national unity’.36 Already in the ’45 Days’ of 
summer 1943, the PCI leaders’ explicit policy was to build a broad national front 
against Hitler. Promoted by the Comintern since July 1941, this was a strategy to 
which all of the Togliattians’ tactical shifts conformed, seeking common action 
with not just other working-class or left-wing parties but ‘even bourgeois and 
reactionary’ forces opposed to Nazi Germany. Given their common grounding in 
this Comintern policy, the PCI’s line bore close similarities with the behaviour of 
France’s PCF, which had on 30 May 1943 entered the Algiers-based provisional 
government led by generals De Gaulle and Giraud. 
 
At a leadership summit on 15 August Northern-based organisers quizzed 
Amendola on his reasons for providing a labour commissar to Badoglio even 
before his chosen candidate Giovanni Roveda had reached the capital. Yet what 
was most striking about this meeting was the overriding level of political 
agreement, even among cadres who had little contact over summer 1943. In this 
 
 
 
 
35 Amendola 1973, p. 131.  
36 Gluckstein 2013, p. 155. 
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sense, while Amendola took personal initiative in providing a labour commissar to 
Badoglio, this conformed to a wider PCI strategy. Not only were all present united 
around the ‘national-front’ strategy, but they even agreed over its particular tactical 
expression, endorsing Roveda’s ‘technical but not political’ collaboration with 
Badoglio. Party historian Paolo Spriano makes much of a missive from the PCF 
discussed at this meeting, critical of Amendola’s seeming embrace of the new 
authorities. He claims that attendees imagined this letter an indirect warning from 
Moscow against excessive trust in the new régime.37 Yet this PCI leadership summit 
produced no change of political orientation, and resulted in a geographical rather 
than political reshuffling of its leading personnel.38 
 
For want of leader Palmiro Togliatti’s direct presence on Italian soil, the PCI 
apparatus taking form across the 45 Days combined several different centres of 
authority. This was a side-effect of Badoglio’s liberalisation measures, which 
returned to Party ranks a number of cadres who had remained imprisoned or in 
confino during the PCI reorganisation efforts that preceded the coup. Concretising 
a divide that would endure until Togliatti’s arrival in late March 1944, on 29 
August 1943 the national leadership separated into two groups, with a Rome 
centre led by Luigi Longo, Mauro Scoccimarro, Agostino Novella, Roveda and 
Amendola, and its Milan counterpart by Umberto Massola, Pietro Secchia, 
Girolamo Li Causi, and Celeste Negarville.39 As well as being one of two hubs of 
‘national’ PCI leadership, the capital also had its own Party structures, with 
overlapping apparatuses for the city of Rome and the wider Lazio Federation. It 
was Novella, arriving from Milan at the end of August, who took charge of the 
capital’s PCI organisation, with Amendola in turn representing the national 
leadership on the Lazio Federation’s various working bodies.40 
 
Despite the Rome PCI leaders’ unity around the ‘national-front’ strategy, they 
faced difficulties creating Party branches on this basis. This problem was 
aggravated by the fact that communist groups had already begun appearing 
outside of PCI structures, mostly ignorant of or opposed to the official Party line. 
 
 
 
 
37 Spriano 1973. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Amendola 1973, p. 153. 
40 Ibid. 
  
84 
 
 
A November 1943 Lazio Federation Committee report41 noted that ‘before 26 July 
only one part of the Roman communists was directly in contact with the P[arty]’; 
there had only ‘existed various groupings scattered here and there’, autonomous 
initiatives ‘propagandising with their own local papers and leaflets’.42 If these 
circles’ activity showed that ‘our Party was never destroyed in Rome’,43 only the 
Amendola group had been connected to the PCI centre, with the December 1942 
arrests44 in particular suggesting it was ‘imprudent for Party members to present 
themselves as such [to other underground circles] when comrades’ conspiratorial 
level was not very developed’.45 Only after the ‘fall of the Fascist government’ on 
25 July did the PCI form a regional federation ‘to unite all these disparate groups 
and groupuscules’; a task made yet more difficult by the prevalent political mood 
among Roman communists. 
 
Arriving from Milan to organise Rome’s new PCI federation, Agostino Novella 
found an underground including not only ‘the residues of old parties and tendencies’ 
but also the ‘movements and individuals that 25 July violently pushed onto the 
Italian political scene’.46 The man responsible for building the Roman PCI noted that 
these rising forces, ‘lack[ing] a spirit of discipline’ were now ‘knocking on the door of 
our party, dazzled,47 seduced and enthused by the Soviet Union’s clamorous political 
and military victories’, and ‘desirous of “doing what they did in Russia”’.48 This 
‘Soviet prestige’ however led these militants to want ‘to go too far, that is, to do the 
wrong thing for the current moment’; they were ‘anything but persuaded by the 
national-front policy, which they deride as reformist and collaborationist’.49 Novella 
ascribed this leftist mentality to the ‘social composition 
 
 
41 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November  
1943: APC/7/2/14, p. 4.  
42 Anniversary of Russia’s October Revolution.  
43 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November   
1943: APC/7/2/14, p. 3.  
44 The report also refers to the arrest of the Pugno Chiuso [clenched fist] group, led by the 
Catholic Communists around Franco Rodano.  
45 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November   
1943: APC/7/2/14, p. 3. 
46 Ibid., p. 4. 
47 The striking use of the word ‘dazzled’ [abbagliate] is very telling of PCI leaders’ concern 
over this pro-Soviet enthusiasm, implying that these new forces were not only enthused 
or impressed by the Red Army’s successes, but also unsighted or even deluded by them.   
48 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November  
1943: APC/7/2/14, p. 4. 
49 Ibid. 
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of Rome’ that he had outlined in this same document: a city ‘more artisanal than 
industrial’ providing a poor terrain for trade-union-type organisation.50 Its 
déclassé masses bore a ‘false conception of the political moment’: the Party was 
being invaded by ‘powerful wills, rather than truly political forces’.51 
 
Also of note here was Novella’s description of the PCI’s Fronte Nazionale strategy, 
complaining that it was unpopular among existing communist circles and that 
‘even the [other] parties joining the FN’ had dishonestly tried to ‘claim that our 
party was more “collaborationist” than they were’.52 Indeed, PCI leaders also 
faced the problem of distinguishing themselves from the Socialists, now that they 
had abandoned the class-war intransigence that had defined their 1921 split from 
the PSI. Fellow cadre Antonello Trombadori described attending an August 1943 
meeting in Campo de’ Fiori attended by ‘around twenty workers and popolani’ 
and addressed by the Socialist Achille Corona.53 In Trombadori’s account, the 
audience were left unclear to why the Socialists and Communists were different 
parties, since the Socialists did not advance ‘reformist or anti-Soviet arguments’; 
however, ‘political clarity’ came from the PCI’s Fernando Mella, who explained 
that as against the Socialists’ alleged attesismo (passive, ‘wait-and-see’ approach), 
the numbers of Communist arrestees in recent years demonstrated the Party’s 
singular ‘will to struggle’ and ‘class spirit’.54 
 
3.4. The foundation of the Movimento Comunista d’Italia 
 
While the Comitato delle Opposizioni parties won the King and Badoglio’s recognition 
as the official representatives of Italian democracy, other anti-fascists sharply 
criticised these parties’ relations with the post-coup régime. Among the prisoners 
released in the second week of August 1943 were around half the leading figures in 
Scintilla, who had already in autumn 1942 discussed the possibility that the ruling 
class would cast off Mussolini in order to find a managed way out of the crisis. For 
these Roman militants, the 25 July shake-up and the mild liberalisation measures that 
had followed were but the confirmation of their own prognosis, as longtime Fascist-
loyalists sought to pacify Italy’s social situation without 
 
 
50 Ibid, pp. 1–2.  
51 Ibid, p. 4. 
52 Ibid. 
53 ‘Una discussion con gli operai nel clima dei “45 giorni”’, l’Unità, 20.1.1957.  
54 Ibid. 
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meaningfully giving up power. During the ‘45 Days’ the popular-frontist 
Togliattians sought to bear influence on Badoglio’s reform process by working 
through official channels. Scintilla denounced such ‘class-collaborationism’ as a 
mere trap, a stance which drew it into contact with other ‘subversives’ similarly 
distrustful of the conservative manoeuvres surrounding the palace coup. 
 
Even before the Scintilla prisoners’ release, parallel Gruppi di Rinnovamento had 
formed in Rome’s northwestern Trionfale district, on the initiative of journalist Ezio 
Malatesta,55 Croat theatre director Branko Bitler, and engineering worker Romolo 
Iacopini, a veteran of the Arditi del Popolo.56 First emerging around 1939,57 this circle’s 
encounter with Scintilla was crucial to the MCd’I’s creation, not least given its 
military contacts through SIM intelligence agent Roberto Guzzo and career soldier 
Gino Rossi. The Trionfale militants shared Scintilla’s searing disdain for the Church, 
King, and the bourgeoisie belatedly breaking with Mussolini, with the single issue of 
their bulletin Attenti! warning that ‘the Fascist hierarchs in their luxury cars still 
rule[d] the roost’ despite the régime’s change of face.58 For Attenti!, any democrat 
who rallied behind Badoglio had swallowed the idea that ‘the formation of currents 
of ideas must be forbidden “for now” as the situation is too dangerous’. 59 In its view, 
the Comitato delle Opposizione represented not a challenge to the régime, but the 
‘resuscitation of the venerable champions of the defunct parties, who had the merit of 
sowing the seeds of Fascism, nourishing it and collaborating with it when it had 
proletarian blood on its hands’.60 
 
Circulated in August 1943, this professionally-printed propaganda-sheet lampooned 
the idea that after twenty years of Fascism communists could subscribe to a politics 
of ‘national unity’. Attenti! portrayed this policy as both conferring undue legitimacy 
on figures like Bonomi, and undermining the Left’s freedom of organisation. Blasting 
the Socialists and the PCI for accepting posts as labour commissars in Badoglio’s new 
régime,61 Attenti! thus insisted that trade-union 
 
 
 
55 See the entry in MCd’I 1944c. See also section 6.3 
56 See Il Comandante del Trionfale, a 1945 pamphlet in homage to Romolo Iacopini. Copy at  
INSMLI.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Attenti!, p. 2, ‘25 Luglio’  
59 Attenti!, p. 1, ‘25 Luglio’.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Attenti!, p. 2, ‘Cronachetta’. 
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militants ‘should be supporting the strike movements [in the Northern factories], 
rather than seeking jobs in the state that policed them’.62 The Trionfale militants’ 
insinuation against the PCI and PSI labour commissars was certainly an 
ungenerous portrayal of their positions,63 but also expressed the Gruppi di 
Rinnovamento’s refusal to give any kind of credence to the new régime, not least 
after the repression following 25 July. Wary of all ruling-class factions, Attenti! 
made natural allies for the most intransigent wing of Roman communism, as its 
militants sought contacts with other revolutionary and anti-Badoglian 
conspiracies now forming in the city. 
 
A key date in this effort to merge Rome’s revolutionary circles was 15 August 
1943, with representatives of Scintilla, the sons of murdered Socialist MP 
Giacomo Matteotti, and the anarchist Gabriele Pappalardo64 convening at 
Malatesta’s home to discuss their common objectives.65 The meeting concluded 
that ‘both the composition of the Badoglio Cabinet and its first actions showed 
that fascism was not dead, nor was there any intention of suppressing it, but 
simply a change of face’.66 Attendees thus decided to found ‘an organisation of 
communist propaganda and military action’.67 This body was not initially a 
party, but instead took the name ‘Provisional Communist Executive’, as it began 
organising local cells. For Scintilla co-founder Orfeo Mucci, ‘when 25 July and the 
fall of Fascism came, the monarchy thought it could get rid of Mussolini and 
happily continue as before’, and ‘the parties now felt liberated from the grip of 
Fascism, we instead turned our workplace cells into combat cells, ready for when 
… the war would officially be over, in order to fight against the Germans and the 
residues of Fascism, and above all against capitalism’.68 
 
 
 
 
 
62 Ibid.  
63 Indeed, this unfairly dismissed the PCI’s role in driving the August 1943 strikes in 
Turin and Milan, which the Togliattians had in fact initiated precisely as a means of 
exerting pressure on Badoglio to announce an armistice.  
64 In 1921–22 Pappalardo had collaborated with Palermo’s Communists in the Arditi del 
Popolo anti-fascist militia. See ‘Un direttore irresponsabile’, Sicilia libertaria, 1.6.2005; and 
the newspaper he co-edited, Il Vespro Anarchico.  
65 Guzzo 1964, p. 48.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Orfeo Mucci, interview for Regione Lazio, Banca della Memoria, 1995, available online 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlSyH9tiFZY 
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If this statement of Mucci’s, drawn from a 1995 interview, well-reflects the 
MCd’I’s typical presentation of its place in the Resistance, there is good reason to 
doubt his and Guzzo’s assertion that the ‘Provisional Communist Executive’ had 
formed armed cells already in August 1943. While Mucci claims that even before 
25 July Scintilla ‘had our comrades in all parts of the state – the Statistics Agency, 
the Railways, the Post, the Phone Exchange’,69 and that these became ‘combat 
cells’ after the Badoglio coup, his account curiously elides the idea of strategically 
inserting militants into key infrastructure roles (better to sabotage the state-
apparatus), and the suggestion that these workplace groups became armed 
guerrillas in August 1943 (thus seemingly abandoning the advantages of having 
militants in these particular jobs). Neither interpretation seems appropriate to 
conditions in the 45 Days. If a militant like Giuseppe Palmidoro had maintained 
relations with other communist postmen throughout the 1930s, or Pietro Bàttara 
led fellow civil servants into the MCd’I, these circles had emerged independently 
of one another and were seemingly not yet engaged in sabotage operations. 
 
In practice, these ‘combat cells’ were not armed bands but circles of communists 
based in workplaces, neighbourhoods and army battalions, which gradually 
cohered into a single network following the meeting at Malatesta’s home. The 
militants connected to the Provisional Communist Executive did not mount any 
armed actions during the ‘45 Days’, and nor do their accounts yet report specific 
operations to procure weaponry, a task which would begin in earnest after 8 
September. That said, the contacts among these cells in August 1943 clearly did 
help the MCd’I build its Resistance network, insofar as it had already begun 
linking together militants across the city. The 15 August meeting united a series 
of hitherto separate conspiracies, from Scintilla and Attenti! to the communist 
postmen and telephone employees, as well as a group of PCI expellees led by 
former electricians’ union secretary Antonino Poce, now returning from confino. 
It was this patchwork of clandestine circles whose leaders formed the self-
consciously unofficial Provisional Communist Executive. 
 
This formation’s politics bore clear signs of Scintilla’s earlier clashes with the 
Togliattian students. The militants meeting at Malatesta’s home issued a 
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‘programmatic declaration’70 that invoked the PCd’I’s revolutionary traditions 
while laying its own claim to represent the Roman underground. Stopping short 
of proclaiming itself the Communist Party, the Provisional Communist Executive 
however claimed that its cadres were ‘actively working on linking up with 
communists in other regions in order to achieve the unification and official 
reconstruction of the Partito Comunista d’Italia’.71 Expressing this same provisional 
status, other statements from August 1943 referred to the group as ‘the 
Communists of Rome and Lazio’ or ‘the Communists of Italy’. Despite its 
claimed ideological orthodoxy – declaring that ‘Communism is and must be the 
theory espoused by Marx and Engels, realised by Lenin and Stalin’72 – and self-
description as an ‘organised and disciplined movement, ready to give the place 
of honour to the Party’s political prisoners’ – this remained a specifically Roman 
organisation, unconnected to the centro interno or indeed sections in other cities. 
 
The Provisional Communist Executive insisted that the Communist Party must be 
rebuilt on the basis of ‘intransigent Marxist socialism’, with an immediate 
programme for ‘the revolutionary conquest of power’ and a ‘sovietist [sic] 
Constitution of intellectual and manual workers of all categories’.73 It linked this 
‘intransigent tactic’ to the question of ‘workers’ democracy’. According to its 
simultaneous ‘communist proclamation’, if ‘the Communist Party [were] not 
organised according to the principles of workers’ democracy’ – providing ‘the only 
guarantee that the Party directives will respond to the masses’ needs’ – then the 
‘inevitable’ consequence would be ‘the complete emptying-out of the Party’s very 
substance’, ‘suffocated by Party bureaucracy’.74 In compromising with Badoglio, 
‘other communists’ had ‘distanced themselves from the working masses’, failing to 
make the case why ‘the consequences of the war must fall on the Bourgeoisie’s 
shoulders alone’; they had failed to realise that ‘socialisation’ was not ‘the song of the 
future’ but a concrete programme of immediate realisations’.75 
 
 
 
 
70 ‘La nostra propaganda’: ACS/AGS/PS/F1/104/1314. Much of the text is reworked in 
‘In linea’, BR, 5.10.1943.  
71 ‘La nostra propaganda’: ACS/AGS/PS/F1/104/1314  
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 ‘Proclama Comunista – democrazia operaia’, FB/FGB/3/7/1. Much of the text is 
reproduced in ‘Serena intuizione’, BR, 22.10.1943. 
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Examining a later reprint of these texts, Silverio Corvisieri discerned a classically 
‘Trotskyist’ narrative blaming unaccountable ‘bureaucrats’ for the Communists’ 
‘reformist cop-out’.76 Paradoxically, however, these militants also proudly claimed to 
uphold the theory ‘realised by Lenin and Stalin’. The ‘Proclama comunista’ declared 
‘the communists of Italy’ ‘convinced that they stand in uniformity with the Soviet 
proletariat, which is organised according to the principles of workers’ democracy’ – 
meaning ‘the needs of a proletariat conscious that it alone is the master of its 
destiny’.77 Lacking formal structures yet considering both itself and Stalin’s USSR to 
be examples of ‘workers’ democracy’, it seems that the Provisional Communist 
Executive defined this term tautologically – in terms of the socialist end goal itself, 
the ‘Party’s very substance’ – rather than with regard to particular organisational 
forms. As in the programme’s naïve promise to send delegates to the ‘next 
Comintern Congress’78 in spite of the mothballing of the International in May 1943, 
the Roman communists exalted Stalin’s democratic probity while attacking the 
Togliattians as controlling bureaucrats. 
 
The greater political significance of the ‘programme’ and the ‘proclamation’ was their 
insistence that the Communist Party did not yet exist and could not be refounded by 
existing cadres alone. In this sense, the Provisional Communist Executive was not so 
much an alternative to the PCI as what Cretara called part of the ‘broader 
phenomenon of dissidence affecting all parties after 25 July’ given the clandestine 
Left’s fragmentation after two decades of Fascism.79 Adopting the name Movimento 
Comunista d’Italia by the end of August, its militants continued to insist that this 
‘movement’ would feed into the Communist Party when a congress could finally be 
held. Such naivety was also apparent in the MCd’I’s claim that the Comintern would 
‘soon be rebuilt’;80 like the historic PCd’I it thus adopted the 
 
 
76 Corvisieri 1967.  
77 ‘Proclama Comunista – democrazia operaia’, FB/FGB/3/7/1  
78 ‘La nostra propaganda’: ACS/AGS/PS/F1/104/1314. The very earliest congresses of the  
Third International had in fact allowed some range of debate, including the 
representation of multiple parties for each country and even non-communists such as 
anarcho-syndicalists. If this was not as diverse as the First International (1864–72), whose 
initial membership stretched from trade unions to Bakuninites, Marxists and Mazzinian 
republicans, it was far more open than the high-Stalinist Comintern of the Sixth and 
Seventh World Congresses (1928 and 1935, respectively), which featured no oppositional 
statements and were little but a display of Moscow’s domination over the monolithic, 
‘Bolshevised’ Communist Parties.  
79 Unnumbered 1945 typescript, MSdL/FSC/29/87. 
80 ‘La nostra propaganda’: ACS/AGS/PS/F1/104/1314. 
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qualifier d’Italia (‘communists in Italy’, and not ‘Italian communists’), in order to 
highlight its continued allegiance to a worldwide and not nationally-defined 
movement. This further distinguished it from the Togliattians, who had adopted 
the name Italian Communist Party (PCI) in May 1943 in order to emphasise their 
national autonomy after the dissolution of the Comintern. 
 
3.5. The united front 
 
Keen to achieve a wider Left regroupment, across the 45 Days the MCd’I swallowed 
up a series of other workers’ circles and dissident currents who also opposed 
collaboration with Badoglio. Without doubt, the ‘phenomenon of dissent’ described 
by Cretara was particularly notable on the communist underground given the exile 
PCI’s dramatic strategic shifts over the Fascist period, leading the Party away from 
its foundational principles. Yet comparable phenomena also surfaced in the other 
anti-fascist parties as they re-emerged from clandestinity. In his diary entry for 6 
August 1943, Socialist Party leader Pietro Nenni could thus lament that ‘renewing 
contacts with the old comrades’ after living in Paris since 1926 ‘was a case of Heri 
dicebamus … Were it not for the fresh approach brought by a significant younger 
contingent I’d have thought that we were continuing the same discussions as 
seventeen years ago’.81 Among the questions again returning to the centre of debate 
was the possibility of overcoming the historic split with the Communists, who had 
broken from the PSI at Livorno in 1921. 
 
This was the problem posed by a Movimento di Unità Proletaria (MUP) which 
formed in Milan. On 1 August 1943 this movement issued a clandestine Avanti! – 
unilaterally adopting the name of the historic Socialist newspaper – in which its 
main theorist Lelio Basso proposed an alternative to the ‘reformist praxis’ of the 
Second International and the ‘authoritarian, centralising, rigidly schematic 
tradition of the Third’.82 Basso argued that the proletariat must unite in a single 
movement, able to fight for the socialist revolution in Italy.83 This movement was 
characteristic of those currents emerging in this period, unbound from party 
structures, who sought to overcome the divides of the pre-Fascist period, in the 
name of forming a single working-class representation. Not only did Basso create 
 
 
 
81 Nenni 1981, p. 23. 
82 As described in ‘Rivoluzione o collaborazione’, Bandiera Rossa [Milan], II/3, 25.5.1944. 
83 'Unità proletaria', Avanti!, 47/1, 1.8.1943 
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armed squads in Milan assuming the name of the Arditi del Popolo, but he 
published twelve issues of a newspaper also named Bandiera Rossa. These, and 
their call for a ‘revolutionary proletarian front’, endured even after he integrated 
his movement into the Socialists. 
 
The Provisional Communist Executive was keenly aware of the need to attract 
support from such resurgent Socialist circles as well as old Communists. Just as 
the October 1942 edition of Scintilla had declared the old divisions on the Left 
senseless, 84 in August 1943 its successor movement began to agitate for a single 
working-class bloc, crossing party divides but opposed to any collaboration with 
bourgeois forces. With this in mind it issued a clandestine appeal addressed to 
‘workers of all parties, of all categories’, signed by Carlo Matteotti. The inclusion 
of Matteotti’s name lent credibility to this argument not only in that his father, 
murdered by Blackshirts in 1924, was an icon for anti-fascists in general, but also 
because he had belonged to the most centrist wing of Italian socialism after 
World War I.85 Where Giacomo Matteotti had once denounced communism as 
‘the twin of fascist violence and dictatorship’, the leaflet issued in his son’s name 
summarily dismissed ‘the divisions of the past’, held ‘responsible for the 
workers’ defeats past, present and future’.86 
 
Intended to help overcome such divides, the statement signed by Matteotti laid 
down important political lines. Speaking of ‘the grave hours yet to come’ even after 
the ‘breaking of the régime and its defeat in war’, the text insisted that the workers’ 
‘only route to salvation’ was ‘the compact union of the whole Proletariat, against the 
whole bourgeoisie’.87 Dismissing the ‘monotone old polemics and splits between 
socialists and communists’ as ‘often hiding personal vanities and the aspiration for 
jobs in the hierarchy’88 the statement expressed its trust that its readers’ ‘own 
experience, class consciousness and instinct as workers’ would guide them toward 
‘the workers’ goal, not far away’.89 If this appeal was vague as to precisely what 
‘arduous path’ or ‘grave hours’ lay ahead, it laid down a clear 
 
 
84 Scintilla, 2, p. 2, ‘Parliamo a voi’.  
85 The ‘United Socialist Party’.  
86 Carlo Matteotti, ‘Compagni lavoratori di tutti i partiti, di tutte le categorie’, copy in  
FB/FGB/3/7/1. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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strategic imperative. At the same time as working to rebuild a Communist Party 
in Italy, workers must form a single front, independent of a ‘bourgeoisie to be 
held alone responsible’ for Italy’s ‘catastrophe’. 90 
 
This invocation of the Comintern’s 1920s united-front tactic91 was more a means 
of claiming political legitimacy than a reflection of the dissidents’ own activity. 
Not only did the main workers’ parties’ commitment to the Comitato delle 
Opposizioni prevent such a class-based alliance, but the MCd’I itself sealed a pact 
with the quixotic Cola di Rienzo initiative. Named after a 1340s popular tribune, 
this idiosyncratically Roman movement’s goal was to organise a fifteen-minute 
strike on 1 September to demand an armistice, imitating previous such stoppages 
in the Northern cities. With rumours circulating that the Pope would appeal for 
peace at 1pm that day, Cola di Rienzo called a strike for 10am, ‘in order to display 
the popular will for this objective to be realised’.92 Defined by this aim alone, Cola 
di Rienzo was backed by a rag-bag of currents hostile to the Badoglio régime, 
bringing the MCd’I together with not only Christian-Socialists and republicans, 
but also representatives of the Carboneria, an anti-clerical secret society akin to 
Freemasons. The author of the jointly-issued strike call was, indeed, the Carbonaro 
Felice Anzalone, likely a Fascist double-agent.93 
 
Plastered over the walls of Rome in the final days of August 1943, the appeal issued 
by Anzalone was sharply hostile to the Badoglio government, but otherwise lacked 
clear political definition. If it was bold in declaring that 1 September would see 
Italians ‘fold their arms [i.e. strike] in the barracks, the offices and workshops, the 
courts, tramways and public services’, it insisted that they would do so in order to 
‘meditate on the material and moral ruin of the Italian nation … observ[ing] the most 
religious reflection, without declamations or recriminations’, and ‘not as a rebellion, 
but as a sign of civic courage, restored will and regained sense of responsibility’.94 
For their part the Comitato delle Opposizioni parties opposed the strike appeal, joining 
the Badoglio government in issuing a public statement, 
 
 
 
 
90 Ibid.  
91 A ‘united front’, implying a union of workers’ parties only, as opposed to a ‘popular 
front’ also including liberal or democratic parties.  
92 Quoted in Piscitelli 1965, p. 39.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Quoted in Piscitelli 1965, p. 39. 
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reproduced in all legal newspapers, which dismissed Cola di Rienzo as a 
‘provocation’.95 Boycotted by these parties as well as their trade union 
representatives, few accounts credit the 1 September strike with more than the 
faintest public response.96 
 
Notwithstanding the failure of the ‘peace strike’, Badoglio was well-advanced in 
his efforts to secure an armistice, and by 3 September his diplomats had reached 
a secret truce with the Allies. Already in the days prior to the armistice, the 
Anglo-Americans had pressured Badoglio to make plans in case the Wehrmacht 
counter-attacked to shore up its strategic position; the announcement of the 
cease-fire was itself delayed until 8 September in order to allow such 
preparations. Similarly alert to the dangers of German retribution, from the 
beginning of September Roman anti-fascists of multiple persuasions began 
making demands on the Badoglio government to arm the general population in 
case of attack. According to Roberto Guzzo’s account, the MCd’I received PCI 
emissaries seeking to discuss the armed response, suggesting that Bonomi had 
promised that weapons would soon be delivered. Despite their sharply opposed 
interests, it seemed that the imminent threat of invasion could bring Rome’s anti-
fascists and the government into a single line of defence. 
 
3.6. 8 September: the chaotic collapse 
 
Its military fate hanging in the balance, Italy however sorely lacked a political 
leadership up to the measure of the situation. Publically announcing the armistice by 
radio on 8 September, Badoglio called on Royal Army forces to oppose attacks ‘from 
whatever quarter’. Yet he said nothing of the specific threat represented by 18 
German divisions already based on Italian soil – the very Axis partner he had now 
abandoned. Only vague calls for ‘vigilance’ sharply contrasted with Hitler’s 
determination to protect what Churchill called the ‘soft underbelly’ of the Nazi 
empire. On the same day as Badoglio announced Italy’s withdrawal from the war, 
German forces rushed to assume control of barracks, bridges, and other strategic 
 
 
 
95 If they had no factual basis to suggest that this strike was literally designed to provoke 
German intervention, the CdO were at least right to be suspicious of Anzalone, showing 
greater caution than the MCd’I in accepting this dubious lodge-master’s approaches. 
Playing a ‘double game’, Anzalone remained in contact with Fascist intelligence 
operatives, before later hiring himself out to the US Office of Strategic Services.  
96 The exception being Guzzo 1964, p. 32. 
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points around the country. Having received no orders of their own, the mass of 
Italian soldiers abandoned their positions to the far better-organised Wehrmacht. 
As regiments broke up in chaos, great cities like Turin, Milan and Genoa fell 
without resistance; having failed even to attempt a defence of the capital, the 
King and Badoglio cowardly fled to Brindisi, the Southern port town already 
controlled by the US Fifth Army. 
 
The King and Badoglio’s escape represented the disastrous political and moral 
collapse of Italy’s royalist-military establishment, which organised no defences 
except for the protection of its leaders’ ‘flight’. This epitomised what Elena Aga Rossi 
has called ‘a nation disbanded’, with the Wehrmacht capturing Rome with a single 
division. Across Italy there were just a handful of cases of military resistance to the 
invasion, the capital most prominent among them; yet even the defence of Rome 
lacked overall co-ordination and relied on individual platoons’ decision to 
participate. After skirmishes on the south-western roads into the city, the decisive 
battle took place at the central Porta San Paolo, the greatest concentration of armed 
resistance anywhere in Italy. Fighting tanks with rifles and without hope of 
meaningful reinforcements, the Italian defenders stood no chance of success. While 
the soldiers and civilians’ mobilisation did something to preserve a spirit of 
resistance amidst a more general military collapse, by the evening of 10 September 
the capital’s fate was sealed. Only the far south of Italy remained beyond Wehrmacht 
control, in areas already under Anglo-American occupation. 
 
Lacking any orders from the Stato Maggiore, the isolated officers who led resistance 
acted either out of personal initiative or because of their anti-fascist ties. Grenadier 
captain and Scintilla co-founder Aladino Govoni led conscripts under his command 
against the greatly better-armed German forces. His comrades Roberto Guzzo, Gino 
Rossi and Tigrino Sabatini also played prominent roles in the pitched battles at 
strategic sites across the city, from Termini station to the Colosseum roundabout,97 
the thoroughfare cutting through Magliana, and the Cecchignola barracks. 
Numerous accounts tell us of communist military officers combining their civilian 
comrades with conscripts, from the forty men led by San Lorenzo-based sergeant 
Nicola Stame at Termini to the sixty organised by Eusebio Troiani 
 
 
 
 
97 See ‘Partecipazione alla difesa di Roma’, MSdL/FSC/29/87. 
  
96 
 
 
in the adjacent Esquilino district.98 The disbandment of army regiments also allowed 
militants to raid depots and barracks in search of weaponry in subsequent days: even 
where such buildings were guarded, a soldier on duty might be willing to allow 
access in exchange for the civilian clothes facilitating his own escape.99 
 
Romans’ isolated and ad hoc resistance was a first sign of the ‘popular’ character 
of the armed struggle against Wehrmacht Occupation. Perhaps a thousand 
civilians joined conscript soldiers in resisting the invasion, despite being only 
very lightly armed and often having little military training. While organised anti-
fascist movements clearly did help lead the resistance in the capital on 9–10 
September, it seems that most Italians joining these battles were driven by a 
reactive spirit of national defence, or even simple adventurism. This was clear 
even in the obituary claiming the symbolic legacy of the ‘first martyr of the 
Resistance’: the sixteen-year-old Antonio Calvani, one of 508 Italians killed in the 
two days of pitched battles at the Porta San Paolo. According to the MCd’I’s 1944 
pamphlet Our Martyrs, featuring biographies of dozens of the movement’s fallen 
comrades, this teenage nephew of one of its founding members100 had rallied to 
the grenadiers’ defence out of ‘instinctive hatred’ of ‘the German invader’.101 
 
The collapse of authority sparked widespread looting. Police noted that arms stocks 
remained unguarded as late as 14 September. In Trionfale officers reported running 
battles between police and the crowds ransacking food stores, including in a local 
hospital.102 In San Ippolito the Fascist Party office that had been closed down after 25 
July was itself looted. Only in smart Trevi could the police speak of public calm in 
the days following the invasion.103 9–12 September saw looting across Trastevere, 
with one policeman reporting ‘100 Jews hearing of the Germans’ arrival … breaking 
down the doors of an unguarded armory such as to lay hold of the weapons 
therein’.104 Informants noted guns being handed out haphazardly in that district’s 
Piazza de’ Renzi as well as in poor neighbourhoods like Quadraro. 
 
 
98 Ibid.  
99 As noted by Corvisieri 1967.  
100 Ezio Lombardi was his uncle. 
101 ‘Antonio Calvani’, in MCd’I 1944c.  
102 See the extensive reports on the looting on subsequent days in 
ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/146.  
103 Ibid.  
104 ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/146, ‘13 Settembre 1943 – Relazione 
della Questura di Roma per il capo della Polizia’. 
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A police agent witnessing the distribution of weapons at Via Taranto on 9 
September characterised the insurgent mood by citing the comments of one 
citizen handed a rifle, who declared ‘this will be useful with the Germans, but at 
some point the time will also come for the others who deserve it’.105 
 
In their postwar reports MCd’I commanders each claimed that their units were 
created on or before 8 September 1943, yet around half detailed no specific activities 
beyond gathering abandoned Royal Army weaponry. 106 This casts doubt on Mucci 
and Guzzo’s claim to have formed partisan bands even in August,107 apparently 
another example of the tendency – so common among Resistance memoirs in general 
– to collapse events following 8 September into the aftermath of 25 July. Although 
Italy had remained allied to Nazi Germany in the weeks following the palace coup, 
there is no evidence of anti-fascists attacking the Wehrmacht forces already stationed 
in Rome during the 45 Days, or mounting armed actions of any kind. After a summer 
in which the Roman dissidents focused on cohering a political leadership, it was the 
unexpected breakdown of army command on 8 September that allowed the 
movement to rally disbanded conscripts under its own banner, and indeed lay hold 
of weapons. Nonetheless, its militants’ capacity to exploit this vacuum of authority 
clearly owed much to the network of military and workplace contacts pieced 
together during the 45 Days. 
 
Recognising this also helps us to answer the question of how far the Romans who 
now enrolled in partisan movements distinguished between them politically. Social 
historian Alessandro Portelli casts doubt on this idea, citing such cases as Umberto 
Turco, who joined the MCd’I through an acquaintance after thinking that it was the 
Communist Party; Franco Bartolini, who joined the GAP after losing touch with 
MCd’I; and Raffaele Zicconi, who joined the Partito d’Azione because his cousin was 
in it.108 We can find countless such cases of young and politically inexperienced 
militants meeting anti-fascists via chance ties of family or friendship. Yet if we 
understand these movements as social phenomena and not 
 
 
 
 
105 ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/146, ‘10 Settembre 1943 – Relazione 
del capo della Polizia’.  
106 See files collected in MSdL/FSC.  
107 Guzzo 1964; Orfeo Mucci, interview for Regione Lazio, Banca della Memoria, 1995, 
available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlSyH9tiFZY.  
108 Portelli 2003, p. 122. 
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just aggregates of individuals, we ought to ask why such accidental contacts 
were so unevenly distributed. The low numbers of Christian Democrats 
compared to Marxists in partisan ranks reflected not their numbers of friends and 
cousins, but the respective importance their political strategies placed on 
building armed bands. The initiative they took in organising the soldiers 
disbanded after 8 September was itself an expression of this focus. 
 
3.7. A single communist movement? 
 
The Wehrmacht invasion had pitched the Italian state into a deep crisis, with the 
country now subject to two opposed invaders and two rival governments. Having 
abandoned the capital upon the armistice, the now Salerno-based Badoglio régime 
only held sway in the far South of Italy occupied by the Allies. While SS parachutists 
liberated Benito Mussolini from prison on 12 September, installing him as president 
of an ‘Italian Social Republic’ (RSI) spanning the German-controlled regions, the 
exhausted Duce’s government effectively withdrew from Rome. Taking up residence 
at Salò on Lake Garda, the Fascist leader removed both his ministers and his 
ministries from what was now his capital in name alone. Already on 14 August, 
Badoglio had declared Rome an ‘open city’ in response to a further set of Allied 
bombing-raids, and after defeating the resistance at the Porta San Paolo, the 
Wehrmacht made a similar statement on 10 September. However, the capital 
remained not only a hub of partisan activity, but also the centre of the machinations 
that would define Resistance politics nationally. 
 
This soon became apparent as the democratic party leaders meeting in Rome on 12 
September proclaimed a new Resistance coalition. This Comitato di Liberazione 
Nazionale (CLN) united the PCI, PSI, Partito d’Azione, Christian-Democrats and 
Liberals as well as Bonomi’s Democrazia del Lavoro, all of whose clandestine 
newspapers issued a common call for mobilisation. ‘Noting with distress that at the 
Patria’s most painful hour the monarch and head of government did not remain in 
their command and leadership posts and that, as a consequence of this failure, all 
possibility of defence and resistance was deeply shaken and weakened, the National 
Liberation Committee proposes to pursue its activity so that the people might 
rediscover the paths of dignity and redemption’.109 Although its parties were 
 
 
 
109 Untitled, l’Unità, 19.9.1943. 
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militarily independent, the CLN acted as a collective political centre, issuing joint 
statements calling for national Resistance while insisting that the Italian people 
would freely choose its institutional forms once it was liberated from German 
occupation. Even while claiming to lead the Italian people’s fight for national 
liberation, the CLN stopped short of declaring itself a provisional government. 
 
The MCd’I damned such calls for national unity. The first issue of Bandiera Rossa on 5 
October derided a ‘national front rallying the most disparate political currents, which 
represent social classes with contradictory interests’.110 It insisted that ‘as has been 
the case ever since the 26 July [sic] coup]’, the CLN parties were ‘destined to support 
the monarchical government led by Marshal Badoglio’,111 for this was their only 
possibility of convincing the Anglo-Americans that ‘the Italian people [was] united 
and compact in its political objectives and aspirations’.112 Convinced that ‘on 10 
September the tricolore was definitively dropped in the mud’,113 the MCd’I scorned 
the forces of ‘capitalist dictatorship and conservative monarchist and militarist 
institutions’ who now called for unity. Bracketing the CLN with the royalists, it 
argued that ‘workers and peasants [could] not risk their blood and their strength in 
defence of privileged classes whose time has passed … uniting in the front through 
which these very forces attempt to save themselves by posing as defenders of the 
whole Italian people’.114 ‘The proletariat, weapons at its feet’ must instead ‘reserve 
the sacrifice of its blood for its Revolution’.115 
 
Declaring the CLN’s watchwords to be ‘in contradiction with its parties’ 
programmatic objectives and contrary to what their directives for action should 
be’,116 Bandiera Rossa set down enduring dividing lines among Roman communists. 
This was apparent in the unity talks following 8 September, as the MCd’I and PCI 
attempted a merger deal. While there is no written record of the first such summit, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 ‘In linea’, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943.  
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 ‘Perché collaborare?’, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943.  
114 Ibid.  
115 ‘Proletari!’, FB/FGB/3/7/1. On 11 September the MCd’I similarly imposed its political 
stamp on a fresh Cola di Rienzo appeal, enjoining Romans to fight for ‘a workers’ republic 
of Italy’ and a ‘government free of bourgeois’; reproduced in Guzzo 1964.  
116 ‘Perchè collaborare?’, BR, 5.10.1943. 
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taking place around two weeks after the invasion,117 numerous accounts suggest 
that the key questions at issue were the acceptability of allying with ‘bourgeois 
parties’ and – in case of a successful fusion – co-option of MCd’I leaders onto the 
Party’s leadership bodies. Although the PCI’s incubation in Stalin’s Comintern 
might seem to preclude openness on either the political or organisational front, 
both sides’ accounts of this meeting do indeed record a discussion over 
incorporating MCd’I cadres into the Party’s Rome federation leadership118 – itself 
a reflection of this movement’s influence among renascent communist circles. 
However, the negotiators remained divided by the MCd’I’s insistence on the 
PCI’s withdrawal from the CLN in favour of a strictly ‘proletarian front’.119 
 
According to art critic Antonello Trombadori, one of three PCI representatives at 
these talks, they were disrupted by the MCd’I’s ‘attack against our Party, 
principally concentrated against the person of Giorgio Amendola, whom they 
characterised as an opportunist and a traitor to the working class because he 
proposed the absurd idea of the proletariat uniting with the bourgeoisie against 
fascism’, in a heated exchange ‘that almost led to a brawl’.120 In this 1957 article 
on the clash with the dissident-Marxists, appearing in the PCI daily l’Unità, 
Trombadori did concede that ‘many of this movement’s followers fought the 
Germans and heroically faced death’.121 However, despite this lip service to its 
Resistance ‘martyrs’ he also sought to trash the MCd’I’s politics. Hence he 
described the movement’s leaders as ‘determined enemies of the armed struggle’ 
who had come from the old ‘pro-Trotskyist and Bordigist opposition’, while 
claiming that in the days after 8 September 1943 ‘the greater part of the leaders 
and activists of Bandiera Rossa seemed to have no goal other than to break up the 
ranks of what they called the “official” Communist Party’.122 
 
Such fighting words, written over thirteen years after the event, reflected two rival 
leaderships’ often bitter contest to win militants to their ranks; a fight for political 
legitimacy that profoundly shaped the entire Roman Resistance. These anti-fascist 
 
 
117 Tre storie di Roma clandestina’, l’Unità, 20.1.1957; Corvisieri 1967, based on Felice 
Chilanti’s testimony (Primo incontro con Chilanti 3.6.1966’: MSdL/FSC/26/22).  
118 Ibid. 
119 An appeal made in ‘Serena intuizione’, BR, 22.10.1943.  
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formations’ growth had not only been a matter of picking up new members 
through personal contacts, but also the integration of the armed bands that arose 
outside of their leadership in the wake of the German invasion. As we shall see in 
Chapter Four, this also led to the creation of heteroclite formations, or even ones 
with overlapping memberships, complicating the picture we have thus far 
painted of the re-emerging Left. Strategic goals certainly were important to the 
Roman communists, and the divisions among the main Resistance movements 
closely mirrored the debates we saw in Chapter Two. Yet individuals’ motives 
for joining partisan units were hardly limited to the objectives set out in 
manifestos and newspapers. Examining the growth of partisan organisation in 
Rome’s peripheral borgate slums, in Chapter Four we shall look deeper into the 
social conditions in which these communist movements took form. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The borgate rise 
 
The historic fortresses of Italian trade unionism are the great factories of the North. The 
FIAT plant at Mirafiori, the port of Genoa and Magneti Marelli in Milan are the country’s 
Boulogne-Billancourt, its South Wales collieries, its Putilov works. Less important to this 
panorama of ‘Red bastions’ is the Italian capital. Never an important centre of industry, at 
no point in the twentieth century was it a hub of shopfloor militancy. So, too, in the 
Resistance period was there a striking geographical divide. There were repeated general 
strikes across the Northern cities from March 1943 until the end of the war, while no such 
action was ever fulfilled in Rome. 
 
This was a period in which the PCI remodelled its conception of class politics, with the 
Northern working class at its centre. In advancing its national-unity strategy, it sought to 
integrate democratic and patriotic themes into a broader cult of labour. Symbolising this 
shift, l’Unità championed March 1943’s FIAT strike as the opening shot of the national 
Resistance1 and summer 1944’s Northern factory occupations as proof of workers’ concern 
to defend Italian industry from German looting. This was honoured in the postwar 
Constitution’s reference to a ‘democratic republic founded on labour’, recognising 
workers’ role in the war against Nazi Germany and share in a rebuilt national community. 
 
These strikes clearly illustrated labour’s importance to society, and the strategic power of 
the factory floor. This resulted in part from these workers’ ability to disrupt military 
production, their stoppages adding to the effects of absenteeism and power cuts. But these 
strikes were most importantly political mobilisations, a concentration of the revolt against 
Occupation. Mobilising even tens of thousands in single workplaces, mass strikes could 
puncture the régime’s reign of fear and catalyse a broader popular mobilisation. They 
brought economic concessions to workers at the same time as strengthening the PCI’s 
shopfloor influence. The Party’s decisive role in this workplace action also allowed it to 
build its own leadership within partisan ranks. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 An essay by Tim Mason appearing in his Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class expertly picks apart the 
commonly-accepted myth that the strike wave spreading across Turin and then Milan in March 1943 did 
indeed begin at the Mirafiori FIAT plant. He demonstrates how the PCI manufactured this version of 
events as a mobilising tactic, since the idea that the nation’s largest factory and a key centre of war 
production had downed tools could serve as a means of encouraging workers in other areas to do the 
same. We might moreover note that this was a classic case of the PCI seeking to co-opt and re-purpose a 
cult of industrial labour that had initially been built up by Fascism. See Mason 2008. 
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It was the PCI’s political strategy that led it to emphasise the patriotic nature of these 
strikes rather than their socially subversive character. Party press extended this same 
analysis to other forms of revolt characteristic of this period. It thus portrayed the women 
raiding bakeries as rebels against German depredations of Italian agriculture, and young 
men fleeing conscription as upholders of Italian army honour. For co-editor Antonello 
Trombadori, l’Unità ‘put national unity against Nazi Germany above all other 
considerations’,2 repudiating any narrow ‘class particularism’.3 Emphasising its patriotic 
character, the PCI organ invoked Milan’s Five Days of revolt against the Austrians in 
1848, the Garibaldian Risorgimento and even winter 1917 on the Brenner Pass4 as 
precursors to Italians’ latest struggle against the ‘Nazi Huns’, the ‘barbarous foe’. 
 
The Party’s attempt to place the working class at the centre of a national alliance was 
more difficult in locations where shopfloor organisation was weaker. At the same time, 
such social revolt as did emerge was harder to reduce to this logic. This is evident when 
we look at Resistance activity in the borgate, the slum districts on the Rome city periphery. 
Cut off from the city centre and governed by mass unemployment and social exclusion, 
borgate residents were of little use to German war industry, unless they could be deported 
and made to work elsewhere. Faced with unemployment and absent rations, most 
Romans turned to individual survival strategies rather than collective mobilisation. But 
while the social revolt in the borgate was less able to galvanise mass organisation, it was 
also more sharply antagonistic, including in its attacks on propertied Italians. 
 
As this chapter shows, the Roman proletariat little conformed to the PCI’s conception of ‘class 
politics’. As one of the Party’s internal reports noted, this was not because the city was 
dominated by bourgeois and civil servants alone: the 1936 census classed some 40.1% of the 
capital’s active population as ‘workers [operai]’ and 27.8% artisans. But these numbers also 
concealed the reality that Rome had a proletariat, more than an industrial working 
 
 
 
2 Trombadori 1981, p. 24.  
3 Ibid.  
4 This invocation of World War I is particularly remarkable given the central role of the 
internationalist opposition in the classic Comintern creation story. In this Leninist account, the 
social-democratic ‘betrayal’ of 1914 had necessitated the creation of a new International opposing 
all competing imperialisms in the name of worldwide proletarian revolution. While some  
‘interventionist’ socialists favouring Italy’s participation on the Entente side (as came to pass in May  
1915) had claimed that the fight against Austria would complete the Risorgimento by winning back 
the irredenta (‘unredeemed’) north-east of Italy, this was wholly at odds with the kind of class-war 
politics at the origin of the Communist Party founded in 1921. In the Resistance period PCI press 
was evasive about its leaders’ past attitudes toward World War I: l’Unità denied apparent (albeit 
untraceable) BBC claims that Togliatti had been expelled from the Italian Socialist Party in 1915 for 
his pro-Entente stance, without specifying that he had indeed held this view. 
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class in the manner of Turin or Milan. As of 1939, just 17 workplaces had more than 1,000 
employees,5 and during the Occupation period a majority of the population were 
unemployed. The industrial workforce that did exist was too small and dispersed to 
galvanise any wider popular movement: under Occupation they never mounted any 
concerted strike action like their counterparts in the North.6 
 
The weakness of intermediate forces between the Nazis and the abandoned borgatari also 
emboldened the dissident communists in their understanding that class hierarchies were 
on the brink of collapse. Building their organisation in the borgate, their proletarian politics 
in fact put minimal emphasis on workplace action, except insofar as this served narrowly 
military purposes. The movement instead focused on what one band leader called the 
‘perfection of its discipline’,7 the concretion of the proletarian militias that would 
eventually seize power. Building such a force in the borgate also demanded a more 
immediate programme of activity, recruiting draft resisters into bands and distributing 
the food and weapons gathered through expropriations. This imaginary of an ultimate 
(but deferred) moment of revolution, combined with solidarity initiatives among the 
general population, encouraged militants in the belief that they were building their 
strength relative to liberal and conservative forces less implanted in the borgate. 
 
This also fed the clash between Rome’s communist leaderships. We have already seen how 
Agostino Novella ascribed the prevalence of ‘ultra-Leftism’ to Rome’s mass of slum 
proletarians and small artisans, unlike the factory workers central to PCI organisation in the 
industrial North. Like his comrades Giorgio Amendola8 and Antonello Trombadori,9 Novella 
argued that while dissidents could ‘demagogically’ appeal to déclassé layers’ undisciplined 
revolt against authority, this only entrenched these populations’ subalternity, marginal to the 
official economy and unable to influence national life. As against what young PCI intellectual 
Franco Calamandrei mocked as ‘Bandiera Rossa’s position of sacking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November 1943: 
APC/7/2/14.  
6 See Chapter 8.2. on the failure of attempts to organise such a strike.   
7 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’, ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665. 
8 Amendola 1973.  
9 See his article Trombadori 1981. Secchia (ed.) 1974, p. 434 notes that the lack of an industrial 
working class was aggravated by the lack of a hinterland of peasant masses fighting to keep control 
of their produce, as in Emilia-Romagna or the Po Valley. 
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the homes of the wealthy’,10 his Party sought the ‘progressive and national coalition’ that 
could allow an institutional representation of labour’s interests.11 
 
We could rightly question whether such theoretical divides corresponded with the MCd’I 
and PCI’s practical activities under Occupation, or whether ‘productivist’ or more 
‘antagonistic’ views of class politics always implied different types of mobilisation. Not 
even the most reductionist account could flatly conflate class-composition and the forms 
of political action; only a small minority of Italians engaged in collective mobilisations 
during the Resistance, and any such picture is in any case complicated by the reshaping of 
the social order by the war itself. Nonetheless, in this chapter we shall argue that Bandiera 
Rossa’s stronger organisation in Rome’s borgate slums, as against the PCI’s dominant 
influence among intellectuals and the industrial workplaces of the North, reflected the 
different classes to which they addressed themselves. 
 
4.1. A ‘Red Belt’? 
 
‘Via Appia, Via Tuscolana, Via Casilina! What names – the memory of the actions executed by 
our organisation’s comrades…’12 Thus reminisced Costantino Rossi, MCd’I commander in 
Rome’s south-eastern Quadraro district, as he reflected on his unit’s military record. These 
thoroughfares were central focuses of partisan activity under Occupation, as armed bands 
mined the Wehrmacht’s routes to the frontline. However, while German communications 
were key targets for partisans across Italy, Rossi’s band combined these sabotage operations 
with a concerted mobilisation in neighbouring city-districts. The borgate slums aligning these 
three roads faced conditions dissimilar to those in Italy’s other main urban centres. 
Geographically close to the capital and the Wehrmacht’s base in this ‘open city’, these 
marginal populations were effectively abandoned by Mussolini’s Salò Republic, and of little 
use to German war industry. This was less autonomy as the 
 
 
 
10 Calamandrei 1984, p. 145 (9.3.1944 diary entry).  
11 This was drawn into sharp relief by postwar PCI senate leader Edoardo Perna, at a postwar cadre 
school (Perna 1981, p. 50): ‘Our policy’s expansive capacity was tested from the outset by the need to 
achieve a decisive victory in the battle within the working-class movement. We had secured victories 
over the Bandiera Rossa formation already by Liberation, but there were still episodes of sharp conflict … 
Our central task was to establish a very broad alliance policy, incorporating as vanguard and mobilising 
forces the workers and intellectuals who were the bedrock of the Party during the Resistance, but also 
the great mass of the poor and underclass who surrounded the capital, within and outside the Agro 
Romano … we won because we did not start out by besieging the city of the rich and powerful from the 
outside. We did not act following what we might compare 
 
– a little academically – to Mao Zedong’s strategy, the countryside besieging the city, but by giving the 
poor, the underclass, the socially weakest, a consciousness of their progressive and national role’. 
12 ‘Relazione  sommaria  dell’attività  svolta  in  periodo  clandestino,  dall’organizzazione  Rossi’,   
MSdL/FSC/28/64, p. 3. 
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endurance of a kind of purgatory, left to fend for themselves – and indeed, feed themselves 
 
– as the war raged around them. 
 
Rome has never been a centre of industry. The city’s ‘differentness’ has roots dating back 
even before the Fascist period, given the Papal capital’s marginal role in the creation of the 
Italian state. As a country united by the Turin-based Savoy monarchy began its industrial 
development at the end of the nineteenth century, a Rome only annexed to Italy in 1870 
was left behind by the urban centres of the North. It took until the 1880s for the capital to 
expand beyond the walls defined by the Emperor Aurelian in 271AD; and successive post-
unification governments preserved its character as a city of small shopkeepers. Its lack of 
industrial development also owed to political opposition to creating centres of potential 
class ‘turbulence’ in the immediate vicinity of the capital.13 An occupational census in 1927 
found that just 53,028 out of a Roman population of some eight hundred thousand were 
employed in manufacturing industries; the figure for Milan was 205,386.14 
 
This also meant that Rome remained peripheral to the mass strikes and factory occupations 
that shook Italy in the wake of World War I. The sharp social conflicts of 1919–20 were a 
mainly Northern phenomenon, reaching their most advanced expression in the creation of 
worker-elected ‘factory councils’ in hundreds of engineering plants across the ‘industrial 
triangle’ of Milan, Turin and Genoa. The biennio rosso’s half-million participants were 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the industrial North, with no overall political leadership 
linking this movement to land occupations elsewhere in Italy, or the discontent among 
soldiers expressed in the Ancona marksmen’s mutiny of June 1920. Despite sporadic strikes in 
sectors such as construction and the railways, the Roman working class contributed little to 
this movement, whose regional isolation soon led it to impasse. The capital was more notable 
for its resistance against the Blackshirt counterattack that followed the biennio rosso. As we 
noted in our comments on the San Lorenzo district, the 1921–22 biennio nero saw Rome become 
a major centre of the anarchist and republican-led Arditi del Popolo, mounting a last-ditch battle 
against the rising Fascist street militias. 
 
The relative lack of industrial concentration in Rome increased under the Mussolini régime, 
with Fascism’s plannerist effort to create a monumental capital wantonly destroying certain 
economic sectors in favour of others. Hotels and restaurants tripled in number. Housing 
 
 
 
13 Seronde Babonaux 1983, pp. 227 quotes one statesman of the immediate post-unification period concerned 
that Rome must not ‘become another Paris’; Insolera 2011 highlights this same concern, but also the small 
pockets of industry in such neighbourhoods as Testaccio.  
14 Figures from Seronde-Babonaux 1983, p. 219. 
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was built for civil servants at Piazza Bologna, but they did not increase as a share of the 
overall population. This remodelling of Rome as a centre of both tourism and imperial 
grandeur marginalised wide sections of the population. Most notable were the mass 
deportations of the residents of the historic centre, demolishing Rome’s early-modern 
architectural heritage in order to showcase an ersatz-ancient imperial capital. Removal 
works lasting from 1924 to 1937 created a deliberate divide between the centre and the 
new borgate slums, most of which were separated from the city proper by several 
kilometres of open ground and lacked public transport. Tens of thousands of residents of 
the historic centre, mostly reliant on small artisan trades, were evicted and often violently 
deported to the borgate.15 
 
Massed together with migrants from Central and Southern Italy, these populations lived 
in dismal conditions. While Fascism venerated industrial productivity, granting a ‘Labour 
Code’ as it invoked the harmonisation of class conflict and ‘the civilisation built on 
labour’, there was no place for the borgate in this ‘national community’. A 1928 ‘anti-
urbanism’ law discouraging migration to the capital banned new Romans from signing up 
at the anagrafe [register-office], denying them access to the most basic services. Alongside 
the overcrowded ‘official’ borgate – where even new homes lacked running water or 
electricity – there emerged so-called ‘spontaneous’ or ‘abusive’ borgate made of discarded 
building materials. A borgata planned before Fascism like La Garbatella – an intended 
‘model community’ of allotments and social housing – thus towered over Tor Marancia, a 
shanty-town lacking drainage and labelled ‘Shanghai’ due to its frequent flooding.16 Even 
‘official’ housing was allocated on an ideologically-biased basis, prioritising ‘families with 
more than seven children and four-five child families of military or political merit’ 
followed by ‘war widows, injured soldiers, squadristi, combatants with at least three 
children, overcrowded subletting families and other categories’.17 
 
The cult of soldiering was widespread across all areas of social life in Fascist Italy, but World 
War II created a particularly difficult situation for those not employed in armaments 
industries or the military. This sector did indeed expand on account of the war: PCI survey 
estimates that between 1934 and 1942 metallurgy had quadrupled in the city and chemicals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 On the development of the borgate see Villani 2012, and for particular districts of Rome see 
Ficacci 2007, Sinatra 2006, Camarda 2007, and Masini 2010 on Piazza Bologna.   
16 See Rivolta 2009.  
17 Villani 2012, p. 193. 
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production tripled.18 Yet looking at industry as a whole we find small production units 
and low industrial concentration. Among all workplaces in manufacturing, there were on 
average just 5.5 workers per site. The largest single industry, garment production, not 
only relied on a two-thirds female workforce, but was extremely fragmented: fully 6,120 
out of 6,808 textile plants in the capital had fewer than ten workers, and this entire 
industry had less than half as many workers as Turin’s Mirafiori FIAT plant alone.19 After 
1940, as the economy buckled under the pressures of war, electricity shortages closed 
businesses not directly connected to military production and a lack of materials forced 
builders to abandon their sites. 
 
The beginning of the Wehrmacht Occupation in September 1943 marked a sharp decline 
in Romans’ living conditions. The bread ration fell to 150g per person, per day and then 
100g, with unreliable food deliveries and the part-substitution of sawdust for flour further 
thinning citizens’ calorie intake. Their desperation was particularly severe after 
Mussolini’s military draft at the beginning of November 1943, a failed conscription effort 
followed by a series of attempts to deport workers en masse to Northern Italy and the 
Reich itself. Breda, one of the city’s few major industrial plants, ceased all activities and 
laid off all of its workers, before German troops stripped the factory bare, looting its 
machinery.20 Meanwhile thousands of civil servants abandoned the city as Mussolini’s 
ministries moved to the Northern redoubts of his Salò Republic. 
 
A common theme of the PCI’s l’Unità was the ‘plan to starve Rome’. The ‘almost total 
paralysis of all productive activity not useful to Germany’s war’ combined with what it 
termed ‘almost all Romans’ disdainful rejection of voluntarily enrolling in labour service 
for the enemy’, the Occupier sought to ‘make the proud people of Rome fold’ through 
hunger.21 Yet while Romans’ responses to this situation were mostly a matter of individual 
survival strategies rather than collective mobilisation, the vacuum of authority did also 
encourage the emergence of a militant minority. This was not limited to hostility toward a 
foreign enemy. Ever since 1940 women demanding overdue rations had mounted bread 
riots around the capital, their assalti ai forni [mass raids on bakeries] becoming an iconic 
expression of the Roman Resistance.22 The German invasion not only exacerbated anti- 
 
 
18 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November 1943:  
APC/7/2/14.  
19 Figures from Seronde-Babonaux 1983.  
20 Regia Questura di Roma to DGPS Roma, Comando Città Aperta di Roma and Regia Prefettura di 
Roma, 17/11/1943, in ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/146 
21 L’Unità, 17/11/1943, p. 2, ‘La disoccupazione e la fame della popolazione romana’.  
22 Particularly as portrayed in Rossellini’s Rome: Open City. 
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régime feeling and food crisis, but also catalysed communist militants’ attempts to drill 
this ‘army of hunger’ into literal battalions. 
 
4.2. Motors to Resistance 
 
With the fragmentation of Italy’s political and military authorities in the wake of 8 
September, the German forces capturing Rome imposed a harsh Occupation régime. 
While the city was nominal capital of the now reduced Mussolini’s Repubblica Sociale 
Italiana (RSI; ‘Salò Republic’, proclaimed 23 September), the Duce’s regime was a distant 
power, maintaining little pretence of restored Fascist authority as its ministries abandoned 
Rome for the North. Despite its formal status as an ‘open city’ the RSI capital became a 
Wehrmacht supply base, with German units taking over barracks, office buildings, 
schools and hospitals across Rome as the operational centre for the Gustav Line defences. 
Such was the occupier’s presence in the city under military governor General Reiner 
Stahel that tank units parked in open ground around the Colosseum, Vatican and Altare 
della Patria in the confidence that the Allies would not bomb these historic sites. While 
German forces were initially mostly limited to the centre and the transport routes 
attaching it to the front line, Resistance attacks on Wehrmacht convoys also drew these 
units into peripheral areas in order to crush pockets of partisan organisation. 
 
This also reflected the enfeeblement of Italian police. On 16 September crowds in Testaccio 
overwhelmed carabinieri and ransacked flour stores; in a similar incident at Tiburtina station 
eight days later, looters raided parked wagons for food.23 So under-resourced was the RSI’s 
Roman police-chief that his reports were typed on the old Savoy letterhead, with the royalist 
crest crudely crossed-out. With barely a hundred German policemen to complement their 
Italian counterparts, the Occupier ruled the borgate via sporadic sorties rather than ongoing 
patrols. Telling in this respect were the events of 26 September in Tormarancia, as German 
troops raided this borgata in search of looted weaponry. Italian police reported that as 
Wehrmacht soldiers arrived, young residents of Rome’s ‘Shanghai’ ran away in the false belief 
that the Germans had come to press them into labour-service.24 This repressive effort was itself 
often found lacking: on 21 September Polizia dell’Africa Italiana (PAI) and German units 
conducted house-to-house searches in Trionfale yet found no hidden weapons; the 28 
September raids in Torpignattara and Tiburtino III, and in Pietralata two days later, also failed 
to detect the partisan weapons caches in these districts. 
 
 
 
23 16.9.1943 report in ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/146.  
24 26.9.1943 report in ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/146. 
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Partisans used a variety of weapons in attacking the Italian Fascists and German troops. 
As one PCI slogan had it, they had to ‘make the ground burn under the Occupier’s feet’, 
disrupting the social peace that allowed Rome’s use as a Wehrmacht supply base. A 
group of young intellectuals recruited to the Party’s crack Gruppi di Azione Patriottica 
(GAP) were particularly effective in mounting such attacks in the city centre, for instance 
the 28 October bombing outside Palazzo Braschi, injuring 12 Fascist militi; the 5 December 
assault outside the Opera, torching two German tanks; or the bomb-attacks on cinemas 
and restaurants frequented by Wehrmacht soldiers. Surprise attacks by passing cyclists 
throwing grenades soon led to a general ban on the use of bicycles in the capital. One 
commonplace partisan tool was the chiodo a quattro punte: a simple but ingenious device 
made by welding two nails together. When thrown in the path of German traffic either 
point of the chiodo could tear apart a vehicle’s tyres, bringing whole columns to a halt and 
thus exposing Wehrmacht crews to armed potshots. 
 
Beyond any mobilisation against Occupation forces, the proliferation of armed bands on the 
Roman periphery also reflected a social conflict fuelled by soaring unemployment and draft-
resistance. Police in rural districts at the outer limits of the province reported ‘a real 
emigration [from the city] of elements subject to conscription’25 and a food crisis aggravated 
‘by the presence of bands of disbanded soldiers’.26 A 1 December report to Rome’s police-chief 
evocatively described the factors swelling partisan ranks in Genzano, a comune twenty miles 
from the centre: ‘After 8 September local police services disappeared, predictably followed by 
the looting of schools, German and Italian barracks and private homes, with laws or 
disciplinary norms openly disavowed. Subversive currents do not refrain from taking on 
organised form. Only about a month ago did local police reappear … Add to this the influx of 
disbanded soldiers coming to the countryside in this district: youth whose mood and difficult 
living conditions (mostly Southerners) would alone allow us to consider them easily “won to” 
subversive currents. There have been thefts of the now-ripe olive-vine harvest; in the fields, 
thefts of livestock and produce’.27 
 
Romans’ fight for self-preservation was shaped by harsh economic circumstances. These 
also had uneven effects on different sections of the population. Given borgate residents’ 
marginality to industrial production – or even the official economy – Rome’s slum 
 
 
 
 
25 See the reports on armed bands in ACS/MI/DGPS/AGR/A5G/II guerra mondiale/150.  
26 ASR/Prefettura Gabinetto/1495, ‘Relazione del segretario comunale di Genzano per il capo 
provincia di Roma’.  
27 Ibid. 
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proletarians were of little use to the Axis war effort unless they could be removed to and 
made to work in other industrial centres, even in Germany itself. Not only did this tend to 
diminish workplace-based organising as a means of undermining war production (and 
thus Occupation infrastructure) relative to cities like Turin or Milan, but it also radically 
increased the importance of draft-resistance in borgate residents’ concerns. Compulsory 
labour service – effectively implying deportation from Rome – as well as the Salò 
Republic’s November 1943 attempt to conscript a fresh ‘classe’28 of troops for its armed 
forces were key factors in driving such renitenza alla leva. Draft-resistance also contributed 
to the conflict over the food supply, since those who evaded conscription were deprived 
of access to rations – or rather, compelled to lay hold of food by other channels, often to 
the detriment of farmers and grocers. 
 
With even those receiving regular salaries ever less sure of the reliability of food supplies, 
increasing numbers of Romans were driven toward the unofficial economy. This was a 
grim ‘autonomy’, forcing them to head to the country or directly appropriate food, as 
wages and fixed incomes became mere strips of paper. While the mass absenteeism in the 
Northern factories (reaching the order of 10-15%)29 points to a similar phenomenon in the 
more conventionally industrial context, with even wage-rises won through strikes and 
régime concessions evaporated by inflation, the difference in the capital was the extreme 
collapse of the rationing system. Across late 1943 even a much-depleted police force 
arrested between four and six hundred Romans per week for black-market activities,30 
hinting at a widespread parallel economy: the unofficial price of bread soared to around 
50 lire a kilo (tantamount to a skilled worker’s daily wages), butter to 250 lire a kilo, and 
cigarettes to 50 lire a packet.31 These records break off in early February 1944; diaries and 
memoirs suggest that the crisis reached yet more severe proportions in April-May, with 
armed bands’ looting of farms and foodstores peaking in the final month of Occupation.32 
 
This social breakdown itself fed the MCd’I’s distinctive conception of ‘class politics’, distant 
from trade-union-type corporatism. While historians have typically33 identified the PCI’s 
 
 
28 I.e. those Italian men born in a given calendar year.  
29 Gobbi 1971.  
30 Extensively documented in ACS/Segreteria del Capo della Polizia/RSI/1943-1945/70. 
31 Ibid.  
32 E.g. Mafai 2008, Chilanti 1996.  
33 Corvisieri 1967, a sympathetic treatment of Bandiera Rossa, argues that the movement was mistaken to 
show such little regard for workplace organisation. He insists that the social breakdown in the borgate – 
and the MCd’I strong organisation in these areas – ought not to blind us to the pockets of industry that 
did exist, and the fact that many of the movement’s leading cadres were skilled workers. While these are 
both necessary qualifications to any portrayal of the movement’s social 
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proletarian base with Italy’s major industrial centres – and thus the ‘class war’ of 1943–45 
with the strikes the Party organised in the great Northern factories – the MCd’I showed 
little concern for mass action in the workplace. Across tens of thousands of pages of its 
press and internal documents we find only a handful of references to trade unions;34 not 
once was its propagandistic invocation of the value of strike action addressed to workers 
in specific companies or industries. Tellingly, 2nd Zone commander Tigrino Sabatini quit 
his tram-depot job – a seemingly classic base of union activism – in order to lead 
sympathetic workmates in a full-time effort of armed expropriations and sabotage. The 
MCd’I’s practical initiatives were dominated by the procurement of weapons and 
supplies, and increasingly, the practicalities of defending its base from repression. This set 
of activities, grouped under the title Soccorso Rosso [‘Red Aid’], combined self-preservation 
with communist political organisation. 
 
Lacking industrial strength in the sense of forming trade unions, the MCd’I was inventive in 
mobilising particular groups of Romans in service of its armed bands. Beyond its post and 
telegraph workers’ sabotage of German communications, one key workplace unit was its 
‘special band’ in the fire brigade, whose militants derailed a Wehrmacht supply train before 
hosing water on the wreckage in order to feed the petrol-fuelled blaze.35 As well as fire its 
militants found an ally in ice, centrally produced in breweries in these early years of 
refrigeration. The teenage ‘Dantin [sic]’ Pepe, whose job involved cycling from the Wührer 
beer factory to grocers and butchers distributing ice-cubes, recounted the pretext this gave him 
to cross Rome at all hours with a cargo of weapons and contraband covered by layers of frost. 
Named after the French revolutionary Danton, Pepe was active in COBA, the MCd’I youth 
group so-called in homage to Stalin’s teenage sobriquet. Gloria Chilanti, teenage daughter of 
Bandiera Rossa co-editor Felice, wrote in her diary of how COBA used 7 to 14-year-olds and 
particularly girls as staffette [relays] able to carry ‘Red Aid’ ranging from food to guns and 
newspapers around Rome without being searched by German troops.36 
 
 
 
base, Corvisieri’s political argument seems difficult to ground in any experiential evidence. Not only did 
the MCd’I evidently prefer to use workplaces as bases for clandestine-military type organisations 
(‘special bands’), but the Socialist or Communist Parties also proved unable to initiate strike movements 
in the capital. See Chapter Eight on the failure to organise a general strike.  
34 Notable in this regard is the complete lack of detail in Poce’s trade union report at the February 
1945 MCd’I congress, a declaration of principles and critique of the Socialist and Communist 
parties’ collaboration with Badoglio, lacking any detail of workplace organisation… ‘Relazione 
sull’azione sindacale del compagno Poce Antonino’, copy in FGFM/275/222.  
35 See the report by Renato Gioia in MSdL/FSC/26/55/Vigili del Fuoco.  
36 See Chilanti 1996. The book features an appendix with the whimsical ‘Statutes and Norms’ that 
novelist Guido Piovene drew up for COBA, here reproduced in full. In homage to Stalin, child 
members adopted the name ‘Koba’ and their adult supervisors ‘moustaches’: 
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Women MCd’Iers were largely limited to such auxiliary roles rather than properly political or 
military ones. This was not true of all Roman Resistance forces: the PCI’s GAP units were 
around one-quarter female, their militants even pairing into pretend couples in order to 
present an outward air of ‘normality’.37 The MCd’I’s contemporary records (like Allied reports 
on its post-Liberation ‘feminine groups’)38 mostly refer to women only as wives, sisters or 
lovers of male members, without independent initiative of their own. Bandiera Rossa did like 
other Resistance groups make an Appello alle donne italiane, highlighting the suffering of Italian 
women who grieved for lost sons, and calling on them to join the Movement. Yet the overall 
tone was strongly patronising,39 and tended to highlight women’s use to the movement in 
auxiliary roles, than any solution to their particular 
 
 
 
‘COBA: Association of free children in rebellion  
1. COBA is a clandestine association, so all those who belong to it must be sure to be able to keep a 
secret. 2. To be part of COBA, the following qualities are necessary: a) To be brave and loyal; b) Never to 
tell lies, without having first obtained the authorisation of the leadership committee. If it is necessary to 
tell a lie in the interests of COBA, without there being time to obtain authorisation, the members 
concerned must communicate this to the committee within 24 hours. 3. To be intelligent and always help 
each other in the following situations: a) At school: helping out other members questioned by the 
teachers, and passing notes in exams; b) In everyday life: practicing absolute equality, such that there are 
neither rich nor poor. COBA members will share amongst themselves in equal measure not only sweets 
but also clothes, books and, if necessary, bread. 4. COBA members must do everything possible to earn 
money, to be given to the leadership committee’s funds. Each will do everything necessary, through 
their own initiative (selling strips of cloth, paper and bottles  
– variety shows or acting – those who can sing well can perform in public places – etc.). With these 
funds, COBA will buy books and clothes or food for the poorest, for orphans, and those wounded or 
made homeless by bombings. If COBA gets a lot of money, we will organise trips to the mountains or 
the sea. 5. If parents place obstacles to a member’s participation in COBA, they must rebel, and in all 
cases keep it a secret from them. 6. 7 to 14 year olds can join COBA. 7. Membership is also open to 
grown-ups, but they must be watched very carefully such that they do not attract enemies into our 
homes. 8. Grown-ups affiliated to COBA will take the name ‘moustachioed’, or just ‘moustaches’. They 
will have special duties. 9. The motto of COBA is ‘I for all of you, and all of us for you’. 10.  
Before having the right to a COBA membership card, it is necessary to make the following 
declaration in the presence of three other members: ‘I have read the statute and I declare my 
absolute loyalty to the COBA association, I am a free and rebellious child and for this reason am a 
COBA’. 11. For grown-ups, the declaration will be the following: ‘I have read the statute and I 
declare my absolute loyalty to the COBA association, I am a free and rebellious “moustache” and 
for this reason am a COBA’. 12. Punishments – Those who, in the view of the committee, are not 
giving their active collaboration after three weeks of membership, will be expelled, and be entitled 
to the reimbursement of their dues. Liars: Will be expelled without any right to reimbursement of 
their dues. Traitors: will be beaten with 24 strikes of a whip, and expelled in disgrace’.  
37 Several of these pairs did in fact marry after the war, having been introduced to one another as 
secret GAP contacts: most prominently in Rome, Carla Capponi and Rosario Bentivegna; Lucia 
Ottobrini and Mario Fiorentini; and Maria Teresa Regard and Franco Calamandrei. In the film 
Senza Tregua Milan gappista Giovanni Pesce recounts meeting his future wife Onorina Brambilla in 
this manner; upon their first appointment at a fountain he falsely told her that he had orders from 
the Party that she was hitherto to stay at his own home.  
38 See Chapter Eight.  
39 In particular, the text highlighted women’s lack of political activity under Fascism, and implored 
women not to stop their husbands from entering the struggle, even if they did not understand 
what purpose it served. 
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concerns.40 This made particularly exceptional the case of Matilde Bassani Finzi, a Jewish 
socialist commanding a band in eastern Rome. Her activity, explored in Chapter Five was 
closely connected to both the MCd’I and Allied intelligence. 
 
4.3. The MCd’I’s command structure 
 
The Central Executive Committee formed over October-November 1943 worked to unite 
these armed bands and communist circles into a city-wide insurrectionary force. Here 
artisans and tradesmen predominated, and not the borgatari at its social base. Formed 
through co-option rather than election, this leadership body was nonetheless diverse in its 
political make-up, with Scintilla (De Luca, Cretara, Govoni) and Attenti! (Malatesta, Merli, 
Paolorossi, Bitler) members featuring in Executive Committee ranks as well as the socialist 
Matteo Matteotti and the anarchist Pappalardo. Also included were cobbler Ezio 
Lombardi, the telephone engineer Giuseppe Palmidoro, San Lorenzo lawyer Salvatore 
Riso, bookkeeper Franco Bucciano, the SIM intelligence operative Roberto Guzzo, and 
Filiberto Sbardella. Malatesta, Merli, Paolorossi and Bitler were all executed on 2 February 
1944 and their co-defendant Paolorossi deported to Germany; Bucciano together with 
Govoni died in the Fosse Ardeatine massacre seven weeks later. They were each replaced 
by militants from elsewhere in the organisation, though as we will see in Chapter Six 
these killings greatly weakened the MCd’I’s military capacities. 
 
The Executive created working committees covering ‘internal bands’, ‘external bands’, ‘press 
and propaganda’, ‘assistance and finance’ and ‘technical services’. Executive members 
appeared on these bodies together with militants like electrician Antonino Poce and carpenter 
Orfeo Mucci (responsible for internal bands), career soldier Gino Rossi (external bands; 
executed 2 February 1944), and for press Felice Chilanti, Carlo Matteotti and Pietro Bàttara. 
The ‘assistance and finance’ committee led by Pappalardo also included Costantino Rossi and 
Austrian dancer Herta Habernig, and the ‘technical services’ operation eleven sympathetic 
police contacts. Zone Commanders oversaw six areas of Rome, comprising twenty-seven local 
units; eight ‘special internal bands’ organised firemen, railworkers, ISTAT statistics staff, post 
and telegraph workers, telephone engineers, and student draft-resisters; added to this were 
thirty-nine ‘external bands’ in outlying and rural areas. Highlighting the difficulty of 
communications, 17 of 35 members 
 
 
 
40 The PCI press, at least, presented a more developed view of these questions: APC/7/2/23, from  
December 1943, outlined a plan of women’s work in Rome. While assuming women ‘not interested 
in political questions’ and interested in ‘tranquility’, it sought to connect women’s concerns over 
food, housing and welfare to the wider struggle for national liberation. 
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handling contacts between internal bands met their deaths during the nine-month 
Occupation; of the 19 responsible for external bands, four were deported, one killed and 
one wounded. 
 
The final months of 1943 also saw a de facto geographical division between PCI and MCd’I 
operations in the capital. Whereas the latter dominated the Resistance in the peripheral 
borgate, to the near-exclusion of other parties,41 in the centre the armed attacks on German 
troops, prisons and police stations mostly owed to the PCI’s GAP units, largely formed of 
young intellectuals. There were some cases of overlap: an MCd’I band active to the south 
of San Giovanni helped collect funds for l’Unità,42 Quadraro’s Banda Rossi hesitated 
between ‘the Party and the Movement’ before a majority vote to join the MCd’I in late 
October,43 and upon his arrest during a failed GAP attack on the ‘Aquila d’Oro’ hotel in 
January 1944 Umberto Scattoni was a member of both organisations. Nonetheless, there 
are no signs of GAP activity in the borgate before February 1944, and a prominent gappista 
like Rosario Bentivegna could describe a visit to Centocelle that month as the discovery of 
an unknown universe, a ‘borgata of free men’.44 Organised in terrorist cells, Bentivegna’s 
comrades isolated themselves from the wider population, never venturing outdoors 
except on operational business; following strict rules of clandestinity, each gappista was 
known to just a handful of fellow militants. 
 
The MCd’I’s attempts at ‘mass’ organising in the borgate sharply contrasted with the GAP’s 
disciplined secrecy. Members’ accounts tell of a near-open-door recruitment policy, printing 
4,000 membership cards amidst exuberance over the numbers of bands joining the movement. 
‘Dantin’ Pepe’s unpublished memoir reports a ‘joyous’ 30 October 1943 tesseramento 
[registration session] in his district ‘when we forgot reasons for sadness. Romoletto and his 
two sons brought along several bottles of fizz and we sang “The Red Flag will triumph, long 
live communism and freedom”’.45 Protected from Fascist assault by armed guards, the 
meeting nonetheless ‘allowed everyone to get to know each other, with 
 
 
 
41 Orfeo Mucci even spoke of a division of the city: ‘[we were] across the whole periphery, Tor   
Pignattara, Quadraro, because it was there that our comrades fought. While they [the PCI leaders] 
were in the centre of Rome, we had a kind of understanding, they fought in the centre and we on 
the outside’: CGB/FAP, Mucci, p. 31. Gremmo 1996a writes that ‘in the borgate, Bandiera Rossa WAS 
the Resistance’.  
42 ‘Relazione particolareggiata delle attività della Banda “Metronio”’, MSdL/FSC/26/55.  
43 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dell’Organizzazione comunista del Quadraro del MC d’Italia’: 
ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665. 
44 See Bentivegna 1983, p. 114. 
45 The old socialist/communist anthem Bandiera Rossa, with origins at the turn of the twentieth 
century. 
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larger and smaller squads coming together to form the great “Certosa and Torpignattara 
formation” uniting over three hundred men’.46 In Chapter Six we will examine how the 
Fascist secret services exploited such laxity. Here we need only note that one of the 
MCd’I’s first armed actions on 20 October brought the execution of ten members, followed 
on 2 December by the collapse of Malatesta and Iacopini’s Trionfale group at the hands of 
the spy Ubaldo Cipolla, resulting in 16 arrests and 11 executions. 
 
While from its first issue Bandiera Rossa proclaimed the MCd’I a ‘regularly disciplined 
movement’,47 it seems that it was more a ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ cohered by the 
prestige and initiative of local leaders. ‘Organisational Rules’48 circulated in November 
1943 stipulated the creation of 3-to-8 member cells49 and proclaimed the movement 
organised ‘on the principle already tested in all countries: from the bottom up’.50 Local 
commanders’ reports on their armed actions however suggest an essentially ad hoc 
tactical-military organisation, with many of the bands affiliating to the MCd’I after 8 
September failing to subdivide into smaller cells even if they had several dozens of 
members. The only truly centralised element of the MCd’I was its press; the Executive that 
issued Rules proclaiming ‘democratic organisation … through which all members follow 
directives emanating from their own selves’ to be the ‘indisputable basis for political 
emancipation and voluntary revolutionary activity’51 was itself unelected. When internal 
elections were suggested in February 1944, Orfeo Mucci not only dismissed this as 
impracticable in clandestine conditions, but reasoned that ‘the MCd’I founders are already 
“elect” because they are the organisation’s heart and soul’.52 
 
Beyond the understandable dysfunctions in the MCd’I’s internal structure, we can also 
distinguish between its ‘intransigent’ political perspective and its local units’ more 
immediately practical concerns. While all its bands distributed a common centrally-produced 
press and even sent militants to a ‘Marxist school’ at Grotta Rossa (see section 4.6) they were 
autonomous in their practical operations and collaborated with local forces of less definite 
political character. In sabotaging Occupation infrastructure MCd’I partisans worked together 
not only with isolated PCI members or Socialists such as the armed bands 
 
 
 
46 Pepe n.d., p. 34. 
47 ‘In linea’, BR, 5.10.1943.  
48 MCd’I 1944a, p. 10. Copy at ACS/MI/Gabinetto/Archivio Generale/Fascicoli Permanenti, Partiti 
politici/181/3212.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
52 ‘Riunione del Comitato romano tenuta il 13.2.1944, copy in MSdL/FSC/28/91.  
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led by Franco Napoli,53 but also forces steeped in the world of criminality and malavita 
such as the gang run by Giuseppe Albano, the sixteen-year-old ‘Hunchback of 
Quarticciolo’.54 And just as bandits could be useful conduits for fuel or weaponry, so too 
could priests and medical doctors be allies in finding refuge for POWs or draft-resisters 
gravitating toward the movement’s Red Aid network. As the MCd’I repudiated the state 
and even ‘bourgeois’ Resistance parties, its self-proclaimed ‘working-class solidarity’ 
relied on practical collaboration with forces standing far from Marxist politics. 
 
4.4. The ‘Banda Rossi’ 
 
Instructive for understanding how these communists extended their clandestine networks 
across autumn 1943 is the example of Quadraro’s Banda Rossi, whose ultimate detachment 
from the MCd’I also highlights the movement’s fragmentary character. Voting to join the 
MCd’I in October 1943 and operating along three major Wehrmacht transport routes, the 
history of Costantino Rossi’s band is particularly well-attested thanks to the June 1945 Allied 
Control Commission (ACC) trial of seven of its leaders, charged with armed robbery. The 
arrival of US-UK troops brought neither an end to these partisans’ ‘expropriations’ nor any 
blanket amnesty for Occupation-era crimes against property; ACC prosecutors thus 
interviewed dozens of partisans and local onlookers as they investigated what one British 
operative stuffily termed ‘Robin Hood’ activities.55 Combining communist agitation, ‘Red Aid’ 
for fugitives, and rather murkier banditry, this unit combined many aspects of the armed 
bands forming in the peripheral borgate as the central state’s authority crumbled. Here we shall 
begin by explaining the Banda Rossi’s basic organisational forms, before continuing to trace its 
progress across subsequent chapters. 
 
In its own report to the Allied authorities the band emphasised the defensive and anti-Nazi 
character of its activity. Listing twenty squad-leaders, the Quadraro formation spoke proudly 
of the base it had formed at its ‘improvised fortress’, the ‘Ramazzini sanatorium in Porta 
Furba, where in September 1943 Costantino Rossi founded a band made up of the communist 
comrades hiding from Nazi-Fascist persecution’.56 Like other partisans we have encountered, 
the band based at the hospital initially devoted all its activity to procuring weapons, listing a 
series of armed attacks on German convoys as well as raids ‘on depots, 
 
 
 
53 See his memoir Napoli 1996.  
54 Recchioni and Parrella 2015, Corvisieri 1999. 
55 ACS/ACC/B245A/S50/‘Extract from file No. 636/3 sheet no.23’.   
56 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’, p. 1. See also ‘Relazione sull’attività 
svolta dell’Organizzazione comunista del Quadraro del MC d’Italia’: ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665. 
Further documents from this band appear in MSdL/FSC/26/55. 
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namely Ciampino and Centocelle [airports], Forte Prenestino, Cinecittà and the Forte 
dell’Acqua Santa’ in the wake of 8 September.57 ‘Skilled, proven men guarded [the 
sanatorium] day and night, checking people coming in … checking weapons out for 
actions and patrols, and in again once they were complete’.58 More than a weapons cache, 
the hospital was a ‘Holding Centre for all fugitives from political persecution’, including 
‘English and Russian prisoners and men escaping conscription and labour service’.59 Some 
such soldiers provided written confirmation of aid received.60 
 
Cut off from the official rationing system, young men from Quadraro evading 
conscription to Mussolini’s army were particularly active in Rossi’s band. Its ‘Red Aid’ 
operation forged identity papers and ration-books, and as provisions dwindled over 
winter 1943–44 its militants increasingly turned to expropriating and redistributing food. 
While in November 1944 it told the Allied Control Commission that its help for ‘political 
fugitives and the families of deportees’ consisted of ‘food, flour and whatever could be 
obtained from collaborating sympathisers’ and ‘daily quintals of bread and flour supplied 
by mills and bakeries’,61 it seems that these supplies were mostly looted from official 
distribution centres or else extorted from farmers and grocers by ultimatum.62 ‘Very many 
times requisitioning livestock requisitioned by the Germans and butchering it to support 
the population and fugitives’, the Banda Rossi claimed to have spent 896,260 lira in 
Quadraro during the Occupation, and 1,006,474 in the five months after the Allies’ arrival 
.63 Detailing the ‘butter, cheese, parmesan, flour and petrol’ and boxes of flour his unit 
seized from Wehrmacht stocks,64 Rossi’s report to the ACC left unmentioned what they 
had seized from Italian producers and traders. 
 
While the Banda Rossi’s leaders admitted to such thefts at their June 1945 trial, arguing that 
they were necessary for feeding a famished population, it is more difficult to determine their 
real level of attacks on Occupation forces. Rossi’s own list of missions details seventeen armed 
assaults on ‘Nazi-Fascist’ convoys, depots and patrols during the nine-month Resistance, 
involving 84 militants and mainly aimed at stealing weaponry. The band’s arms 
 
 
 
 
57 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’, pp. 2–3.  
58 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’, p. 1. 
59 See MSdL/FSC/26/55.  
60 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’, p. 1.  
61 Ibid. 
62 See the complaints by these latter in ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665/1.  
63 Relazione sull’attività svolta dell’Organizzazione comunista del Quadraro del MC d’Italia’: 
ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665  
64 Ibid. 
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stocks reported to the Allied Military Government in June 1944 included 70 rifles, 18 pistols, 
600 grenades, three heavy and three light machine-guns, two submachine-guns and two 
rocket-launcher pistols.65 Rossi’s reports are prone to omission as well as boastfulness; in 
February 1945 police discovered nineteen undeclared firearms in the Sanatorio Ramazzini, 
used for the Band’s continuing ‘extortion’ efforts. Yet overall this level of activity seems quite 
plausible for a group with a few dozen armed members. Its accounts for the Occupation 
period describe some 658,802 lira of its expenditure being devoted to aid to the population, 
25,000 for false documents, and 7,800 on aid to Russian POWs.66 
 
The extortion of food and money did not end upon the Allies’ arrival in June 1944, and one 
British official describing the partisan bands still operating after Liberation could thus decry 
militants seeking ‘the destruction of the bourgeoisie and the established order by means of 
Robin Hood tactics which admit that a rich landowner may be “eliminated” provided his 
wealth is put at the disposal of the proletariate [sic]’.67 Despite this class-war aspect of the 
Band’s activity, the construction of its ‘Red Aid’ relief networks under Occupation also relied 
on seemingly unradical forces. According to a report by the band’s ‘Quadrumvirate’, ‘many 
hospital managers were aware’ that the Sanatorio Ramazzini had been used to hide fugitives, 
‘with the whole personnel, particularly the nuns, collaborating prudently and heroically’,68 
‘offering aid even to us heathens’.69 This document described the hospital’s ‘bursar Telemaco 
Conti, informed about everything’ as ‘the soul of this solidarity’.70 Banda Rossi collaborators 
included policemen and even Vatican officials, with the printing of false papers realised with 
‘the truly valuable and selfless collaboration of Comm. Zonghi, Chamberlain to His Holiness’ 
as well as that of the Italian Red Cross’.71 
 
Like all Roman Resistance networks, the band based at the Sanatorio Ramazzini also took 
care of fugitive Allied soldiers, including the POWs liberated in a series of prison breaks. 
For German embassy adviser Eitel Friedrich Moellhausen ‘the way to escape Rome was 
either the Vatican or Quadraro’; 72 seeking to prevent such ‘flight’, on 26 October Stahel 
introduced the death penalty for whoever aided escapee POWs. While this mostly 
 
 
 
 
65 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’.  
66 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dell’Organizzazione comunista del Quadraro del MC d’Italia’, p. 10. 
67 ACS/ACC/B245A/S50/‘Extract from file No. 636/3 sheet no.23’.   
68ASR/CAP/Cd’A/Rossi/1665/1/’Relazione sull’attività svolta dall’organizzazione comunista del 
Quadraro del MC d’Italia’.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Moellhausen 1948, p. 126. 
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concerned Allied fugitives, the MCd’I’s ‘Red Aid’ did in isolated cases extend beyond 
wartime national divides. This was most evident in the presence of Wehrmacht defectors 
at the Sanatorio Ramazzini and even as Banda Rossi militants, its leader describing Hans 
Bracher, Stefan Fischer (both squad-leaders) and Herbert Salamm as ‘among our [unit’s] 
best elements’, men of ‘elevated anti-Nazi-Fascist sentiment’.73 While mere handfuls of 
soldiers switched sides, the idea of working-class conscripts turning against their generals 
fed MCd’I propaganda on its internationalist character, asserting in one clandestine 
newspaper that the Anglo-Americans now feared ‘not Nazi Germany facing defeat today 
but the triumphant Soviet Germany of tomorrow’.74 
 
Such lofty Marxist slogans were distant from the Banda Rossi’s more prosaic activities. While 
the band was attached to the 2nd Zone MCd’I and the anarchist Pappalardo’s city-wide 
Soccorso Rosso operation, the movement’s political leadership took its distance from Rossi 
during postwar trials, not only accusing him of embezzlement but falsely telling prosecutors 
he had never belonged to the MCd’I at all.75 Yet if they went along with Allied efforts to 
distinguish between ‘idealist’ elements and those using the Resistance ‘as a mere cover for 
their criminal activities’, this distinction had not necessarily existed in partisans’ own heads 
during the armed struggle. Considering the competing Italian governments illegitimate and 
the victory of communism imminent, the outlaw Rossi had acted regardless of outside 
authority, even after the Anglo-Americans’ arrival. Building the Banda Rossi thus itself 
became a revolutionary act, and anything that served this purpose legitimate; the Quadraro 
communists stole livestock even from the Sanatorio Ramazzini’s own estate despite the 
hospital authorities’ help for their Red Aid effort. Only after the ACC dissolved all armed 
bands in Rome would the MCd’I repudiate Rossi’s ‘criminal’ activities. 
 
Given the importance of Soccorso Rosso to building MCd’I organisation, there is no simple 
separation between banditry and its more explicitly political efforts. This is all the truer when 
we consider that the individuals whom Rossi sought to train as communist cadres were 
fugitive conscripts. The Quadraro unit not only offered shelter to draft-resisters and refugees 
but also sought to educate them politically. A Press Office report boasted that ‘our comrades 
ardently worked to inspire in a small group of young people [Rossi’s] faith in communism, 
such as to infuse in these others love for the proletariat and social justice as 
 
 
 
 
73 ASR/CAP/Cd’A/Rossi/1665/1/’Relazione sull’attività svolta dall’organizzazione comunista 
del Quadraro del MC d’Italia’. 
74 Bandiera Rossa, 14/11/1943, p. 2, ‘La voce dell’operaio’.  
75 A claim also made in print in ‘Comunicato’, Bollettino del Movimento Comunista, I/5, 26/10/1944. 
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the essential basis of the struggle’.76 The most concrete evidence of this was ‘a little paper 
called L’Italia Proletaria’ with which ‘we educated and emancipated those attached to us. 
Our own comrades passionately contributed as impromptu journalists, and also took 
charge of distributing it’.77 By the band’s own account, after its October 1943 decision to 
join the MCd’I ‘while preserving its own autonomy’, ‘[i]n a short time all those attached to 
us acquired a perfect political consciousness’.78 
 
Reading this handwritten paper79 we find less sign of political ‘perfection’ than autodidact 
eclecticism. This reflected both L’Italia Proletaria’s autonomy and its educational purpose. 
Combining its own texts with readers’ letters, this ‘internal paper’80 carried articles from both 
Bandiera Rossa and l’Unità as well as reports on Fascist press claims. It echoed the MCd’I’s 
insistence on the imminence of socialist revolution81 and exaltation of the Red Army.82 A 
programmatic-type statement reasoned that given the bourgeoisie’s ‘identity’ with Fascism, 
‘collaborating with it amounts to betraying the rights of the masses, who ask of us communists 
the material-political intransigence guaranteeing them a battle waged with no goal other than 
destroying capitalism’.83 However, it distinguished itself from MCd’I propaganda by 
reproducing PCI statements calling on all Italians to join the armed struggle, and indeed by its 
own effort to melt nation into class. An epigraph proclaimed ‘Young Italians follow us, for us 
there is a Patria, but not one under bourgeois-capitalist hegemony, but the one the whole 
people wants, namely a truly proletarian Patria’.84 
 
4.5. Strategic directives 
 
Rossi’s claim that his comrades opted to join the MCd’I in October 1943 after comparing 
Bandiera Rossa to l’Unità85 reflects the importance the communist leaderships placed on 
 
 
76 ‘Relazione sommaria dell’attività svolta in periodo clandestino, dall’organizzazione Rossi’,  
MSdL/FSC/28/64, p. 1. 
77 Ibid., p. 2.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Not conserved in any library or institutional archive, it seems the only remaining issues are nos.  
III and IV (both from December 1943), in the personal possession of Quadraro MCd’I member Ercole  
Favelli. My thanks to Riccardo Sansone for providing me with photographs of Favelli’s copies. 
80 See the co-editor’s comments in Di Cesaris 2004, p. 141. 
81 ‘Parole ai giovani comunisti’, L’Italia Proletaria, III, 1.12.1943, signed ‘Nipro’; same text but titled  
'Parla un comunista' in issue IV, 13.12.1943. 
82 Particularly ‘Viva Stalin’, L’Italia Proletaria, III, 1.12.1943. 
83 Parole ai giovani comunisti’, L’Italia Proletaria, III, 1.12.1943, signed ‘Nipro’; same text but titled  
'Parla un comunista' in issue IV, 13/12/1943.  
84 L’Italia Proletaria, IV, 13/12/1943, untitled box. Similarly in that issue’s front-page headline ‘For 
freedom, justice and a people’s Italy the whole youth rallies under the Red banner, sure defender of 
the proletariat’.  
85 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dell’Organizzazione comunista del Quadraro del MC d’Italia’: 
ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665. 
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propaganda. This was crucial in the effort to mould ad hoc bands of draft resisters into political 
movements. While l’Italia Proletaria resembled the copied leaflets and handwritten bulletins 
discussed in Chapter Two, there now emerged professionally-produced broadsheets for a 
mass audience. The two-page weekly Bandiera Rossa (edited by journalist Felice Chilanti and 
graphic designer Francesco Cretara) claimed a circulation of 12,00086 and the Rome edition of 
l’Unità as many as 10,000 copies. Beyond agitating for Romans to join Resistance activities, 
each paper sought to educate militants in its own political line. Given this objective (as well as 
their necessarily irregular distribution), both Bandiera Rossa and l’Unità favoured 
‘programmatic’ over ‘news’ content, offering analyses of the political situation, Resistance 
objectives, and the lessons of Marxism. Some partisan bands distributed both publications, as 
well as papers like the Socialist Avanti!, the Catholic-communist Voce Operaia, and, after a 
January 1944 split in the Socialist Party, Il Partigiano.87 
 
The PCI was first to issue a newspaper in the capital after the invasion, with a Rome l’Unità 
appearing from 19 September 1943. While tailored to local events, the Party’s organ reflected 
the same national-front strategy as it promoted in its Northern redoubts. The first issue’s 
banner headline called on ‘ALL THE FORCES OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE to chase out the 
Germans and destroy Fascism’;88 this article was accompanied by appeals to ‘workers, 
peasants and intellectuals’ but also ‘all Italians’, ‘soldiers and officers’ and ‘agents and officers 
of the security services’ to join a common front to redeem ‘the honour of the Patria’.89 A series 
of texts on the ‘new historic tasks of the working class’ insisted that the Party was ‘not 
abandoning its socialist end goal, but taking a positive step in that direction’; in the 
immediate, workers must fight for the achievement of ‘National Independence and a people’s 
democracy [sic]’,90 of which the PCI was the ‘proudest champion’.91 The working class must 
raise ‘the tricolore that flew among the Italian people’s armies on the barricades 
 
 
 
 
86 Primo incontro con Chilanti 3.6.1966’: MSdL/FSC/26/22.  
87 See section 5.4.  
88 L’Unità, 19.9.1943, p. 1, ‘TUTTE LE FORZE DEL POPOLO ITALIANO per cacciare i tedeschi e 
distruggere il fascismo’. 
89 L’Unità, 19.9.1943, p. 1. ‘La nostra guerra per l’indipendenza e la libertà’.  
90 It should be emphasised that this term did not yet have the connotation it adopted in the postwar 
period with the creation of ‘People’s Democracies’ in Central and Eastern Europe, where states liberated 
by the Red Army in 1944–5 adopted Soviet-type political and economic structures. Its use here reflects 
an idea developed by Comintern president Georgi Dmitrov in 1935, replacing the classic  
 
Leninist counterposition of either ‘bourgeois’ or ‘proletarian’ ‘dictatorships’ with the idea of an 
expansive democracy excluding fascists and embodying a certain element of social ‘progress’, but 
without as such meaning socialism or working-class rule.  
91 Supplemento al n° 17 de L’Unità, 29.9.1943, ‘I nuovi compiti storici della classe operaia: 
Indipendenza Nazionale e democrazia popolare’ 
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of Milan, the fields of Lombardy and the mountains of Veneto every time they had to 
defend Italy’s freedom against the Germans’.92 
 
The PCI organ’s constant refrain was the need for Italians to unite in Resistance ‘even if 
starting from different perspectives or having different future goals’.93 While advocating a 
CLN government, it emphasised that Italians’ first task was to free the country’s soil; it 
proclaimed that its opposition to Badoglio owed ‘not to any class or party prejudice’ but rather 
to the fact that after the royalists’ failure on 8 September ‘[o]nly a CLN government [could] 
realise the union of all national forces’.94 Within this alliance the working class was the 
‘national class’ par excellence: invective against particular ‘treacherous industrialists’ or 
‘collaborationist financiers’ expressed a class radicalism now rerouted into a narrative 
distinguishing between ‘patriotic’ and ‘unpatriotic’ capitalists. While l’Unità asserted that ‘the 
proletariat pick[ing] up the banner of National Independence dropped by the decadent 
bourgeoisie’95 would be at the ‘centre’ or ‘heart’ of a ‘progressive democracy’ and a ‘new 
political order’, it left undefined its vision of the future Italy. The PCI instead outlined a classic 
‘stageist’ argument, arguing that winning Italy’s freedom from foreign occupation was the 
necessary first step before workers could fight for further social progress. 
 
L’Unità’s articles on the working class’s ‘new historic tasks’ addressed Party militants whom 
branch reports consistently termed indisciplined and ‘ill-informed’. Meant as a Leninist 
‘collective organiser’ – a ‘weapon for mobilising, educating and politically orienting the 
masses’96 – it initially met with the same ‘incomprehension’ cadres had faced since 25 July. A 
November 1943 agitprop-section report portrayed a membership ‘unhappy with P[arty] 
propaganda in general and l’Unità in particular, intolerant of words like “Patria”, “nation” etc., 
and distrustful of the P[arty] line’. 97 Similarly stark claims dominated a 4th zone dossier that 
same month: ‘Frankly, we know that l’Unità gets a real hearing in bourgeois circles, whom we 
might hope to conquer or neutralise; but it seems 
 
 
 
92 L’Unità, 19.9.1943, p. 3, untitled box.  
93 L’Unità, 26.10.1943, p. 2, ‘Punto e basta’. This text appeared in a polemic against Bandiera Rossa, 
arguing that whatever this giornaletto’s ‘lectures based on insinuations and hypocrisy’, the PCI was 
‘proud of realising in the struggle against fascism the union of all those forces that, even if starting 
from different perspectives or having different future goals, have nonetheless come together on the 
positions of fighting fascism, which in its both Mussolinian and Hitlerite forms is the main enemy 
of the working class’. 
94 L’Unità, 29.9.1943, ‘Per l’unità del popolo italiano nella lotta contro il nazismo e il fascismo’.   
95 Supplemento al n° 17 de L’Unità, 29.9.1943, ‘I nuovi compiti storici della classe operaia: 
Indipendenza Nazionale e democrazia popolare’.  
96 As explained in L’Unità, 17/11/1943, ‘Vita di Partito’.  
97 ‘Appunti sull’attività di agit-prop del P. in relazione alla sua linea politica’, November 1943:  
APC/7/10/4, pp. 3–4. 
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almost written for them alone, while disappointing our properly “popular” base ... It 
disappoints them because it speaks of nothing but national liberation, fighting the 
Germans, collaborating with other anti-fascists to this end, of Badoglio and the King … 
but nothing specifically communist, to distinguish us from other parties’.98 ‘The Right 
accuse us of bad faith, while the grassroots say we have become national-jingoists, which 
allows the harder, red-painted Trotskyist [sic]99 papers to out-compete us’.100 
 
Amassing a series of such local reports, Lazio PCI organiser Agostino Novella identified a 
‘raw, proletarian anti-fascism’ little reconciled with the politics of national unity.101 
‘Sectarianism’ prevailed among both ‘old comrades’ ‘stuck’ to the intransigent positions of 
the 1920s and the PCI’s new recruits: ‘almost all Roman comrades, including many with 
important roles in the Party, [did] not know the first elements of communism’,102 
‘instinctively feeling that the world is turning in our direction, yet not fully knowing who 
we are or what we want’.103 This vacuum in their understanding was filled ‘by the 
triumphalist verbal extremism of B[andiera] R[ossa]’,104 whose ‘revolutionary bluster’ 
Novella deemed ‘more readily accepted and assimilated by still-inexpert comrades and 
the working-class masses in general – ill-educated by twenty years of Fascism – than is the 
tight, concrete reasoning of our own Unità’.105 Attracted by ‘extremist phrase-
mongering’,106 ‘apolitical infants [were] becoming political infants won to ultra-Leftism’.107 
Commenting on similar remarks by Giorgio Amendola, Corvisieri notes the irony of PCI 
hierarchs ‘accusing the old comrades of sectarianism because of their past experience, 
while directing the same accusation against the young on account of their inexperience’.108 
 
Party cadres feared such ‘unpreparedness’ and ‘indiscipline’ feeding dissent, as ‘the 
dissatisfaction over l’Unità ensure[d] a very favourable reception for Bandiera Rossa’.109 This 
 
 
 
98 Intervento del “coadiuvatore” della IVa Zona’, November 1943, APC/7/2/13, p. 2.  
99 There were no Trotskyist papers in wartime Rome; this is doubtless a reference to Bandiera Rossa, 
the only dissident-communist publication that could possibly ‘out-compete’ l’Unità.  
100 Intervento del “coadiuvatore” della IVa Zona’, November 1943, APC/7/2/13, p. 2.   
101 Rapporto sulla 2° zona’, December 1943, FGAN/87/262–70. 
102 ‘Fida’, ‘sull’orientamento del P’, November 1943, APC/7/2/12.  
103 Ibid.  
104 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November 1943:  
APC/7/2/14, p. 7. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid. The idea of ‘infantilism’ is clearly a reference to Lenin’s 1920 pamphlet, Left-Wing 
Communism, an Infantile Disorder, a polemic written for the Comintern Second Congress whose 
main polemical targets included Amadeo Bordiga, by 1943 a hate-figure in the PCI. 
108 Corvisieri 1968, p. 29.  
109 Intervento del “coadiuvatore” della IVa Zona’, November 1943, APC/7/2/13, p. 4.  
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latter was dominated by the class-war rhetoric the PCI now abandoned, its 5 October first 
issue publishing an abridged version of the earlier ‘Proclama comunista’. As against what 
it termed ‘the directives circulated and implemented by disparate currents combining in a 
National United Front, which do not conform to Communist thinking and action’,110 the 
MCd’I organ insisted that the question now posed was the ‘revolutionary conquest of 
power’.111 A self-described ‘battle-organ for defeating all reactionary forces blocking the 
proletariat’s road to redemption’, Bandiera Rossa lustily enjoined workers ‘to unite around 
our banner … poin[ting] the weapons of our Revolution, inflexibly and openly, without 
fail and without compromise, against the enemies of yesterday, today and tomorrow’.112 It 
damned a CLN that ‘represent[ed] classes with opposed interests and aims’; a conception 
of Resistance based on national unity would ‘destine’ communists to end up ‘supporting 
the monarchist government headed by Marshal Badoglio’, ‘leader of Fascism’s first 
imperialist endeavour in Abyssinia’.113 
 
For Bandiera Rossa, the class war could not be subordinated to any common national interest. 
At times it did suggest that national Resistance and socialist revolution would follow in two 
distinct phases, such as where it referred to the need to ‘free Italy from first foreign occupation 
then bourgeois domination’. Yet its overwhelming polemical thrust was directed against this 
latter foe. The war was already lost for the Axis, but there remained a threat of capitalist 
‘restoration’; for the ‘bourgeois democrats’, ‘the liberation of Italy [was] not an end, but a 
means of securing the right to restore capitalist domination’. In its own efforts to conquer 
Italy’s future, ‘the working class [could] have neither unity of action nor of ideology with the 
Italian ruling class’.114 It was ‘time to raise the red flag, not the tricolore’; in a moment where 
workers must clearly recognise their distinct class interests, ‘all who adopt the symbols of 
nationalism [were] abandon[ing] any claim to be legitimate representatives of the working 
masses’.115 The MCd’I insisted that ‘the political parties representing the working class can and 
must form a United Front, in a “crusade” of thought and action, means and ends’ aimed only 
at proletarian revolution.116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 In linea’, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943.  
111 Ibid.  
112 Untitled box, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943. This text appeared at the top of the front page of the first 
issue, beneath the masthead.  
113 ‘In linea’, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943.  
114 ‘In linea’, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943. 
115 Perché collaborare?’, Bandiera Rossa, 5.10.1943.  
116 Serena intuizione’, Bandiera Rossa, 22.10.1943. 
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Bandiera Rossa frequently invoked class unity as an alternative to national unity. The 15 
October edition republished the Provisional Executive’s call for the refoundation of the 
Communist Party of Italy, accompanied by an article entitled ‘Toward the Single Party of 
the Proletariat’.117 Scorning the divisions that hampered workers’ collective organisation, 
this piece advocated ‘a unitary representation of the whole proletariat[,] embracing the 
exploited of all categories under a single name expressing its modern needs[,] and 
preparing to be a fraction that does not only represent workers in a bourgeois 
parliament[,] but is a secure guide preparing to lead them to the social revolution’.118 
Bandiera Rossa’s awkward syntax was matched by its often superficial analysis, decrying 
the ‘old outmoded ideological questions’ and ‘superfluous tactical questions’ that divided 
Marxists, which it blamed on ‘the egotistical instincts permeating bourgeois society’.119 
While the MCd’I’s ideological and tactical mores in fact had everything to do with its 
clashes with the PCI, its refusal to admit the Togliattians’ ‘official’ character prevented it 
from frankly addressing the reasons why unity had proven impossible. 
 
These divides between ‘the Movement’ and ‘the Party’ soon deepened. Bandiera Rossa had 
declared the two ‘distinct but not separate organisations’, and expressed its ‘confidence’ 
they would ‘meet on the higher path of revolution, if both sides are sincere’;120 Orfeo 
Mucci would later remember ‘a clash of leaders, whereas among the grassroots there was 
no difference’.121 However, in areas where both operated they competed to integrate new 
bands and poach each others’ militants. The memoirs of Trastevere barber Aleandro 
Servadei, a PCI member, thus recount an October 1943 meeting in the cloisters of the 
Madonna d’Orto church where Matteo Matteotti told partisans that ‘the only anti-fascism 
is the fight inspired by Bandiera Rossa – a fight also directed against the Badoglio 
government’, repudiating ‘the Communists who collaborate with that government, who 
real anti-fascists therefore distrust’.122 Servadei relates his own intervention to ‘rebut these 
false arguments, denying that the Party supported Badoglio, and clarifying its national-
unity policy’, namely that ‘the Italian people would freely choose its institutions after 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 ‘Verso il partito unico del proletariato’, Bandiera Rossa, 15.10.1943.  
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 ‘Equivoco da chiarire?’, Bandiera Rossa, 29.10.1943.  
121 Interview with Alessandro Portelli, in CGB/FAP, p. 34.  
122 Servadei n.d., p. 53. 
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chasing out the Nazi-Fascists’.123 He boasts that this left even Matteotti ‘unconvinced of 
what he had said’, with ‘all present joining the [PCI’s] Garibaldi bands’.124 
 
Despite this claimed polemical triumph, internal PCI reports speak of ongoing tensions in 
Trastevere. Surveying this district west of the Tiber in spring 1944, Egle Gualdi noted that 
‘given the dominant disorientation and infantilism’,125 she was unsurprised to be told that 
‘l’Avanti, Bandiera Rossa, Voce Operaia and anti-royalist tracts are more widely desired and 
appreciated than L’Unità, and read by our own comrades with greater enthusiasm’.126 She 
reported an unease with patriotism, for ‘[m]any comrades are scandalised about our use 
of the word Patria while others consider our national policy a mere ruse, believing that the 
Comintern is more active than ever’;127 ‘many, many other misunderstandings, almost all 
of an extremist bent’128 fed the ‘overall impression that our leading activists see the Party’s 
functions as detached from the practical fight. They think we need the same forms of 
struggle as in 1920 and 1921 – as if these twenty years of Fascism had not completely 
changed the situation’.129 A militant recruited from Bandiera Rossa ‘occasionally expressed 
extremist views yet this [was] not particular to him alone’: Gualdi claimed that ’the 
majority of our grassroots comrades are still disoriented and have not assimilated our 
Party’s policy, often interpreting it in a sectarian manner’.130 
 
While Gualdi’s comments concerned Trastevere specifically, the branch reports her husband 
Agostino Novella amassed in late 1943 consistently refer to the dissidents’ role in undermining 
PCI discipline. A report on the reorganisation of the Party’s agitprop section bemoaned the 
‘infantilism prevalent among almost all members’ and the ‘apolitical fideism’ of those ‘layers 
of the proletariat more given to movements like Bandiera Rossa than a paper like l’Unità, which 
fails to enlighten them on the nature and policy of a P[arty] that claims to be working-class, 
yet speaks in terms barely different from the bourgeois papers’.131 The 4th Zone organiser 
reported that when he suggested that partisans wear tricolore armbands, there was a general 
refusal’; ‘amidst great uproar they decided that they would instead 
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126 ‘Rapporto sulla 2° zona’, December 1943, FGAN/87/262–70.  
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid.  
130 ‘Risultato di questo mese di lavoro’, December 1943, FGAN/87/271–84. My italics. 
131 Appunti sull’attività di agit-prop del P. in relazione alla sua linea politica’, November 1943:  
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make red ones with the hammer-and-sickle, and to the Devil with the tricolore’.132 A 
dossier by one cadre visiting isolated Zagarolo, Prenestina and Viterbo by bicycle 
reported that local PCIers had not only shown sympathy with MCd’I propaganda,133 but 
themselves distributed it.134 Local members thus received a stern order to ‘Accept, read 
and distribute only the Party press, delivered by your leaders’, and not that of the 
‘dissidents and deviationists of Bandiera Rossa’.135 
 
Bemoaning members’ ‘lack of ideological preparation’,136 PCI cadres were also perturbed by 
‘so-called communists acting on their own initiative’.137 Seeking to contain the ‘further 
development of such displays of indiscipline, which bring very dangerous disorientation’138 
the PCI organ lashed out at Bandiera Rossa. A 15 October polemic publicly accused ‘this 
movement, which we have nothing in common with’, of ‘sowing confusion when clarity is so 
necessary’, ‘brandishing the “communist” label in order to exploit a prestige that belongs to 
our Party alone’.139 When Bandiera Rossa retorted that ‘the confusion and disorientation among 
the masses comes not from we who follow the trusty old red flag … but those who have since 
25 July been “upholding the tricolore”’,140 L’Unità dismissed its claim to the communist 
tradition: ‘it would take a lot more than a few dilettanteish proclamations of revolutionary 
faith to credit a “movement” of such limited merits in the fight against Fascism’.141 It was 
‘untroubled by Bandiera Rossa’s insinuations about [its] top-down appointments’ of cadres; 
these ‘recall[ed] the positions all kinds of opportunists have taken against the iron discipline 
that must govern the Communist Parties’.142 
 
While 26 October’s ‘Enough is enough’143 declared the Party ‘uninterested in further debate’, 
cadres continued to deploy the Stalinist ‘amalgam technique’ in order to smear the dissidents. 
Echoing the Milan section’s claims that such movements were merely ‘the Gestapo’s mask’ in 
its efforts to divide Resistance,144 the Lazio Federation warned members against reading 
‘Bandiera Rossa and the agent provocateur material produced by the secret 
 
 
 
132 Intervento del “coadiuvatore” della IVa Zona, novembre 1943’: APC/7/2/13, p. 5.  
133 ‘Caratteristiche generali della zona [Stefano, marzo 1944]’, APC/7/8/8, pp. 1–2. 
134 ‘PCI, Com. Prov. di Viterbo – Zona 3-4, 2 aprile 1944’, APC/7/7/15, p. 5.  
135 Ibid.  
136 Untitled, November 1943, APC/7/10/5, p. 4.  
137 Ibid. 
138 Untitled, November 1943, APC/7/10/5, p. 5. 
139 L’Unità, 10/10/1943, ‘Equivoco da chiarire’.  
140 Bandiera Rossa, 22/10/1943, ‘Equivoco da chiarire?’. 
141 L’Unità, 26/10/1943, ‘Punto e basta’.  
142 Ibid. 
143 L’Unità, 26/10/1943, ‘Punto e basta’.  
144 ‘Il sinistrismo: la maschera della Gestapo’, La Nostra Lotta, November 1943. 
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services’.145 L’Unità accused the Roman dissidents of issuing ‘Goebbelian propaganda’; if 
Bandiera Rossa ‘seem[ed] not to be the work of Prussian agents’, it came from an 
‘irresponsible little group misusing the red flag’ in its ‘stubborn game of provocation 
against the working class and communism’.146 Cadres accused the dissidents of 
‘objectively’ giving ‘succour to Nazi propaganda about the “Bolshevik” threat‘, thus 
‘dividing the anti-fascist front’.147 For their part, they set themselves the task of ‘win[ning] 
back comrades who easily fall prey to the diversion campaign … waged by groups and 
individuals not all acting in good faith, doubtless aided and guided by the Fascist 5th 
column’.148 Their own goal was ‘to break up the MCd’I, absorbing its healthy part until the 
movement is liquidated from the local political scene’.149 
 
4.6. 7 November 
 
Beyond the circulation of propaganda, the MCd’I and PCI also sought to galvanise their 
base through spectacular acts of publicity. This was epitomised by their respective 
celebrations of 7 November, anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Together with their 
wall-writings and a special edition of their newspaper, Bandiera Rossa militants’ flying of 
red flags from public buildings was both an act of defiance against Occupation forces and 
a means of asserting their own claim to the Soviet tradition. Even such symbolic acts 
posed great dangers: raising a red flag on the Via Appia in the Alberone neighbourhood 
on 7 November Costantino Imperiali’s band were caught by local Fascists, with Luigi and 
Costantino Lo Bue arrested as their comrades escaped.150 For their part, members of the 
PCI’s GAP held comizi volanti [literally, ‘flying meetings’, speeches lasting just one or two 
minutes] in central Piazza Fiume and outside San Giovanni basilica. L’Unità spoke of how 
‘red-painted wall-writings praising the USSR, Red Army and Stalin literally flooded the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 ‘PCI, Com. Prov. di Viterbo – Zona 3-4’, April 1944, APC/7/7/15, p. 5. 
146 L’Unità, 6/4/1944, ‘Manifesti provocatori’. My italics.  
147 The claim that the MCd’I’s positions ‘objectively’ divided anti-fascist ranks (even if some or most of 
its members acted in good faith) clearly provided PCI cadres their most effective argument against 
‘the Matteotti group’s sordid paper’. They could thus explain to members that even if ‘Bandiera 
Rossa’s ‘extremist rhetoric and big talk of communism [found] favour among the masses’, who 
‘identif[ied] with this lurid sheet, finding something in it that responds to their demands’ ‘it almost 
seem[ed] to have been printed by [Nazi] general Stahel, for the sake of breaking up the anti-fascist 
front…!’ (Intervento del “coadiuvatore” della IVa Zona, novembre 1943’: APC/7/2/13, p. 4).  
148 PCI Federazione Laziale, Comitato direttivo federale, ‘Rapporto politico’, late November 1943:  
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130 
 
 
streets’ together with red flags ‘saluting the Red Army in the name of the whole Roman 
citizenry’.151 
 
While the popular-frontist L’Unità duly fêted 7 November as ‘a concrete part of the history 
of all humanity’, with ‘the power of the first socialist state now becoming the power of a 
cause that unites nations and peoples in struggle against Nazi-Fascist barbarism’,152 Bandiera 
Rossa invoked the Revolution’s more strictly class-war inheritance. Hailing ‘the Russian 
comrades celebrat[ing] their anniversary of the Revolution amidst the fervour of the war 
which they have fought with such heroism’, it emphasised the similarity with ‘our 
comrades also celebrating the anniversary of 7 November, a date that heralds their own 
future struggles’.153 The revolutionary anniversary itself presaged the coming ‘day of 
liberation’. ‘[T]he communist workers know that their day has come and they will be 
present, vigorously to chase the Fascists out of the last hiding places guarded by the 
Germans. Avanti Popolo alla riscossa/Bandiera Rossa trionferà. Our anthem will sound the 
reveille for the masses’ return to the terrain of proletarian revolution’.154 
 
Past traditions were renewed as ‘the red flags once so common on our demonstrations, 
conserved by the workers for twenty years, flew over Rome on 7 November’.155 If a 18 
November 1943 Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana report to Mussolini on the mood in the borgate 
claimed that ‘Moscow is their Mecca’,156 this report written just days after the revolutionary 
anniversary likely reflected the most visible signs of anti-fascism, rather than popular 
sentiments as such. Even those who did rally around the ‘trusty old red flag’ did not 
necessarily know anything about the USSR beyond its opposition to Fascist Italy. A local 
MCd’I commander in Viterbo, won to the PCI after Liberation, recalled how ‘we [Bandiera 
Rossa] won workers to us with the red flag and the word “revolution”, but that was the 
beginning and end of their political understanding’.157 This reflected the argument present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 L’Unità, 10 November 1943, ‘Roma ha celebrato il 7 novembre’. In his autobiography (Bentivegna 
2011) the GAP’s Rosario Bentivegna takes particular pride in those graffiti invoking the names of 
 
German Communists such as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, showing the internationalist 
character of the struggle. 
 
152 ‘Nel XXVI Anniversario della Rivoluzione Russia i popoli di tutto il mondo vedono sorgere 
l’aurora della vittoria della libertà e dell’indipendenza nazionale’, L’Unità, 3 November 1943. My 
italics. 
153 ‘7 Novembre’, Bandiera Rossa, 7 November 1943.  
154 Ibid.  
155 Ibid. 
156 See the 18 November report, reproduced in Bonomini (ed.) 1974.  
157 See Attilio Vagnoni’s reminiscences in Galli (ed.) 1984, p. 127. 
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throughout internal PCI reports that ‘intransigent’ class-war feeling came more easily to 
the poorest Romans than any notion of political organisation or strategy. 
 
The MCd’I did however lay emphasis on political education. Beyond the risks its militants 
took in distributing a clandestine press, from November 1943 they also organised a 
clandestine ‘Marxist school’. Led by student Unico Guidoni, this ‘Grotta Rossa’ [‘Red 
Cave’] welcomed ‘students, workers, builders’ labourers and smiths’.158 His night-time 
lectures159 were accompanied by a ‘library’ for militants’ political edification. There is no 
inventory of the books included, but an internal bulletin listing ‘texts necessary for a 
communist library’ mentioned not only Marxist-Leninist classics like Marx’s Communist 
Manifesto and Capital, Lenin’s State and Revolution and Stalin’s Short Course history of the 
Bolshevik Party, but also such texts as anarchist Errico Malatesta’s ‘Among the Peasants’, 
Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution (legally published in Italy in 1938), Bukharin 
and Preobrazhensky’s ABC of Communism and Michels’s History of the Italian Socialist 
Party.160 This eclectic selection speaks not only of a thirst for any available reading 
materials, but also of a pro-Soviet movement unbound by Stalinist doctrinal orthodoxies. 
 
From the outset Grotta Rossa operated as something more than a ‘Marxist school’, for it 
also served as a hub of MCd’I military planning. Establishing radio communications with 
the US Fifth Army in November, Ezio Malatesta provided information on German troop 
displacements in the rural areas north of Rome, as the Allied forces approached from the 
South. Indeed, while the issues of Bandiera Rossa discussed at Grotta Rossa’s one-sidedly 
championed the Red Army’s role in defeating fascism, over the winter the Roman 
communists increasingly faced the question of what they would do when the Western 
Allies reached the Italian capital. Already at the beginning of October the Anglo-
Americans had captured Naples in the wake of a popular uprising; political machinations 
in that city, including in its trade-union movement, pointed to the role the Western 
powers might have in shaping Italy’s future more broadly. As we shall see in Chapter 
Five, this was a problem particularly sharply posed in January 1944 as Allied troops 
landed at Anzio, just fifty kilometres from the capital. 
 
 
 
 
158 A later obituary of the ‘martyr’ Guidoni would eulogise ‘the long and anxious nights when 
beneath the ground Rome was inhabited by young students, workers, builders and smiths, intent 
on hearing the word of Unico, who was inspired by a passion to make the humble hear the process 
of time, the mathematics of proletarian victory, the considerable importance of the rebirth of a 
people mastering its own destiny’: MCd’I 1944c, Unico Guidoni e Grottarossa.  
159 Ibid. 
160 ‘Per la bibliotechina di sezione’, Bollettino del Movimento Comunista d’Italia, 13/11/1944. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Allies’ approach 
 
 
 
 
We must today carry out the greatest, most fruitful activity for the organisation 
and regimentation of proletarian forces. The aim is to train and constitute the 
preponderant force that at the coming moment “X”, coinciding with the end and 
the settlement of the war, will achieve the revolutionary conquest of power by the 
working class, in contest with the opposing reactionary forces. 
 
Bandiera Rossa, 29 October 19431 
 
 
 
 
Partisans began 1944 optimistic that the war was turning to their advantage. In recent 
months the Allies had surged through Southern Italy, breaking through the Wehrmacht’s 
Winter Line defences at several points. Further good news came from neighbouring 
Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito had declared a republican government, and the Eastern 
Front, where the Red Army had advanced deep into Ukraine. After the ‘turning point’ of 
1943, L’Unità could herald 1944 as ‘the year of victory’.2 Such hopes were further raised in 
late January, as the Allies landed troops within striking range of the capital. Establishing a 
beachhead fifty kilometres south of Rome, the landings at Anzio promised a decisive 
breakthrough in the Italian campaign. Thinking that an Allied march on the city might be 
just days away, partisans prepared for insurrection. 
 
This also fed hopes of political overhaul. Badoglio had already pledged to resign once the 
Allies reached Rome, a promise that also opened up the prospect of a wider change of 
government. Seeking a rapid solution of the ‘institutional question’, anti-fascists 
developed plans to form their own administration. In CLN ranks this was particularly the 
concern of the Socialist and Actionist parties, who pushed for the coalition to proclaim 
itself a provisional government. They also sought Allied backing for the formation of such 
an authority. Yet partisan organisers on the Roman underground instead sought to force 
the issue, presenting the Allies with a fait accompli. The most ambitious planned to seize 
control of public buildings, exploiting the power vacuum in the interval between the 
Germans leaving and the Anglo-Americans arriving.3 
 
 
 
1 ‘L’Ora presente e noi’, BR, 29.10.1943 
2 ‘1943: Anno di svolta – 1944: Anno di vittoria’, l’Unità, XX/29, 30.12.1943.  
3 See Chapter Seven. 
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The regions controlled by the Allied Military Government (AMG)4 were already the stage 
of sharp political and social conflicts. While conservative and ex-fascist circles held onto 
power in the South, both labour protests and rising republican sentiment expressed the 
desire for change. This situation also created grounds for friction – if not outright 
antagonism - between the anti-fascist parties and AMG. The Allies had clearly played the 
central role in liberating these regions from Wehrmacht occupation, and could thus be 
thanked for laying the fundamental bases of any democratic politics. Yet the Allies were 
also concerned to prevent institutional upheaval, and any fighting that might tie up 
troops. This attitude, expressed in their continued recognition of Badoglio, also posed 
limits to the scope and pace of change that democratic forces could hope to achieve. 
 
Decisively important within this context were those forces who sought a compromise 
between the royalists and the anti-fascist parties. As early as December 1943 officials in 
the South had floated plans for the King to step down in favour of his son upon the 
liberation of Rome, and allow a constitutional referendum.5 This proposal had the merit of 
pushing aside a monarch compromised by his ties to Fascism, but without pre-empting 
any final decision on Italy’s future order. At the suggestion of Benedetto Croce and Count 
Carlo Sforza, a CLN congress held in Bari at the end of January embraced this proposal. 
This was received positively by CLN president Ivanoe Bonomi.6 Conversely, the left-wing 
parties were concerned that replacing a tarnished King might in fact strengthen the 
monarchy as an institution. Plans for a unity deal thus divided the anti-fascist coalition. 
 
The CLN’s difficulties in sealing such an alliance also threatened its parties’ internal solidarity. 
Formed in summer 1943 out of two different movements, the Socialist Party was particularly 
riven by conflict.7 Leftists in the party never reconciled to the CLN accused leaders of failing to 
advance the Socialists’ republican agenda,8 and in January 1944 split away to form their own 
Movimento Partigiano. Seeking to prevent further such divides, Socialist leaders adopted a 
more aggressive policy, calling for the CLN to declare a provisional government.9 This did 
help galvanise party ranks, and also cohered a left-wing 
 
 
4 Initally known as Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT), here called 
AMG throughout for simplicity’s sake.  
5 NA/FO371/43814, 5.12.1943. 
6 Bonomi 1947, p. 145, entry from 2.2.1944.  
7 Amati 2005 is the best-researched history of the Movimento di Unità Proletaria (MUP) that flowed 
into the PSI to form the PSIUP. This like the volumes Neri Sereni (ed.) 1988 and Fondazione Basso-
Issoco 1988 offer extensive documentation on the leftist currents within this party, as does Critica 
Marxista of March-April 1965.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
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bloc in the CLN. However, this also antagonised liberals and conservatives within that 
coalition who remained intent on a deal with the royalists. Disturbed by the shifting 
mood, on 23 March Bonomi resigned as its president. The CLN risked a permanent split. 
 
These tensions reflected anti-fascists’ frustration at the slow pace of institutional change. 
However, their keenly-felt desire to overcome this political blockage did not translate into 
the power to do anything about it, for the Allies in any case remained the clear masters of 
the Italian situation. For the arriving liberators, the desire to democratise Italy’s 
government was also conditional on the higher need to prevent unrest. In the South, this 
demanded a careful management of the post-Fascist transition, allowing the rise of new 
parties and unions while also stabilising the state machine. This also forced militants to 
recognise the barriers to immediate change. The days after the Anzio landings enthused 
anti-fascists in the belief that insurrection was near. Yet they also came to understand that 
the Allies would themselves be a direct actor in Italian politics. As Chapter Five shows, 
this was also no uniform process, and the different parties offered wildly varying visions 
of what kind of change remained possible. 
 
5.1. Insurrectionary plans 
 
Partisans in Rome had long believed that the Allies’ approach would mean the moment of 
insurrection. There was no shared understanding of how this would take place, but most 
such outlooks relied on the assumption of a dramatic upsurge in popular mobilisation as 
the Allies were in any case about to arrive. One common trope was the idea of exploiting a 
temporary power vacuum, wiping out the last Fascist personnel in order to seize control 
of government offices, military bases and radio stations. Antonino Poce drew up a list of 
infrastructure around the city that would be most important to capture.10 This idea was 
also present in Bandiera Rossa, which spoke of a ‘moment “X”’ when the revolutionaries 
would clash with the reactionary forces11 The CLN president posed the question frontally: 
‘With the new year there begins a new concern. Who will govern Rome in the interval 
between the Germans’ departure and the Allied forces’ arrival?’12 
 
The Anzio landings concentrated minds on this problem. On 30 January the Rome PCI called 
on citizens to prepare for an uprising, which would ‘strike the oppressor’s army at all its most 
vulnerable points’ upon the Allies’ arrival.13 The battle for Rome concerned ‘not only the 
Allied troops but also and above all Rome’s own people’; it was ‘decisive’ to turn 
 
 
10 ‘Riunione del Comitato romano tenuta il 6.2.1944, copy in MSdL/FSC/28/91.  
11 L’Ora presente e noi’, BR, 29.10.1943  
12 Bonomi 1947, p. 140. 
13 ‘Cittadini di Roma’, dated 25/1/1944, appears in l’Unità 30.1.1944. 
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it into an ‘irresistible movement of national insurrection’.14 Romans would have to read 
between the lines to see how this would indeed be ‘decisive’ for ‘Italy’s fate’, beyond 
hastening the Allies’ arrival.15 L’Unità’s call to arms made no reference to the Allied-recognised 
government; this, combined with other articles characterising the royalists as a spent force, 
and a call on Romans to unite around the CLN, hinted at the goal of declaring a new authority. 
Reflecting the heady mood, cadres drafted a final appeal for insurrection.16 
 
With the Allies on the brink of reaching the capital, the MCd’I also developed its plans for 
insurrection. The Rome leadership meeting on 6 February – one of very few for which 
minutes survive – evidenced the frenetic activity of this movement, trying to create all 
manner of initiatives in the time before the Allies reached the capital. Poce insisted that 
the groups of the ‘central Party’ would join them in battle at the ‘given moment’ in the 
fight to take over 150 objectives around the city.17 Red flags would be raised and strategic 
points occupied. When it was mentioned that local bands had not given information on 
membership numbers to the centre, Filiberto Sbardella immediately derailed this into an 
argument that military ranks were uncommunist and indeed ‘no longer relevant’ in the 
Soviet armed forces.18 Meanwhile Eusebio Troiani complained that the paper must 
become more ‘alive, polemical, intransigent’, even though it was over a month since it had 
last appeared at all.19 
 
While the discussion at this meeting suggested that bands still lacked for maps or 
common norms of organisation, Poce and Sbardella had already embarked upon another 
initiative. This was apparent in militants’ proclamation of an Italian ‘Red Army’ at the end 
of January. The bombastically-named Armata Rossa had the declared aim of joining all 
communists in a single military force, which would be able to pursue the armed campaign 
through central and Northern Italy together with the Allies. This was a recognition of the 
fact that the liberation of Rome would not mark the end of the partisan war. In the first 
months of 1944 this ‘Red Army’ became one of the largest Resistance forces in the capital, 
building partisan bands in parallel to the MCd’I’s own military organisation. It had 424 
recognised partisans during the clandestine period. 
 
 
 
 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 ‘ALLA BATTAGLIA DI ROMA La popolazione deve partecipare in massa’, l’Unità 
(unpublished), 1/2/1944. This would have followed the regular edition two days previously.   
17 ‘Riunione del Comitato romano tenuta il 6.2.1944’, copy in MSdL/FSC/28/91. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
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As well as forming its own bands the Armata Rossa sought to establish operational unity 
between Rome’s communist movements. Its founding appeal preached the unity of the 
‘Movement’, the ‘Party’ and the Catholic-Communists.20 PCI cadres could only see this as 
a form of sectarian competition; it threatened to undermine the CLN’s own internal 
solidarity by uniting Party members with communists outside of the coalition.21 Such 
hostility was not necessarily shared by their own militants, who sometimes collaborated 
with Armata Rossa militants when this was practically useful. Particularly notable is the 
case of Rosario Bentivegna, among the most prominent GAP militants in the capital. He 
visited Armata Rossa commander Celestino Avico’s San Lorenzo gravestone workshop in 
order to procure explosives for his ‘Antonio Gramsci’ unit.22 
 
Armata Rossa was closely bound to the MCd’I, but not simply part of it. Sbardella and 
Antonino Poce served on its command together with three communists who were not 
aligned either to the ‘Movement’ or the ‘Party’. Giordano Amidani, Otello Terzani and 
Celestino Avico were each PCI expellees who had been kicked out of its confino 
organisation together with Poce. The wider membership also seems to have been broadly 
similar in composition to the MCd’I. An appeal for recruits reflected the outlook of its 
veteran communist leaders, who signed it as ‘the comrades of yesterday, today and 
tomorrow’; the text however cited letters from two new fighters. On the one hand was an 
‘old anarchist, driven to fight for the sun of the future’; on the other, an abandoned young 
soldier who wanted to ‘defend the Patria’.23 Likely ‘types’ rather than real individuals, 
their letters indicated the kind of militants the ‘Red Army’ could hope to attract. 
 
On 1 February PCI cadres prepared a special issue of l’Unità, whose distribution would serve 
as the call for insurrection. Yet the Allied advance stalled, and the issue was withdrawn. The 
Allies’ approach had spread enthusiasm in Resistance ranks, and a spark of belief that 
insurrection was about to arrive. This popular mobilisation would never in fact come. As 
wartime suffering ground on, and the Allies’ arrival seemed to be just around the corner, 
Romans were entrenched in the attesismo of waiting for this outside relief. The 
 
 
 
 
20 See the posters and leaflets in the BCF/FOT. 
21 See section 8.4 
22 Bentivegna 1983, pp. 64–68 recounts his meetings with Avico. He describes the former Arditi del 
Popolo fighter as ‘frankly out of the ordinary, not so much for exceptional qualities as for his 
“vivacity”. A little agitated, perhaps even rather boastful, he claimed to be preparing great projects 
for a struggle without quarter against the German and Fascist commands with the city. He never 
wanted to establish continuous, regular contacts with us nor to be considered a member of our 
organisation’.  
23 BCF/FOT. This document is undated but likely from early March 1944. 
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desire for an end to their hardships far from amounted to any identification with the 
Allied cause, or still less any effort to aid it militarily. This was particularly notable in the 
mass peace rallies held by the Vatican, which prominently called on the Allies to desist 
from bombing the city. Such passive hopes for deliverance would remain a dominant 
sentiment over the next four and a half months, even as the Anglo-Americans faltered. 
Only a small minority were aiding the Allies’ approach. 
 
5.2. Military contacts and POWs 
 
Before the Anzio landings the contacts between the Roman Resistance and the Allied 
powers had mostly been a matter of intelligence-gathering rather than direct military 
collaboration.24 While operatives of the UK’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) were 
already active across Yugoslavia (from September 1941) and Greece (from November 
1942), providing technical support for partisans and reporting back on the political 
situation, the SOE placed distinctly less priority on the far weaker partisan forces that had 
formed in southern-central Italy.25 Not before the landings in Sicily in July 1943 did SOE 
operatives reach Italy at all, and only on 6 February 1944, two weeks after the 
establishment of the beachhead at Anzio, did the organisation make its first, unsuccessful 
attempt to infiltrate an agent into the Italian capital. 
 
Even insofar as Allied commanders considered it important to establish a relationship 
with Italian partisans, in early 1944 they had a low estimation of the Resistance’s military 
capacities. This was particularly true in the Lazio region, where partisan movements were 
both sporadically organised and largely unknown to Allied agents. The AMG knew that 
such movements existed, and used them as scouts: Allied radio broadcasts also invoked 
partisan actions to present an image of mounting revolt against the Germans. But 
operational collaboration only developed after the liberation of Rome. Widespread in 
AMG and PWB reports on ‘partisan and patriot activity’ was the attitude that partisans 
had contributed little to the fight against Nazi Germany and should not be allowed to sow 
social instability or attempt to monopolise power for themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 See Le Gac 2008.  
25 The AMG’s own official historian describes ‘the dropping of arms and radio transmitters’ in the   
South. But ‘during the winter of 1943–4, when the Allied line was more or less stationary just north 
of Naples, a number of partisan bands had formed themselves south of Rome in the Abruzzi and in 
the hills of Lazio, but these were practically wiped out after the failure of the Anzio landing to lead 
to an immediate capture of Rome’. Harris 1957, p. 179. 
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Such attitudes did only regard forces of explicit revolutionary intent. They saw the 
Resistance above all as an extension of the parties organising in the South, whom it 
considered the greatest threat to stability and who were most active in placing unwanted 
political pressure on the AMG. The Allies maintained a privileged relationship with the 
forces politically linked to the Kingdom of the South, most notably Di Montezemolo’s 
Fronte Miltare Clandestino. The MCd’I’s own contacts with the Allies were mostly via such 
forces, and its own career soldiers, rather than spontaneously established with the Anglo-
Americans. 
 
As with the welfare initiatives explored in the previous chapter, the MCd’I’s efforts to aid 
Allied troops involved collaboration with figures far from its own politics. This was 
particularly evident in the Allied prisoner organisation in the capital, in contact with 
Aurelio Borg, an Augustinian priest involved in Hugh O’Flaherty’s shelter operation. 
Herself connected with this ‘Vatican Pimpernel’ organisation, the MCd’I’s Herta Habernig 
managed a series of safehouses where Allied POWs could be hidden and then slipped out 
of the city. San Lorenzo priest Libero Raganella was also a key figure in this activity, 
collaborating with the movement’s Renato Gentilezza as well as other partisans.26 
 
Central to this work was Matilde Bassani Finzi, like her partner Ulisse an agent of the 
Psychological Warfare Branch. In this capacity she wrote extensively for Resistance press,27 but 
she also played a military-command role in both Rome and Florence. Particularly important 
was her role in finding shelter for Allied POWs, including through her abduction of German 
medical supplies on the false pretence of working for the Red Cross. Contacts with the 
O’Flaherty organisation also allowed her to find sanctuary for Jews. She was also part of the 
‘Supreme Military Command’ formed by dissident elements of the Socialist Party in January 
1944. The 25 year-old Bassani Finzi was of middle-class extraction,28 but her extensive 
leadership role was particularly remarkable given that she was a Jewish woman. 
 
While little in Bassani Finzi’s writing suggests any close identification with the MCd’I’s 
class-war agenda, her practical activities closely bound her to this movement as well as 
dissident elements in the Socialist Party. Her leading collaborators in the capital included 
Carlo Andreoni, the PSIUP’s leading military commander in Rome, as well as the MCd’I’s 
 
 
 
 
26 Raganella 2000.  
27 She wrote widely for both Il Partigiano and the PWB’s own l’Italia combatte. Her archive is kept at 
Yad Vashem and the Unione Femminile Nazionale.  
28 Her father was a language teacher, albeit one unable to find work on account of his anti-fascist 
views. 
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Aladino Govoni, Tigrino Sabatini and Angelo Lombardi (her cousin). Despite this 
collaboration, Bassani Finzi’s takeover of Andreoni’s newspaper Il Partigiano after his 
arrest in early March would strongly moderate its political tone, as she shifted it to an 
agenda focused on partisans’ practical role in aiding the Allied war effort. 
 
Bassani Finzi was keenly involved in the Allied prisoner organisation, whose central focus 
was to help POWs back across the frontline. After the armistice there were around thirty 
thousand Allied prisoners in Italy, and camps in the Lazio region held not only Western 
troops captured in the Italian campaign, but Soviet POWs transported from the Eastern 
Front and downed RAF and USAF airmen. Around a third of this total managed to escape 
thanks to prison breaks and Allied air assaults; this however left them at large in a 
country where they rarely spoke the language or had personal contacts of their own. 
Italian partisans like Bassani Finzi were key to providing a solidarity network for these 
POWs, and a route to safety. 
 
These militants’ activity ‘overlapped with’ the Western Allies military effort, but was 
never integrated into it. The US Air Force carried out arms drops in the Lazio countryside 
from November 1943, but no MCd’I sources report benefitting from this. Some of the 
career soldiers involved in the movement did at least see themselves as useful aides to the 
Western Allies, providing information on German troop movements and, most boldly of 
all, supplying detailed invasion plans designed to guide the arriving armies. Radio 
contact also provided information from reconnaissance missions.29 Its political leaders 
were however less interested in the Anglo-Americans than the hope of establishing 
contacts with the USSR. At a 13 February committee meeting Eusebio Troiani emphasised 
that the leadership should have the authority to deal ‘not only with the other Italian 
parties but also the Delegates of the Soviet Union, who will soon be in Rome’.30 
 
The idea of a privileged connection with the USSR also reflected a certain political 
diffidence toward the Western Allies. Despite these latters’ decisive role in liberating Italy, 
Bandiera Rossa portrayed them as merely secondary actors in the Soviet Union’s war effort, 
and in its pages only this state earned the label ‘ally’. The Anglo-Americans remained 
‘imperialist’ powers, and their slow advance through Italy evidence of their limited will to 
fight Nazi Germany. This even extended to the claim that these powers wanted the war to 
 
 
 
29 Recounted in ‘Grotta Rossa’, MCd’I 1944c; ‘Relazione del compagno Otello Di Diego, capo del 
concentramento ‘Grotta rossa’, MSdL/FSC/28/61’ displays extensive such contacts as well as aid 
for Allied airmen.  
30 ‘Riunione del Comitato romano tenuta il 13.2.1944’, copy in MSdL/FSC/28/91. 
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continue, in the attempt to stave off ‘Bolshevisation’ in Germany and the end of arms-
industry superprofits. This reading was however curiously bereft of indications of the 
Western Allies’ attitude toward Italy’s internal politics. It was instead assumed that 
communists should fight with the ‘imperialists’ against the Germans and then impose 
their own political agenda once the Wehrmacht was defeated. 
 
Bandiera Rossa instead presented the USSR as the ultimate guarantor of self-determination, 
as if this state would be able to block any Anglo-American influence on Italy’s future. A 14 
November article denied the ‘myth designed by bourgeois states’ that the USSR was itself 
participating in an imperialist carve-up. It contrasted Anglo-American influence, which 
would mean continued capitalist domination, and Soviet influence, which would mean 
the ‘redemption of labour from Capital’s economic-political tyranny’31. Its authors assured 
themselves that this latter would be the decisive force, once Soviet representatives had 
arrived in Rome. The article invoked the Soviet leader’s authority as a guarantee of 
national self-determination: ‘Stalin warns: “the Peoples of Europe will be granted the 
widest freedom to decide on their own Countries’ political structures”’.32 
 
Where it was recognised that the Western Allies would attempt to shore up Italian 
capitalism, or even take measures to prevent social unrest, this led immediately to the 
conclusion that the revolution would have to be put on hold. Two weeks after the Anzio 
landings Orfeo Mucci told a Rome committee meeting that given the likelihood that ‘the 
plutocrats will return to power with the Anglo-Americans’ aid … communists [could] 
take power only after the Allies had left’.33 But internal bulletins continued to point to the 
Moscow Declaration as proof that the dominant military forces would stay out of politics. 
Left unexplained was how Moscow could guarantee the Western Allies’ ‘non-
intervention’ in an occupied country’s politics, in particular in the kind of short term 
scenario within which the MCd’I hoped to launch an insurrection. In fact, the British 
Prime Minister was about to make a clear statement of intent for Italy’s future. 
 
5.3. The Churchill speech 
 
Speaking to the Commons on 22 February, Churchill expressed his concern for Italy’s 
political stability. The Prime Minister told the House that the democratic parties were not 
yet ready to take over the government. While victory in the battle for Rome would allow a 
 
 
 
 
31 ‘Il comunismo e Mosca’, BR, 14.11.1943.  
32 Ibid.  
33 ‘Riunione del Comitato romano tenuta il 13.2.1944’, copy in MSdL/FSC/28/91. 
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‘more broadly-based government’ to be formed, it made no sense for ‘unsettling change’ 
to be ‘made at a time when the battle is at its climax, swaying to and fro’.34 For Churchill, 
the King and Badoglio were best-placed to command the armed forces’ loyalties. As he 
tersely remarked, ‘when you have to hold a hot coffee-pot, it is better not to break the 
handle off until you are sure that you will get another equally convenient and serviceable 
or, at any rate, until there is a dishcloth handy’.35 Churchill declared that the parties could 
have ‘no elective authority, and certainly no constitutional authority, either until the 
present King abdicates or until he or his successor invites them to take office’.36 
 
Already after 25 July the Allies’ readiness to deal with Badoglio had owed much to the 
belief that he could prevent a slide into chaos. This desire for stability remained an 
imperative for both main Western Allies. Progressive-minded American officials in the 
South often spoke of the need to extend the ‘four freedoms’ to Italians, and did seriously 
expand the space for free expression. At the same time they sought to forestall the kind of 
social unrest that might disrupt Allied supply lines or even tie up troops.37 This was a real 
possibility, given the resurgence in the South not just of the old democratic parties but 
also armed bands, independent trade unions and overtly revolutionary movements. None 
of these forces were straightforwardly hostile to the Allies, being in any case preoccupied 
with their own domestic political problems. Their mobilisations nonetheless exceeded the 
limits of what AMG was prepared to allow. 
 
The controversy over Churchill’s speech itself illustrated this tension. Reported by radio, the 
Prime Minister’s comments marked a serious blow to any hope of removing the royalist and 
ex-Fascist officials who had remained in place after 25 July. He had effectively ruled out any 
possibility of a change of government, except at the King’s instigation. The CGL union, which 
had already built its strength through labour protests in the Southern port city, called a ten-
minute protest strike for 4 March. Even though this was not intended to undermine Allied war 
production, and for this reason would be compensated by 15 minutes overtime at the end of 
the day, the AMG quickly moved to stop it happening. Military police invaded a printshop to 
seize the 7,000 leaflets calling for the strike. Generals 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Churchill 1951, p. 499.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.  
37 See documentation in WO207/2167. The history of the CGL in Naples is extensively covered in 
Giliani 2013, including a detailed reconstruction of the role of AFL-CIO officials brought into the 
Italian labour movement from the United States. 
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MacFarlane and Wilson leaned on the party leaders to stop the strike: if it did go ahead, 
they would be ordered to leave AMG territory within 24 hours. 
 
Summoned to meet General MacFarlane, the Communist, Socialist and Actionist leaders 
agreed to stop the strike happening, and instead to hold a rally the following weekend. 
This took a markedly different tone to the originally planned strike action. While calling 
for a ‘truly peoples’ army’ and the purging of Fascists, the monarchy and their supporters, 
it affirmed the parties’ will to fight alongside the Allies and support their cause.38 The 
outlier in this regard was the Trotskyist speaker Enrico Russo, a leader of the CGL who 
more strongly criticised Allied conservatism; the PCI’s Italo de Feo described his 
intervention as ‘little short of calling Churchill a fascist’.39 AMG officials noted a rally of 
6,000 to 10,000 people at which reference to Russia and Yugoslavia was warmly 
applauded, but talk of Britain and the United States more cooly.40 
 
The demobilisation of even such a tender strike mobilisation also helped change the 
dynamics within the labour movement in the South. Replacing the corporatist unions 
inherited from fascism, the CGL had been created by veteran militants including Russo 
and Nicola di Bartolomeo, both of whom were Trotskyists. This was thus a case where the 
parties had to join a union organisation created by much smaller circles. The political tone 
of its leadership was apparent in their newspaper Battaglie Sindacali, which was opposed 
to the politics of class compromise. Yet the PCI waged a hard battle to impose its own 
control over the CGL and dissolve it into its own organisation. This ultimately succeeded 
in August as the AMG revoked authorisation for Battaglie Sindacali, until it was 
reconstituted in the hands of the PCI. 
 
What even this distinctly unmilitant strike had shown was the way in which anti-communist 
officials could lean on CLN leaders and even the Communist Party for the purpose of reining 
in more uncontrollable forces. Whether the PCI would indeed be a force for moderation 
remained an open question, but it was at least flexible under pressure. AMG officials tended to 
see the PCI as an unreliable ally, whose professions of good faith toward the Allied cause 
concealed a focus on building its own organisational muscle. Without doubt, a facility with 
tactical about-turns and an instrumental attitude toward alliances were real attitudes of PCI 
culture. Yet as we shall see in section 5.4., opportunism or cynicism did not necessarily 
 
 
 
 
38 See ‘Translation of ‘resolution’ adopted at 12 March Naples meeting’ in WO207/2167 
39 De Feo 1973, p. 85.  
40 NA/W5089/64083, General Wilson to USFOR, AGWAR, Hall PWB, 13.4.1944 
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translate into an effective Machiavellian policy. This became starkly apparent in the early 
months of 1944, as a crisis in the CLN escaped the PCI’s control.41 
 
5.4. The CLN crisis 
 
Already before the Anzio landings it was widely understood that the capture of Rome 
would bring the formation of a new civilian government.42 Despite the counter-attacks by 
German and Mussolini-loyalist forces in early February, the salient established by the 
Anglo-Americans had held firm, and a march on the capital now seemed imminent. For 
the Socialists’ l’Avanti, ‘to the cannon fire from Moscow, celebrating the triumphant 
victory of Leningrad, there responds the cannon fire of Nettuno, which announce the 
Anglo-Saxon allies’ approach to the Italian capital’.43 It hoped that the ‘people of Rome … 
gathered around the CLN’ would win this battle for the city.44 Yet as Liberation neared, 
the Roman CLN faced a damaging split, with a political crisis ending in Bonomi’s 
resignation as the coalition’s president. 
 
The roots of the CLN’s crisis lay in a split in the Socialists. Returning from exile in the wake of 
the Badoglio coup, the Socialist leaders had like their Communist counterparts encountered an 
array of non-party movements created by clandestine militants. The most important of these 
was libertarian socialist Lelio Basso’s MUP. Although this movement merged with the PSI 
during the 45 Days, it continued to publish a distinct press in Milan. In calling for a 
‘revolutionary proletarian front’ it sharply criticised not only the Badoglio government but 
also the less belligerent stance adopted by the CLN. In Rome, such criticisms were particularly 
voiced by Carlo Andreoni, who was also the Socialists’ leading military commander in the 
capital. He accused party leader Pietro Nenni of a purely platonic republicanism, which he did 
nothing to advance in CLN ranks. At the start of 1944, Andreoni and his comrades walked 
away to create their independent Movimento Partigiano. 
 
First appearing the day after the Anzio landings, Andreoni’s paper Il Partigiano announced the 
formation of a new military command outside of the CLN. Il Partigiano referred but 
 
 
 
41 Far stronger was the tone adopted by Pietro Secchia in ‘Risposta a Churchill’, La Nostra Lotta, March 
1944, describing the success of the strike against the Occupier on 1 March as an action ‘in which the 
Italian popular forces, the working class in the lead struck Nazi-Fascism hard, said no to Badoglio, 
and gave an eloquent response to Churchill’. 
 
42 Note the claim by the Duke of Acquerone, the Minister of Court, as early as 5 December, that the 
representatives of the Rome CLN parties were already aware of the monarch’s plan to resign at this moment. 
NA/FO371/43814/96. 
 
43 'La battaglia di Roma sarà vinta dal popolo di Roma', l’Avanti, 7.2.1944  
44 Ibid. 
  
145 
 
 
obliquely to the command’s plans as it referred to the eventual solution [that] cannot but be 
decisively influenced by what happens in the immediate aftermath of German withdrawal’;45 
Bonomi feared that ‘the hardest elements (among them Carlo Andreoni) [planned] to impede 
the Royal Army forces … from prevailing in Rome’.46 The Supreme Partisan Command also 
linked Andreoni’s comrades to the MCd’I and Armata Rossa. These dissident movements 
collaborated in both sabotaging Wehrmacht infrastructure, and in aiding Matilde Bassani 
Finzi’s Allied prisoner organisation. At a more symbolic level, Il Partigiano was also notable as 
the only other Roman Resistance newspaper to pay homage to the MCd’I’s ‘martyred’ 
partisans, who went unmentioned in the CLN parties’ press.47 
 
Responding to the Movimento Partigiano split, Socialist leaders adopted sharper republican 
positions. The slogan ‘All Power to the CLN’ was designed to evoke a sharp opposition to the 
monarchy, but the distinct means by which it might be realised implied strongly different 
social contents. Based on the workplace CLNs of the North, or establishing itself in power 
through an insurrection in Rome, the CLN government would be a very different beast to one 
created by a transfer of power from the Badoglio government. Even if the CLN did indeed 
reach such an agreement, with the King and the Marshall agreeing to step down, this would 
tend to imply a less disruptive change in the state machine than a government directly 
emanating from Resistance forces. In pushing for the CLN to declare itself the legitimate 
government, the Socialists tilted the scales in this latter direction. 
 
The disagreements this produced within the CLN were evident at the Bari Congress, the 
first CLN conference held in liberated Italy. The AMG had banned a similar meeting 
planned for Naples on 20 December, and only after a public petition did it allow the anti-
fascists to convene in Bari on 28 January. Representatives of all six CLN parties attended, 
but Benedetto Croce and Count Carlo Sforza made the defining interventions. This latter 
set the tone for the Congress with his combination of moderate liberalism and antipathy 
toward the King. The Socialists and Actionists sought to set up an interim parliament, and 
called on the congress to sit in permanent session. However, they dropped this motion in 
 
 
 
 
45 ‘La situazione politica in Italia’, Il Partigiano, 23.1.1944. 
 
46 Bonomi 1947, p. 143, 25.1.1944 entry. Bonomi confusedly grouped Andreoni together with 
unnamed others who wanted the CLN to take over the ‘vital points in Rome’ to the exclusion of the   
Royal Army.  
47 References to the anti-war socialists of World War I as well as an appeal to German soldiers 
reflected its similar embrace of sharp internationalist positions. One notable difference was the 
absence of the Stalinist rhetoric so commonplace in Bandiera Rossa, despite its positive references to 
Soviet military advances. Andreoni would in postwar years become a militant of the Titoite USI 
and later an anti-communist social democrat. 
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the face of liberal and Christian-Democratic opposition. Expressing the prevalent distrust 
for the royalists, the Bari Congress passed a resolution calling on Sforza to create a 
‘National Council’ that could prepare the way for a republican government. 
 
The Actionists’ and Socialists’ intransigent republicanism had long set them at odds with 
more conservative forces in the coalition who were ready to a deal with Vittorio Emanuele 
III. Since Badoglio’s government enjoyed sole Allied recognition as Italy’s legitimate 
leadership, CLN president Ivanoe Bonomi insisted on the necessity of a deal. He was open 
to the possibility of the King abdicating, yet made no principle of this; above all he 
insisted on the need to avoid disorder at the moment that the Allies reached the capital, 
telling the CLN parties that they must instead ‘provide the spectacle of a national solidity 
which resists even such political disagreements as will inevitably occur’, avoiding any 
clashes with ‘the forces charged by the Command of the Italian Army to keep order’.48 He 
feared that such social peace would be difficult without political compromise. 
 
The Socialists soon brought the situation to a head. A motion to the Rome CLN declared 
the inadmissibility of negotiations with the Kingdom of the South. While a bid to move 
the CLN into a more intransigent position rather than an attempt to split the coalition, the 
motion’s passing was the last straw for conservatives impatient at the Left’s posturing. 
Bonomi was no longer willing to serve as president of a coalition so adamant in its 
opposition to the Badoglio government. On 23 March he resigned from his post, damning 
his CLN partners in an irate missive; the Communists, Socialists and Actionists had tried 
to ‘impose their will’ on the rest, showing none of the spirit of national unity to which 
they laid claim.49 L’Unità appealed for the CLN to show ‘responsibility’ in this grave hour, 
but did not even mention the crisis.50 
 
This crisis owed much to the Party’s own vacillation. Its peripheral position in this dispute 
driven by the Socialists belied its own organisational muscle. Over the first months of 
1944, its cadres remained opposed to CLN participation in the Badoglio government. Yet 
it also sought to avoid any split with the liberals and conservatives more favourable to 
this possibility. The PCI thus attempted to prevent the Socialist motion being tabled. 
However, the Communists’ longstanding partnership with the Socialists as well as their 
wariness of being ‘outflanked’ to their Left did compel them to vote with the other 
republican parties. 
 
 
 
48 Bonomi 1947, pp. 143–44, 25.1.1944; in his entry on 31.1.1944 (p. 145) he noted that the left-wing 
parties had admitted the need to avoid armed clashes. 
49 Bonomi 1947, 23.3.1944. 
50 ‘Coscienza della responsibilità’, l’Unità, XXI/8, 30.3.1944. 
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The PCI sought to maintain the unity of the CLN; yet the Socialists’ hard line was forcing 
it to take sides in the most important dispute that divided this coalition. As we shall see in 
Chapter Seven, only Palmiro Togliatti’s return at the end of March would allow the PCI 
again to take the political initiative. 
 
5.5. The ‘Committee of Public Safety’ 
 
This blocked situation also fed the creation of a coalition seeking a cleaner break with the 
Badoglio regime. In January 1944 dissident parties outside the CLN declared a 
‘Committee of Public Safety’ in the capital. This committee included not only Andreoni’s 
movement but also the Roman dissident-communists (represented on the committee by 
Antonino Poce), Gerardo Bruni’s Christian-Socials, the Republicans, as well as lesser-
known circles including a ‘Feminine Movement’. This was not a military command, but a 
union of the political leaderships opposed to any deal with Badoglio and the King. The 
attempt to form a coalition defined by republicanism and not simply anti-fascism also 
pointed to partisans’ contrasting conceptions of what new political authority could be 
created. The dissidents assembled in the Committee sought to create a new power based 
not on the old state machine, but rather the partisan militias themselves. 
 
This name made telling reference to revolutions past. The comités de salut public declared in 
1793 and 1871 had each seized control of the French capital in order to lead a fight against 
foreign occupation and domestic reaction. Drawn from the history of revolutions on the 
other side of the Alps, this imaginary was also fired by a reality that had emerged during 
the Italian Resistance itself, the ‘partisan republic’. In pockets of territory around the 
peninsula, armed bands able to free villages and towns from Wehrmacht Occupation 
through their own efforts proclaimed these authorities separate from both Mussolini’s 
Salò régime and the Kingdom of the South. Mostly formed in response to immediate 
military necessities, they nonetheless expressed the idea of directly turning the partisan 
war into a new kind of political authority. This was inspiration for Roman militants who 
dreamt of forming a ‘new Commune’ on the Parisian model.51 
 
Often amounting to only a few valleys, the ‘partisan republics’ were not meaningfully 
‘governments’ so much as sets of rules negotiated between armed bands and local 
 
 
 
51 There are multiple references to the Paris Commune throughout MCd’I propaganda, the most 
extensive of which is the article ‘La Comune di Parigi’, DR, 29.3.1944, which comments: ‘At a moment in 
which the bourgeois fatherland had turned into a laughing stock and a bloodbath by the German 
invasion and bourgeois cowardice, the Paris Commune established and proclaimed the workers’ 
fatherland. For we who are living through the same pain as then, it points the right path’.  
  
148 
 
 
populations. Starting with the Repubblica di Maschito in mid-September 1943, these were 
most concentrated in mountainous regions of Northern Italy in the latter part of 1944. 
Their decrees most notably concerning the food supply and the enforcement of an ad hoc 
justice; Fascists were suppressed, and those accused of theft, rape or murder could 
themselves be put to death. In the Repubblica Partigiana dell’Ossola, one of the most 
renowned such ‘republics’ food prices were established by decree, and a government 
giunta formed to control its over 1,500 km2 of territory. 
 
While this was a principally rural phenomenon, some accounts speak of such partisan 
control being established on Rome’s city periphery. The area referred to by Orfeo Mucci as 
the ‘partisan republic of Torpignattara and Certosa’ was the strongest centre of Resistance 
organisation in the capital. It was not at any point liberated from the Wehrmacht,52 who 
maintained a base within this territory. Partisans did however exert their control over the 
Italian police, which aided both the extension of their armed organisation and their efforts 
to evade repression. This negative ‘control’ over officials in the neighbourhood, combined 
with an operation distributing false papers and even food, allowed communists to build 
their authority among the local population. 
 
Whatever margin of ‘autonomy’ was left to the people of Torpignattara most of all reflected 
their abandonment. As we have noted in our comments on the Quadraro district, just south of 
Torpignattara, it is true that the collapse of law and order, the lack of war industry and the 
deportation of the Roman carabinieri left a vacuum of authority in the peripheral borgate. These 
conditions allowed militants to assert their own control, including through military 
demonstrations. On 1 February 1944 Uccio Pisino staged a training session in Torpignattara at 
which communists openly brandished their weapons, the routes in and out of the square 
protected by an armed guard.53 This movement and the GAP also held brief public rallies 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Bentivegna 1983, p. 133, describes the Germans as absent from Centocelle for ‘more than a 
month’, and Pepe n.d. similarly portrays the Wehrmacht as too afraid to enter this district. This 
allowed the GAP to hold a public meeting in the Piazza dei Mirti. The Occupier nonetheless 
remained a headquarters on the Via dei Glicini.  
53 Gloria Chilanti writes, in a comment on her own teenage diary, that in Torpignattara ‘the 
Bandiera Rossa movement had a big detachment of partisans and the population was all for us. On 
that occasion [1 February] I had my first training with weapons. Some partisans closed the entry 
and exit to a street and I came along together with others including Giovanni Pepe and his brother, 
who did a drill in the open air with old rifles from 1891. All the women watched with admiration 
from the windows’ (Chilanti 1996, p. 115, 1.2.1944). The idea of ‘unanimous’ popular support is 
common across all partisan accounts, reflecting either the desire to associate their cause with a 
popular and national unity, or indeed the recognition that a single determined opponent would 
have been sufficient to report and destroy any kind of public activity. 
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in Centocelle’s Piazza dei Mirti. On May Day there was also a public demonstration 
guarded by the partisans. 
 
Such actions were only possible assuming the absence of German troops and the non-
intervention of Italian police. Their only freedom of operation owed to them being able to 
bear some form of influence over remaining regime officials, through a mix of sympathy 
and intimidation. This was evident in Torpignattara, where the MCd’I managed to secure 
the collaboration of local police. This particularly owed to the aid of Dr. Angilella, 
introduced to a command role in this area after the GAP killing of the Fascist policeman 
Antonio Stampacchia on 25 February. He was linked to the MCd’I’s ‘internal band’ in 
‘technical services’, also including ten other agents54. 
 
In reality, the local nature of such control also corresponded to its weakness. Angilella 
continued to work under the official auspices of the RSI, and the Nazi-Fascist regime had 
no difficulty in imposing its authority over the district. While partisan republics like 
Ossola had emerged from military confrontations with Occupation forces, which thought 
better of retaking these areas at unnecessary cost, these Roman districts were less 
autonomous than abandoned. The school on the Via dei Glicini remained a German HQ, 
and was never threatened by partisan forces. 
 
As the Allied advance toward the capital halted, the possibility of any radical political 
change was itself subdued. The Allies still stood close to the capital, and it could still be 
expected that they would soon relieve the city. Diaries from this period do not show mere 
defeatism; there were constant rumours of breakthroughs, and false hopes that the Allies 
would soon arrive. Yet what changed over the spring of 1944 was the strength of the 
Resistance movement itself. Mounting ever bolder actions in the hope of coming 
insurrection, they were instead compelled to retreat, broken. As we shall see in Chapter 
Six, the apparent ‘autonomy’ of winter 1944 was not to last. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 He is listed in ‘MSdL/FSC/28/55, ‘Banda Prenestino’. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The forces of repression 
 
Euphoria over the Anzio landings did not long endure. After the Allies’ initial 
breakthrough, the Wehrmacht managed to hold a defensive front that blocked the route to 
the capital. The Allies were similarly held back further south at the Gustav Line, as Monte 
Cassino proved similarly difficult to breach. The liberators stood just fifty kilometres from 
the capital. But Rome’s partisans had been drawn into a dangerously exposed position. In 
the days following the landings, Resistance movements around the city intensified their 
public agitation, exhorting Romans to join the final struggle. Yet as the Germans held 
firm, militants lay vulnerable to heightened counter-insurgency. At the end of January 
1944, Rome’s partisans had imagined that the final victory was within sight. They now 
instead faced heightened bloodshed. 
 
The Nazis used counter-insurgency measures that had been developed across occupied 
Europe. Combining surveillance and raids with deportations and collective punishment, 
this was a repressive apparatus of a scale unknown to Roman anti-fascists. Particularly 
threatening were the efforts to subvert their organisations from within, through the 
insertion of spies working to organise chain arrests. In January 1944 one such delazione 
destroyed the MCd’I’s band in the Trionfale district, killing several of the movement’s key 
leaders. Like all Resistance forces, it was also affected by the repression targeted against 
the general population, and in particular the series of deportations. Some 220 of its 
militants were transported to Germany during the Occupation; these losses added to the 
186 members who were either executed or killed in action. 
 
What turned mass arrests into mass executions was the Nazi collective punishment policy. 
Already in September military governor Stahel had declared that ten Italians would be 
executed for each German killed by Italian ‘banditry’. This was a blackmail against 
partisans, designed to paralyse the armed struggle. They could now only attack German 
troops in the knowledge that this risked provoking reprisals. Some Resistance forces drew 
the conclusion that they should limit themselves to defensive activity, waiting for the 
Allies’ arrival. The PCI however strongly resisted this attesismo, instead emphasising the 
need for Italians to make their own contribution to the war of liberation. The fear of 
reprisals could not serve as a pretext for passivity. Terrorist tactics were however a point 
of divergence among Rome’s communists. 
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For the GAP, exemplary attacks against German troops were a key means of stirring 
Romans from their passivity. Terrorist actions sought to ‘make the ground burn under the 
Occupier’s feet’, sowing fear in enemy ranks while also showing Italians the possibility of 
armed mobilisation. This protagonism in turn sought to galvanise the Party’s role as a 
patriotic leadership. While its militants knew that their actions risked reprisals against 
innocents,1 the Party insisted that they were legitimate ‘acts of war’. It dramatised Nazi 
atrocities politically, using them as calls for intensified Resistance. In no way did this 
imply that the GAP actively sought to provoke reprisals.2 The GAP’s armed actions 
proceeded in spite of this threat, rather than with an aim of realising it. 
 
Directed toward a future moment of insurrection, the MCd’I’s strategy was far less focused on 
attacking German troops. Its policy was above all defined by the aim of seizing power at the 
moment of their withdrawal. To this end it prepared a network of clandestine militias across 
the capital, as well as the political structures which it hoped could lead these forces. This was 
not attesismo in the fullest sense; it had taken part in the resistance on 8 September and 
conducted an energetic campaign of sabotage operations: even in resisting raids and looting 
weapons they inevitably came into conflict with Occupation troops. But fighting the 
Wehrmacht was more a by-product of their activity than its purpose. Both self-defence and the 
primacy of the future end goal counselled against exhausting their organisation in frontal 
clashes. As the GAP’s actions drove a mounting wave of repression, the dissidents were in fact 
hardened in their opposition to terrorist tactics. 
 
 
 
1 Rosario Bentivegna discusses his agonising over this question, and indeed the killing of 
Wehrmacht conscripts, in Bentivegna 1983, pp. 91–2.  
2 The belief that this was indeed the GAP’s agenda has a diffuse historiographical influence. Bocca 1966, 
pp. 165–6, writes that ‘rebel terrorism, as the communists well know, is carried out not to prevent the 
enemy terrorism, but to provoke it, to harshen it’. It was a strategy of ‘premeditated self-harm: it sought 
wounds, punishment, reprisals, to involve the uncertain and deepen the abyss of hatred. It is a ruthless 
pedagogy, a fierce lesson. The communists rightly considered it necessary and were the only ones to 
impart this lesson unhesitatingly’. Yet the evidential base for the claim that the 
GAP deliberately provoked reprisals is very thin. There is no record of any such policy being debated or 
agreed. In his reconstruction of the Roman GAP’s debate on terrorist tactics, Dan Kurzman argues that it 
switched from attacking Fascists only, to also attacking the Germans, after a ‘meeting of national 
Communist leaders led by Luigi Longo, at Monchiero in Piedmont’ (Kurzman 1975, p. 103). He claims 
that this meeting decided ‘that the most effective way to enhance partisan power and influence would 
be to incite the Germans to take reprisals against the Italian people’ (ibid.). He provides no reference for 
this claim, but seemingly relies on the sole account of such a discussion in Monchiero, by the monarchist 
Resistance leader Piero Operti. Briefly leader of the CLN forces in Piedmont, Operti relates a meeting 
with Longo and the Actionist Ferruccio Parri at the cafe in 
 
Monchiero station, at which Parri suggested that the Resistance should seek ‘to provoke further 
reprisals and deepen, among the people, the dramatic sense of the hour we are living through, even 
where bombs have not brought ruin’ (Operti 1963, p. 135). Such words do, indeed, appear as a 
justification of seeking reprisals. But this was no ‘meeting of Communist leaders’, and nor does 
even Operti suggest that Parri’s comment could be considered a ‘decision’, still less of the PCI’s. 
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This fed PCI press claims that any focus on the ‘problems of the future’ was a distraction 
from the fight against Nazi-Fascism. No other social or political goal could be realised 
before liberation from this regime, and thus this military campaign had to be prioritised 
over all other considerations. Yet the tension between present initiative and building for 
the future was in fact present in every Resistance movement; it was the obvious question 
posed by every decision to commit forces to risky actions. As even other parts of the PCI 
press made clear, its concern for military protagonism was itself directed at consolidating 
the Party as a mass force which could help shape postwar society. It was also this more 
sectarian goal which determined its efforts to discredit and break up the rival communist 
movement. It attacked the MCd’I not because it was passive (a critique more aptly applied 
to some of its CLN partners) or because it was oriented toward future goals, but rather 
because these particular goals conflicted with its own. 
 
As we shall see in Chapter Six, the Party’s strategy of escalating military actions failed to 
produce any wider mobilisation. Terrorist attacks instead prompted reprisals that 
devastated all partisan ranks. This disproportionately affected the dissident communists, 
who were ill-prepared to confront an onslaught on this scale. Some of their number were 
killed in clashes with Fascists or German soldiers; far more died after falling into police 
hands, whether through spy infiltration, raids in their districts, or as a result of their own 
security lapses. The effort to build a city-wide clandestine network left the Roman 
dissidents little able to defend themselves from chain arrests. This was particularly 
evident in the devastating losses among those militants responsible for contacts between 
their ‘internal bands’. This did not bring total disaggregation, and new security measures 
were soon implemented. But as Nazi repression intensified, even the bearers of the most 
aggressive tactics were forced to scale back their actions. 
 
6.1. The arsenal of repression 
 
Since 8 September 1943 the Nazi-Fascists had presented Rome as an ‘open city’ beyond the 
zones of conflict. The German High Command gave the city this status immediately after the 
invasion, and within weeks Rome was declared capital of the Italian Social Republic. The legal 
press portrayed the Wehrmacht not as an army of Occupation, but as a ‘police’ presence 
welcomed into the city by Mussolini’s government. In practice the Germans and their Fascist 
allies did little to maintain such a pretence of normality. The fact that the Wehrmacht had 
taken the city in the face of dogged resistance had openly demonstrated its repressive 
character, and this was confirmed in October with the beginning of mass deportations. As the 
Resistance intensified, over winter the Nazi-Fascists extended their 
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specifically anti-partisan measures. The arsenal of repression ranged from a system of 
curfews and passes to spy rings, torture cells, and collective punishment. 
 
Even the first partisan actions alerted Rome’s communists to the scale of Nazi repression. 
A first sign of this came on 20 October 1943 as the MCd’I’s Pietralata band attempted to 
invade the Forte Tiburtino. The barracks there had been abandoned by the Royal Army, 
and they planned to loot its arms and food stocks. Unaware of the presence of an SS 
division, the militants arriving at the scene were rapidly ambushed. Put on trial, nine 
were condemned to death and ten to deportation. The executions of the men, not allowed 
to put up any defence, took place two days later. Executed together with them was an 
entirely uninvolved young man who just happened to be passing on a bicycle. This gave 
Rome’s partisans their first bitter taste of the rappresaglia, one of the most effective 
weapons in intimidating the Resistance. 
 
The heavy blows suffered in the first months of the Resistance sparked reflection in MCd’I 
ranks as to the value of its armed activity. Already on 5 January an article in Bandiera Rossa 
offered a withering critique of the ‘adventurism’ that had seen dozens of its comrades 
captured or killed. This extended into the broader advocacy of the ‘need to wait for the 
right moment’; not a strategy of passivity, but one that avoided direct confrontation with 
the Wehrmacht forces.3 The bite of repression had certainly alerted militants to the 
dangers of clashes with Occupation troops, in practice the building of armed bands 
remained the central focus of all MCd’I activity. 
 
From its foundation, the MCd’I’s strength was its ability to build communist political 
leadership within military organisation. This rooted its proselytising in a real social revolt 
on the city periphery, expressed in the proliferation of armed bands. As Chapter Four 
demonstrated, these bands’ activities were not simply a matter of attacking Wehrmacht 
men and materiel, but also involved an array of solidarity and welfare initiatives directed 
at the wider population. Resistance against raids and deportations kept militants 
constantly on alert for armed action; not only the desire to hasten the Allies’ advance, but 
also these initiatives, demanded an ongoing campaign to sabotage the machinery of 
Occupation. This was not all-out warfare, and militants often had good reason to avoid 
frontal clashes with the Wehrmacht troops. But they also had to be ready for 
confrontations being imposed upon them. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 ‘Saper attendere’, BR, 15.10.1943; ‘L’Azione’, BR, 5.1.1944. 
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Without doubt, the death of 186 MCd’I militants in nine months of Resistance in some sense 
refutes critics’ claims that its political ‘sectarianism’ reduced it to mere ‘passivity’. This 
amounted to over a third of all of the Resistance casualties in Rome, after the invasion of 8 
September. Nonetheless, the large numbers of militants condemned to death for ‘anti-German 
activism’ or ‘favouring the [Allied] enemy’ are not simply an index of effective anti-
Wehrmacht actions. The movement was also characterised by security lapses, from its use of 
membership cards to its propensity for spectacular acts of publicity. It was moreover struck by 
the wider repression against the population, and the borgate in which it established its social 
base. The violence deployed by the Nazis and their Italian accomplices like the ‘Banda Koch’ 
was far from simply a response to partisans’ own actions. 
 
6.2. Raids and deportations 
 
This was most evidently true in the case of the Roman Jews. While at its origins Italian 
Fascism was not remarkable for its anti-Semitism, the regime’s racist dynamic heightened 
through its colonial endeavours and then ties to Nazi Germany. In 1938 the regime 
enacted leggi razziali banning Jews from public functions and forbidding Aryan-Jewish 
marriages. Bringing profound moral and material hardships, these measures isolated Jews 
from the wider population. With the Wehrmacht invasion in September 1943 there began 
mass deportations from Italy to the death camps. With the Allies approaching from the 
South, the Nazis and their Italian helpers hastened their Final Solution. Most important of 
their targets was the ghetto ebraico, a maze of streets close to the Tiber which had stood as 
the centre of Roman Jewry since 1555. Invading its narrow avenues on 16 October 1943, SS 
forces and Italian police rounded up 1,259 ghetto residents. ‘Half-bloods’ and those 
‘mistakenly’ considered Jewish were released; the remaining 1,023 victims were deported 
to Auschwitz. Only 16 would return. 
 
From the GAP’s Lucia Ottobrini and Mario Fiorentini to the Socialists Anna-Maria Enriques 
and Matilde Bassani-Finzi, several prominent anti-fascists were of Jewish-assimilationist 
backgrounds, while the likes of the MCd’I’s Angelo Lombardi had more distant Jewish ties. 
Other resistenti also invoked the racial laws of 1938 as a key moment of anti-fascist 
identification. However, organised Resistance movements were poorly-implanted among the 
Jewish population. Bandiera Rossa made no reference to the fate of Rome’s Jews even after the 
16 October raid. Orfeo Mucci remembered the ghetto residents as essentially helpless, 
complacent in the belief that they could reach an accommodation with the 
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Occupier.4 For its part l’Unità invoked the ghetto raid as reason for Italians to join the war 
of Liberation, although it devoted far less coverage to Jewish suffering than it did the 
partisan victims of Nazi repression.5 If not making the Jews a cause célèbre, each movement 
did produce false papers to help survivors evade detection. 
 
Of more direct concern for the MCd’I were the raids in the borgate, the heart of its own 
social base. Notable was the rastrellamento in Quadraro, the south-eastern district 
mentioned in Chapter Four. This was what Erich von Moellhausen had termed the 
‘vipers’ nest’, both a centre of partisan attacks on German transport lines and an area 
through which draft-resisters and Allied POWs made their escape from the capital. 
Cordoning off the roads in and out of the borgata on 17 April 1944, SS troops and Italian 
police rounded up 947 men. Loaded into trucks and taken to the Fossoli holding camp, 
these ‘Italian labour volunteers’ were deported to concentration camps in Germany and 
Poland. Used for slave labour, the 947 were not meant to be exterminated; however, given 
the gruelling conditions in the disease-stricken camps, barely half survived the war. 
 
The Quadraro raid also had an explicitly political purpose. The German High Command 
declared that it was striking against a population in a ‘certain neighbourhood of Rome’ 
that had protected ‘political murderers’. Its statement published in the Italian press on 18 
April reported the deportation of ‘communists and able-bodied men able to work who 
have collaborated with the communists’.6 In rounding up all men they found between 16 
and 60, the Occupation troops directly identified the Resistance and the wider population. 
Without doubt, most of those deported from Quadraro were not literally collaborating 
with the communist movements. Yet such raids hit hard at the MCd’I’s social base. Over 
the nine-month Occupation, some 220 of its militants fell victim to deportations, which 
disproportionately struck at working-age men in the borgate. This was not far short of one-
tenth of its membership. 
 
As well as the blunt instrument of mass raids, one of the most effective means of repression 
was the insertion of spies into Resistance ranks. This allowed the intelligence services to 
uncover and then crush partisans’ clandestine networks. The most dramatic such example in 
Rome was the destruction of the MCd’I’s band in the Trionfale district, eleven of whose 
 
 
 
 
4 CGB/FAP/Mucci.  
5 ‘Pogrom a Roma’, l’Unità, XX/21, 26.10.1943, hence described ‘a general proof of the sinister design to 
remove not just the Jews, but all Romans from Rome’, an end for the ‘illusions of those who do not today 
believe in the barbarous plan to depopulate Rome of all men able to fight and work’. 
6 Quoted in Majanlahti and Osti Guerrazzi 2010, p. 137. 
  
156 
 
 
militants were executed on 2 February 1944. This band grew out of the Attenti! group founded 
at the beginning of the war.7 Trionfale militants were central to the Grotta Rossa ‘Marxist 
school’ as well as the MCd’I’s links to the Allies via Matilda Bassani Finzi. However, at the 
turn of 1944 the spy Ubaldo Cipolla unleashed a wave of repression against the band, as he 
organised the ambush of seven of its leaders at the Piazzale Flaminio.8 
 
Cipolla worked together with Biagio Roddi to undermine the band from within. These men 
were both convinced Fascists, who had managed to insinuate their way into the group and 
win its militants’ trust. They received 5,000 lire for each male partisan consigned to the SS and 
4,000 for each woman. Certain accounts describe the MCd’I as establishing the membership 
criterion that each new militant must already be known to two existing members, but this pair 
easily managed to infiltrate it without previously being known to the other members. They 
also played on the militants’ inexperience with clandestine organisation. Cipolla expressed his 
own fears that the German Command was already on the band’s tail, as he argued that they 
should move their operations away from Trionfale. They met at Piazzale Flaminio in order to 
flee the city, where they were instead arrested.9 
 
Held at the Forte Bravetta prison, these seven and nine of their comrades rounded up 
around the capital were put on trial on 27 January. They were charged with ‘attempted 
violence against the Occupation troops, the illegitimate possession of arms, the failure to 
report the illegitimate possession of arms, and the distribution of anti-German 
newspapers favouring the enemy’. At the military tribunal eleven were condemned to 
death, and the rest sentenced to prison spells ranging from five to fifteen years. The men 
shot at the fortress on 2 February included such important leaders of the MCd’I as the 
engineer Romolo Iacopini, the journalist Ezio Malatesta and the Croat theatre director 
Branko Bitler. The imprisoned militants including Herta Habernig would be freed upon 
the Allies’ arrival at the beginning of June. 
 
Certain details of the trial reveal other ways in which militants had exposed themselves to 
discovery. Particularly notable were the risks taken for the sake of spreading propaganda, 
with even such important leaders as Romolo Iacopini distributing Bandiera Rossa in public 
places. This boldness reached its most extreme proportions on 6 December, as MCd’I 
 
 
 
 
7 See section 3.4.  
8 Both Roddi and Cipolla were jailed after the war, and their German interpreter executed. The case 
records, including extensive interviews with MCd’I militants, appear in ASR/CAP/Corte d’Assise  
Speciale 177/b. 1590.  
9 Ibid. 
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groups around the capital combined in a simultaneous propaganda action. This sought to 
mobilise the whole organisation at once, carrying out leaflet drops in 60 cinemas around 
the city in a single evening. Cinemas were well-established as a site for such actions, since 
militants could throw handfuls of leaflets into the crowd from behind the projector and 
then flee under cover of darkness. Yet the actions around Rome were not truly 
simultaneous, and not all militants succeeded in escaping. 
 
At the trial the Trionfale militants managed to avoid implicating their comrades from 
outside the district. The prosecutors made no reference to the rest of the movement, 
believing the defendants before them to be not only key figures in its command, but the 
central leaders on which the rest of the organisation depended. Iacopini, known to both 
Socialist and PCI militants as well as his own comrades, resisted torture to the last. The 
hazy references to the ‘Communist Movement’ in the trial records indicate prosecutors’ 
lack of clear understanding of this as an organisation distinct from the PCI. For their part, 
the Trionfale militants were no wiser to the nature of the Nazi spy operation: they had not 
at any point understood that Cipolla was an enemy agent, and even after their arrest their 
surviving comrades did not identify him as the traitor. Deprived of all its main leaders, 
the band did re-organise in February 1944, as Iacopini’s brothers took over its leadership. 
Nonetheless, its activity was now greatly diminished.10 
 
6.3. Via Rasella and the Fosse Ardeatine 
 
The destruction of the Trionfale group was but part of a wave of repression that now 
struck the movement. Already on 4 January one of its founding leaders had been arrested. 
Brought before a military tribunal, Raffaele de Luca was sentenced to death for 
‘distributing anti-German propaganda’ and ‘organising armed bands’. Held in Regina 
Coeli prison, he was soon joined in its cells by San Lorenzo commander Nicola Stame. 
Arrested at Piazza Mignanelli on 24 January, Stame arrived at the jail having already 
undergone hours of torture at the hands of the SS. The following day, Aladino Govoni, 
Uccio Pisino and Eusebio Troiani fell into an ambush by Fascist spies. On 28 January 
Umberto Scattoni was arrested together with the PCI’s Guido Rattoppatore during an 
abortive GAP assault on the German-occupied Aquila d’Oro hotel. The MCd’I’s ranks had 
already been decimated after the audacious action on 6 December; by late March close to a 
hundred of its militants lay in jail cells around the Italian capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
10 See Fifth Zone report in MSdL/FSC/28/59. 
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Rome’s GAP suffered similar repression in the immediate wake of the Anzio landings. Just 
four days after Rattoppatore’s arrest, the SS broke into the ‘Santa Barbera’ GAP bomb factory 
run by Gianfranco Mattei and its ‘head artillery-maker’ Giorgio Labò, arresting both men as 
well as Antonello Trombadori. However, the GAP’s command structures remained largely 
intact. Seeking to rouse the population from its passivity the GAP counter-attacked against the 
Occupation forces. On 5 March a gappista assassinated a German soldier in Centocelle’s Piazza 
dei Mirti. When this led to a reprisal on the established ratio, with ten prisoners including 
Labò shot at Forte Bravetta on 7 March, Giorgio Amendola insisted that the GAP in turn raise 
its own operational level. Two weeks later his comrades conducted a bomb attack on a 
German military-police patrol on central Via Rasella. 
 
This was the Roman Resistance’s biggest single military feat. Gappisti had long observed 
troop movements in the district bound by Via Tritone, and decided that a bomb on the 
steep and narrow Via Rasella would have the most explosive force. The date chosen for 
the attack was 23 March, anniversary of the founding of the Fasci di combattimento. As the 
Polizeiregiment ‘Bozen’ turned up the Via Rasella, the GAP’s Rosario Bentivegna slowly 
pushed a trolley downhill toward them. Dressed as a waste-collector, as the soldiers 
approached Bentivegna threw his charge. Four of his comrades hurled hand grenades 
from both sides. Shrapnel tore through the column, as the force of the blast set off the 
soldiers’ own explosives. Shooting broke out between the gappisti and the surviving 
troops. Bentivegna had already escaped unnoticed. A manhunt began. 32 military-
policemen lay dead on the street. Two passers-by were also killed in the crossfire.11 
 
Nazi retribution was swift. Rather than await the discovery of the assailants, Hitler ordered 
immediate vengeance. SS officers and Italian police collaborated in drawing up a list of 
victims, who were to be drawn from the city’s jails. They included 68 members of the MCd’I, 
52 from the PCI, 52 from the Action Party and 18 Socialists, as well as 43 from the monarchist 
Fronte Militare Clandestino. 75 of the victims were Jewish, around a third of them with links to 
anti-fascist organisations. With one German soldier still in critical condition and the late 
addition of extra numbers, in total 335 Italians were rounded up. Loaded into wagons, the 
prisoners were driven down the Via Appia to the Fosse Ardeatine caves, on the southern 
outskirts of the city. There the blindfolded hostages were lined up in rows in front of a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Piero Zuccheretti, a 12 year old boy, and the TETI worker Antonio Chiaretti, himself a member 
of the MCd’. 
  
159 
 
 
trench. As each set of executed prisoners fell into the pits, the next took its place. The 
systematic slaughter took some two hours. 
 
The MCd’I’s victims ranged from its youngest sympathisers to its leading commanders. 
Former grenadier commander Aladino Govoni was the most renowned among the 
victims; others included San Lorenzo tenor Nicola Stame as well as Umberto Scattoni, the 
only one of the movement’s members who was also a gappista. While these militants had 
been condemned to prison sentences weeks beforehand, most of the victims were never 
tried at all, some having been picked up by police just days beforehand. Eusebio Troiani, 
leader of the Marxist school at Grotta Rossa, was arrested on 21 March and murdered 
three days later. His student Unico Guidoni was also among the victims, as were band-
leaders like Costantino Imperiali and Pietro Principato. Orfeo Mucci and Felice Chilanti 
narrowly escaped arrest on the day of the massacre by climbing across a roof terrace. 
Their comrade Raffaele de Luca was also spared at the last moment, as sympathetic prison 
guards declared him ‘too ill to be transported to the execution site’.12 
 
The massacre produced much soul-searching among the victims’ comrades. In a display 
of defiance, militants carried out a series of tributes at the Fosse Ardeatine, including the 
laying of a crown of red carnations and the staging of a ceremony by nightfall by the 
Torpignattara and Quadraro bands. The atrocity however also provoked more angered 
 
 
 
 
12 Given the numbers of MCd’Iers killed in the massacre, the PCI’s role in ‘provoking’ it has been the 
subject of wild conspiracy theories. The 1996 trial of SS officer Erich Priebke saw a ragbag of such 
allegations appear in print form, after they had long enjoyed an only diffuse renown. Exploiting the 
publicity around the trial, works by self-published historian Roberto Gremmo and far-right journalist 
Pierangelo Maurizio each claimed that the PCI deliberately provoked the Nazi reprisal in order to 
destroy rival Resistance forces. In Maurizio’s terms, the Communists had ‘entrusted their dirty work to 
the Germans’, in order to ‘free themselves of competition in the scramble for power’.  
Maurizio curiously combines this with the claim that even the passers-by killed in the attack  
(including not only an MCd’I member but also a thirteen-year-old boy who had, by Maurizio’s 
account, ‘foreseen’ his own demise) were also deliberately targeted. The far-Right publicist claims 
that while the lynching of Regina Coeli prison director Donato Carretta was in fact a PCI bid to 
prevent him from revealing that the Communists had selected the victims. 
 
Beyond lacking in evidence, these hypotheses make little sense in terms of PCI strategy. While the Nazi 
reprisal policy was well-known, there was no reason to expect that it would particularly negatively 
effect the MCd’I. All Communist Parties around Europe faced similar Nazi blackmails, and all insisted 
on the need to attack Occupation forces regardless. While this approach could be criticised in terms of its 
tactical efficacy or the danger in which it placed innocents, it has nothing to do with the Stalinist 
repression of dissidents. While in other contexts Stalin-loyalists did propagate the need to treat 
‘Trotskyists’ as Nazis and advertised that they had done so in practice, the Via Rasella conspiracy theory 
alleges that the PCI attacked these opponents both secretly and via the unlikely intermediary of the SS. 
Maurizio’s indignation that ‘only members of the Fronte Militare Clandestino, the Partito D’Azione and 
Bandiera Rossa were sent to the Fosse Ardeatine’ is quite unjustified; several dozen PCI militants were 
also killed, as well as Socialists and non-partisan Jews. 
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responses. A text by Govoni’s father, circulated by the MCd’I, extended blame to the Via 
Rasella attackers. The Futurist poet’s tribute to his son raged at those whom he accused of 
provoking the massacre. Corrado Govoni wondered ‘Who was the dark soul of the 
bomb/Bonomi, or Togliatti. Or was it Badoglio? … Whoever was guilty, forever/All that 
blood, the cold of the heart will crush him’.13 Govoni’s comrades did not make a similar 
claim; paying tribute to the martyrs of all creeds, their bulletin called on militants to 
‘avenge’ the fallen by keeping their cause alive. Nonetheless, the catastrophic effect of the 
Nazi reprisal also hardened their attitude in opposition to terrorist tactics. 
 
6.4. A retreat 
 
MCd’I leaders sought to discourage further terrorist attacks. To this end they offered 
analyses of why such actions were ‘not part of Marxist strategy’.14 Their 29 March internal 
bulletin emphasised that ‘heroic gestures’ and ‘romantic impulses’ were foreign to the 
collective, class basis of ‘revolution in the Marxist sense’. To risk ‘blowback against the 
innocent’ was inadmissible; such an attitude was ‘useless and reprehensible’, 
‘individualist, not communist’.15 While communists sought ‘to conquer power, even 
violently’, ‘the sacrifice of proletarian blood’ could only be worthwhile if this brought 
‘tangible victories for the proletariat alone’.16 Rome’s communists thus emphasised very 
different lessons from the Fosse Ardeatine massacre. Where l’Unità called for unremitting 
attacks on troops in order to avenge the victims,17 the Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie called for 
a more cautious approach, avoiding further losses to the ‘proletarian vanguard’. Given 
this priority on collective organisation over individual military feats, militants’ priority 
task must be ‘active defence against the repression of our Movement’.18 
 
This related to a broader disagreement over the merits of attacking Wehrmacht troops. For the 
MCd’I, the proletariat’s interest was ‘above all to distinguish and assert itself as a class’, as it 
built toward final insurrection.19 Both this end goal and the immediate tasks of expropriations 
and draft-resistance demanded armed force; in this sense, it could only build its ‘working-
class Resistance’ by extending its military apparatus. Yet this did not imply that attacking 
German troops was an end in itself, or that spectacular terrorist attacks gave 
 
 
13 Govoni 1944. 
14 ‘I fatti di via Rasella’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, pp. 1–2, 29.3.44  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17 ‘Gloria eterna ai 320 fucilati di Roma! Vendicare i nostri martiri – Liberare la nostra Patria’, 
l’Unità, XX/8, 30.3.1944.  
18 ‘I fatti di via Rasella’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, pp. 1–2, 29.3.44  
19 Ibid. 
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workers a sense of collective agency. It was inadmissible to risk ‘the lives of conscious 
workers’, for these were ‘precious to the proletarian vanguard’s cause and it alone’.20 This 
offered a practical expression of what Tigrino Sabatini termed the difference between 
‘turning war into revolution’ and ‘sending revolutionaries off to fight the war’.21 His 
comrades bitterly criticised the GAP’s incautious embrace of this latter approach, accusing 
it of an adventurist desire ‘to get a mention on the BBC’.22 
 
The GAP was indeed planning a ‘counter-reprisal’, an attack against a German military-
police column at Via Tassino on 28 March. Faced with pressure from other CLN leaders to 
stop the cycle of violence, the PCI however called off the action.23 GAP militants struggled 
to make sense of this fall into attesismo, in evident conflict with the idea of an accelerating 
campaign of attacks.24 Yet repression would soon force the GAP to take a more cautious 
approach. On 21 April, as the GAP’s Guglielmo Blasi passed through a police checkpoint, 
he was found in possession of doctored papers and a pistol. Betraying his comrades in 
order to save his own life, Blasi revealed details of the GAP organisation to questore Pietro 
Caruso. He in turn had six gappisti arrested and tortured. Only Calamandrei’s escape 
allowed him to warn the few survivors, who fled to the borgate beyond the capital. They 
would remain there until the Allies’ arrival. 
 
GAP militants’ accounts like police and MCd’I records thus point to a decline in Roman 
partisan activism in April 1944.25 The Allied landings at Anzio in January had raised 
militants’ hopes of a coming insurrection, and this in turn encouraged them to ever more 
confident public agitation. Yet as the Allied advance stalled, the clandestine networks that 
had come out into the open were left exposed to repression. The result was bloodshed, 
feeding passivity among the population and even within partisan ranks. In the days after 
the Fosse Ardeatine massacre, MCd’I press only subtly departed from Bandiera Rossa’s 
characteristic triumphalism, oblique referring to a ‘great socialist future which at times 
seems superior to our forces’.26 Yet the bulletin produced on the eve of May Day had to 
 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Quoted in Chilanti 1969, p. 49.  
22 A subsequent bulletin criticised PCI ‘adventurism’ in even sharper terms: ‘No one can say what 
the Badoglio-Communists are capable of doing to get a mention on the BBC. But sadly we all know 
what horrific acts the Teutonic criminal madness is capable of’.  
23 Bentivegna himself recognised that this ‘action also had suicidal characteristics’; ‘not because we 
wanted to die … but because we were so enraged that we did not care’. See his discussion in   
Bentivegna 1983, p. 172. 
24 Ibid.  
25 See the discussion of the destruction of the MCd’I by police measures in ACS/MI/RSI (Gabinetto, 10), 
‘Panorama della situazione dei partiti politici antifascisti’, cited in Gremmo 2015, p. 110.  
26 ‘Ammonimenti’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, p. 1, 30.4.1944. 
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recognise that the organisation was in crisis: ‘With the shootings, the arrests and the 
deportations the ranks of our best comrades have been thinned out, and fear and unease 
have crept in among the less mature. Indiscipline slithers through our ranks’.27 
 
This bulletin’s very existence reflected leaders’ attempts to restore a sense of cohesion 
following the Fosse Ardeatine killings. Since the SS printshop raid in January there were 
no new issues of Bandiera Rossa. From 29 April the MCd’I Executive thus produced the 
handwritten and copied Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie in order to issue centralised directives 
to local bands. The first issue opened with a call to keep the struggle alive, arguing that to 
shrink into passivity now would simply reflect ‘the moral disarray produced by fascism’.28 
It called on MCd’Iers to maintain their ‘balanced nerves, historical and political 
sensibility, moral purity, spirit of sacrifice, trust in the proletariat and above all the overall 
vision that does not lose itself in the particular … [but] keeps the supreme conquest’ in 
sight.29 Bitter references to ‘petty criticisms’, ‘personal tittle-tattle’, those who ‘abandoned 
themselves to bourgeois chicanery’ and ‘old minds trapped in self-contemplation’ scorned 
those finding pretexts to retreat from the struggle. ‘To have doubts’ now ‘would mean 
offending the memory of the dead, being unworthy of the name we bear’.30 
 
Demanding tightened organisation, the bulletin edited by Cretara and Mucci admonished the 
‘large share of organisers’ who ‘[had] fail[ed] to show any capacity for conspiracy’. This was 
blamed on their either ‘not know[ing] the bite of police repression or ignor[ing] its lessons’.31 
Given the ‘fundamental’ need for ‘political education’ ‘cells should meet frequently to keep 
their revolutionary spirit and political capacity alive’;32 however, to avoid ‘chain arrests’ they 
should remain isolated from one another, with only one militant per cell maintaining contact 
with the ‘group captains’ coordinating their efforts. This cell structure had both political and 
security implications: ‘meeting and discussion in the small and comfortable circle of five 
people who know and respect each other is immensely more productive than big assemblies 
where generally the mass’s only role is passively expressing itself through diffuse shouting, 
whistling and applause’.33 This cell structure was 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 ‘1 maggio’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, p. 1, 30.4.1944.  
28 ‘Ammonimenti’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, p. 1, 30.4.1944.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 ‘La lotta clandestina’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, p. 1, 30.4.1944. 
32 ‘La cellula’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, pp. 2–3, 30.4.1944.  
33 Ibid. 
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fideistically defined ‘so valuable … to political consciousness that it serve[d] as the basis 
of all cultural organisations … [and] self-government in the USSR’.34 
 
In practice, as Nazi repression spread havoc in MCd’I ranks in spring 1944, it reverted to 
its original state as a scattered series of local bands. As we have seen, the ‘Organisational 
Rules’ issued in November had failed to regularise its armed units, and such problems 
worsened after Govoni’s arrest. Despite Orfeo Mucci’s best efforts to reorder its internal 
bands, Nazi violence had turned its command structures into a bloodbath. Of 35 militants 
responsible for contacts between internal bands, no fewer than 13 were killed at the Fosse 
Ardeatine. 1st Zone commander Nicola Stame was also executed on 24 March; his 2nd Zone 
counterpart Tigrino Sabatini, arrested on 16 April, suffered the same fate on 3 May. Fellow 
Executive member Salvatore Riso had already fled to Milan, fearing for his life after 
Govoni’s arrest. External bands in the Umbria region had represented the MCd’I’s best 
hope of building a clandestine movement beyond Lazio; after a Fascist raid on 14 March, 
these depleted units instead took shelter under a local PCI command.35 The MCd’I looked 
ever less like a coherent movement building toward insurrection. 
 
While this bulletin distinguished between undisciplined ‘terrorist’ actions and other 
armed activity, neither the MCd’I nor even GAP militants obeyed any clearly defined 
policy in the weeks following the massacre. Gappisti fleeing the capital via Torpignattara 
headed to the village of Poggio Mirteto. There they joined with the Brigata D’Ercole Stalin, 
clashing with the Wehrmacht on 7 April in the ‘Battle of Monte Tancia’. Despite the call 
for retreat in Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, some of the MCd’I’s own bands also remained 
active in military operations. In subsequent weeks they sabotaged German telephony and 
mounted armed robberies of food and weaponry, but equally conducted armed assaults 
on German and Polizia dell’Africa Italiana convoys.36 Quadraro’s Banda Rossi reported just 
one, risky, armed sortie in the four weeks following the Fosse Ardeatine massacre, as ten 
militants snuck into the caves by night to lay red flowers to their fallen comrades.37 Above 
all the movement was characterised by disorder: the breakdown in communications, and 
of trust, that resulted from repression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Ibid.  
35 The Foligno V Brigade Garibaldini. See MSdL/FSC/28/66/’Raggruppamento bande “Bandiera 
Rossa”’, pp. 4, 7. 
36 Reconstructed in Corvisieri 1967.  
37 ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta dalla banda Rossi – Porta Furba’, ASR/CAP/Cd’A/1665. 
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The disappearance of the MCd’I’s newspaper also undermined the movement’s political 
cohesion. After the SS raid on its printshop in January, its co-editor Felice Chilanti had 
been unable to find a commercial alternative, and for four months there were no new 
issues.38 Despite the examples of solidarity between dissident communists and fugitive 
gappisti in Torpignattara in the face of repression, PCI cadres’ hostility played an 
important role in frustrating Chilanti’s efforts. As he noted in a press-section report in 
mid-April, he had made steps to revive the paper ‘without success, especially because 
almost all the printshops in Rome include CLN elements and many communists of the 
central party who block our work. … At first I got assurance from the [PCI] typographer 
Fausto Guercino at Il Messaggero that the paper would be printed. He then informed me 
that his local sector chief forbade him from taking this on’.39 Only thanks to another PCI 
printworker flouting this anathema did it reappear in a small format on 11 May.40 
 
Much had changed since its previous edition. Even at the start of the year, key organisers 
like Iacopini, Malatesta and Bitler had fallen under arrest; already then, Bandiera Rossa had 
begun to doubt the merits of ‘adventurist’ military action. Yet nothing prepared its 
militants for the repression which tore through their ranks over the first months of 1944. 
The destruction of movement structures and the loss of militants’ lives could not help but 
sow distrust and pessimism. As the Occupation ground on, the possibility of insurrection 
not only seemed further away, but impossible. This deprived the movement of the 
common purpose that might have restored its coherence. The ‘Red Army’ declared at the 
start of the year had sought to combine partisan warfare with the ideal of ‘doing like in 
Russia’. A wave of Nazi repression had now torn its military plans asunder. As we shall 
see in Chapter Seven, it soon had reason to doubt what really connected its activity to the 
‘workers’ fatherland’ at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 MSdL/FSC/28/60/‘Relazione Chilanti al CE sull’attivita della cellula stampa’.  
39 Ibid. 
40 ‘Sottoscrizione’, BR, 11.5.1944 was also the first appeal for funds in its pages. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
A Soviet foreign-policy move 
 
Togliatti arriving in Italy from Russia was just like a Christ descending on Earth. He came 
from Moscow, he had worked in direct contact with Stalin, who had directly appointed him: 
no one else could boast a similar charisma. He came with the message that he had received 
from the recognised, beloved leader of the international workers’ movement. There was just too 
much of a difference in stature between him and all the rest. 
 
Antonio Giolitti reflects on the PCI leader’s return1 
 
 
 
 
The Fosse Ardeatine massacre marked a watershed in the Roman Resistance. Stunned by 
the murder of their comrades, the MCd’I worked desperately to avert further reprisals. An 
internal bulletin on 29 March instructed band organisers that ‘comrades’ activity is only 
and must remain – defensive’,2 cautioning that this critical situation demanded ‘not 
passive flight but active defence against repression’. Militants would now have to tighten 
their security, prioritising ‘the identification and punishment of spies and the suspect’.3 
Likewise relenting their attacks in subsequent weeks were the GAP, as the authors of the 
Via Rasella attack fled to Torpignattara. Ever since the Anzio landings, militants had been 
preparing for the moment of insurrection. As the Allied advance stalled over the spring, 
they were instead forced to scale back their activity. 
 
Communists were still reeling from the massacre when they received news of a decisive shift 
in the political situation. On 27 March Palmiro Togliatti finally reached Italian soil, bearing 
new instructions for his comrades. After a hastily-convened congress in Naples, on 1 April he 
announced his party’s support for the Badoglio government. Institutional questions were to be 
deferred until the end of the war, in the interests of strengthening Italy’s contribution to the 
Allied cause. His ‘Salerno Turn’ pushed the CLN toward a deal with Badoglio, and within 
three weeks each of its parties were represented in his ‘National Democratic Government’. 
Bonomi returned as CLN president, and a split was avoided. Outwardly aimed at uniting the 
Allied-backed administration in the South with the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 An interview with Pietro di Loreto, quoted in his Togliatti e la “Doppiezza” (Di Loreto 1991, p. 33). 
2 ‘I fatti di Via Rasella’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 29/3/1944, p. 2.  
3 Ibid. 
  
167 
 
 
Resistance in Wehrmacht-occupied regions, Togliatti’s svolta also removed any realistic 
prospect of partisans seizing power by force. 
 
The Salerno Turn has long fuelled controversy among historians. For Togliatti’s 
defenders, this svolta reflected the Party’s patriotic spirit, sealing a broad alliance able to 
mobilise Italians against Nazi Germany. More critical interpretations alleged that Stalin 
had directed the turn. In this view, Togliatti’s approach was part of an attempt to entrench 
spheres of influence, showing that the Communists would not make any bid for power in 
the West. It was an ‘Italian precedent’, which sought to deny the Anglo-Americans any 
pretext for interfering in the Red Army-occupied East.4 In Italy’s own politics, the core of 
the debate over whether Togliatti decided the svolta was the question of the PCI’s real 
autonomy from Moscow. Archives opened in the 1990s showed5 that Stalin had indeed 
ordered the turn. Yet this did not simply prove that it had been a concession to the Anglo-
Americans. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, in bringing the PCI into government, the 
svolta was partly directed against the Western Allies. 
 
This is particularly clear when we look at the discussions among Roman communists in 
April 1944. Reading the Party press we find a focus on the immediate military purpose of 
the Turn, strengthening the Italian contribution to the Allied cause. To this end l’Unità 
vaunted the svolta’s success in ensuring a fuller ‘national unity’. Yet internally the Turn 
was also advertised as a means of countering Anglo-American hegemony. As we see in 
Chapter Seven, at all points throughout the Resistance, PCI cadres knew that their policy 
had to be compatible with Soviet foreign policy. The Salerno Turn was something more 
than this, for it grounded all PCI strategy in the incipient competition between the 
Western Allies and USSR. Stalin’s move both cut short the strategic debate in the PCI, and 
galvanised the Party behind a common position. Militants had long worried that the PCI 
was watering down its historic mission. Yet Stalin’s role in the svolta allowed cadres to 
present the Party line to members as part of a Moscow-led revolutionary strategy. 
 
It may seem obvious that the PCI’s turn to alliance with the monarchists would encourage 
dissent in its ranks, particularly when there were already large dissident movements in 
rebellion against its strategy. This was not the case. Even the sensibilities in the PCI that 
 
 
 
 
4 Such is the thesis of e.g. Cortesi 2004. This kind of argument is also well-known due to Djilas’s 
famous reference (1962, p. 90) to Stalin’s comment that ‘This war is not as in the past: whoever 
occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as 
far as his army has the power to do so. It cannot be otherwise’.  
5 Reconstructed in Aga Rossi and Zaslavsky 2007/2011. 
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expressed most reticence over the turn made no attempt to reverse it; nor was there any 
exodus of disgruntled members. Those who opposed the CLN strategy were already 
outside the Party; opposition to the svolta from within the CLN came from minorities in 
the Actionists and Socialists. The Stalinist dissidents to the Left of the PCI were instead 
disoriented by the Turn. This was particularly true of the MCd’I, which far from 
identifying the PCI with Stalinism had always insisted that its ‘centrist’ positions were 
undermining Moscow’s revolutionary agenda. It was precisely this perspective that the 
Kremlin’s diplomatic moves set into crisis in March 1944, for they established an obvious 
connection between Soviet foreign policy and PCI strategy. 
 
Less apparent in these weeks was the svolta’s long-term role in shifting the PCI toward an 
institutional strategy. Even into the postwar period, there persisted among its militants 
the notion of the ruse, the clever tactical shift, the doppiezza through which the Party was 
building its forces for some later bid for power. Within the Party leadership there were 
those who considered it a more ‘tactical’ than ‘strategic’ turn. The different registers of 
internal and external Party communication – in particular as related to the Soviet role in 
the turn – strongly reinforced this belief. The upheavals in Yugoslavia and Greece also 
suggested that national-front coalitions were hardly permanent. In reality, the svolta 
permanently shifted the centre of Resistance politics from the clandestine movements to 
national institutions. For the partisans there would be twelve more months of sacrifices, of 
heroism and martyrdom. But the agreements made at Salerno imposed lasting limits on 
what their Resistance could achieve politically. 
 
7.1. The turn before Salerno 
 
To understand the role of instructions from Moscow in governing PCI policy, it is first 
necessary to understand the situation that had resulted from 25 July 1943. Cadres on Italian 
soil were able to receive radio broadcasts from Moscow, but had no direct dialogue with 
Togliatti, who remained in the Soviet capital. Only with his physical arrival was Moscow’s line 
fully imposed on the Party. Accounts that focus on this reassertion of central control tend to 
assume that this had disruptive and negative consequences. This encourages the framing of 
the svolta as a political shock6 that blew apart the Communists’ previous ‘intransigent’ 
strategy, or fuelled the rise of ‘Trotskyist’ dissident movements. 7 A closer 
 
 
 
6 What Pietro Nenni called the ‘bomba Ercoli’, in reference to the PCI leader’s pseudonym.  
7 Bandiera Rossa is consistently and in most Resistance histories (if described at all) described as a  
‘Trotskyite’ current ‘opposed to the Salerno Turn’, as if this were its origin. This also reflects the 
confused understanding that the real moment of controversy was the Salerno Turn rather than the 
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study reveals that the svolta in fact strengthened the Party’s coherence and sense of 
common purpose. Both the Rome and Milan leaderships immediately rallied behind the 
svolta, and they were soon followed by their members. An extension of the existing 
‘national unity’ policy, the new Party line was entrenched all the more quickly by the 
widespread understanding that it had indeed come from Stalin personally. 
 
The speed with which Roman PCI cadres rallied around the svolta owed to conclusions that 
they had already reached in debates over winter 1943. While they were no homogenous bloc, 
Roman cadres such as Celeste Negarville, Giorgio Amendola and Agostino Novella had in this 
period accepted the possibility of the PCI joining Badoglio’s government. Never before April 
1944 did Roman PCI cadres offer unconditional support for his administration, and in this sense 
the Salerno Turn clearly was a novel policy. Yet only by looking back to this earlier period can 
we explain how they came to accept this new line. While it was Togliatti’s arrival on Italian 
soil that precipitated the svolta, a series of less clear-cut cues from Moscow in previous months 
had already paved the way for the Party’s turn toward government. Tracing Roman leaders’ 
debates from autumn 1943 onward, we can see how they came consciously to align their 
approach with Kremlin strategy. 
 
Roman PCI leaders first confronted this problem at a 4 November 1943 secretariat meeting, at 
which they discussed Togliatti’s recent Radio Moscow broadcasts. Their debate centred on the 
terms in which the general secretary had described Badoglio’s declaration of war against Nazi 
Germany. Most controversial was his fleeting reference to the need for Italians to ‘rally around 
Badoglio’.8 This opaque formulation seemed to clash with l’Unità’s call for a CLN government, 
and also posed the question of Togliatti’s authority to change Party policy by fiat. The 4 
November meeting, attended by Novella, Negarville, Amendola and Scoccimarro, was 
principally remarkable for highlighting the tight limits within which PCI 
 
 
initial moment that the PCI joined the CdO/CLN. Typical in this regard Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky 1997’s 
repeated description of the pre-svolta PCI line as ‘intransigent’. Appearing in a detailed account in the 
shifts of PCI cadres’ policy toward the King and Badoglio prior to Togliatti’s arrival (which would better 
be described as ‘conditional’ or ‘hesitant’ than ‘intransigent’), this is also to misuse an adjective widely 
associated in the Italian Marxist tradition with ‘intransigent’ commitment to a revolutionary 
programme. The popular-frontist PCI’s commitment to the CLN stood far from this kind of 
‘intransigence’, even looking beyond the fact that this coalition never did declare itself an alternative 
government to Badoglio’s. This misreading is echoed in Trotskyist historian Donny Gluckstein’s 
characterisation of the svolta as the PCI’s move from a ‘class-struggle’ policy to one based on ‘national 
unity’, disregarding the Party’s prior involvement in the CLN. His claim that to fight against both Italian 
Fascism and German occupation amounted to class struggle makes a particular nonsense of this reading. 
This would curiously imply that a) Christian Democrats fighting Italian Fascism and German occupation 
were waging ‘class struggle’, and b) the PCI ceased to fight Italian Fascism and German occupation once 
it made the Salerno Turn (Gluckstein 2013, p. 155).  
8 APC/CRM, A/16, ‘Verbale riunione segreteria’, 4 November 1943. 
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cadres moved, as they sought to explain their positions in terms compatible with 
Moscow’s line. While their positions did in fact all subtly differ from what Togliatti had 
said, they were at pains to avoid couching this in terms of political disagreement, and 
repeatedly imputed their own intentions to Moscow. 
 
The PCI’s lead representative on the CLN, Scoccimarro was least willing to take Togliatti’s 
comment as an instruction to support the government. The veteran cadre told his 
comrades that this represented not Moscow’s ‘dissent with the Party’s line’ but an ‘error 
essentially result[ing] from a lack of information’.9 He emphasised that Badoglio’s 
declaration of war against Germany did not meaningfully change the regime’s character 
as an attempt to save the ruling class from Fascism’s collapse, moreover reasoning that 
Togliatti was unaware how far the 8 September debacle had alienated Italians from the 
monarchy.10 Raising the possibility that ‘the Moscow comrades’ had mistakenly assumed 
that PCI cadres already supported Badoglio – ‘and this is very probably the case, if they 
trusted information from the BBC’ – he argued that ‘if they did have a precise knowledge 
of the situation they would doubtless share the policy we have followed. In such a 
rapidly-changing and complex situation it is impossible to lead the Party from Moscow’.11 
 
Whereas Scoccimarro stressed that the PCI could aid Badoglio militarily while refusing 
him political support, Novella lent Togliatti’s comments a more extensive meaning. It was 
‘difficult to interpret the broadcast exclusively in terms of military collaboration. Badoglio 
is the head of government and “rally around B[adoglio]” must necessarily have a political 
meaning’.12 For Novella, ‘the M[oscow] comrades surely did mean to give directives. We 
may even reject [their] positions, but first we have to make the effort to understand 
them’.13 While Scoccimarro limply declared Togliatti’s statement ‘surpassed’ by the 
Moscow Conference, Novella speculated that the Soviet party’s Central Committee would 
have informed the PCI leader on the ‘conference preparations and the fundamental 
decisions due to issue from it’.14 If Stalin had ‘taken an even harder anti-Badoglio line than 
us’ after 25 July, he now recognised that Badoglio’s declaration of war had rearranged the 
international chessboard. For Novella, this was a change to which the PCI had to adapt. 
 
 
 
 
9 Ibid., Relazione M.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., Intervento di Giulio. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
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Novella did not argue that the PCI should support Badoglio, but rather that it should 
prepare the ground for such a turn. Insisting that the CLN parties’ arrival in government 
would mark a ‘capitulation’ by Badoglio, he suggested that ‘while sticking by our 
fundamental positions’ the PCI ‘should begin personal efforts among CLN members to 
encourage them to move away from exclusivist positions regarding Bad[oglio]’.15 The call 
for a constituent assembly need not rule out a more ‘elastic approach’ to the monarchy; 
the Moscow broadcast was ‘indicative’ in this regard. Novella did not mean ‘that we have 
to take what was said on the radio as directives, but that what was said was intended to 
give directives’; while ‘the M[oscow] comrades lack much information and cannot 
effectively lead the P[arty]’ they were ‘very well informed on the international situation 
and the Italian government’s general policy’, and thus had to be ‘taken seriously’.16 
Novella insisted on granting due ‘importance to what the M[oscow] comrades said’.17 
 
Fellow cadres denied that Moscow had intended to give directives at all. For Negarville, 
‘particularly unacceptable’ was Novella’s presentation of ‘the relations between the 
Bolshevik Party and members of foreign parties, contradicting the dissolution of the 
C[omintern]’.18 ‘Indications from M[oscow] no longer ha[d] the value they did before’, and 
Togliatti was ‘not in favourable conditions to determine the Party line’.19 Amendola 
argued that they must not allow the Comintern’s dissolution to be seen as a mere façade; 
‘changing our line on the basis of Moscow’s broadcasts would give rise to a campaign 
trying to deny our party’s political independence and have people believe that we follow 
Moscow’s orders without discussion’.20 Yet he simultaneously argued that given 
Moscow’s ‘lack of information’ ‘it is difficult to say that [they] have a “position” as such’.21 
Novella was ‘mistaken to believe these positions had not been surpassed by the [Moscow] 
Conference’s decisions, now endorsed by Stalin’s speech talking of liberated people’s 
rights to choose their form of government’.22 
 
This highlighted the limits of the PCI’s real autonomy. Its Italian-based cadres asserted 
their freedom to make their own decisions, but at the same time could only argue within 
parameters that assumed that their positions were indeed consistent with Moscow’s. The 
 
 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., Intervento di Gino. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., Intervento di Palmieri. 
21 Ibid.  
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dissolution of the International and Togliatti’s absence evidently allowed a certain 
diversity of approaches within the Secretariat. Yet Soviet blessing remained a crucial test 
of political legitimacy within the PCI, and as Moscow made increasingly robust 
interventions in the Italian political scene over early 1944, it became implausible to claim 
that it was not issuing instructions to the Party at all. The leading Soviet representative in 
Italy, Vyshinky’s contacts with Badoglio over the possibility of recognition from January 
onward were not the imposition of a PCI line, but did point to Moscow’s interest in such a 
deal. If the Soviet Union did indeed recognise the Badoglio government, it would be 
senseless for the PCI to remain in opposition.23 
 
Thus already in the weeks before Togliatti’s return, key Roman cadres had begun a shift 
away from ‘exclusivist’ positions regarding Badoglio. As Novella told the PCI secretariat 
on 25 February, ‘given the balance of forces today, it [is] impossible to obtain the two 
objectives of an extraordinary government and distancing ourselves from Badoglio. We 
should make our position in relation to the extraordinary [government] and Badoglio 
personally more elastic’.24 At the 11 March secretariat Amendola agreed that Badoglio’s 
‘international positions had developed a new constitutional praxis, which we must 
necessarily take into account’. This meant that ‘the formation of a new government’ 
would depend on ‘constitutional continuity, also due to international needs, and 
coexistence with the monarchy as an institution’.25 Scoccimarro’s insistence that ‘the 
popular forces can only be mobilised under a new, fundamentally democratic 
government’26 thus left him in a minority faced with this higher international logic. 
 
When news of Togliatti’s announcement arrived in Rome in early April, most of the Roman 
leadership was already well-placed to turn toward government. There is some evidence that 
other cadres consented to this policy less enthusiastically. Northern leaders also embraced a 
national-front strategy, but displayed a greater tendency to associate this with continued 
efforts to build the CLN’s ‘popular’ bases. Scoccimarro was sympathetic to this position. 
Amendola claimed that when he informed Scoccimarro of the turn, this latter replied ‘This 
policy, that’s for you lot to carry out’.27 However, much of the heat in this debate came only 
after the Turn was a fait accompli, as Novella and Amendola attempted to blame Scoccimarro 
 
 
23 Spriano 1975, p. 301, cites the Rome l’Unità’s incongruous response to the Soviet recognition of 
 
Badoglio in its 23 March issue, as if it were a recognition of Italy’s fighting contribution rather than 
Badoglio’s specific government.  
24 Spriano 1975, p. 302  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Cited in ibid., p. 314. 
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for preventing the Party reaching the same conclusions earlier. Togliatti himself had little 
patience for such bickering and was quick to rally all these leaders behind his own 
authority. There was some rancour over the svolta, and its presentation, but there was no 
revolt against it. The svolta neither split the PCI leadership nor fed the rise of dissident 
movements to its Left. 
 
7.2. Togliatti’s return 
 
Party unity was on Togliatti’s mind as he made his return to Naples. Criss-crossing Europe 
since 1926, he had been a Comintern functionary more than a leader of Italian workers; even in 
building his leadership over the PCI’s exile and prison organisations, he was unable to address 
the mass of militants on Italian soil. But just as dissident movements harked back to the class-
war ‘intransigence’ of the 1920s, it was the antagonists of decades past who most troubled 
Togliatti’s thinking. According to a sympathetic account by one Neapolitan cadre, upon 
reaching the Southern port city Togliatti immediately asked his comrades what Amadeo 
Bordiga was up to. Told that the Party founder had in fact fallen out of political activity, 
Togliatti replied ‘impossible! Do try and work out what’s going on!’28 Another PCI cadre in 
Naples reported a similar concern to settle scores with the renowned expellee, ‘We have an 
account still open with that man, and we have to close it’.29 
 
The PCI general secretary immediately imposed Stalin’s new line. A special Party congress 
was held in Naples on 30 March-1 April, at which cadres unanimously voted ‘confidence’ in 
the general secretary, without voting on his policy itself.30 Togliatti had pre-arranged a press 
conference for the final day of the conference, at which he told media that the PCI was ready 
to make a deal with Badoglio. Any questions of Italy’s future institutions would now be 
deferred until after Liberation. Togliatti had on his route via Algiers already praised the Soviet 
recognition of the Badoglio government in PCF press;31 even on 31 March The Times had 
quoted Izvestia’s hints that Moscow would push for a widening of the Badoglio government.32 
The London daily’s Italy correspondent emphasised Togliatti’s ease in 
 
 
 
 
28 Valenzi 1995, p. 119, cited in Cortesi (ed.) 1999, p. 1.  
29 Cacciapuoti 1972, p. 130, cited in Cortesi (ed.) 1999, p. 1.  
30 The closest to a collective vote on the svolta was at a meeting of the Salerno Communist Party itself, which 
now fell under the leadership’s control: see FGFM/Archivio Direzione Napoli/6. At a meeting with Naples 
leaders Eugenio Reale and Velio Spano on 22.4.1944 (FGFM/Archivio Direzione Napoli/8) Togliatti 
suggested that ‘three in four’ members supported the svolta. There was, however, no organisation among the 
remaining quarter; Togliatti was emphasising the need to fight remaining ‘sectarian’ sensibilities.  
31 ‘Le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques avec l’Urss’, Liberté, 23.3.1944, Spriano 1975, p. 283.  
32 ‘Soviet Policy in Italy’, The Times, p. 3, 31/3/1944 noted the ‘asperity’ implicit in Izvestia’s comments 
on Italy, suggesting that the Soviet call for a democratised Badoglio government reflected 
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imposing this ‘Soviet initiative’ on his party. He was ‘armed with the latest Soviet 
directives and with high prestige to take over the leadership of the party, and is thus 
fortunate in not being under the necessity to eat his own words’.33 
 
Returning from exile like another Communist during the last war, Togliatti’s own ‘April 
Theses’ could make little claim to past orthodoxies.34 His early articles in l’Unità 
nonetheless made extensive reference to the Party’s great ‘anti-fascist martyr’, Antonio 
Gramsci. The Sardinian’s works remained little-known in PCI ranks: while in an article on 
Gramsci’s ‘literary inheritance’35 Togliatti could reveal the existence of the unpublished 
Prison Notebooks, he essentially ventriloquised Gramsci in defence of Stalin’s strategy. This 
required no little distortion. Where Gramsci had emphasised the need to address the 
‘national-popular’, with the Communist-led working class also ‘hegemonising’ other 
subaltern layers, Togliatti crudely recast this as the need for ‘national’ alliances.36 The 
Party’s own history was also remoulded in order to present an illusion of continuity. 
Given Italian communism’s in fact decidedly ‘ultra-Left’ origins, Togliatti chose to present 
Gramsci and not Bordiga as the Party’s ‘creator’.37 
 
The svolta did indeed help strengthen ‘national unity’, putting an end to the crisis in the CLN. 
Since the fall of the regime the Socialists and Actionists had rejected political collaboration 
with the royalists, seeking instead to declare a provisional government. The January 1944 split 
in the Socialist Party, combined with the Actionists’ republican tones at the Bari Congress, had 
helped intensify these tensions in the coalition.38 After Bonomi’s resignation it seemed that the 
CLN was poised to split, with the Right departing to support the Badoglio government. Yet 
given the reformist parties’ limited base in the country, their hopes of forming a separate 
republican front also depended on the backing of the far larger PCI. Togliatti’s move put a 
definitive end to any such possibility. The Socialist and Actionists strongly protested the PCI 
leader’s turn, highlighting the injustice that Italian 
 
 
 
 
 
Moscow’s will to become an independent actor in Italian affairs. See also ‘Allied Policy in Italy’, p.  
4, 1/4/1944 (and the editorial ‘The Allies and Italy’, p. 5). 
33 ‘Party Moves in Italy’, The Times, p. 4, 3/4/1944.  
34 A contrast noted in ‘Due ritorni’, Il Proletario 16/5/1944. Organ of the ‘Left Fraction of the 
Communists and Socialists of Italy’, Il Proletario was stridently anti-Stalinist and dominated by 
Left-Communist positions, unlike Bandiera Rossa. See Chapter Nine on the February 1945 ‘Naples 
Congress’ which failed to unite the dissident movements.  
35 ‘L’eredità letteraria di Gramsci’ (unsigned), L’Unità, Naples, 30.4.1944.  
36 Ibid. 
37 ‘La politica di Antonio Gramsci’ (signed Ercoli), L’Unità, Naples, 30.4.1944.  
38 See Chapter Five. 
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anti-fascists were being railroaded by Moscow’s decision.39 Yet this was a reaction of 
‘resentment, rather than refusal’. Their own alternative now unrealisable, they were 
railroaded into joining the new government.40 
 
Where Bonomi’s search for a deal with Badoglio had divided anti-fascists, Togliatti united the 
CLN behind this policy. 41 The liberal grandee’s own enthusiastic response was evident in his 
7 April diary entry. ‘[A] prodigious horseman has arrived from distant shores, a Lohengrin 
redivivus, who has come over to Badoglio, saved him. This horseman arrived from Russia’.42 
Bonomi recognised the Soviet inspiration of Togliatti’s position, which was ‘evidently 
interpreting Moscow’s thinking, and acting in conformity with the directives for his Party’.43 
This had succeeded in forcing the hand of the other anti-fascist parties, whatever their ‘stupor’ 
upon receiving news of the svolta.44 Bonomi doubted that anyone else could have pushed 
through this policy: ‘If …. I had proposed what Togliatti has got 
 
them to accept (entering Badoglio’s Cabinet, being appointed by the old King and the lack 
of any precise legislative commitment to the Constituent Assembly) I would have been 
forced out’.45 He now returned to the CLN presidency. 
 
For his part, Badoglio was well-aware that the new PCI line was a child of Soviet diplomacy. 
He had for some months been seeking bilateral diplomatic ties with Moscow, which would 
both assert Italy as a diplomatic actor and free it of its total dependency on the Anglo- 
 
 
39 Note in particular ‘La politica socialista dopo la crisi governativa’, 1.5.1944, reproduced in the 
Rome Avanti! on 6.5.1944 and in Neri Sereni (ed.) 1988, pp. 142–50.  
40 Notable is the mismatch between the hostile tone of l’Italia Libera, 19.4.1944, protesting Togliatti’s 
deal with conservative interests, and the approach actually taken by Action Party leaders in the 
South, who did join the government.  
41 Spriano 1975, p. 310, describes the ‘anguish’ with which figures like Bonomi and liberal 
philosopher Benedetto Croce greeted the turn, and further draws on a US State Department report 
emphasising the damage that the Communists’ move might have on the easy introduction of 
Anglo-American hegemony in Italy. Spriano develops this into an argument that the svolta should 
not be seen in terms of ‘renunciation’ or a shift to the ‘Right’. He is quite right to see that Togliatti’s 
initiative had a certain Machiavellian logic, for it not only allowed the PCI to conquer ground on 
the institutional stage, but also sidelined left-wing opponents both within and outside the CLN. As 
we demonstrate in section 7.6, the svolta was also an aggressive policy on the international terrain, 
representing not a capitulation to the Western powers but rather an attempt to drive contradictions 
between the Badoglio régime and the Allied military authorities. Yet the svolta not only occupied 
 
‘enemy territory’ within the state machine, but also displaced Communist politics onto this terrain; 
it equally conflicted with any policy (such as the likes of Mauro Scoccimarro and Eugenio Curiel 
had upheld within the Party) focused on building forms of popular power outside and against that 
state machine. The PCI continue a policy of mass Resistance mobilisation, while also building its 
party machine across Italy. Yet the forms that this took were now tightly disciplined by its 
governmental responsibilities, as it sought to recast itself as a party of republican legality.  
42 Bonomi 1947 (7.4.1944), p. 175.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Bonomi 1947 (8.4.1944 entry), p. 176.  
45 Ibid. 
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American occupiers. For the Kremlin, this also offered a way into Mediterranean affairs. 
Badoglio’s foreign minister 46 sounded out Andrey Vyshinsky to this effect as early as 11 
January, and the pair also discussed the possibility of the PCI joining his government.47 
While cadres in the South continued to place conditions on such a deal, the discussions 
had given the Kremlin a litmus test of Badoglio’s openness. On 14 March Moscow 
officially recognised his government. Togliatti’s turn extended this cooperation into 
domestic politics, presenting a fait accompli to the other anti-fascist parties. As one 
historian has argued, Togliatti was here ‘adopt[ing] Badoglio’s old unity proposal as his 
own, relaunching it as the PCI’s proposal’.48 
 
Within two weeks of Togliatti’s return the CLN announced its support for a ‘National 
Democratic Government’, led by Badoglio and committed to stepping up conventional 
Italian forces’ involvement in the war of Liberation. L’Unità emphasised this aspect of the 
Salerno Turn, at the same time presenting Togliatti’s move as a means of ending the crisis 
in the CLN and ending the ‘paralysis’ that had the King and Badoglio had imposed on 
‘popular initiative’ to fight the Germans.49 It obliquely referred to the ‘already long well-
known’ Soviet support for the formation of a ‘democratic government able to secure 
Italy’s contribution to the war effort against Nazi Germany’, noting that ‘Eden for the 
English government and Cordell Hull for the American government’ had ‘now also 
pronounced in favour of such a move’.50 Formed on 22 April, Badoglio’s new cabinet 
mostly aimed at establishing itself as a legitimate Italian leadership, such that the Allied 
Military Government could hand it control of newly liberated areas. Establishing its links 
with the Resistance movements, the government also appointed the PCI’s own Mauro 
Scoccimarro as minister for the German-occupied regions. 
 
These developments little-surprised the Roman dissidents. Even Bandiera Rossa’s very first 
issue had declared the CLN parties ‘destined’ to join Badoglio’s regime, describing this as the 
logical conclusion of their ‘national unity policy’. In this view, a cross-class coalition defined 
only by its anti-Nazism would inevitably ally itself to the dominant institutional force. A 
bulletin reacting to Togliatti’s svolta sharply criticised this new union sacrée. ‘[W]ith the excuse 
of national liberation, the left-wing parties in liberated Italy leave the working 
 
 
 
46 Technically Renato Prunas was ‘General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.  
47 See Gori and Pons (eds.) 1998. 
48 Cortesi 2004, p. 295. 
49 ‘Una politica italiana’, L’Unità XX/9, 6.4.1944.  
50 ‘Il fronte nazionale unitario’, l'Unità, 13.4.1944; ‘Unanime deliberazione del CLN dell'Italia libera 
per un Governo Nazionale Democratico’, ibid. 
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masses in the hands of apolitical unions, exploiters and ex-fascist speculators’.51 This was 
counterposed to a more classically Leninist approach. ‘[T]he workers’ war policy must be: 
transform the war against Nazism into a war against all capitalism. Our watchword is: as 
long as there is a single bourgeois [sic] country in the world, there will be neither enough 
bread nor lasting peace, nor liberty for anyone’.52 The problem was how to ally this ‘war 
policy’ to an effective mobilising strategy. 
 
The bulletin’s authors in fact took a downcast view of Italy’s military position. Deeming 
Togliatti’s svolta ‘of dubious political value and of no practical sense’, the 8 April issue 
characterised the turn as ‘pointless’ even in terms of intensifying the war effort. Given the 
liberated regions’ industrial backwardness and the exhaustion of their populations, it 
would be ‘mad to expect any physical or moral force from them’; they would in any case 
have to rely on the Allies for weaponry.53 While these dismissive comments referred to the 
South, this also expressed a pessimistic view of the movement’s own capacities. 
Triumphalism gave way to weary omniscience. While ‘some say that we of the MCd’I are 
too doctrinaire, they now discover that it is precisely this doctrine that helps us navigate 
in purity amidst this morass. … The difference is that we do not want to delude ourselves, 
or delude anyone, on what we can do, and that we do not want to get mixed up in any 
political intrigue: not so much out of principle, but because it yields so little’.54 
 
This doctrinal purity was held up as a remedy for the prevalent disorientation.55 Fascism had 
left ‘the rebels against tyranny lost, disorganised, discouraged, losing any social sentiment, 
any ideal to hold onto’; now Fascism was ‘dead’, but its opponents continued to show their 
lack of political bearings. In this sense, ‘anti-fascism’ – a merely nihilist reaction against 
Fascism – was to be considered ‘the worst illness that we have contracted in these last twenty 
years’.56 Holding ‘Mussolini alone responsible for Italy’s disaster’ had served only to ‘prepare 
alibis for capitalism, militarism and the monarchy’,57 thus allowing Communists to join a 
government built on these same forces. For ‘a communist, a builder of tomorrow’, this was 
‘shameful’.58 ‘Anti-fascism rule[d] imperious’ yet the task remained 
 
 
 
 
51 ‘Commentario’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 30/4/1944.  
52 ‘La nostra tattica’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 30/4/1944, p. 3. These same words appear in 
‘Perche siamo contrari alla collaborazione’, BR, 11/5/1944.  
53 Untitled, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 8/4/1944, p. 1.  
54 Ibid. My emphasis. 
55 ‘Antifascismo’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 30.4.1944, p. 2.  
56 Ibid. 
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to ‘reject not only fascism but the whole political and economic system that generated it’.59 
Faced with the new consensus, the dissidents could only reaffirm their separateness: ‘We 
are not anti-fascists. We are communists’.60 
 
7.3. A narrative of betrayal 
 
A further difficult problem in rationalising the turn was its connection to Soviet foreign policy. 
The Roman dissidents had always understood Moscow’s collaboration with London and 
Washington as a contingent military pact, and not a blueprint for communists’ alliances in 
Italy. However, as the Kremlin stepped up its diplomatic initiatives in March 1944, it was 
obvious that it was directly intervening in Italian domestic politics. Moscow’s recognition of 
Badoglio two weeks before the svolta displayed a clear parallel between Soviet foreign policy 
and PCI strategy, and gravely undermined the attempt to counterpose Stalin to an 
‘opportunist’ Togliatti. The perception of Soviet influence did cause PCI leaders some 
discomfort within the CLN as the reformist and liberal parties accused them of deferring to 
Stalin. However, within communist ranks this had an essentially cohesive effect. Even the 
reticent were compelled to recognise that the PCI line was part of a wider Soviet strategy, and 
not a mere abandonment of the Party’s historic mission. 
 
Already before news of Togliatti’s arrival, the dissidents sought to rationalise Moscow’s 
recognition of Badoglio. The 29 March Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie attempted to provide its band 
leaders means of explaining this shift, reconciling Moscow’s move with the movement’s own 
agenda. A piece on ‘The Official Recognition of the Badoglio government’ insisted that Italian 
militants could still push for change in Kremlin policy. Given that ‘in the current moment the 
USSR has not had precise information from the Italian people’ on who should represent it, it 
was quite legitimate for Moscow ‘to remain in doubt between Badoglio and us, and to act 
without further delay in establishing the relations necessary to its national interests’.61 This 
was, however, only a temporary situation, as ‘the USSR will recognise more legitimate 
representatives of the Italian people when this latter makes its strength felt through its will, 
winning power, showing itself capable of conserving [that power] and establishing fruitful 
relations with all the world’s peoples’.62 
 
This optimistic view of Italian communists’ capacity to shape Soviet foreign policy 
concealed a broader shift in MCd’I propaganda in spring 1944, as its triumphalist 
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predictions became increasingly detached from any real progress in its own organising 
efforts.63 Effectively, the subject of the MCd’I’s strategic forecasts had become the 
Communist Party itself. While Bandiera Rossa had long portrayed the wartime crisis of the 
Italian state as the final reckoning for capitalism – with the intensified struggle between 
proletarian revolution and Fascist reaction dooming all intermediate forces to oblivion – 
the MCd’I bulletin appearing in spring 1944 turned this analysis on its head. It instead 
blamed the PCI’s approach for having helped save the conservative establishment from 
the abyss. This was then projected back onto the international terrain, and taken as the 
reason why the USSR had itself recognised Badoglio. This curiously presented the svolta 
as confounding rather than fulfilling the real intention of Stalin’s policy. 
 
Taking over MCd’I press at its gravest moment of defeat, this reasoning echoed a 
narrative of ‘betrayal’ characteristic of minoritarian sects throughout history. Deeming the 
situation ‘objectively revolutionary’ yet recognising its own lack of ‘subjective’ strength, it 
resorted to decrying other, more powerful forces’ failure to rise to the occasion. The 
vehemence of its attacks on Togliatti reflected not only his success in rallying militants 
around his position, but the dissidents’ inability to mobilise for their own alternative. This 
did not mean simple resignation: to accuse Togliatti of treachery was itself a bid to tear 
support from the PCI by exposing its supposed malfeasance. Yet this was also an 
abdication of political responsibility, effectively blaming its political rivals for failing to 
realise its own predictions. Presenting the PCI line as the decisive factor in Italian politics, 
this narrative of betrayal projected the very possibility of socialism onto the choices of 
individual leaders. Togliatti was blamed not only for ignoring the ‘inevitability’ of 
revolution, but also for posing insuperable obstacles to it. 
 
The MCd’I’s power of attraction over the PCI grassroots was now significantly weakened. 
Already after the Fosse Ardeatine massacre its press had adopted a downcast tone; regime 
officials could boast that the movement had been ‘torn apart by recent police measures’,64 and 
the dissidents also made ever rarer appearances in PCI cadres’ own reports. In fact, the 
movement’s own members were now flaking away to the Party. In Chapter Four we saw 
Agostino Novella express his alarm at the dissidents’ appeal among the Roman proletariat, 
also fanning more ‘intransigent’ elements among his own members. Yet by March 1944 he 
could portray a quite different picture, as the Lazio Federation now cleared the last traces’ 
 
 
 
63 Or indeed that provided by ‘Quando verrà Baffone’ in Scintilla issue 2.  
64 ACS/MI/RSI (Gabinetto, 10), ‘Panorama della situazione dei partiti politici antifascisti’, cited in   
Gremmo 2015, p. 110. 
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of Bandiera Rossa’s influence.65 This situation was more varied in outlying and rural 
communes harder to submit to central control. A 2 April instruction to the militants of the 
Viterbo Federation PCI not to read the press of the ‘dissidents and deviationists of 
Bandiera Rossa’ suggested that this ‘mopping up’ operation was still ongoing.66 
 
Although one of the most significant turning-points in PCI history, the svolta did not 
either split the Party, or feed the dissident movements that had already emerged. This 
partly owed to internal weaknesses of these latter movements, unable to build a national 
organisation. In Italy’s other great cities as in Rome, dissident movements had emerged at 
the very beginning of the Resistance, contesting the politics of national unity. As the Party 
took to the institutional stage, they were unable to react. In the Roman case this partly 
owed to the repression that had been suffered over the early months of 1944. As we saw in 
Chapter Six, the military organisation of the Resistance in the capital was weakened in the 
period immediately preceding these events, and the dissident coalition was also struck 
hard by the arrest of Carlo Andreoni on 10 March. Confined to Rome, politically 
disoriented and with its leadership decimated by Nazi violence, the MCd’I was forced 
into an increasing subaltern position relative to the now-united PCI. 
 
Around Italy there were other movements like the MCd’I who reflected some sort of class-war 
sensibility. The Stella Rossa movement in Turin67 and the Organizzazione Comunista Autonoma in 
the Alto Milanese were similar cases of underground movements that sought to rebuild the 
Communist Party. Each of these latter had around a thousand members at the turn of 1944. 
The Party’s efforts to swallow up these movements was, however, making headway, in 
particular through its domination of the trade union cells in these cities. In the strike at the 
beginning of March it had finally forced Stella Rossa off the strike committees in the Turin 
factories; unlike the MCd’I it had no armed bands and was thus more easily absorbed into PCI 
shopfloor organisations. Yet the Party also directly clashed with this movement, labelling its 
leaders ‘fascists’.68 Taking this claim seriously, on 19 June 1944 members of the PCI would 
 
 
65 APC 7.3.10, ‘Fed. PCI, direttive per gli attivisti’, 1.3.1944. 
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svolta’. This sent the following instruction to PCI federal commiteees: ‘There are comrades who already in the past 
have found our position on the national question and democracy in contradiction with the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and our final goals. These comrades generally think that the working class must defend national 
independence only in the case that the fight for national independence coincides with a fight for a democracy of a 
popular type or even the proletarian revolution, and thus that the fight that the working class must wage for 
national independence excludes any alliance with parties or social groups that 
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murder Temistocle Vaccarella, Stella Rossa’s most important leader.69 
 
The PCI had acted decisively to remove a potential rival. But what was most important 
was the lack of any nationwide dissident movement before the svolta, such as might have 
rendered the svolta perilous for Togliatti in the manner that the Actionists and Socialists 
had earlier caused problems for the PCI within the CLN. The dissident movements that 
had emerged around Italy were not only politically incoherent and disunited, but also 
lacked the technical means that might have stemmed from a common organisation. 
Government participation now greatly strengthened the PCI in this regard, offering it not 
only a greater air of authority but massively increased access to radio airtime and column 
inches, transmitting Allied propaganda from the South to clandestine organisations across 
the country. This greatly contrasted with the precarious state of the ‘unofficial’ 
movements like Bandiera Rossa and Stella Rossa. 
 
7.4. Tito’s alternative 
 
As dissidents sought to challenge Togliatti’s authority, they looked to counter-examples from 
foreign communists. Yugoslavia’s KPJ offered a particularly useful point of reference. While 
since 1941 Tito’s party had adopted the Comintern’s national-front strategy, building an 
armed rebellion against the Italian-German Occupation together with non-communists, it had 
ultimately come into sharp conflict with the Chetnik royalists. This battle reached its 
conclusion in November 1943 as Tito declared a republican government, which soon won 
Allied recognition. A further example was Greece’s KKE. Not only was its EAM-ELAS front 
the country’s dominant anti-Wehrmacht force, but it also sharply opposed the royalists who 
had emerged from the pre-war Metaxas regime. From the perspective of the spring 1944 it was 
far from clear what the results of these strategies would be; Tito’s relations with Stalin 
remained outwardly close, and the KKE appeared to be master of its situation. Togliatti’s 
critics could thus use these examples as reason to doubt that the Communist Parties were 
indeed bound by a common line. 
 
 
 
 
are not strictly popular [sic]. The position of these comrades has nothing in common with Marxism-
Leninism. In these comrades’ positions there are, rather, points of context with the anti-Leninist positions of 
the traitor Bordiga, chased out of the Party in 1930, who through Leftist phraseology ended up becoming 
fascism’s helper and ally. Toward comrades who think like this we need an immediate work of clarification’. 
Notable in this comment is the elision of the dispute more proper to the dissident Stalinists (the insistence on 
an imminent ‘proletarian revolution’), Bordiga, and then currents within the PCI itself who agreed that the 
fight for national independence was a fight for a ‘democracy of a new type’.  
69 Ibid. Left-Communists Fausto Atti and Mario Acquaviva were also executed in this manner.  
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Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie’s discussion on Yugoslavia sought to emphasise this lesson in 
strategic possibility. It held that the KPJ had shown how partisan movements could 
change the terms of international politics. Ever since Tito’s declaration of a republican 
government, MCd’I press had portrayed his intransigence as the key factor in shifting the 
diplomatic chessboard, and they also chose to explain the Soviet recognition of Badoglio 
by reference to this same positive example. Whereas ‘the USSR had recognised the 
royalist government of Yugoslavia soon before the German invasion, establishing normal 
diplomatic relations with it, the living, active will of the Yugoslav people made itself felt 
in the fight against the foreigner and the legitimate representative of the royalist 
government General Mihailović’.70 This ‘changed the orientation of not only the USSR’s 
diplomatic relations, but those of all the United Nations, who recognised Tito’s 
government’.71 This argument implied that the Italian communists could shift the 
diplomatic dynamic by building a counter-power opposed to Badoglio’s régime. 
 
Whereas Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie’s generally downbeat tone reflected the heavy effect of 
repression, these comparisons with the KPJ were wildly over-optimistic. Tito’s party was 
ten times larger than the entire Italian Resistance at its height relative to population, and 
by spring 1944 the forces it commanded had already liberated most of Yugoslavia. The 
partisans did not achieve these successes alone, for they benefitted from both Allied air 
support and the wider setbacks for Axis forces. Yet they had also captured these areas 
without any direct Anglo-American presence. This afforded them much greater freedom 
to shape their country’s future than Italian partisans operating just miles ahead of the 
Allied front-lines. Also misleading was the implicit comparison between the Roman 
dissidents’ anti-Badoglian positions and the KPJ’s republicanism. The Roman dissidents 
had raised armed forces independently of the royalist government, with a view to 
ultimate insurrection, but never frontally clashed with it; across the border, tens of 
thousands of Communists died fighting the Serb-monarchist Chetniks. 
 
In this sense, to invoke the Yugoslav example was more a moral condemnation of the PCI 
leadership than an assertion of a strategy to be followed in Italy. Comparing the Party to this 
much more successful foreign example, Bandiera Rossa cheaply derided Togliatti’s strategy. A 
2 June editorial concluded with a sharp counterposition of the two approaches, noting, ‘It is 
hardly worth saying how much we would have preferred to have a Tito with his 300,000 
partisans than a Badoglian government with the Secretary of the PCI as a minister without 
 
 
70 ‘Il riconoscimento ufficiale del governo Badoglio’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 29.3.1944.  
71 Ibid. 
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portfolio’.72 Drawing on the same considerations advanced in issue 2 of Scintilla and 
‘Buldog’, it recognised the dissolution of the Third International as something that had 
‘really happened’, a ‘just recognition of the political and revolutionary maturity of the 
proletariat of each and every country’. This implied a focus on self-organisation, the need 
to build a movement particular to each situation. Yet it merely schematically condemned 
the PCI in the mirror of an idealised KPJ. 
 
The further irony of this reading was that Stalin was not simply happy to allow Tito to 
follow his own strategy. The Soviet leadership was dismissive of the possibility of 
revolution in Yugoslavia, and once this was achieved it sought to impose its control over 
it. The KPJ had taken too seriously the Soviet promise of world revolution, assuming that 
the ‘workers’ fatherland’ would support rather than suppress their initiative. Where the 
Yugoslavs looked naively on the good faith of their Soviet ‘brother party’,73 the Roman 
dissidents went one step further by using an idolised view of the Yugoslav experience as 
a means of critiquing the policy which Stalin imposed on Togliatti. For the KPJ the only 
solution to this clash was a break, the recognition that their own revolution would require 
a split from the discipline of Soviet foreign policy. Some Italian militants, yet to see the 
effects of the svolta play out in full, found this recognition rather harder to achieve. 
 
7.5. Doppiezza and Soviet foreign policy 
 
Already in this study we have explored the emergence of a ‘movement-Stalinism’, the 
aspirations projected onto the Soviet Union inconsistent with the political instructions 
which emanated from Moscow. The MCd’I’s attempts to justify the Kremlin’s recognition 
of Badoglio, so strikingly at odds with its own strategy, were a case of such doppiezza. Also 
present within layers of the PCI membership, doppiezza was the attempt to justify Soviet or 
Party strategy as a ‘ruse’ or a ‘double-game’, where outer appearances did not conform to 
real intent. This was notably expressed in the idea that democratic politics was merely the 
prelude to an ultimate seizure of power. This separation of means and ends allowed the 
faithful to reconcile themselves to decisions like the svolta that would otherwise have 
merely offended sensibilities. Doppiezza was less a Party strategy than a militant culture, 
which internalised the tension between the revolutionary end goal and reformist practice. 
 
 
 
72 ‘Parole e fatti’, BR, 2.6.1944. 
 
73 Djilas 1963, p. 15; in his own words, the Yugoslav Communists fell into the same trap as 
‘everyone in the long history of man who has ever subordinated his individual fate and 
the fate of mankind exclusively to one idea: unconsciously they described the Soviet 
Union and Stalin in terms required by their own struggle and its justification’’ 
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Roman PCI cadres indulged militants’ belief in doppiezza in order to rally them behind the 
new line. This was strikingly apparent in a 16 April 1944 justification of the turn by Rome 
PCI cadres Fabrizio Onofri and Antonello Trombadori. Whereas l’Unità emphasised the 
tactical necessity of the Salerno Turn in mobilising all possible forces against Nazi 
Germany, this internal justification of the svolta explained its place in a wider 
revolutionary project. Posed as an explanation of the recent ‘correction of the P[arty]’s 
political line’, this purported to use ‘Marxist-Leninist theory’ to justify what was, at face 
value, a pact with reactionary forces.74 More than Togliatti’s own public statements on the 
need for national unity, this argument allowed cadres to set the svolta in a broad historical 
context, and indeed the wider international situation. Looking beyond the demands of 
partisan mobilisation, Trombadori and Onofri’s text presented the svolta as part of a global 
strategy directed by what they called ‘Soviet foreign (read: revolutionary) policy’.75 
 
This first meant explaining why the Party was now collaborating with élites it had earlier 
presented as merely reactionary. This proceeded via emphasis on the need to defend Italy 
from the Western Allies’ domination. Fascism had emerged from Italy’s unfavourable 
position following World War I, with ‘working-class defeat opening the way to reaction in 
those same countries where bourgeois discontent with the peace treaties was strongest’.76 
The royalists and the ‘financial oligarchy’ had embraced Fascism in search of ‘real 
economic independence’, but abandoned it once the Anglo-Americans began to threaten 
the peninsula. The coup against Mussolini was an effect of the élite’s need to defend its 
international position: if the ‘whole Italian people was tired of war’ and ‘the popular 
masses made a parallel contribution to weakening the régime’, ‘without the conspiracy 
within the corridors of power and the palace the Italian people would certainly not have 
torn down Fascism on 25 July’.77 Not to recognise these élites’ role in overthrowing 
Fascism was ‘abstract political moralism’; worse, to allow Italy to remain divided in the 
face of the new occupying power was merely to ‘play the Anglo-Saxons’ game’.78 
 
The need to assert Italy’s independence was explicitly tied to the Soviet foreign policy 
interest of blocking Anglo-American hegemony in the Mediterranean.79 In this sense, ‘[the 
Kremlin’s] recognition of the Badoglio government’s cobelligerent status represented the 
 
 
 
74 ‘Il fascismo e il movimento rivoluzionario in Italia’, 16.4.44, APC/7/10/1.  
75 Ibid., p. 23. 
76 Ibid., p. 3.  
77 Ibid., p. 10. 
78 Ibid., p. 16.  
79 Ibid., p. 14. 
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first move in the “Italian round” of the diplomatic offensive conducted by the USSR 
against the conservative Anglo-American policy’.80 To empower the ‘living forces’ of the 
nation was also to pose obstacles to the Western’ Allies ‘imperialist designs’ on Italy.81 The 
pair portrayed this as a Soviet foreign policy goal, for ‘the USSR, the revolutionary 
movement, has no interest in a formally, juridically independent Italy which is in reality 
subjected to Anglo-American imperialism through its own internal economic structure’.82 
They recognised that the Kremlin had already given ‘indications’ of its policy through the 
Moscow Conference and Tehran Declaration, Togliatti’s radio broadcasts and the 
diplomatic recognition of Badoglio.83 The PCI had, alas, remained ‘deaf’ to these 
indications; fortunately, they ‘had in practice opened up a path for [the Party] to retreat 
down, however intransigent its formulas’. 84 
 
The PCI cadres baldly identified ‘the USSR, the revolutionary movement’, and the Salerno 
Turn. The svolta was a move on the ‘international chessboard’ not only compatible with 
Soviet foreign policy, but integral to and determined by it. This justification of the svolta 
emphasised the unity of Soviet and Italian communist strategy, portraying Togliatti as the 
instrument of Moscow’s initiative. The Roman PCI cadres even framed the timing of the 
svolta within this Soviet foreign-policy perspective: 
 
After resolving the Polish and Yugoslav questions, and strengthened by its military 
victories, the USSR could now address the Italian question. The diplomatic accreditation of 
the Badoglio government and Ercoli’s [Togliatti’s] declaration a few days after arriving in 
Naples put the opposition parties’ policy back on track. If [Togliatti] only intervened 7 
months after the armistice was declared and 6 months after [Italy] was recognised as a 
cobelligerent, in our view this was not so much because it took the Bari Congress to show 
that the Italian situation was blocked (it already had been, to varying degrees). It was more 
that his arrival from Moscow would too obviously appear as a card played by the USSR, and 
it thus had to be delayed until Russian policy – tied up in the Polish and Yugoslav questions 
– had brought these two operations to their conclusion.85 
 
This presentation of the svolta strongly foregrounded the antagonism among the Allies. 
While the ‘Anglo-Saxons planned to have Italy in their hands upon the war’s conclusion’, 
 
 
 
 
80 Ibid., p. 17.  
81 Ibid., p. 18. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid., p. 21. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid., p. 17. 
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the USSR’s ‘foreign (read: revolutionary) policy’ had ‘thwarted their manoeuvre’.86 This 
interpretation closely reflected Stalin’s own rationalisation of the turn. As the Soviet 
leader had told Togliatti at their 4 March meeting, ‘The existence of two camps (Badoglio-
King and the antifascist parties) is weakening the Ital[ian] people. This is to the advantage 
of the English, who would like to have a weak Italy on the Mediterranean. If the struggle 
between these camps continues, it will mean disaster for the Italian people. The interests 
of the Ital[ian] people dictate that Italy be strong and possess a strong army’.87 Ordering 
the turn toward Badoglio, Stalin emphasised the need for ‘outwardly loyal’88 relations 
with the British, and l’Unita did indeed present the svolta as an effort to secure the 
maximum possible unity against Nazi Germany. Yet PCI cadres were well-aware that the 
policy was also an aggressive diplomatic move. 
 
The Soviet-foreign policy dimension of the svolta inevitably introduced a lasting tension 
within PCI strategy. Insofar as Togliatti’s ‘new party’ sought to rally Italians around short-
term democratic goals, the Salerno Turn built on Popular Frontism’s tendency to reroute 
anti-capitalism into anti-fascism. It continued the Communists’ efforts to place themselves 
at the heart of broad alliances that united democrats and patriots of all stripes. This also 
helped the Party to project the image of a national communism, dispensing with narrow 
class particularism and putschist visions of the seizure of power. Yet viewed in light of 
international politics, the svolta had a more definite sectarian edge, governed by the 
unsustainability of the Grand Alliance. Like Moscow’s recognition of Badoglio, it was less 
a concession to the Western Allies’ hegemony, as an attempt to counteract it, ensuring 
Soviet diplomacy some locus of support on Italian soil. In the short term, the pact with 
Badoglio prevented the Anglo-Americans from creating a government that excluded the 
PCI. Yet it also presaged the likelihood of future conflict. 
 
This tension allowed the PCI to hold opposite sensibilities together in one party. Its broad 
alliance strategy had led it into government, affording it the prestige of a force for national 
Resistance and democratic reconstruction. Yet militants could also rationalise its policy in 
terms of doppiezza. This meant imagining that after a first period of institutional alliances the 
Party would eventually signal the ora X of insurrection. Togliatti himself never planned such 
an end goal,89 and other cadres pointed to the harmful effects that such a mindset 
 
 
 
 
86 Ibid., p. 23.  
87 Cited in Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky 1997, p. 72 (2011, p. 66; Dimitrov 2003, p. 304) 
88 Ibid.  
89 See Di Loreto 1991. 
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could have: Turin organiser Arturo Colombi lamented that militants conceiving national 
unity in terms of doppiezza would ‘surely fall into passivity, if they thought they should 
instead await ‘the “real” struggle against the bourgeoisie’.90 Yet whatever the PCI’s 
gradualist practice, notions of the ‘ruse’ flowered in a party which never explicitly 
renounced its revolutionary end goal, and thousands of whose militants held on to their 
weapons even after 1945.91 Roman PCI cadres’ discussion of the Soviet foreign policy 
chicanery behind the svolta could only encourage this notion. 
 
Such a vision was also implicit in the way the Party spoke about class. As Pavone notes in 
his analysis of the civil, class, and national wars taking place in the Resistance period, the 
combination of these three terms could lead them to have different meanings 
simultaneously.92 In his view, the hostility directed against the adjective could not but 
redound on the noun, such as to present all industrialists as collaborationist, or the police 
as ex-Fascist. Yet the same time, this was a language which allowed the Party to speak to 
different sensibilities, since one could either surmise that the problem to be fought was 
either the police, the industrialists and the capitalists, or else the fascist presence within 
each of these layers. Even where the Party’s explicit strategy was for national-unity and 
capitalist reconstruction, the rerouting of class radicalism through these compounds 
allowed it to speak to a more militant audience. 
 
For their part, Soviet officials in Italy did not think that the svolta meant a permament 
acceptance of national unity and non-fascist industrialists. Indicative in this regard are the 
writings of Soviet diplomat Alexander Bogomolov, who had recently replaced Andrey 
Vyshinsky on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy. Writing to Vyshinsky on 6 April in 
reaction to the svolta, Bogomolov noted the likely future conflict with British interests in the 
Mediterranean, and indeed ‘an internal situation becoming increasingly favourable for us’. He 
could ‘not see any possibility of Italy avoiding a revolutionary situation’.93 As Pons notes, 
while Bogomolov did not as such represent a Kremlin point of view, his reading does at least 
reflect Soviet leaders’ conception of spheres of influence as mobile and unstable. It equally 
reflected the understanding that Soviet policy and the PCI’s fate were closely 
 
 
 
90 ‘Lettera di Luca alla direzione’, 25.1.1944, IPRAC/3..  
91 Zaslavsky 2004 presents evidence for the PCI having had paramilitary structures into the 
postwar period. While it is possible that some outside event or shock may have forced the Party 
into renewed armed activity, including to defend itself against repression, the demobilisation of the 
armed demonstrations of July 1948 showed that Togliatti’s strategy was premised on democratic 
advance rather than any attempted coup.  
92 Pavone 2014, p. 382.  
93 Cited in Gori and Pons (eds.) 1998, p. 42. 
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interlinked: Bogomolov worried that the Party was not really preparing itself for the 
ultimate clash with reactionary forces.94 
 
Postponing that struggle to an undefined future, the svolta’s immediate effect was, indeed, 
to displace Resistance politics onto the institutional terrain. With the CLN parties now in 
government, the clandestine movements in occupied Italy could have little effect on party 
leaders’ political choices. The partisan campaign in the North was still intensifying, and 
was already mobilising far greater numbers of Italians than anything that had taken place 
in the South or Centre. Yet the agreements reached at Salerno set the political limits of 
what these partisans could achieve.95 Involvement in government greatly strengthened 
the CLN parties relative to other anti-fascists, allowing them a platform to expand their 
influence and shape national reconstruction. Yet as they joined forces with the central 
state, these parties also became responsible for maintaining social stability in liberated 
regions. It was this that shaped their approach at the end of spring 1944, as the Allies 
made their final march toward Rome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 As Pons relates in ibid., pp. 48–52.  
95 See section 8.5. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
The missing insurrection 
 
Since the Anzio landings the frontlines had been close to static. For over three months, the 
Allies remained agonisingly close to the capital. The forces holding the coastal salient at 
Anzio were cut off from the armies assaulting Monte Cassino, who failed in three 
offensives to cut the Wehrmacht’s Gustav Line. The breakthrough finally came at the end 
of spring. On 11 May the Allies launched a fourth assault on Monte Cassino, finally 
capturing the mountain citadel on 18 May. This opened the way for the Fifth and Eighth 
Armies to advance north through the now-divided Gustav Line. Five days later the 
Canadians and Poles launched a renewed offensive at Anzio. Fearing encirclement, Field 
Marshal Kesselring mounted a tactical retreat in order to preserve the Wehrmacht’s Tenth 
Army. The Allies were now poised to overrun the capital itself. 
 
The German High Command had little intention of defending Rome. Over the last nine 
months this had been an ‘open city’ in name only; it remained a Wehrmacht supply base, 
and was thus subject to Allied bombing deep into the spring. But the German leadership 
considered impossible any fighting defence through city streets, and began withdrawing 
its forces in March. The Wehrmacht ran down its food and fuel reserves as it prepared to 
fall back to a defensive line north of Florence.1 In this sense, the Fifth Army’s turn toward 
the capital at the end of May was of dubious military merit, for it allowed the German 
forces north of Anzio to retreat in good order and continue the Italian Campaign. Yet the 
fall of the first Axis capital was of obvious symbolic importance: as Roosevelt told 
Americans, they were ‘One up, two to go’. 
 
The prospect of Wehrmacht withdrawal had long excited spectres of social unrest. Italian 
police, Vatican officials and Allied planners were each concerned that the fall of the regime 
could produce a dangerous vacuum of authority.2 Their fears particularly focused on the 
 
 
 
1 ‘Food situation in Rome’, 21.3.1944, NA/WO204/2452/46/150/5, shows AMG fears that they 
would arrive to find a starving population. Sir D’Arcy even suggested that flour be delivered to the   
Pope in order to alleviate the popular suffering (see e.g. FO 371/43870/5055), though this was 
ruled out on the grounds that it would indirectly aid the Germans.  
2 Bocca 1966 contradicts Battaglia’s argument that the lack of insurrection in Rome was a ‘masterpiece of 
Vatican diplomacy’, instead rightly drawing attention to the weakness of the Resistance as well as the 
fact that ecclesiastical pressure was insufficient to preventing insurrections in the Northern cities. 
Missing from this analysis however are the Resistance forces outside the CLN (Bocca refers to the  
 
‘loss of the Roman Resistance’s only effective armed force, the gappisti’, notwithstanding its tiny 
numbers even prior to the Fosse Ardeatine massacre forced its militants to flight; p. 342), as well as 
the PCI’s own different attitude toward what insurrection would entail in these other cities: see 
section 8.5. 
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possibility of rival armed groups attempting coups de main, or even a descent into chaos, 
before the Allies could assert their own control. Even if this did not mean partisans 
actually trying to seize power, there was also the prospect of looting, should police 
control and the food supply not be rapidly restored. The CLN president’s diary spoke of 
the ‘many people around [him] worried by Rome’s handover from the Germans to the 
Allies’. They, the partisans, the Vatican and the Allies all asked one same question: ‘Who 
can ensure public order’?3 
 
There were in fact no upheavals. As American and British tanks rolled into Rome on the 
afternoon of 4 June, the city was largely quiet. The retreating Wehrmacht sought above all 
to protect its forces from attack, and there were only isolated skirmishes between 
partisans and the retreating German columns. In previous days the Allies had warned 
Resistance leaders against ‘adventurist’ attacks, telling them not to mount any uprising 
before they received a codeword. The call for action never came. The Allied armies 
rapidly established their own control of strategic points around the city, from the 
Colosseum roundabout to the Altare della Patria, stations, bridges and government 
buildings. Their only use for the partisans was as an interim police force, charged with 
preventing looting. The capital had changed hands without any popular uprising. 
 
This also allowed a change of government. The King and Badoglio had committed to 
withdraw from the political stage once the Allies reached the capital, and they 
immediately fulfilled these engagements. On 5 June, Vittorio Emanuele III named his son 
Umberto as Luogotenente, establishing a Regency that effectively took over the Crown 
powers. Three days later Badoglio resigned as Prime Minister, handing over the reins to 
Ivanoe Bonomi. The royalists’ honouring of these commitments was conditional on the 
behaviour of the anti-fascist parties, who had to show their respect for constitutional 
order. This was a carefully orchestrated change of government; any attempt at a coup de 
main in the capital, or even widespread disorder, threatened to undermine the 
institutional pact and turn the royalists against their CLN partners. 
 
The generally weak state of Resistance organisation also undermined the possibility of any 
such uprising. As we saw in Chapter Six, Nazi repression had broken the back of the most 
significant partisan movements, and the Fosse Ardeatine massacre in particular served to 
discourage armed actions. This bloodshed also had a demobilising effect on the wider 
population, which had proven poorly prepared to take part in strikes and protest actions. 
 
 
 
3 Bonomi 1947, p. 191 (4.6.1944 diary entry). 
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This is not to say that the Resistance had died away completely; partisan units remained 
active on the city periphery, and there were still militants who planned an armed uprising. 
Yet any such action would now have to be conducted against the express instructions of the 
CLN. Even dissident movements not bound by this coalition’s discipline were little able to 
mount an uprising in open defiance of the other anti-fascist parties. 
 
As we see in Chapter Eight, the dissidents were also restrained by Allied pressure. Across 
the spring, AMG officials worked to head off the threat of ‘subversive organisations’ 
attempting a coup de main at the moment of German withdrawal. Without doubt, the most 
lurid of such fears were based on exaggerated estimates of these movements’ military 
strength. Yet Allied pressure was necessary to hold back the most adventurist bands, who 
remained a destabilising presence even after the capital was liberated.4 Armed assaults on 
the last Fascist holdouts, the storming of government buildings, and the spike in 
recruitment for the ‘Red Army’, all indicated that dissidents planned to continue 
extending their armed organisations. The AMG did not long tolerate this threat to public 
order. Over the Occupation period militants had suffered grave sacrifices in the name of 
building armed organisation. They would now be demobilised. 
 
8.1. A peaceful takeover 
 
The prospect of insurrection was a key element of partisans’ imaginary. It offered the 
hope of actively helping to liberate their city, rather than await outside aid. They could 
eliminate the vestiges of Fascism, and perhaps even assert their own control. Despite the 
low level of popular mobilisation in Rome, examples from elsewhere in Italy hinted that 
this might be possible. Naples had at the end of September 1943 seen soldiers and civilian 
insurgents push out the Wehrmacht even before the Allies arrived. Despite Rome’s very 
different social profile, strikes in the Northern cities had also convinced PCI cadres that 
such actions could help build toward an insurrection, galvanising a mood of mass 
mobilisation. In late January, the Party prepared a call for an ‘insurrectionary general 
strike’ in the capital, only to cancel it as the Allied advance stalled. It now developed the 
plan to organise a general strike through the CLN, as a step toward this ultimate uprising. 
 
After repeated delays, the CLN called the general strike for 3 May. The action sought to shut 
down the city by paralysing its transport network. This could help give the impression of a 
truly collective action, and galvanise a mood of revolt. However, the Germans easily 
 
 
 
 
4 See Chapter Nine. 
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foiled the strike. Occupying the tram depots on the night of 2 May, they forced the workers 
already on-shift to keep the service running into the next day. Some walkouts were more 
successful, from the state cigarette factory to the Testaccio slaughterhouse and Il Messaggero 
newspaper. Yet the few thousand strikers had little impact on the city as a whole. L’Unità 
issued a short article on locations where strikes had taken place, but was unable to present this 
as any kind of breakthrough in popular mobilisation. Internal dossiers recognised that it had 
been a grave failure,5 accusing the other CLN parties of ‘boycotting’ the strike. This augured 
poorly for trying to organise an armed uprising in concert. 
 
The AMG feared infighting among partisan forces. Already in the build-up to their 
arrival, the Vatican and the British Ambassador strongly pressed for measures to prevent 
fighting in city streets. In his missives to the War Cabinet from Rome, Sir D’Arcy Osborne 
expressed his fears about the moment of Wehrmacht withdrawal, which threatened to 
leave a vacuum of authority. He explained that for want of ‘any obviously indicated and 
universally respected figure to take charge and issue orders on German evacuation and 
pending [sic] the installation of Allied authority’,6 clashes could emerge between rival 
leaderships. Seeking to stave off this threat, he advocated the creation of an Italian 
military body that could immediately assert its authority. Sir D’Arcy Osborne saw 
portrayed a risk of ‘confusion and possible conflict involved in a scramble to secure 
control of the city for the ostensible purpose of protecting it, between Badoglio 
representatives, the political party chiefs, and possibly the dissident communists’.7 
 
These latter were a danger because they were an unknown quantity. Officials had an only 
diffuse awareness of the dissidents’ intentions, an understanding also clouded by alarmist 
intelligence. Indicative of this climate was a carabinieri report on 8 May, emphasising the 
dangers to police control. It claimed that the MCd’I had ‘the secret aim, together with the 
other extreme-Left parties, of seizing control of the city, overthrowing the monarchy and 
government and implementing a full communist programme while the other parties are 
preoccupied with chasing out the Germans’.8 The British Ambassador offered the War 
 
 
 
 
 
5 APC/Comitati Dirigenti/62/Roma/1235-1245. Idem, 1257-1259, the Catholic-Communists 
likewise complained of ‘four of the six’ other CLN parties’ non-participation in the strike.  
6 NA/FO37/43873/8769, 2.6.1944.  
7 Ibid. A 27.4.1944 report from AMG to ACC (in NA/WO204/2452) aptly noted the reconciliation 
of political and military leadership thanks to the new government, thus identifying the real threat 
not in ‘civil war’ between the CLN parties and the royalists, but rather ‘anarchy’ owing to the 
desperate food situation.  
8 ‘Notizie sui partiti della concentrazione di sinistra’, 8.5.1944, copy in FGPCI/62/1362–4. 
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Cabinet a rather more tempered assessment.9 Sir D’Arcy reported while the ‘population in 
general’ presented no danger, there remained the threat of ‘looting by hooligans if all 
forces of order disappear’.10 This combined with the possible ‘danger of anti-German 
demonstrations and disturbances from a small dissident communist party which 
disavows instructions of [the] official Italian communist party’.11 
 
Preparations to avert this threat were already underway. On the same day as Sir D’Arcy’s 
report to the War Cabinet, the Allied Chiefs of Staff relayed to General Wilson the 
Vatican’s hope for a ‘despatch of small Allied force to show itself at central point of town’, 
which could ‘demonstrate impending Allied control and administration and serve to 
avert disorders’.12 This force was organised, together with measures designed to keep the 
partisan movements under control. Particularly important in this regard was Roberto 
Bencivenga, whom the Badoglio government had already in March appointed as military 
commander in Rome. His authority owed to his role in the monarchist Resistance, which 
allowed him to straddle the divide between the partisan movements and the Royal Army. 
He was entrusted with ensuring civil order.13 
 
Bencivenga also imposed his control over the MCd’I. His influence in part owed to his 
personal connections to Antonino Poce, with whom he had spent time in confino. Yet he 
also exerted more direct pressure. At the end of May, Bencivenga organised an encounter 
between a British major and Poce in the grounds of Villa Borghese, where Poce was told 
he would be arrested if the forces under his command were guilty of ‘disorders’. Poce 
angrily protested this restriction in a 2 June letter to Bencivenga, insisting that his men 
would ‘go to the police stations and eliminate whomever we do not find suitable’.14 
Nonetheless, he did agree to wait until he was issued with a codeword before he issued 
the call for action, and then in turn passed this information on to band leaders. 
Instructions issued on the same day as his letter to Bencivenga stated that militants should 
not launch the insurrection until the codeword was received. If there was a popular 
uprising they should join it, but they should not themselves provoke it.15 
 
 
 
 
9 The report arrived too late for the Cabinet to act on it. Similar themes were present in Vatican 
communications to the AMG, and D’Arcy’s views likely influenced by the Holy See’s own.  
10 NA/FO37/43873/8769, 2.6.1944.  
11 Ibid.  
12 NA/WO204/2452/2879, 1.6.1944. 
13 See 27.4.1944 report in NA/WO204/2452.  
14 Poce to Bencivenga, 2.6.1944, in MSdL/FSC/91.  
15 Kurzman 1975, p. 374, highlights Poce’s role in dampening any idea of insurrection, following 
the meeting with the British major. 
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Bencivenga’s call to action never came. Togliatti sent a radio message advising against 
insurrection.16 Poce also preached caution. Mucci remonstrated with his comrade. He 
argued that it would still be worth taking over public buildings and declaring a Republic. 
This could have a propaganda effect in publicly displaying the opposition to the Badoglio 
regime. But in reality the movement was powerless to act alone. As one Armata Rossa 
commander recalled, militants still marked ‘by [their] opposition to the GAP action at Via 
Rasella’, were unwilling to get in the way of the ‘two great armies in battle’.17 It would 
have been impossible ‘to protect the Roman population from fighting through the streets 
and squares of the capital’.18 They could, at most, join together with the Allied forces on 
their final advance. There was to be no general uprising. 
 
8.2. The moment of liberation 
 
After the twin breakthroughs at Anzio and Monte Cassino, on 2 June the Allies reached 
the edges of the capital. They faced German opposition to the South of the city, but this 
was above all a means of protecting the other forces in retreat. On the evening of 3 June 
Sir D’Arcy could write with content of the Wehrmacht’s abandonment of the city, as tanks 
rumbled through the northern outskirts of the capital. The Allies had ignored German 
communications seeking a reciprocal promise to avoid fighting, and the Wehrmacht 
instead attempted to flee Rome in good order. For the more ideologically fanatical, the 
desire to punish the Resistance went beyond the actual Wehrmacht concern to retain 
control over the city. On 4 June, the SS loaded fourteen prisoners from Via Tasso into a 
truck, before then shooting them at La Storta, ten miles north-west of the capital. 
 
In some areas of the capital anti-fascists did fight alongside the Allied troops. From the 
eastern outskirts of the Via Casalina and Tuscolana to Porta Maggiore, militants of the 
Armata Rossa’s thirteenth concentration joined with Allied troops and other partisans in 
attacking the German convoys. These roads surrounded the area including Torpignattara 
and Centocelle, the most important centre of MCd’I organisation, and both Dantin Pepe’s 
comrades and independent armed bands like those led by Franco Napoli joined in this 
 
 
 
16 Secchia (ed.) 1974, p. 441. Secchia notes the the fact that ‘at a certain moment in Rome unity had 
to take a lead over every other consideration’, remarking that Bonomi’s diary shows ‘how in those 
days the CLN was thinking about anything other than popular insurrection’. ‘In the North, too, 
there were no lack of manoeuvres to impede the insurrection, but [t]here unity was not considered 
a fetish, an inviolable taboo (pp. 440–41). In his reconstruction he uses a 10 April 1945 instruction 
from the PCI leadership in the North to highlight the Party’s strong stance against whoever would 
block an insurrection.  
17 Otello Terzani, letter to Silverio Corvisieri, 8.8.1979.  
18 Ibid. 
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fighting. In this effort they took around sixty German soldiers prisoner. Four of the 
MCd’I’s members were killed in the fighting, with Pietro Principato the last of those to die 
fighting in the Roman Resistance. There were tragic scenes in Soriano nel Cimino, north of 
the capital, where at least 11 Resistance fighters were killed by bombings on the very day 
of Liberation, as the US Air Force sought to block the Germans’ retreat.19 
 
For most of militants Liberation took on more the character of a triumphal parade, by the 
side of the Allied troops. Felice and Viviana Chilanti rode through city streets on a truck, 
surrounded by armed militants, leading chants of ‘Viva Stalin’. At 3am on 5 June 
Antonino Poce was able to hold a public rally of Armata Rossa fighters at the Piazza del 
Collegio Romano, indeed a ‘baptism’ of this ‘Red Army’.20 In his speech he emphasised 
that after the sacrifices of recent months, this was not a return to ‘tranquility, peace and 
goodwill’, but the beginning of a fresh struggle. Deriding those who would rush to 
‘ingratiate themselves with the new boss’, he emphasised the need for the building of an 
Armata Rossa to ensure ‘capitalism [would] not return to Italian soil’.21 After the rally, 
armed fighters paraded through Roman streets. 
 
While the collapse of the Italian authorities in September 1943 had occasioned widespread 
looting, the Germans’ withdrawal did not produce similar social unrest. The partisans did 
take over public buildings. Notable was Alfredo Paccara’s band, which occupied the Navy 
Ministry after a battle in the Piazzale delle Belle Arti. This was however a policing 
operation, carried out with the explicit authorisation of the Allied forces. There were, 
however, some clashes between partisans and Fascists. On 6 June was a fight at a vintner’s 
in Via Aurelia where 22-year-old Giulio Torsani accused the owner of hoarding. The wine 
merchant fatally stabbed the young man, a member of the MCd’I.22 In towns to the north 
of Rome, including Viterbo, partisans took over public buildings without any apparent 
clashes with local Fascists. 
 
The overriding atmosphere was one of social peace, and an untroubled transfer of power. 
Flying to the capital on 5 June, the King immediately handed over his powers to his son. 
Three days later, Badoglio resigned and the Prince Regent appointed Bonomi as the new 
Presidente del Consiglio. Having last left office in 1921, the liberal grandee formed a new 
civilian government, based on the same cabinet inherited from the institutional pact in 
 
 
 
19 Zolla 1972, p. 40. 
20 ‘Il comizio di Piazza del Collegio Romano’, BR, 6.6.1944.  
21 Ibid. 
22 ‘Un delitto della V colonna fascista’, Armata Rossa, 14/6/1944. 
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April. This coalition of the CLN parties declared itself a ‘government of national unity’. 
There would be ministerial crises, and divisions within its ranks. Bonomi was succeeded 
in June 1945 by the Actionist Francesco Parri, and that December by Alcide de Gasperi. 
Yet the principle of a ‘government of national unity’ would endure into the postwar 
period, as the Allies and the Resistance fought to free the rest of Italian territory from 
German Occupation. 
 
8.3. Open organisation 
 
As the Fascists fled with the Germans, the dissident communists were able to set up bases 
of their own around the city. These allowed them to expand their public profile, recruit 
new militants, as well as set up centres for popular relief efforts. Already the day before 
the Allies’ arrival militants occupied a Polizia dell’Africa Italiana station in the south-
western Garbatella district, and in subsequent days they also took over two abandoned 
schools as well as apartments on the central Via Nazionale. These latter now served as the 
MCd’I’s headquarters, from where it produced its newspaper and organised the activity 
of its local sections. A further notable site occupied by its militants was the building of the 
Fascist Large Families Union on the Corso Vittorio Emanuele which now became the seat 
of the movement’s women’s group. 
 
These sections provided the basis for expanded ‘Red Aid’ efforts.23 The ‘finance and 
assistance’ work run from the women’s group headquarters included the provision of 
basic healthcare, food distribution and advice services. A ‘political school’ engaged in the 
study of Marx and Engels’ doctrines on women, family and childhood’, Soviet legislation 
on these matters, as well as the history of women communists and the role women could 
play in the communist movement.24 Money for welfare initiatives was raised through 
dances, held as often as three times a week in each MCd’I section. Frequented by the 
movement’s own sympathisers as well as Allied soldiers, these events raised the hackles 
of Agostino Novella. The PCI organiser characterised the ‘free entry’ for ‘loose women’ at 
such occasions an example of this movement’s ‘dubious morals’.25 Boxing matches and 
gambling were further sources of funding. 
 
The Nazi-Fascists’ disappearance from Roman streets also allowed an intensified 
propaganda operation. All anti-fascist movements issued special editions of their 
 
 
23 See report in ACS/Comando Generale dell’Arma dei CCRR/Ufficio Servizio Situazione e  
Collegamenti/ 3779/2441/3.12.1944. 
24 See 9.10.1944 report in ACS/MI/Gabinetto/Partiti Politici/181/3212  
25 ‘Informazioni sul Movimento Comunista’, 26.2.1945, FGFM/275/47. 
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newspapers hailing the new climate of freedom. Since the SS raid on its printshop in 
January, the MCd’I organ had appeared only twice, in a small format edition. By 6 June 
the Roman militants had produced their first freely distributed paper. Bandiera Rossa paid 
homage to the Allied liberators and stressed the role of the ‘Red Army’ in both the 
Liberation of Rome and in the future fight to free the rest of the Italian soil. This 
conciliatory note after the tensions of previous weeks was also reflected in the 14 June 
issue, with its ‘Salute to Bencivenga’.26 This homage to a ‘guarantor of freedom’ doubtless 
reflected a certain gratitude for the fact that he had allowed the movement to hold onto its 
weapons, notwithstanding his role in restraining its insurrectionist plans. 
 
There were, however, to be just two legal editions of Bandiera Rossa. The Psychological 
Warfare Branch had taken over the old Ministry of Popular Culture building, and now 
introduced its own press controls. Such major dailies as Il Messaggero and Il Tempo were 
pulled off sale until they carried out an internal ‘epuration’27 of Fascist-loyalist employees. 
The shortage of newsprint also imposed further political choices. The six CLN parties 
were authorised to issue dailies, with Avanti! and l’Unità becoming the biggest ‘political’ 
papers. The PWB also allowed some non-CLN parties to produce weeklies, but these did 
not include Bandiera Rossa. Unable to get its paper onto the newsstands, it now had to 
limit its print media to internal bulletins. The PWB also imposed similar limits on the 
airwaves. A programme called La Voce dei partiti allowed the six CLN parties to broadcast 
their views by radio. The MCd’I’s own requests were denied. 
 
Both decisions reflected the PWB’s hostility toward so-called ‘subversive organisations’. 
Forces who fomented social unrest and opposed the ‘national-unity’ government were 
undeserving recipients of the limited available radio airtime and newsprint. The PWB’s 
conservative approach was however also exploited by PCI leaders, who pursued their 
own distinct agenda of discrediting and breaking up the MCd’I. As Agostino Novella had 
put it, the Party had to ‘liquidate Bandiera Rossa from the local political scene’. In this 
effort the AMG and the Italian police were both important allies; the PCI campaign 
against the MCd’I also included such measures as inserting undercover Party agents into 
the movement’s local sections, as well as a broader political effort to play on its internal 
tensions. A particular coup was the PCI’s success in organising the break up of the Armata 
Rossa. As we shall see in section 8.4., this brought a deep crisis in the MCd’I. 
 
 
 
 
26 ‘Saluto a Bencivenga’, BR, 14.6.1944.  
27 This inelegant translation of epurazione [purges] was commonly used by Allied officials. 
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8.4. The ‘Red Army’ 
 
As the partisan war in the capital reached its conclusion, plans were made to build the 
Italian contribution to the wider Allied campaign. For the CLN parties now in 
government this meant rallying Italians into the Royal Army. The dissident communists 
focused on expanding the Armata Rossa into a broader force. Their stated goal was to 
pursue the Resistance struggle beyond the city, deploying a communist-led army to fight 
alongside Allied troops. Recruitment offices were set up around the Lazio region and 
local sections constituted in 38 sub-district areas. Wall posters and newspapers advertised 
the call to mobilise. The numbers who signed up to this ‘Red Army’ were vastly greater 
than those who had participated in the Resistance proper. Allied officials estimated its 
recruits at around twenty thousand by late June;28 a poster issued by the Armata Rossa 
claimed to have reached twice this count within just three days.29 These militants set up 
camps north of the capital in order to train the mass of new recruits. 
 
In June 1944 building the Armata Rossa was the central focus of MCd’I activity. It had not 
been able to mount an insurrection in the capital, but hoped nonetheless to continue 
extending its military might. This would also help break the movement out of its 
geographic isolation. Poce and Sbardella sought to form a communist army, which could 
continue the Resistance into central and northern Italy. The Roman partisans had played a 
small auxiliary role alongside the Allied troops during the Liberation, and the Red Army 
sought massively to expand this cooperation while maintaining the autonomy of 
communist organisation. This differed from the stance of the PCI leadership, whose 
approach to military organisation in liberated regions reflected its new role as a party of 
government. Dissolving the PCI’s armed bands in Rome, Togliatti called on partisans to 
join the regular armed forces. 
 
Armata Rossa propaganda connected the need to liberate Italian territory to the need to replace 
the Regio Esercito. This was the message of an eponymous newspaper appearing on 6 and 14 
June, printed recto-verso with Bandiera Rossa. It emphasised its interest in the ‘most cordial 
relations with the Allies’ and its focus on liberating Italian territory. Yet a ‘people’s army’ 
would also have to reject the traditions of Italian militarism.30 It dismissed the reactionary 
codes of the Royal Army, from its aristocratic command structure to its officer 
 
 
 
28 ACS, ACC, 1082C/230, letter to Pollock from Major A.W. Nattersbey, 18.7.1944, cited in Gremmo 
2015, p. 149. 
29 In Fondo Otello Terzani, Biblioteca Comunale di Follonica. 
30 ‘L’esercito del popolo’, Armata Rossa, 14.6.1944. 
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schools and the obligation for officers to be married. It related the ‘brutal treatment of the 
troops’ to the army’s institutional role of ‘preserving reaction in power’. Workers must 
fight alongside the Allies, but for their own interests: whereas ‘in the normally organised 
[sic] bourgeois army you will give your life for a class that is not your own, in the Red 
Army you, proletarians, will be fighting for yourselves’.31 
 
Alarmed by this unauthorised initiative, the Allies quickly moved to shut it down. A 
report by a British major to Colonel Pollock spoke of a situation ‘developing very fast 
when bad characters and others posing as communist patriots were committing many 
outrages’ in the Red Army’s name.32 He reported shopkeepers complaints of being forced 
by ‘Reds’ to advertise its recruitment. It was thus ‘felt desirable in the interests of public 
order to stamp these acts out and firstly to eliminate the source of the soi-disant “Armata 
Rossa”’.33 This source was Antonino Poce, who was arrested together with two of his 
comrades. Hauled before the Allied Military Court on 17 June, Poce was sentenced to 
three months’ imprisonment, suspended. By Terzani’s account, further Allied pressure 
came from a Soviet official, who insisted that the Armata Rossa stop ‘abusively’ using a 
name which belonged to his own country’s army.34 
 
The Red Army was thus banned from further recruitment. The PCI now exerted pressure 
for it to be dissolved entirely. Already in a May 1944 circular the Party had ordered 
members not to join demonstrations against the monarchy, affirming its opposition to 
‘extremists’. But its work to break up the Armata Rossa from within relied on 
instrumentalising its non-MCd’I leaders. Particularly useful in this regard was Amidani, 
as he sought his own path back into the Party. He wrote to Novella stressing the Armata 
Rossa’s work fighting ‘the common German enemy’ and ‘keeping public order following 
Liberation’ ‘regardless of any ideological or tactical differences’.35 This was a clear attempt 
by the expellee to show his loyalty to the Party, emphasising – even in a letter to the PCI 
leadership – that his relations with it had remained ‘uninterrupted’ and (in contradiction 
with this) that he had made contact with its official organisation as soon as it was possible 
to emerge from clandestine conditions.36 
 
 
 
 
31 Ibid.  
32 ACS, ACC, 1082C/230, letter to Pollock from Major A.W. Nattersbey, 18 July, cited in Gremmo 
2015, p. 149.  
33 Ibid., pp. 149-150.  
34 ‘Programma politico-economico’, May 1944, FGFM/275/1 
35 ‘Relazione al comitato esecutivo del PCI’, [n.d./June 1944?] FGFM/275/18.  
36 Ibid. 
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Amidani, in turn, was a means of influencing Terzani. Novella had little time for this Left-
Communist, writing in a 17 June 1944 report that this ‘extremely vain’ ‘Trotskyist [sic]’ 
had ‘very close links with agents provocateurs’.37 Yet his help was also necessary in 
winding down the Armata Rossa. This became possible after the AMG ban on recruitment 
– and Poce’s sentencing – convinced Terzani that the militia was doomed. On 2 July 
Terzani thus joined Amidani and Avico in issuing a statement on behalf of the Armata 
Rossa leadership. They announced the dissolution of this body and ‘invited’ its adherents 
to ‘support with all their strength the political activity of the PCI’.38 Poce and Sbardella 
outwardly opposed this. Poce issued a blustering statement protesting l’Unità reports of 
Armata Rossa’s demise despite ‘never having helped with money, men, action or 
supplies’, and insisting that the militia’s status was a purely internal matter.39 
 
Meeting with Novella, they took a rather different tone. Sbardella said that he ‘favoured the 
dissolution [of Armata Rossa] but could not sign the collective statement due to his Bandiera 
Rossa commitments’.40 Poce protested that ‘delay is necessary as [dissolution] will alienate the 
best Bandiera Rossa elements’, pending a congress where the MCd’I could make a firm 
decision on its relations with the PCI. Novella noted Poce’s lack of room for manoeuvre: ’the 
nature of his proposals gave me the feeling that I had a man in front of me who had been left 
behind by the march of events march of events within Armata Rossa and Bandiera Rossa, who 
sought to buy time by giving the impression of assuredness’.41 The split became acrimonious: 
asserting the PCI’s claim to Armata Rossa’s assets, Amidani and Avico alleged that the MCd’I 
had abducted 100,000 lire of its funds and warned PCI leaders that those implicated in this 
‘blackmail’ might try to infiltrate the party.42 
 
The collapse of this initiative also produced recriminations within the MCd’I. Together with 
the lack of a press license, it threatened to paralyse the movement’s activity. Accusing Poce 
and Sbardella of having too easily folded in the face of PCI pressure, Mucci and De Luca 
mounted a coup within the organisation. This soon led to the formation of two rival 
leaderships each of which produced its own ‘internal bulletin’ and declared the other to have 
been expelled. Maintaining control of Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, Mucci and De Luca declared 
the MCd’I ‘the PCI’s number-one enemy’ and bewailed the attempt by the 
 
 
 
37 ‘Noti sui dirigenti dell’“Armata Rossa” ’, 17 June 1944, FGFM/275/7.  
38 ‘Discorso sulla liquidazione dell’Armata Rossa’, 2 July 1944, FGFM/275/16. 
39 ‘Brevi note su “Bandiera Rossa” ’, 15 July 1944, FGPCI/63/1344.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  
42 [Untitled], 26.7.1944, FGFM/275/14 
  
201 
 
 
‘expelled Poce and Sbardella’ to fuse the Movement into the Party.43 In a letter to the PCI 
leadership they defended their autonomy and denied these latter’s right to speak on the 
movement’s behalf.44 
 
This infighting reflected the collapse in the movement’s morale after the folding of Armata 
Rossa, rather than lasting orientations toward the PCI. Disillusioned rather than defiant, 
De Luca met with the Communists’ Giacomo Pellegrini, whom he told that he would 
‘stand aside from all political activity, exclusively working to learn Marxist-Leninist 
theory’, without ‘interfering with the PCI’.45 Moreover, given that the Party was itself 
unwilling to let either ‘extremist’ leadership join its ranks,46 the De Luca and Poce groups 
were reconciled by September. There was an ongoing dialogue between the two sets of 
leaders, and there is no sign of splits within the group’s local branches.47 Novella could, 
however, boast of ‘the hard blow we were able to strike against the MCd’I by breaking up 
Armata Rossa, with many of its sections and members joining us’.48 
 
8.5. From Resistance to insurrection 
 
Rome was liberated but the Resistance continued. In central and northern Italy strikes and 
guerrilla warfare spread. Having already liberated pockets of rural territory, on 25 April 
1945 the CLN could declare the general uprising in the Northern cities. The insurgents 
chased the Wehrmacht out of Milan, Turin and Bologna even before the Allies arrived. 
Partisans could boast of their role in liberating their cities, and an iconography developed 
of a Resistance triumphant. This also cast a harsh light on the lack of such an uprising in 
Rome, capital city yet poor relation of the national Resistance. As we have seen, political 
pressures helped an already weak partisan movement decide against an uprising. Yet it is 
also worth noting that the insurrections that did take place in the Northern cities were 
very different in character to that which the Allies had feared in Rome. 
 
This principally owed to the fact that these latter uprisings reinforced the government’s 
authority rather than to challenge it. This was clear in the instructions that Togliatti issued 
to PCI branches. He sought not to advocate a general policy against insurrection, on the 
Roman example, but rather to determine the political objectives of such actions. This was 
 
 
 
 
43 ‘Carte in Tavola’, Disposizioni Rivoluzionarie, 27.7.1944.  
44 [Untitled], 31.7.1944, FGPCI 63/1357. 
45 ‘Colloquio con De Luca del Movimento Comunista’, 22.7.1944, FGPCI/63/1346.  
46 ‘Relazione riservata’, 29.9.1945, FGFM/275/56. 
47 Corvisieri 1967.  
48 Dal rapporto del compagno Novella’, 24.3.1945, FGAN/87/311–318. 
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first notable in an appeal to PCI militants two days after the Liberation of Rome, to ‘remember 
that the insurrection we want does not have the goal of imposing social and political changes 
in a socialist or communist sense’.49This was followed in the Northern cities even in parallel 
with a policy to argue ‘with the greatest energy’ for insurrection in each locality, and to mount 
the insurrection alone and in the name of the CLN even if the other parties refused support’.50 
Just as the lack of insurrection in Rome had helped the CLN into government, uprisings in 
other cities would also bind militants to this coalition. 
 
Togliatti venerated anti-fascist militancy while also emphasising the need to respect the 
Party’s sense of ‘governmental responsibility’. His call to arms was thus designed to 
discipline his members’ more sectarian mores, while also allowing a settling of scores 
with the Nazi-Fascists. This also acted as a pressure valve within the PCI, for it satisfied 
militants desire to play an active role in Liberation, even without destabilising the 
government pact. In this sense, the use of superficially militant tactics in the fight against 
the Nazi-Fascists was an instrument of the politics of ’national unity’. Its only danger 
came when dissident forces used these same tactics, in a manner that could provoke 
clashes with the Allied authorities or the other anti-fascist parties. The peaceful transfer of 
power in Rome had, however, allowed the Party to display its own ability to rein in these 
elements in accordance with the deal reached at Salerno. 
 
Allied reticence over the Resistance’s destabilising potential was, in this sense, ill-
founded. Such statements as the General Alexander’s 13 November 1944 call on partisans 
to demobilise over the winter could drive a certain diffidence toward the liberators in 
Resistance ranks, moreover pointing to the lack of weight the Anglo-Americans placed on 
their military contribution. Yet the PCI leadership guarded against any behaviour that 
might produce conflict with the Allies. The uprisings in the Northern cities created no 
lasting threat to social peace, and in each case were followed by an immediate call for 
partisans to hand in their weapons. Briefly seizing control of towns and cities before 
handing control to the AMG, these insurrections showed the Italian role in the war of 
liberation as well as the CLN’s respect for Allied authority. 
 
In the weeks before the Allies arrived in Rome, military planners had effectively 
forestalled any disturbances. The fourth day of June had seen a peaceful transfer of 
power, as the Wehrmacht retreated without major resistance and partisans shied from  
 
 
49 Cited in Secchia 1974, p. 509. Lambert 1985 presents the PCI’s use of insurrection as a pressure 
valve for militancy, which would also demonstrate the Party’s ability to rein in disorder.  
50 Cited in Secchia 1974, p. 441. 
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any attempt at a coup de main. The capital had seen street parties, and not street fighting. 
Yet the social conflict that had simmered in Rome over recent months did not simply 
disappear with the Allies’ arrival. The new government had taken over a capital city 
ruined by war, and a state stacked with former Fascists; even in rebuilding the liberated 
regions, it presided over continuing shortages and massive unemployment. The armed 
bands circulating in the borgate were no contender for political power. Yet there was no 
rapid return to public order. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, the violence of the 
Resistance period would also spill over into the new Italy. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
The constitutional arch 
 
On the first anniversary of the Fosse Ardeatine massacre, a service was held at the Basilica 
of St. Mary of the Angels. Italian and Allied officials convened to pay tribute to the 
partisan dead. As the military orderly was about to begin the ceremony, a crowd of 
several dozen women burst into the Basilica.1 These widows of partisans killed at the 
caves had not been invited to attend. They had instead come of their own initiative, in 
order to protest the presence of former regime officials. Vittoria Tarantini2 headed straight 
toward the Prince Regent, demanding that he be escorted from the Basilica; another 
woman buttonholed the chief of police, attacking his ‘nerve’ in attending.3 The women 
were quickly removed, lest they further disrupt the proceedings. They however received a 
concession the following week, in the form of an audience with Palmiro Togliatti.4 
 
This controversy at the end of March 1945 encapsulated wider political realities. The CLN 
parties had been in government for almost a year, but within the old institutional order. 
There remained social tumult and disquiet at the slow pace of change. The Bonomi cabinet 
sat atop the state machine, but still faced a long fight to assert the central government’s 
authority. This was, in part, a defascistisation policy, as it purged regime officials and 
suppressed the last Mussolini loyalists. But the government also had to win Italians’ 
loyalties, through economic reconstruction and the renovation of the state machine. The 
capital remained a social powder-keg, as the circulation of weaponry threatened to light 
the touch-paper of mass unemployment, crippled infrastructure and absent institutions. 
Allied and Italian officials lay top priority on restoring social peace. 
 
This also meant a fight to subdue the remaining armed bands. These included a range of 
groups on the sometimes indistinct spectrum between ‘subversive’ politics and organised 
crime. The Allies’ arrival in Rome had not simply brought an end to partisans’ armed 
activity. Some militants who had taken up arms under the Occupation continued to traffic 
in fuel and weaponry, expropriate from farms and grocers, take over land and buildings 
and carry out political reprisals. Police treated all such bands as a common threat to civil 
 
 
 
1 The Pubblica Sicurezza report 27.3.1944, in ACS/DGPS/AGR/442/3490, reports that sixty women 
were involved.  
2 Widow of Umberto Scattoni, a militant of both the GAP and Bandiera Rossa, killed at the Fosse 
Ardeatine.  
3 Reported by Pubblica Sicurezza to have been the widow of Fernando Norma, an Actionist militant 
also killed at the caves.  
4 ACS/DGPS/AGR/442/3490. 
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peace, whatever their claimed political status. Former partisan groups could even be 
considered a catalyst to criminality, insofar as they gave cohesion and legitimacy to what 
might otherwise be considered mere banditry. At the beginning of 1945 troops raided the 
city periphery, where armed bands were most active. 
 
The wave of arrests and trials splintered the MCd’I. This was nothing like the bloodletting 
of the Occupation period. Yet it more deeply wounded the movement’s internal solidarity. 
Nazi atrocities had spread death and demoralisation, but never undermined militants’ 
common sense of justice. This was precisely the effect of the postwar trials, which 
distinguished ‘idealists’ from those who had used partisan activity as a mere ‘cover for 
common criminality’. This divide had not always been evident during the clandestine 
period; it was particularly nonsensical as applied to crimes against property committed 
during the Occupation. But militants who wanted to defend their own legitimacy bowed 
to this same logic. This led to the spectacle of partisans disowning their comrades before 
the courts, claiming that the ‘criminals’ had never belonged to the movement at all. 
 
As we shall see in Chapter Nine, this criminalisation fed wider organisational woes. The 
suppression of the Armata Rossa posed serious limits to the MCd’I’s growth, and this was 
compounded by its destructive infighting, its lack of a press license, and defections to 
other parties. Even in the first months following Liberation, it had declined sharply 
relative to Rome’s other political forces. One plausible intelligence estimate rated its 
membership in December 1944 at 13,400; a five-fold increase on its clandestine numbers, 
but a poor reflection of its greater freedom to organise. This same estimate set the PCI’s 
Rome membership at 51,260 and the Socialists’ at 22,525; the dissident communists still 
counted more members than Bonomi’s Labour-Democrats (10,150) and the Action Party 
(12,748), but lagged behind both the Monarchist Party (41,500) and Christian-Democrats 
(47,172).5 And while these latter were building their forces nationwide, the MCd’I had 
little organisation beyond the Lazio region. 
 
The obvious way out of this isolation was to organise a merger with similarly-inspired forces. 
However, militants were divided on whether they should attempt to join the Socialists or 
Communists, or else collaborate with other dissident currents. Since its origins Bandiera Rossa 
had advocated a united workers’ party,6 often highlighting the need for a congress that could 
resolve its differences with the ‘official Party’. But with the PCI now a 
 
 
 
5 ‘Political situation in Rome’, NA/WO204/12612/1–10.10.1944 
6 E.g. Verso il partito unico del proletariato’, Bandiera Rossa, 15.10.1943. 
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party of government and by far the numerically superior force, the dissidents were forced 
to contemplate a merger on terms not of their own choosing. Since the Salerno Turn it had 
become difficult to insist that the political organisations of the Left were merely 
provisional in character, or that the MCd’I was the pole of attraction around which others 
should rally. Its members instead looked for new political homes. 
 
9.1. The anger of crowds 
 
Defascistisation was the central issue facing the new government. To remove the officials 
responsible for Fascism effectively meant establishing an arbitrary dividing line between 
‘those truly responsible for Fascist dominion and the great mass drawn along in their wake’.7 
While state institutions sought a measure of stability, critics accused them of failing to conduct 
an effective purge, protecting top officials while settling scores against less important figures. 
The entire epurazione process led to the removal of just 1,476 of 143,781 officials examined. 
Popular disquiet at the ‘failed purge’ was particularly concentrated in the perception that war 
criminals had gone unpunished. While the spectre of unofficial ‘people’s tribunals’ soon died 
down,8 armed reprisals against Fascists continued into 1945. Both Allied and government 
officials identified the role of ‘subversive organisations’ in exploiting this resentment, 
whipping up mobs and carrying out political assassinations in the name of punishing Fascist 
crimes. Across the first months after Liberation, a series of explosive incidents highlighted the 
unrest that this could cause. 
 
The events surrounding the trial of Pietro Caruso dramatically evidenced the tension 
between state and popular justice. Rome’s police chief during the Occupation, Caruso had 
played a central role in organising the Fosse Ardeatine massacre, and in September 1944 
faced a capital case. In the days before the trial the words ‘Death to Caruso’ appeared in 
red paint on walls around Rome, and on the opening morning a crowd including victims’ 
relatives formed outside the Palace of Justice. Overpowering carabinieri, the crowd burst 
into the courtroom where proceedings were due to begin. Finding Caruso absent, they 
turned their anger on Donato Carretta, former director of the Regina Coeli prison. While 
 
 
 
7 Andreotti 2007, p. 17.  
8 Priest Libero Raganella (2000, p. 311), relates how he convinced MCd’I militant Renato Gentilezza of 
the pointlessness of individual revenge against a Fascist he had himself given refuge after 4 June: 
 
‘We did not risk so much to set up a people’s tribunal and condemn a single Fascist in the whole 
neighbourhood. If you are not able to bring all the fascists in the neighbourhood before a people’s 
tribunal, it is better not to set it up for just one’. ‘Azione militare’ (in MSdL/FSC/91), a set of 
instructions to MCd’I bands for the moment of the Allies’ arrival, advocates taking Fascists prisoner and 
then putting them before such tribunals, rather than killing them outright. MCd’I dossiers in 
MSdL/FSC however report that they handed German and Fascist prisoners directly to the Allies. 
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Carretta was a witness for the prosecution against Caruso, the crowd angrily set upon him. 
Police and Allied officials were powerless to restrain the assailants, as they beat the prison 
director bloody. Dragging Carretta from the courthouse, his attackers unsuccessfully tried to 
tie him to a tram, before dumping him in the Tiber, where he drowned. 
 
This violent retribution foreshadowed the scenes surrounding the botched trial of General 
Mario Roatta. He faced criminal charges for his actions as general and Army Chief of Staff 
under both Mussolini and Badoglio. He was first arrested in November 1944, as a 
commission of inquiry investigated his failure to defend Rome from Wehrmacht invasion. 
Further charges came from Tito’s government in Yugoslavia – which sought Roatta’s 
extradition for war crimes committed on its territory – as well as from a separate 
commission of inquiry investigating his role in the Fascist-era secret services. The first 
body to bring him to trial, this latter commission’s focus included his involvement in the 
assassination of the Rosselli brothers, anti-fascists murdered in France in 1937. The 
proceedings against the disgraced general did not however deliver justice. On 4 March, as 
the commission was due to report, Roatta escaped from the military hospital where he 
was being held. Aided by his army comrades, he fled to Franco’s Spain. 
 
The suspicion that the authorities had turned a blind eye to Roatta’s escape drove a storm 
of protest. Conspiracy theories abounded, blaming Bonomi, the Vatican or even British 
intelligence for assisting his flight. Such sentiments were strongly expressed at a protest 
rally on the evening of 6 March. Given the level of popular resentment, even parties 
which supported the government chose to participate. Speakers addressing the 20,000 
people outside the Colosseum included not only Filiberto Sbardella but also 
representatives of the Actionist and Socialist parties, the CGIL union and the Union of 
Italian Women, and the PCI’s Velio Spano. The initial rally was orderly, but some 
placards suggested an angrier mood. PWB officials noted with alarm such slogans as 
‘death to Roatta and his accomplices’, ‘We want a Committee of Public Safety instead of 
the High Court of Justice’, and ‘do you want another Carretta case? Throughout the 
speeches, voices in the crowd called for a march on the Quirinale palace, and as the rally 
broke up a section of the protestors headed in this direction.9 
 
The advance on the seat of the monarchy led to violent clashes. As the thousands-strong 
crowd pushed toward the entrance, mounted troops intervened to block their path. 
Protestors began hurling stones at police, and one militant pulled out a grenade. A fellow 
 
 
 
9 NA/WO204/6353/’Routine Report for the Week ending March 9 1945’ 
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demonstrator tried to stop him, only for the would-be assailant to trigger the device by 
mistake. He was killed instantly. Word spread among protestors that the police had 
thrown the bomb. Shrouding their ‘martyr’ in a red flag, militants carried his corpse aloft 
as they proceeded toward the Viminale, home of the Interior Ministry. Finding it guarded 
by only a handful of State Police, they soon overran the building. Protestors occupied 
offices and hung red flags flown from the balcony. They also left a grim calling-card for 
the police chief deemed responsible for the ‘attack’, depositing the dead man’s body on a 
table in front of his office. Some of those present attempted to find and confront prime 
minister Bonomi, but palace officials managed to block their path. 
 
PCI cadres arriving on the scene sought to defuse the situation. As the crowd clamoured 
for Bonomi’s resignation, l’Unità editor Spano insisted that his comrades would indeed 
confront the premier: unless there was a ‘change of atmosphere’, they would force him 
from office. But he also appealed for calm; ‘We have waited twenty years, we can wait a 
few more days’.10 This promise of action succeeded in dispersing the crowd, but the Party 
immediately rowed back from this stance. The following day’s l’Unità made no reference 
to police or government wrongdoing; interviewed by PWB officials the following week, 
Spano instead praised the carabinieri for their restraint.11 He damned the MCd’I, the 
Movimento Partigiano and Fascists for having organised a ‘provocation’ against the 
government.12 Embarrassingly for the PCI, it soon transpired that the man who died at the 
Quirinale was in fact one of their own members. 
 
The dissidents had themselves worked to fuel rather than dampen the anti-government mood, 
from their slogans at the initial rally to their active role in the Viminale occupation. Bandiera 
Rossa reported on the riot in enthusiastic terms, repeating the incendiary claim that a protestor 
had been killed by the police. It presented Roatta’s escape as the work of a state machine still 
dominated by Fascists, which the government did nothing to remove. One Allied operative 
responsible for watching ‘subversive organisations’ noted the increasingly ‘extreme’ tone of 
Antonino Poce’s comments on this subject. According to the 5 April 1945 PWB report, Poce 
had claimed that ‘if he were in charge of the epuration the citizens of Rome would see every 
day some collaborators hanged’.13 Like the riot at the Interior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 NA/WO/204/6353/’Routine Report for the Week ending March 15 1945’  
11 NA/WO/204/6353/’Routine Report for the Week ending March 9 1945’ 
12 Ibid.  
13 NA/WO/204/6353/’Routine Report for the Week ending April 5 1945’ 
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Ministry, such sentiments expressed the anger at the slow pace of change, and a sense of 
injustice that Resistance fighters were bearing the brunt of the postwar trials. 
 
The trials of postwar months had struck at both Fascist war criminals and the partisans 
accused of ‘common crimes’ during the Occupation period. The events of the Resistance 
period were being judged by a legal order inherited from before Liberation. In Rome this was 
well-illustrated by a case where the partisans who had killed Quadraro’s fascist police 
commissar in March 1944 were charged with murder, before being absolved on the grounds 
that he had been a collaborationist. Here the judge had used a basically arbitrary political 
judgement in place of any clear legal rationale. From May 1945 the cabinet began to discuss a 
means of bracketing off the mass of claims and counter-claims for wartime crimes. This 
problem was ultimately resolved, if in rather blunt fashion, by the general amnesty 
announced by justice minister Togliatti in June 1946. Explicitly aimed at ‘rapidly pushing the 
country toward conditions of political and social peace’,14 this policy epitomised the 
government’s attempts to pacify social tensions in the name of national unity . 
 
9.2. Holdout partisans 
 
The other key aspect of restoring social peace was the disarming of holdout partisans. One of 
the tools of this effort was the Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d’Italia (ANPI) established two 
days after the liberation of Rome, on the model of the British Legion.15 Like that association 
formed in the wake of World War I, ANPI was created as an ‘official’, state-recognised 
veterans’ body that would replace the fighters’ own organisations.16 Given that ANPI emerged 
not simply as a means of representing the veterans, but also of registering and disarming 
them, it had an ongoing dispute with the Movimento Partigiano, which instead sought to 
galvanise the disbanded fighters in a new political force. An AMG report in December 1944 
pointed to this latter’s subversive character, describing the ‘well-known’ dissident-communist 
takeover of this body.17 While the CLN parties had made ‘an attempt to counter-balance this’ 
by sponsoring the official Association’, ANPI had ‘made little 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Cited in Canosa and Federico 1974, p. 138.  
15 Harris 1957. The AMG also offered former partisans some employment opportunities, by the 
official historian’s account largely low-paid and menial.  
16 On the soldiers’ movement in Britain after the end of World War I, and the use of the British 
Legion as a means of subduing it, see Ward 1977.  
17 ‘Subversive Movements’, 8.12.1944, ACS/ACC/245A/50/SD/280. 
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progress beyond setting up a head office at the Campidoglio’.18 The central government 
thus instructed local prefects to form ANPI branches.19 
 
The difficulties of demobilising the armed bands also reflected the reasons why they had 
first been created. In the Occupation period the social revolt of draft resisters and the 
unemployed had created the bedrock of the partisan movement in the capital, and a mass 
base for its political organisations. The Allies’ arrival alleviated the social despair behind 
this mobilisation, but economic drives to political activity remained. Some Romans could 
be employed with the aid of parties and unions, whose resources and influence were 
rapidly expanding in this period. For their part, partisans’ associations were plagued by 
the phenomenon of ‘thirteenth-hour’ partisans, Italians of thin or non-existent partisan 
credentials who sought the benefits and prestige conferred on Resistance fighters. The 
small benefits for demobilisation – 1,000 lire, at June 1944 black market prices equivalent 
to the price of a litre of cooking oil – were however rather less incentive to those who 
really had risked their lives in the armed struggle. 
 
As the war continued in Northern Italy, there was still widespread scarcity in the capital. 
Rations were delivered with greater consistency than under Occupation, but remained at 
mere survival levels. A May 1945 police report strikingly illustrated the continuing lack of 
food. A city of over a million people was supplied just 15 heads of cattle per day;20 hence 
‘meat is distributed only among the ill. Butter is nowhere to be found. The sugar ration 
often “jumps” to the next month. The capital’s citizens have to live with a monthly ration 
of 2,360g of pasta, 200ml of oil, 100g of soup, 300g of fish and 200g of dry legumes. The 
great food shortages are barely touched by the 141,000 soup rations distributed daily. It 
would take 750,000 lire of annual spending to serve the most basic requirements, but few 
can allow themselves this much. Inflation reduces workers on fixed incomes to the 
blackest misery’.21 Allied sources painted a similar picture of mass unemployment and 
ongoing food shortages.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.; this was later confirmed in ACS/ACS/248/51, ‘Extract from Routine Report, 5 Feb. to 11 
Feb. 1945’. Other partisan veterans’ associations were also formed, before merging into ANPI at its 
founding congress in Rome at the end of 1947. It then became a charitable association which also 
acts as a political pressure group, promoting Resistance memories and values.  
20 Di Loreto 1991, p. 70  
21 ACS, PS 1944-46, b. 24 (Relazioni dei prefetti, Roma, ‘Relazione mensile sulla situazione politico-
economica e sull’ordine pubblico’), May 1945, Rome, cited in ibid.  
22 Harris 1957. 
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This also fed a different kind of ‘thirteen-hour partisan’ activity. Armed bands continued to 
operate in the peripheral borgate as well as neighbourhoods like San Lorenzo and Testaccio. 
They continued a campaign of robberies, armed expropriations and blackmail in order to 
extort resources from Fascists, industrialists and landowners. The distribution of part of the 
proceeds among a wider base of sympathisers, including through such means as ‘popular 
dinners’, allowed these bands to extend their political influence.23 AMG officials bewailed the 
impunity of these militants, faced with the absent or complicit Italian police.24 Most 
emblematic of this ongoing ‘social banditry’ was ‘Il Gobbo’, the sixteen-year-old gang leader 
who worked closely with the dissident communists. After the Allies’ arrival his band had 
gradually extended its control over the borgata of Quarticciolo, for six months keeping out 
police through military force.25 Alarmingly for the AMG, Il Gobbo even used contacts with 
Canadian troops to receive Allied arms, ammunition and food.26 
 
These bands had little interest in handing in their weapons. As one PWB report reasoned, 
the left-wing parties’ involvement in government ought to have allowed ‘the collection of 
weapons from armed partisans’ to ‘be solved by the simple expedient of an appeal to the 
party leaders rather than by police measures on the German model’,27 and in August 1944 
Socialist and Communist leaders echoed the AMG’s call for partisans to hand in their 
weapons. Yet this was ignored both by those militants who still expected some future 
moment of insurrection28 or who continued their armed activities. An 8 December PWB 
report on the MCd’I and Movimento Partigiano emphasised that it was ‘extremely doubtful 
 
 
 
 
23 See the 3 December 1944 letter from carabinieri chief Taddeo Orlando to the Interior Minister in 
ACS/MI/Gabinetto/Partiti Politici/181/3212. He reports that the MCd’I ‘extended to its members 
subsidies and benefits, perhaps with means – according to what is said – deriving from political 
reprisals against ex-fascists.  
24 ACS/ACC/B245A/S50/Extract from file No. 636/3/23/281–9. The rest of the report exemplified the 
distance between officials’ alarm at these groups’ activity and their interest in the vagaries of their 
politics. According to the anonymous author, ‘the Movimento Comunista has recently absorbed two 
other groups of the left, the Sinistra Proletaria and the Comunisti Libertari. The latter is an anarchist 
group of Trotskist tendencies. In his 3 December letter to the Interior Minister, Orlando characterised the 
MCd’I as ‘atheo-internationalist’ [sic]. A report from 13 October 1945 included in the same file 
speculated that the dissident movement’s decline from ’60,000 to 4,000 members’ owed to the ‘decline of 
the moral and financial aid coming from the Moscow government’. One AMG official reasoned, on the 
contrary, that the movement was part of plans by ‘Armando [sic] Bordiga’ to unite the extremist Socialist 
and Communist factions, reasoning that ‘Bordiga is regarded as a man who is very popular amongst 
masses [sic] and especially amongst workmen’. 
25 AMG officials reported that ‘The band installed machine gun nests in strategic spots and   
successfullyrepelledsporadiceffortsofthepolicetodislodgethem’. 
ACS/ACC/B245A/S50/149.20/17.2.45  
26 Ibid. 
27 NA/WO/FO371/43874/R10258/’Harold Caccia (ACC) to Mr Dixon’, 21.6.1944.  
28 See sections 7.6, 10.1. 
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whether they gave up their arms under AMG proclamation’.29 As well as threatening law-
and-order, this also served as a pretext for far-Right ‘subversives’ to hold onto their 
weapons. Allied officials expressed fears that ‘opposed extremisms’ would fuel each 
others’ growth as at the end of World War I.30 
 
With the majority of the population unemployed and the state slow to reassert its authority, 
subversive organisation remained intertwined with social banditry. The carabinieri’s general 
commander spoke of an MCd’I which now united ‘criminals, the unemployed and black 
market traffickers as well as elements of the old communist tendencies’;31 police and 
intelligence reports consistently emphasised the distinction between ‘idealists’ of the 
Resistance period and those who now joined bands as a ‘cloak’ for criminal activities. In 
practice this divide was rarely so simple, not least given militants’ general lack of concern for 
the illegality of expropriating Fascists, and the fact that social bandits like Il Gobbo, Franco 
Napoli and Costantino Rossi were widely recognised Resistance leaders. What united the 
more politicised and latter was a common disdain for state authority and desire to represent 
and lead the borgate populations. This brought them into conflict with those who saw these 
latter only as ‘criminal classes’32 and sought to assert state control. 
 
9.3. Criminalisation 
 
By the end of 1944 the state commission for epuration was the subject of sharp political 
wrangling. The removal that month of PCI cadre Mauro Scoccimarro as this commission’s 
director emboldened the forces in the state who sought to restrain this process. At the same 
time, the most explosive confrontations in the borgate, including the mysterious killing of a 
British corporal in Quarticciolo,33 alerted police and AMG officials to the need to restore order 
over holdout partisans. The first month of 1945 thus marked the beginning of a police 
 
 
29 Subversive Movements’, 8.12.1944, ACS/ACC/245A/50/SD/280.  
30 NA/WO/204/12612/’Political situation in Rome, August 1945; WO/204/6346/‘Report on 
conditions in Central Italy (north of Rome)’, 13.10.1944. This latter further noted: ‘Lastly there is the 
question of Patriots. Undoubtedly many of those who claim to have fought in the ranks of 
Partisans have not done so. But hundreds of others have endured terrible suffering and faced the 
gravest risks, and now find themselves unemployed and almost helpless in the various towns of 
this region. It is true that they have been offered manual labour which many of them refused as 
they considered it beneath their dignity. … Undoubtedly these patriots are discontented, and this 
discontent may be a source of real trouble in the future. It will be remembered that the bands of 
Fascists and Communists, who caused so much disturbance after the last war, were demobilised 
soldiers who were unable to find employment’.  
31 ACS/Comando Generale dell’Arma dei CCRR/Ufficio Servizio Situazione e Collegamenti/  
3779/2441/3.12.1944.  
32 ‘Extremist Political Parties and Movements’, 9.2.1945, ACS/ACC/248A/51, SD/150; 
ACS/ACC/B245A/S50/149.20, 17.2.1945, ’The “Gobbo” and Salvarezza Affair’.  
33 Ibid. 
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campaign to subdue the ‘subversive’ organisations on the city periphery. With the wave 
of arrests and trials that followed, militants were charged not only with their illegal 
actions after Liberation, but even for common crimes under the Occupation. Rome’s 
largest Resistance movement was particularly hard hit. Its militants were torn between 
standing by their accused comrades, or else attempting to distance themselves from their 
more disreputable associations. This question was complicated by the figures who 
aggregated around the movement in the months following Liberation. 
 
A particularly harmful associate was Umberto Salvarezza, one of the most prominent 
Roman ‘subversives’ in this post-Liberation period. While he had not been active in any 
clandestine formation, after the Allies’ arrival in June 1944 he founded a movement of so-
called ‘Gracchist communists’.34 Writing to Colonel Pollock, the carabinieri chief 
highlighted the kind of problems this movement posed to law-and-order, speaking of 
‘irregular and Gracchist communists who acted ‘outside the law, committing crimes 
against citizens’ personal freedoms [and] carrying out true and proper police actions by 
arresting people and confiscating their assets’.35 These armed bands forming after 
Liberation, and even members of the ‘recognised parties’, could ‘secretly hide large 
quantities of arms that came into their possession … following the distribution made to 
citizens in order to resist the Germans’.36 Salvarezza was also a close contact of Il Gobbo’s 
band in Quarticciolo, in both black market and weapons-trafficking activities. 
 
Allied pressure had over the summer helped weaken the dissident communists relative to 
the ‘recognised parties’, especially by disbanding the Armata Rossa. In June 1944 they 
nonetheless authorised Salvarezza to publish the newspaper l’Unione Proletaria, a weekly 
of apparent communist stamp.37 Harsh in its attacks on the Allies as well as the 
government, it soon became clear that this was a front for a group of former Fascists, who 
sustained themselves through organised crime. This Unione Proletaria which had seemed 
like a complement to the ‘subversive’ organisations,38 by January 1945 revealed itself to be 
 
 
 
 
 
34 A seeming reference to the Gracchus brothers, Roman popular tribunes of the second century 
BC, or else (adopting his own name from these predecessors) the great socialist of the French 
Revolution, Gracchus Babeuf.  
35 ACS/DGPS/AGR/I 441/2956, DGPS to Commissione Alleata di Controllo – Sottocommissione 
per la Pubblica Sicurezza, 4.9.1944, ‘Attività di alcuni movimenti politici’.  
36 Ibid. 
37 NA/WO/204/6284 lists this among the papers authorised by PWB.  
38 The Museo Storico della Liberazione ignorantly presents l’Unione Proletaria as well as similar fake 
communist newspaper Spartaco (produced in colour under German occupation!) without comment 
in a display of Resistance press. 
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their deadliest rival.39 Funded by monarchists and Fascists, it had built up an armed 
structure in order to resist the new democratic authorities, and also struck hard against 
the holdout partisan movement. On 15 January, Il Gobbo was killed by an unknown 
assailant as he came out of the Unione Proletaria office. Alarmed by this as well as the 
killing of a British corporal in this same district, police launched a counter-offensive. 
 
The next two days saw a concerted attempt to disarm all ‘subversive’ organisations. In 
some districts this took on the aspect of a military siege, as carabinieri established their 
control over previous no-go areas. Surrounding the borgate on 17 January before invading 
them the next day, the police arrested 97 people in Gordiani and 300 (among a population 
of twenty thousand) in the district previously controlled by Il Gobbo’s band.40 Stolen 
Allied weaponry, uniforms and ammunition were found in partisans’ homes. Largely 
concentrated in the borgate, the raids also struck at dissident-communist organisation 
across Rome. Even in the city centre, at one closed-down school on Via Giubbonari used 
as an MCd’I section office, carabinieri found 44 guns, 100 grenades and over 30,000 bullets 
hidden within the walls. 41 Only the subsequent week was the Unione Proletaria office itself 
raided. Salvarezza was tipped off by his own police contacts before the raid could take 
place, but was finally arrested on 4 February. 
 
This Salvarezza affair also illustrated the barriers to the defascistisation process. It is 
necessarily difficult to judge the true importance to this affair of organised resistance by the 
former officials of the Fascist regime. Any such claims have to rely on speculative links 
between the Salvarezza group, the monarchy, and sections of the police.42 Nonetheless, 
Salvarezza’s own intention clearly was to destroy the remaining partisan movement from 
within, by way of the influence he could exert over Il Gobbo. This was particularly illustrated 
by his attempt to induce the sixteen-year-old to conduct a bomb attack on a Communist-
Socialist rally. It seems that the ultimate killing of Il Gobbo was the result of his refusal to 
carry out this instruction, now that he was aware of Salvarezza’s true intentions and yet 
unwilling to obey his orders. Having inserted himself into the police even during the 
Occupation period, Salvarezza was protected by officials and never brought to trial, despite 
having been exposed as a violent Fascist in the Roman press. 
 
 
 
39 Corvisieri 1999 and Recchioni and Parrella 2015 reconstruct this history in great detail.  
40 ACS/ACC/B245A/S50/149.20, 17.2.1945, ’The “Gobbo” and Salvarezza Affair’. 
41 ACS/Comando Generale dell’Arma dei CCRR/Ufficio Servizio Situazione e Collegamenti, to   
MinInt Gabinetto 142/3, 25.1.1945, signed Taddeo Orlando.  
42 Corvisieri 1999 elaborates a detailed analysis of this kind. This is, however, an essentially 
speculative narrative, of a conspiracy to restore Badoglio to power that was not in fact fulfilled. 
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Amidst the atmosphere of repression, parts of the MCd’I sought to disassociate themselves 
from allegations of criminality. Already in October 1944, a financial dispute had led the Poce-
Sbardella group to declare Costantino Rossi’s expulsion. As he came to trial in June 1945, 
charged with armed robberies in both the Occupation and the post-Liberation periods, his 
former comrades cut him loose, claiming that he had never been part of their movement. Rossi 
and seven of his Quadraro band proudly defended the political character of their actions, 
arguing that they had conducted expropriations in order to feed the wider population. This 
ultimately proved a successful defence under the terms of the ‘Togliatti amnesty’, although in 
a further trial in March 1949 the judge refused this defence of robbery from a known Fascist’s 
home. The case instead collapsed on a technicality. In this latter case the crime had in fact been 
reported by Communists, Socialists and even a former MCd’I member, a reflection of Rossi’s 
lasting split from this movement. 
 
These episodes severely weakened the MCd’I’s morale and collective identity. This first of 
all owed to the fact that the wave of arrests had allowed police to discover its arms stores 
and impose control in previously no-go areas, subduing the holdout partisan movement. 
Yet these events had also explosed its leaders’ poor judgement. Poce in particular had 
veered wildly between naïve collaboration with figures who were nothing short of Fascist 
gangleaders, and then repudiation of the ‘criminality’ of the militants who were absolved 
even by the courts. Under conditions of Nazi repression, it had been easy to reconcile 
expropriations and robbery with more properly political conceptions of the movement’s 
activity. This came unstuck as the movement became bogged down in the organised 
crime of the post-Liberation period. It had internalised the police’s distinction between 
‘idealists’ and ‘criminals’, dissolving the solidarity between its militants most involved in 
the social revolt of the borgate and those who sought a path to legitimacy. 
 
9.4. Unity projects 
 
The difficulty for those who wanted to free the MCd’I from such ‘subversive’ connections was 
their lack of a common political strategy. From its origins the movement had united a variety 
of clandestine milieux, from Marxists to anarchists and less politicised partisan forces. This 
diversity had initially helped it become a leading actor in the Roman Resistance, rallying an 
armed force greater even than the traditional workers’ parties. However, the disappointment 
of its insurrectionary hopes upon Liberation raised questions over its future purpose. Its 
armed strength had been weakened, and it now lacked influence on the democratic process. 
Proposals for a way out of the impasse varied from joining the Communists or Socialists to 
uniting with other dissident currents. Yet it was difficult for 
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its militants to act as a coherent bloc, when they favoured such incompatible solutions. As 
the movement swerved between rival unity projects, it continued to fragment. 
 
This most of all owed to the movement’s difficult relations with the PCI. As we saw in 
section 8.4., this problem had already raised its head in the split following the dissolution 
of the Armata Rossa. This dispute had displayed the different approach of the likes of Poce 
and Sbardella, who accepted the possibility of folding the movement into the PCI, and 
those militants like Cretara and Mucci who more firmly defended its independent 
standing. This was not, however, concentrated in a clash between different political 
theses, or even a split within MCd’I branches. Both groups continued to insist on their 
own ‘Stalinist’ orthodoxy, although the latter group sometimes made reference the 
‘particularity’ of Italian conditions and need to avoid following Moscow ‘blindly’. They 
were ultimately bound together by the fact that the PCI would not accept the movement 
entering its ranks en bloc, unwilling to accept a destabilising ‘extremist’ force. 
 
After the dissolution of the Armata Rossa, Poce had attempted to establish ties with 
Amadeo Bordiga. Absent from organised politics since 1926 and expelled by the 
Togliattians in 1930, Bordiga nonetheless enjoyed prestige among certain layers of 
militants on account of his role in founding the Communist Party. Poce had in fact been 
expelled from the PCI together with Bordiga, and approached the Neapolitan engineer 
with a view to reconstituting a new force to the Left of the PCI. However, aside from their 
common hostility toward the Togliatti leadership, the positions developed by Bordiga had 
little in common with the Roman dissidents. This mostly owed to Bordiga’s extreme 
pessimism about the prospects of a revolutionary movement in the immediate future. 
After a long spell out of political activity, upon his return in the immediate postwar 
period he emphasised the gravity of the defeat suffered at the hands of ‘democratic’ 
politics, and the need to re-establish the programmatic bases of Marxism.43 
 
Already in the Resistance period, the Left-Communists, whose tradition stemmed from 
Bordiga’s battle in the 1920s Communist Party, had sharply criticised the MCd’I’s positions. 
Poce and Viviana Chilanti visited Milan in March 1944 to establish contacts with Bordiga’s 
comrade Onorato Damen, only for this latter to term them ‘Stalinists’ whose proper place was 
in the Communist Party.44 This Milanese organisation was strongly critical of the USSR, the 
vision of socialism it represented, and its international alliances. This also extended to 
 
 
 
43 See Saggioro 2010.  
44 Ibid. 
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a hostility toward the partisan war in general, deemed nothing but a nationalist deviation 
from the class struggle.45 Even in its less passive variants, the Left-Communist approach 
placed an absolute priority on programmatic unity and coherence. Assessing the eclectic 
Roman dissident movement by such standards, Damen and then Bordiga each dismissed 
Poce out of hand. 
 
The MCd’I’s veneration of the USSR set it at odds with the anti-Stalinist currents now 
forming propaganda groups around Italy. This was evident in the conference held by the 
Naples Left-Communists in February 1945, also attended by Trotskyists, Carlo Andreoni, 
the anarchists and Poce, Cretara and Sbardella for the MCd’I. In his own San Lorenzo 
district Mucci had entertained friendly relations with the Comunisti Libertari. These latter 
together with the Left-Communists however used the Naples congress to push a strongly 
anti-Stalinist agenda, connecting their rejection of the PCI’s strategy with a general 
critique of the Soviet social system and role in the ‘imperialist war’. This provoked an 
angry reaction from Sbardella. He furiously attacked the pretensions of those who 
criticised the Soviet war effort, condemning this as a betrayal of the sacrifices made for the 
anti-fascist cause.46 There was no basis for unity with these other dissident circles. 
 
Mucci and Sbardella also travelled around Italy in the effort to create local sections in other 
cities. This had some success, in the sense that the MCd’I could indeed extend its organisation 
across the national territory, with particularly notable sections in Venice and Brindisi. 
Epitomising the contradiction in the movement’s outlook, the Venice group47 was led by 
former members of the Partito d’Azione who themselves sought a merger with the PCI. Since 
the movement’s Resistance operations had been limited to the central Italian regions of Lazio 
and to a far lesser extent Abruzzo and Umbria, these other sections lacked 
 
 
45 L’insidia del partigianismo’, Prometeo, 1.11.1943. 
46 See reports in FG/AN/63/135–6.  
47 Enrico Borin and around twenty of his comrades formed an ‘Association of Sympathisers with 
Communism’. His Qual è il mio partito? [‘What’s my party?] was written in December 1943 but published 
only in abridged form in 1945. It presented a sensibility similar to that of Scintilla, praising the theories 
of Marx, Lenin and Stalin while connecting these latter to a maximalist perspective. It  
 
‘sympathised with communism but did not want to participate in the Communist Party before it 
could more serenely judge its behaviour, and disinterestedly make basic and simple propaganda 
for communist principles without letting itself be influenced by party arrivismo, opportunism and 
ambition and by demagogic systems’. The text was also notable for its attempt to counterpose the  
Church and the Christian religion, as it attacked ‘the priests who abuse the weapon of religion 
ardently to defend the current capitalist institutions, taking sides against communism and thus also 
ignoring the communist principles of St. Paul who said “Whoever works eats and whoever does 
not work shall not eat [sic]’. ‘All this contrasts with the Christian religion, because Christ himself 
preached and practiced a life in common with the humble and destitute. St Paul, true founder of 
the Christian religion, deprived of means, honoured himself on not living off the backs of those 
among whom he evangelised, and everywhere he went exerted his craft as a weaver’ (ibid., p. 20). 
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the social weight the movement had built in the partisan mobilisation. Indeed, while by 
the time of the Constituent Assembly elections the Roman MCd’I considered itself too 
weak to put up candidates, a tiny Milanese group that gravitated to the movement after 
Liberation went ahead regardless, scoring utterly derisory results. 
 
The movement’s difficulties in establishing local sections also owed to the PCI’s energetic 
efforts to suppress its activity. Novella’s approach was most of all governed by the 
attempt to detach ‘healthy’ elements from the ‘extremist’ and ‘criminal’. It was ‘necessary 
to strike on the basis of their delinquent social base and their louche’ activities, also by 
reporting their arms stocks and anti-democratic ends to the police.48 Just as the PCI had 
instrumentalised Amidani, Avico and Terzani in its efforts to break up the Armata Rossa, 
the Party also sent its own militants into the MCd’I in order to help draw sections of its 
membership into its own ranks. In Viterbo, it recruited a former MCd’I leader Attilio 
Vagnoni, who then brought this local group into the Party’s own ranks.49 So, too, did it 
enjoy the spontaneous adhesion of other MCd’I members who worked to organise ad hoc 
mergers of their own local branches.50 At a more indirect level, the Party also secured a 
coup against the MCd’I by registering the name Bandiera Rossa with the press distributor, 
thus preventing the dissidents getting their own title onto the newsstands. 
 
In February 1945 the MCd’I nonetheless issued an ‘internal bulletin’ of this name, breaking the 
eight-month gap since Bandiera Rossa’s last appearance. This strikingly illustrated the dispersal 
of the movement’s leadership among more coherent forces. There were those who had 
departed for the Socialists, from ‘the Matteotti brothers [who] are no longer with us’, to Pietro 
Battara, who had ‘left with good reason’. Even ‘[Raffaele] de Luca no longer sees us as he 
would like to’, and was instead turning toward the Communist Party. ‘Palmidoro, Guzzo, 
Pappalardo, [Gino] Paris and so many others disappointed by incomprehension 
 
 
 
 
48 ‘Dal rapporto del compagno Novella’, 24.3.1945, FGAN/87/311–318. The Brindisi section 
leadership of the MCd’I, expelles from the PCI, were arrested at the beginning of June 1945 after a 
report on their weapons stocks. Sbardella accused the local PCI federation of having been at the 
source of the report (‘’Una protesta del Mov. Comunista d’Italia’, Il Partigiano, 18.6.1945). The PCI 
insisted that the victims of these militants’ blackmail efforts had in fact reported them (‘Da Brindisi 
nota Informazioni’, FGAN/87/53), but repeated the claim that these were ‘adventurers’ embarking 
on ‘criminal actions’. Both Novella’s explicit approach and police reports from this period do 
suggest a certain sharing of information. Note in particular ACS/DGPS/AGR/Sez I/441/04884 
(Capo della Polizia a Gabinetto Min Int, 14.6.45), describing the PCI’s effort to infiltrate its own 
members into the MCd’I. In fact, after Constantino Rossi’s expulsion from the movement, local 
members of the PCI, PSI and even one former MCd’I member joined together in reporting him to 
police. Rossi’s own attempts to join the Party after his expulsion from the MCd’I were rebuffed.  
49 See Attilio Vagnoni’s reminiscences in Galli (ed.) 1984.  
50 E.g. FGFM/275/56. 
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and conscious of their good faith have left us’. 51 At the conference at the end of that 
month, Filiberto Sbardella tried to reassure militants that their hard work was not in vain: 
‘we can compare Communism to a cyclopean wall, which we build taking gigantic 
boulders one by one till we reach the right height’. 52 Less clear was that the movement 
was still building toward this end. 
 
9.5. The communist idea 
 
Faced with charges of criminality, elements of the MCd’I leadership pushed for the 
movement to regularise its position. This included the effort to expel elements in its ranks 
linked to the world of organised crime, measures of which Antonio Poce informed the 
Interior Ministry.53 From September the movement was finally able to circulate a 
newspaper via legal channels.54 To this end it was, however, forced to abandon its historic 
masthead, and instead took the new title l’Idea Comunista. Appearing every Sunday, the 
four-page broadsheet was edited by Francesco Cretara. This paper tried to reposition the 
movement on a more solid political footing, while also publishing numerous articles in 
homage to its Resistance ‘martyrs’. This was accompanied by pamphlets setting out the 
bases of Marxist politics, in the movement’s own idiosyncratic style.55 
 
Above all the newspaper illustrated the difficulties that militants like Poce, Mucci and Cretara 
faced in turning what had been a clandestine and armed movement into one which issued 
propaganda at the fringes of a democratic society. There were articles that aptly pointed to the 
kind of difficulties that persisted under the first postwar governments, with such pieces as 
‘Enough with Reconstruction!’ and ‘On the Threshold of Winter’56 highlighting the conditions 
of Roman tenants and labourers whose conditions remained dismal. Yet what the paper 
notably lacked was a common political line or perspective that gave a sense of collective 
strategy. Given the movement’s longstanding embrace of Stalinism it could, at least, be said to 
be pluralist in its consistent positive references to the meetings of the Italian Anarchist 
Federation. But the movement’s leaders seem not to have 
 
 
 
 
51 ‘A testa alta’, Bandiera Rossa, I/1, 1.2.45.  
52 Cited in Perrotta 2016, p. 294.  
53 Reported in ACS/DGPS/AGR/Sez I/ 441/03562, Capo della Polizia to Gabinetto del Consiglio 
dei Ministri, 16.3.1946.  
54 Antonino Poce personally corresponded with prime minister Ferruccio Parri and Ivanoe Bonomi 
in order to seek permission to publish. ACS/Gabinetto/Archivio Generale/Fascicoli Permanenti, 
Partiti politici/Poce to Parri, 25.7.1945  
55 Including Francesco Cretara’s L’ABC del Proletario and the Turin group’s Repubblica Socialcomunista d’Italia.  
Poce 1947.  
56 Sulla soglia dell’inverno – idem, 13.9.1946, Orfeo Mucci 
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drawn any clear political lessons from their experience, and in particular remained 
attached to the insistence that the PCI stood at odds with Moscow. 
 
This was particularly concretised in a debate on the present relevance of Lenin’s Left-Wing 
Communism, one of many texts that had recently reappeared as part of l’Unità’s own 
publishing efforts. An editorial preface to the opening piece in this debate noted the 
‘highly delicate questions confronted in [its] final part’, described as ‘personal views’. 57 
The reason for sensitivity was that here, for the first time, the movement’s press published 
an article suggesting that Stalin was not the direct heir and continuator of Lenin’s work. 
Gabriele dell’Edera insisted that Lenin’s critique of ultra-Leftism did not justify the kind 
of compromises made by Stalin, and highlighted that the Russian revolutionary had like 
Amadeo Bordiga also been a stern critic of ‘opportunism’. The article was most of all a 
polemic against the PCI’s misuse of Lenin’s own text; it made no attempt to explain why 
the USSR had departed from the Russian revolutionary’s approach. Yet scattered 
references to the need for ‘great reservations’ about the ‘social actions in Eastern Europe’, 
as well as the danger of ‘Stalinist conformism’ for ‘the whole world’s proletariat’, 
suggested a half-formed critique of Stalinism.58 
 
The editor’s reply showed how far l’Idea Comunista stood from other dissident-Left 
currents. Cretara distinguished between the ‘two Stalins’, governed by Realpolitik and 
revolution respectively. This unusual analysis combined elements of past Leninist 
defences of NEP with a recognition of the limits inevitable to any ‘socialism in one 
country’. Internal backwardness had compelled the Soviet leader to make unfortunate 
compromises, from the USSR’s ‘social stratification’ to its reliance on importing Western 
expertise. This could only ‘weigh on the stomachs of all idealists’.59 But ‘if Stalin the 
organiser has had to accept the hardest, most tortuous compromises with bourgeois 
politics and morality, Stalin the revolutionary has never ceased to feel that the end goal of 
the USSR’s current defensive force and domestic and foreign policy is world revolution’. 
He could achieve this only with the aid of foreign peoples, which must ‘break with an 
integrating [sic] progressive democracy and follow revolutionary principles’, thus 
replacing ‘capitalist encirclement’ with a ‘Union of Worldwide Socialist Republics [sic]’.60 
 
 
 
 
 
57 ‘Leninismo sospetto’, l’Idea Comunista, 20.1.1946.  
58 Ibid. 
59 ‘I due Stalin’, l’Idea Comunista, 27.1.1946.  
60 Unione di Repubbliche Sovietiche Mondiali; an idiosyncratic rewriting of the name of the USSR, 
replacing the plural adjective ‘Socialist’ with the plural of ‘Worldwide’. 
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The MCd’I could in this sense draw hope from a shift of tone in the Communist Parties. 
This particularly owed to the offensive against ‘Browderism’, the ‘liquidationist’ course 
taken by the American Communist leadership. Earl Browder had in June 1944 dissolved 
his party into a looser association in the name of helping to keep the New Deal coalition 
alive, and the sharp reproach from Moscow energised a leftist sensibility within the 
Communist Parties. A piece on the PCF theoretical review, taken as representing Stalin’s 
thinking, denied that the Popular Front was a permanent break with the communist end 
goal and reproached any exaggerated optimism regarding the permanence of the anti-
fascist alliance. The Roman dissidents themselves termed the PCI ‘Browderist’, as they 
attempted to identify with the mainstream in the world Communist movement. As the 
fascist enemy disappeared, L’Idea Comunista looked for signs that the Communist Parties 
were stepping back from the wartime alliance strategy.61 
 
9.6. A Cold War Republic 
 
By the end of 1945 little remained of the wartime dissident movements, and the PCI was 
still strongly growing. Committed to the policy it had followed since the Salerno Turn, the 
Party was a consistent member of all the anti-fascist coalition governments. Through their 
different party combinations, these democratic cabinets oversaw a return to peace and the 
formation of a new institutional order in Italy. As part of the ruling coalition the PCI 
played a decisive role in creating a new Republic and writing a progressive-spirited 
constitution. To its lasting pride, this document declared Italy a ‘democratic republic 
founded on labour’ and promised sweeping social rights, job protection and civil liberties. 
The Party had made an imprint on the Republic, which would long survive its own direct 
involvement in government. At the electoral level, the Party was rather less able to impose 
itself. Its popular support, greatly swollen by its protagonist role in the Resistance, was 
sufficient to claim it a central role throughout the constituent process. However, it would 
soon be forced into opposition, as the Grand Alliance came to an end. 
 
The first postwar elections on 2 June 1946 illustrated a political imbalance between the 
Resistance and the population. The institutional referendum was a victory for the Left. The 
anti-fascist parties were all for the Republic, except the neutral Christian Democrats, and 
secured a 54 percent vote to abolish the monarchy. The strong regional divide also reflected 
how far the parties had been able to build influence through the Resistance: while in the 
 
 
 
 
61 It referred to the PCI as governed by ‘Browderist’ positions in ‘La differenza: Partito e Movimento’,  
DR, 27.7.1944. 
  
222 
 
 
industrial North the republican vote topped two-thirds, in Lazio the monarchists won a 
two percent majority and in Campania over eighty percent of the poll. The strength of 
conservative feeling was also evident in the constituent assembly vote that same day. The 
PCI’s 4.4 million votes marked a major advance on its scores in all pre-Fascist elections. 
Yet this still amounted to less than a fifth of all voters; it stood 400,000 votes behind the 
Socialists and over 3.7 million behind the Christian Democrats. The second most 
important force within partisan ranks, the azionisti secured just 1.5%. 
 
The Assembly thus elected embarked on composing a new constitution. The document 
passed in December 1947 established a parliamentary democracy with strong limits on the 
executive, and guaranteed far-reaching freedoms. Designed to prevent the recrudescence 
of authoritarianism, it forbade offensive military action and the reconstitution of the 
Fascist Party. The text was also notable for its references to labour’s special role in Italian 
society, though these were general affirmations of principle more than binding legal 
provisions. This was particularly notable in Article 1, declaring the state a ‘democratic 
republic founded on labour’, as well as Article 4’s assertion of a ‘right to work’. These 
were each compromise formulas between the CLN parties, after Togliatti had attempted 
to assert a more ambitious reference to ‘a democratic republic of the workers’. The 
constitution’s progressive rhetoric and the space it guaranteed opposition parties made it 
among the PCI’s surest points of identification. 
 
The constitutional arch was no longer a government alliance. Alcide de Gasperi had visited 
the United States in January 1947, and after the signing of the postwar peace treaties he was 
convinced that his Christian-Democrats no longer needed Communist support. Pledging a 
more robust strategy for containing Soviet influence, in March 1947 new US president Harry 
Truman told Congress of his plans for financial aid for states resisting the rise of Communism. 
The enhanced US role in European affairs emboldened anti-communist forces, at the expense 
of unity based on anti-fascism. In May 1947, both the PCI and PCF were thrown out of 
government. PCI ministers were forced from office and ex-partisans removed from roles in the 
police and army command. Continuing to work in the constitutional panels, the PCI now 
became a party of opposition, resuming the labour strikes and protest actions it had put on 
hold during the national-unity government.62 
 
 
 
 
62 This did not, however, mean any kind of turn away from democratic politics. See Chapter Ten. 
Note also the Troilo affair at the end of November 1947, discussed in Cooke 2011. A partisan 
appointed prefect was removed from office, unlike many former Fascists. Local leader Giancarlo 
Pajetta organised a brief occupation of the prefecture by partisans: informing Togliatti of his move 
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This sharpened bloc binary also closed down space for the dissident Left. The MCd’I’s 
remaining militants were those who had resisted the rush to join the PCI after Liberation, 
maintaining their opposition to the anti-fascist alliance. Their organisation had continued 
to aggregate dissident currents, forming new branches across Italy. Yet these had never 
included the propaganda groups of the anti-Stalinist Left, and nor could the MCd’I itself 
become such an organisation. Having never developed any theorised rejection of the 
Soviet model in the manner of left-communists or Trotskyists, these dissidents could now 
see signs of a hardening in the Moscow-led world communist movement. These militants 
had always sought a reconciliation with the official Party, on condition that it break with 
its bourgeois partners. Their enfeebled movement was in no condition to lay down terms 
to the much mightier Party. But the PCI’s new position made it easier for them to accept 
its discipline, and by the end of summer 1947 the Roman organisation ceased to exist. 
 
The PCI was not a political home for all of the dissidents. Some of the MCd’I’s leaders 
joined no new party, or retreated from public life; others paused for reflection, later to 
embrace different political identities. The Party itself had no open door policy. It had 
always sought to incorporate the ‘healthy part of the movement’, and its cadres now took 
over its local sections. Yet the animosities of the Resistance period had not simply 
disappeared, and the PCI remained distrustful of those who threatened internal 
opposition. It had been forced out of government against its will, and was not now 
prepared to embrace an image of extremism. Recognising their defeat after 1945, Antonino 
Poce and Raffaele de Luca swallowed their pride, presenting their applications to join the 
‘official Party’. Neither was accepted. As the bulk of their comrades flocked into the PCI, 
the movement’s founders were cast into the political wilderness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by telephone, Togliatti is said to have sarcastically replied ‘and what do you intend to do with it?’ 
The occupation was soon lifted. 
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Chapter Ten 
 
The ‘Red Resistance’ and its myths 
 
Marxists are given to writing their own histories. The red thread of tradition establishes a 
teleology between acquired experience and the imagined future. It is most importantly a 
source of legitimation: it relates both the sacrifices to be redeemed through ultimate 
victory, and the past lessons that guide action in the present. The leaders of the Italian 
Communist Party were prolific in producing this kind of literature. More difficult was 
reflection when the end goal itself drifted out of view. The cadres who dissolved the Party 
in 1991 were little moved to explain where it had gone wrong.1 They had given up not just 
a name, but the very idea of a future that they were working toward.2 
 
The scale of the collapse impeded a serious assessment of the Party’s record. Ever since 
Togliatti’s time the PCI had boasted of its specifically ‘national’ road to socialism. It had 
vaunted its ‘differentness’, the democratic mores that rooted it in a world apart from the 
Eastern Bloc. Yet the ‘Italian road’ stopped at the rubble of the Berlin Wall. The dominant 
mood was resignation, the sense that an illusion had passed. Some recast its old leaders to 
suit their new politics; others sought a ‘Refoundation’,3 or to continue as before. Few 
questioned what linked their past icons to the final collapse. The most serious assessments 
came from those who had always remained at the Party’s margins. 
 
Confronted with their own defeat, the militants of the MCd’I faced similar barriers to 
reflection. They had long portrayed their struggle in grand historical terms, the final 
vindication of apostles and martyrs past.4 They had presented their activity not just as part of 
a national Resistance, but as the culmination of a hundred-year dream.5 These autodidacts 
spoke in a language of faith and redemption. But with the tie to the end goal broken, they 
could only frame their record in much narrower terms. There were tributes to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Aside from historians once linked to the Party, the political figures who wrote works reflecting on 
the PCI were overwhelmingly either dissidents who had always stood apart from the Party 
mainstream (most notably Magri 2012) or else opposed its dissolution. This thus set the final 
generation of leaders apart from the likes of Togliatti, Amendola, Secchia and Longo, who each 
wrote extensive works of Party history.  
2 See Traverso 2016 for useful reflection on this theme. 
3 On the history of Rifondazione Comunista see Favilli 2011 and Broder 2015.  
4 ‘Bandiera Rossa’, BR, 5.10.1943.  
5 ‘Chiarificazione’, BR, 5.10.1943: ‘Whoever cannot in the current moment see the revolutionary 
situation which the European proletariat has been awaiting for a hundred years is either blind or 
betrays the workers’ cause. 
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the dead, and memoirs boasting of wartime feats. Yet their teleology had hit a dead end, 
and no attempt was made to explain its failure. 6 
 
There were medals for leading partisans, and plaques to remember the dead. Even the 
Italian state could commemorate Tigrino Sabatini, victim of Nazism. This in no way 
lessened the oblivion for the movement he had built. The CLN parties had founded a 
Republic in their own image; Sabatini’s comrades were defeated and dispersed. His 
movement had not helped found the new institutions, but attempted to resist their 
control. It had no place in any mythology built on the constitutional arch. Its defeated 
struggle was the repressed of the Italian Republic: the thwarted hopes, and arms stocks, 
that the new democracy could not integrate. 
 
The institutional compromise sealed at Salerno in 1944 would cast a long shadow over the 
postwar Left. The Resistance had seen unparalleled levels of mass militancy, with tens of 
thousands of Italians engaged in armed struggle, and millions in general strikes. It was 
also a breakthrough for the Communist Party, which had established itself as Italy’s 
second party. Yet Togliatti’s partito nuovo was also a party of republican order, which had 
channelled the militancy of the war period into a democratic reform process. The 
Resistance thus stood in Party folklore as the moment when the masses had asserted their 
role at the centre of institutional life. 
 
In the postwar period the PCI vaunted the Resistance’s success in helping to found a new 
democracy. From its election rallies to trade union protests and peace campaigning, the 
Party also invoked the aspirations of the Resistance that still remained to be fulfilled. This 
 
 
 
6 Militants produced remarkably little history of their movement, in which sense Corvisieri 1967 
was a totally original contribution. Short texts produced in the immediate wake of Liberation such 
as Il Comandante del Trionfale (on Romolo Iacopini) or the collective obituary I nostri martiri (MCd’I 
1944c) were largely apolitical and personal portraits. In postwar interviews Orfeo Mucci defended 
his comrades’ contribution to the Resistance as well as their distinct class-war agenda. He did not 
however provide any account of the movement in the post-Liberation period, and thus its defeat.  
The most critical analysis from a figure in the MCd’I’s orbit (if not actually a member) is Periccioli 
2001. This volume is an interview with Otello Terzani, who discusses the movement’s Stalinist 
politics from his own Left-Communist standpoint. Chilanti’s accounts of this are highly 
fragmentary, although are bound by a common tendency to portray the MCd’I as loosely held 
together by maximalist sentiments rather than political organisation. Pepe n.d. is a catalogue of 
bold claims and invective, but sympathetically portrays several of the movement’s key figures. Its 
most striking political edge, beyond its veneration of Joseph Stalin, is its bitter criticism of the CLN 
leaders (and not the GAP or PCI specifically) as the organisers of the Via Rasella attack, which led 
to such bloodshed. Guzzo 1945 and 1964 offer a highly tendentious account of the movement’s 
history, governed by this curious figure’s embrace of right-wing and nationalist politics. This 
extends even to changing its name so that the ‘C’ stands for ‘clandestine’ rather than ‘communist’; 
the second of these volumes is dedicated to the Christian-Democratic prime minister Antonio 
Segni, and little-disposed to question why the revolution did not succeed. 
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was notable in the Party’s reverence for the 1947 constitution, with its promise of a 
‘democratic republic founded on labour’. Across subsequent decades the PCI’s attachment 
to this document remained undimmed, taking its rhetoric as an ideal to be realised in the 
present. This served as a ‘national-popular’ reference point, linking Italian democracy to 
the PCI-led working class and its traditions. 
 
Forces to the PCI’s Left took a more critical view of the Republic ‘founded on labour’. 
Workers had indeed rebuilt Italy, but they had not assumed ownership over it. The 
Christian-Democrats’ dominance of the postwar state emboldened critics of the 
institutional compromise from which the Republic had emerged. There were those, like 
left-communists, who criticised the Resistance as a mere nationalist displacement of class 
struggle. Yet the new movements of the 1960s above all emphasised the potential that had 
gone unfulfilled. They pointed to a ‘Red Resistance’, embodying the class-war militancy 
that had somehow been defeated, or betrayed. 
 
The mythology of the ‘missed opportunity’ also fed a cult of armed struggle. After 
Liberation, thousands of militants had held onto their weapons.7 Despite the PCI 
leadership’s commitment to the democratic process, the dream of insurrection repeatedly 
resurfaced. This was particularly evident in July 1948, as PCI members staged armed 
demonstrations in response to the attempt on Togliatti’s life. At the end of the 1960s some 
former partisans joined with younger militants in armed-struggle groups like the Brigate 
Rosse and the Gruppi d’Azione Partigiana. They drew inspiration both from Third World 
guerrillas and the lost militancy of Italy’s own ‘Red Resistance’. 
 
Neo-fascist terrorism and police repression of the militant Left also helped fuel these 
tactics, earning them a measure of sympathy among the wider extra-parliamentary milieu. 
Yet the spike in such tactics after the contestation of 1977 also reflected the defeat of 
broader-based social movements. The terrorist groups saw themselves in the role of a new 
underground, and drew heavily on the imagery of the war period. They took the Republic 
as the spearhead of ‘fascism’ and the United States for an ‘occupying power’. Frontally 
clashing with the Italian state, they sought to explode the constitutional arch and prevent 
a fresh institutional compromise in the present. 
 
This concluding chapter focuses on the longer-term effect of the repression of Resistance 
radicalism. It argues that this history left a reservoir of disappointed hopes that continued 
 
 
 
 
7 See Di Loreto 1991 and Zaslavsky 2004. 
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to destabilise the new Republic. After the war the new state succeeded in marginalising 
the dissident Left, which was unable to maintain lasting organisation or hand down any 
enduring political tradition. But the limits to defascistisation created a sense of 
‘unfinished business’ which time and again returned to the centre of Italian public life. 
The political violence put on hold in 1945 continued to resurface throughout the postwar 
decades, as militants sought to fight the Resistance’s battles anew. 
 
10.1. The ora X of insurrection 
 
The return of armed struggle first emerged from within PCI ranks. In government in 
1944-47 the Party had asserted its institutional mores, helping write the Republic’s 
democratic constitution. Yet the international context soon blocked further democratic 
advance. The end of the war disbanded the Grand Alliance, and this quickly unravelled 
the pact between Europe’s Communists and their liberal, Gaullist and Christian-
Democratic partners. As the Communists took power in the Red Army-controlled East, 
anti-communists ejected them from office in the West. Both the French and Italian parties 
were thrown out of government in May 1947. The US pressure behind these moves was 
soon followed by Marshall Aid dollars aimed at strengthening Europe’s capitalist 
economies. The PCI would never govern the Republic it had helped to create. 
 
The institutional compromise laid the basis of a new democracy, but not for further 
advance for the PCI. The Salerno Turn had aimed to guarantee the Party a role in Italy’s 
future governance, preventing the hardening of US hegemony. Togliatti combined this 
approach with his own more general conception of ‘progressive democracy’, a gradualist 
vision that replaced a classic Leninist divide between the ‘bourgeois’ and ‘workers’ states’. 
This vision of advancing toward socialism by degrees however tended to underestimate 
the effect of the Cold War on the other anti-fascist parties, and the difficulties of keeping 
Italy outside of the binary bloc system. Postwar elections not only showed the Christian 
Democrats to be far more popular in the country than in the Resistance period, but also 
more governed by anti-communism than Togliatti had anticipated. 
 
The May 1947 crisis thus marked a clear setback for the PCI’s strategy of advance through 
democratic channels. This defeat was a key subject of the first postwar conference of 
Communist Parties, held at Szklarska Poręba that September. The congress saw a 
confrontation between the PCF and PCI and their central-eastern European counterparts, who 
accused the French and Italians of a naïve approach to the new bloc politics. Both Andrei 
Zhdanov and the Yugoslavs bitterly criticised PCI leaders for their over-reliance on 
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parliamentary tactics.8 While all Communist Parties had taken part in popular-front 
alliances and moderated their anti-capitalist radicalism, this did not mean that it was 
possible to follow a consensual and peaceful road to socialism. The institutional turn had 
been just one part of a dual-track strategy, which ought also to prepare for the possibility 
of taking power by force. 
 
While Togliatti himself rejected such doppiezza, it was an enduring strain of the Party’s 
militant culture. This was particularly apparent in the political crisis of summer 1948. 
Already in April the Republic’s first parliamentary elections had marked a setback for the 
PCI’s strategy. While the Christian Democrats won a resounding victory with close to half 
of all votes, the combined Communist-Socialist list won only thirty percent of the total. 
This exposed a vast gulf between the political balance of the Resistance and the feeling 
among the Italian population as a whole. The voters had rewarded a sharply anti-
communist Christian-Democratic campaign with an emphatic mandate. It was becoming 
apparent that the dream of a ‘progressive democracy’ was slipping away. When a lone 
fanatic shot Togliatti outside parliament on 14 July, militants took it as evidence of a 
hardening reactionary mood. Their reaction was fierce. 
 
The unrest hinted at what could have happened if the Resistance had not headed into 
institutional compromise.9 Partisans who had laid down their weapons now again took to 
the streets. Communications and transport were halted; armed militants occupied police 
stations, and workers at FIAT in Turin took the managing director hostage. Police moved 
to repress the unrest, and within three days 30 people lay dead. A general descent into 
violence loomed. Still fresh in the memory were recent events in Prague, where a 
Communist Party risking its own electoral defeat had seized power by force. Yet PCI 
leaders stepped back from the brink. Unprepared for fresh civil war, cadres made clear to 
militants that there would be no ‘ora X’ of insurrection against the democratic 
government. Copying the Czechoslovak example was not so simple in a country without 
a Red Army presence. As Togliatti’s condition stabilised, the revolt dissipated.10 
 
 
 
 
8 See the conference minutes: Procacci et al. (eds.) 1994. Zhdanov’s cutting reproach of the PCI 
appears from p. 195. 
9 On this episode see Behan 1996. Teenage MCd’I member Osvaldo Schiavoni (interview with DB,  
28. 11.2012), reports that upon disinterring his weapon buried after Liberation, his father found it 
no longer functioned.  
10 Notable was the playing down of the military aspect of this episode in later PCI communications to party 
members on the success of the strike that followed: see the article ‘Esperienze di un grande sciopero’, from 
Quaderno dell’Attivista, August 1948 (published in book form by Mazzotta in 1976). Novella’s report on Milan 
emphasises that ‘where the police maintained a correct attitude there were no clashes with it and there were  
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This crisis was more an echo of Resistance militancy than a possible bid for power. As PCI 
cadres at Togliatti’s bedside discussed their response, there were those who entertained 
the idea of insurrection. This was particularly true of Pietro Secchia, partisan commander 
in Spain and the Milanese Resistance. He was esteemed in Party folklore as the ‘man who 
dreamed of the armed struggle’ who sought to settle the ‘unfinished business’ of the 
Resistance. Yet he also recognised that the PCI was unprepared for civil war. Accepting 
the need to defuse the situation, he himself ordered militants to lay down their weapons. 
Already in the Resistance period Secchia had held firm to the Party line, supporting the 
Salerno Turn and vehemently attacking the dissident Left. Again in July 1948, he accepted 
Party discipline. The militant culture of doppiezza had again raised its head. Yet it found no 
leadership among the cadres of the PCI. 
 
10.2. The new anti-fascism11 
 
The sense of a ‘missed opportunity’ endured into subsequent decades, notably in the 
culture of the 1960s new Left. To point to the gap between Resistance radicalism and 
institutional compromise was a crucial challenge to the PCI’s self-narration. Most new 
Left historiography was a reaction against the Party’s own, which also built on its 
assumption that the Resistance had played a key role in liberating national territory. This 
was turned inside-out to present a situation in which the PCI had enjoyed a protagonist 
role in Italian politics which it had then squandered. Rather less apparent in this narrative 
were the broader structural limits to the Resistance. The malign role of the Allies was 
foregrounded; rather less so, the gap between the Left’s involvement in the partisan 
struggle and its actual social weight. Faced with a new era of Christian-Democratic 
dominance, the new Left condemned the PCI for its excessive compromises. 
 
The advance of a new Left also reflected the faded lustre of the Moscow-centred Communist 
movement. Even at the moment of the July 1948 crisis, ‘People’s Democracy’ had been making 
headway in Eastern Europe and the PCI was a rapidly expanding force. Yet the following 
decade saw a series of shocks to the pro-Soviet movement. Khrushchev’s 
 
 
 
no notable incidents of concern’. The Turin report in the same issue notes, in a set of ‘self-critical 
considerations’, that ‘a quite large group of workers, in part ex-partisans’, ‘bitterly opposed the call to go 
back to work, with clashes of some note’.  
11 Wright 1998 offers particularly interesting reflection in this regard, including on the role of the armed struggle 
in the imaginary even of non-terrorist groups. Bermani 1997 emphasises that the New Left began with the cycle 
of struggle at the end of the 1960s rather than the beginning. From a workerist reading, Tronti  
 
2013 (p. 90) labels the Turin workers at Piazza Statuto in 1962 as the ‘children of the generation of 1943–45), 
and Del Carria similarly focuses the turning point on workplace struggles rather than the revival of anti-
fascism in 1960. 
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denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress, followed by the national uprisings in 
Hungary and Poland, each damaged the Communists’ unity and idealism. The rise of 
socialist states autonomous of Soviet leadership (China, Cuba, Vietnam) moreover 
encouraged hopes in less bureaucratic, more radical alternatives to Eastern Bloc socialism. 
Intersecting with the libertarian cultural atmosphere of the 1960s, this Third Worldist 
Marxism allowed New Left currents to damn the PCI for its conservatism while 
themselves maintaining the fundamentals of Leninist politics. 
 
Key to the new Left’s formation was the rise of a new anti-fascism. This particularly owed 
to the March 1960 formation of the Tambroni government, reliant on the neo-fascist MSI’s 
parliamentary backing. This Christian-Democratic cabinet oversaw four months of 
explosive confrontations, driven by the apparent resurgence of the far-Right. The biggest 
flashpoint came in early July with the fatti di Genova, when the government authorised the 
MSI to hold its congress in the northern port city. This provoked a strong local anti-fascist 
feeling, and protests in the city were soon followed by rioting and clashes with police 
around Italy. In the capital, police broke up a rally at the Porta San Paolo held in solidarity 
with the Genoese anti-fascists. The over one-hundred arrestees included even PCI MPs 
laying a wreath to the martyrs of 8 September 1943. This and similar police disruption of 
left-wing activity fuelled the spectre of rising fascist influence within the state. 
 
The result of the unrest was in fact to harden the Republic against the MSI. The climate 
under the Tambroni government demonstrated this party’s toxicity, and by the end of July 
the premier was forced to resign. The impossibility of maintaining a government even 
passively reliant on the MSI doomed the party’s bid for the mainstream. With small 
centrist forces lacking the numbers to give the Christian Democrats a majority, the 
Catholic centre instead made an opening to the Socialists, forming the first ‘centre-Left’ 
government in 1962. Yet this tumult had revived two forces that would continue to 
undermine the Republic. The cordon sanitaire against the MSI was strengthened, but this 
also emboldened radical forces within that party, less committed to democratic politics. 
The mobilisation that developed through summer 1960 in turn encouraged the rise of a 
militant anti-fascism, seeking to close down the MSI’s street presence. 
 
This radicalisation was also the context for other forms of social conflict, as Italy’s febrile 
politics and strong economic growth fed a rise in militant shopfloor movements. This also 
challenged the PCI’s dominance on this terrain, as new layers mobilised who did not 
belong to its traditional Northern-industrial base. The young proletariat central to the fatti 
di Genova, including migrant workers from the South, stood at an economic and cultural 
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remove from the PCI-led working class with which they now combined. Their age, the 
lower industrial concentration in their home regions, and the South’s only brief 
experience of Occupation, made the Resistance legacy a weaker element of their class 
identity. Less assimilated into the Party and its union structures than their Northern 
counterparts, these layers were in the 1960s the bedrock of a rising extra-parliamentary 
Left. This latter cast the PCI as a bureaucratic and conservative force, and rejected both its 
identification with the Republic and its patriotic mythology. 
 
The extra-parliamentary Left exalted Resistance militancy as it criticised the institutional 
compromise in which it had concluded. With no red thread to link them to the wartime 
dissident movements, these 1960s currents were little-compelled to examine where these 
latter had failed. Libertarian socialist Lelio Basso sought to bridge this divide, and in a 
1965 polemic challenged the new Left attempt to cast the Resistance as a ‘missed 
revolutionary opportunity’. He highlighted the reasons why the Left’s dominance of 
Resistance mobilisation did not allow it to seize power, given both the international 
context and the Resistance’s weak social base. In this he departed from the PCI’s own 
veneration of its Resistance record. However, his focus on structural barriers to change 
also jarred with leftists’ attempts to portray the PCI as a destructive counter-revolutionary 
force. These latter could cite the dissident movements as a foil for PCI ‘reformism’, but 
showed little interest in examining their capacity to transform Italy. 
 
There also emerged a distinct workerist historiography, counterposing shopfloor rebellion 
to the Resistance alliance. Such histories ranged from Guido Quazza’s emphasis on the 
class-war drive to anti-fascism to Liliana Lanzardi’s study of the PCI’s role at FIAT in 
1944– 47, showing how it had imposed wage restraint for the sake of national 
reconstruction. Her operaismo challenged the notion of the ‘democratic republic founded 
on labour’, highlighting the contrast between the state’s symbolic valorisation of work and 
the actual conditions of workers. A more ambitious approach came from Romolo Gobbi, 
who denied that wartime industrial militancy was governed by identification with the 
Resistance. He portrayed the strikes and absenteeism in the Northern factories as an 
expression of proletarian self-preservation, driven by the ‘refusal of work’ rather than 
patriotic sentiments. This projected the workerists’ sense of ‘class autonomy’ back on to 
the same struggles which the PCI vaunted as a ‘national-popular’ reference point. 
 
A more conventionally Leninist approach came from Silverio Corvisieri, editor of 
Avanguardia Operaia. His 1967 essay on the MCd’I sought to overcome the oblivion into 
which this movement had fallen, asserting its central role in the Roman Resistance. In so 
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doing, Corvisieri robustly challenged the PCI’s cavalier regard for historical truth. His 
effort to retrace the Roman militants’ history relied heavily on the testimony of Orfeo 
Mucci, a former MCd’Ier himself active in the San Lorenzo autonomist milieu. His work 
expressed themes typical among all extra-parliamentary Left discussion of the Resistance. 
Most important among these was the veneration of armed struggle as a privileged form of 
political action. This was implicit in exaggerated claims regarding Bandiera Rossa’s 
military prowess, but also its repeated comparisons between the Resistance and Third 
World guerrilla movements. Corvisieri’s work tended to present the dissidents’ military 
prowess as a form of justification for their political mores, as if this itself gave them the 
authority with which to pass judgement on other Resistance forces. 
 
Extra-parliamentary Left readings of the Resistance were thus torn between veneration of 
militant anti-fascism, and the attempt to free class struggles from the Resistance’s political 
encrustation of nationalism and popular-frontism. This in turn reflected a tension 
between insurrectionary forces who took inspiration from guerrilla struggles, and those 
operaista currents less focused on the arena of party organisation. This was not an absolute 
barrier between the shopfloor and the political sphere: Corvisieri himself emphasised the 
value of workplace mobilisation as a catalyst to party-building, while operaismo and in 
particular its Marxist-feminist strand offered an expansive conception of the ‘social’ 
worker and the class struggle outwith the factory gates. But this latter position also 
implied a certain critical attitude toward militant anti-fascism. In highlighting the 
totalising character of capitalist social relations, it diverged from any tendency to identify 
a discrete set of individuals as the ‘enemy’. Weapons, and the killing of particular fascists, 
could not uproot and replace the social relations from which Fascism emerged.12 
 
10.3. The Years of Lead 
 
The dangers of this tendency within militant anti-fascism were well illustrated by the 
experience of the armed-struggle Left, an ‘underground’ at the edges of the much larger extra-
parliamentary milieu. The physical elimination of fascists and industrialists, as well as the 
taking of hostages, reflected these militants’ inspiration from the methods of guerrilla and 
national-liberation movements from M-26-7 to the Provisional IRA and PFLP. However, their 
imaginary also drew on Italy’s own Resistance experience, the ‘red thread 
 
 
 
12 Wright 1998, p. 87, cites a letter sent by one woman to Lotta Continua after the killing of a comrade: 
 
‘Altogether, comrades, if we are communists and not just anti-fascists, I believe it’s because we don’t 
struggle against the hand of capital but against capital itself. It’s capital’s headquarters that must be blown 
up, not just those of the fascists, to revenge the death of comrade Rossi’. 
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of unfinished revolution that continued to exist after the end of the war’.13 Telling in this 
regard was their attempt to revive partisan iconography, not least Giangiacomo 
Feltrinelli’s Gruppi di Azione Partigiana (subtly differing from the name of the Gruppi di 
Azione Patriottica) and the Milan Senza Tregua group (named after gappista Giovanni 
Pesce’s memoir). These groups also labelled their political opponents using the language 
of the Resistance period, considering that reactionary elements never removed from the 
Italian state and capitalist class were driving a new form of fascism. 
 
These groups’ actions extended from a reaction against the organised far-Right, to a much 
wider spectrum of forces. The impulse for the creation of Feltrinelli’s GAP was a neo-
Fascist terrorist attack in Milan in December 1969. This Piazza Fontana bombing was the 
beginning of the so-called Years of Lead, triggering a wave of fascist violence and leftist 
armed-struggle movements that would last across the 1970s. The GAP itself only lasted 
until 1972, but the more decisive current in the new ‘underground’ was the Brigate Rosse, 
formed in 1970 and continuing for over a decade. The Brigate Rosse together with the XXII 
Ottobre group, Senza Tregua/Prima Linea, and the Nuclei Armati Proletari each conducted 
bank raids and armed robberies, and kidnapped and killed industrialists, judges and 
military officials. The Brigate Rosse even murdered a ‘social-fascist’ PCI trade unionist it 
accused of informing on its own clandestine organisation, which it glorified as the centre 
of revolutionary activity in Italy. 
 
These groups attacked the PCI for a complacent attitude toward US hegemony in Italy after 
World War II. They instead venerated the polarisation strategy adopted by Third World 
guerrillas, which had allowed them to overcome the established bloc dynamics. Cuba and 
Vietnam provided recent examples of victory through confrontation; Chile, an example of the 
dangers to peaceful reform. The Brigate Rosse’s strategy for polarising the Italian situation also 
included the active effort to undermine attempts to reform the Republic from within. This was 
starkly illustrated in March 1978 as its commandoes kidnapped former premier Aldo Moro. 
The liberal Christian Democrat was chosen as hostage precisely because of his openness to a 
 
 
 
 
13 In this interview with Nicola Lofoco, Brigate Rosse founder Alberto Franceschini describes its 
emergence in the following terms: ‘The BR were born above all of a cultural patrimony that derived 
from communist culture, from the partisan and resistance struggle. The anti-fascist struggle was 
seen as a moment of “passage”; once fascism was defeated, the primary objective was the fight 
against capitlaism. The true revolution was against the form of government that came after the 
authoritarian and capitalist liberation’. Franceschini 2001. ‘Franceschini: Le Brigate Rosse usarono 
armi dei partigiani’, La Repubblica, 5.9.1990, describes his revelations on on the use of partisan arms 
stocks in the 1970s. 
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coalition involving the PCI. This in turn emboldened politicians on the anti-communist 
wing of Moro’s party in justifying a firmer stance against any deal. Killing their hostage 
after an eight-week standoff, the Brigate Rosse had destroyed the last hope of a ‘Historic 
Compromise’. 
 
Producing no distinct historiography, these circles were interested less in the political 
dynamics of the Resistance than the military tactics which it had deployed, as they stoked 
their own cult of armed action. This was particularly notable in their plundering of the 
history of the PCI’s GAP. Groups like the Brigate Rosse sought to reproduce the polarising 
effect of GAP terrorist tactics, while detaching this from PCI strategy. Seeing themselves, 
like the GAP, as an underground group faced with a ‘fascist’ regime and a passive 
working class, their strategy was similarly premised on spectacular feats that would stir 
the masses to action. Their understanding of the Resistance thus showed no trace of the 
dissidents’ critique of military adventurism. The Brigate Rosse embraced the elitist 
voluntarism which the GAP’s critics had so rejected, prioritising clamorous ‘sparks’ to 
mass mobilisation over the building of political, class consciousness. Avanguardia Operaia 
itself emphasised how in the Resistance period intensified anti-fascism had not itself 
driven the formation of a revolutionary subject.14 
 
The extension of this new ‘underground’ in fact closely corresponded to the weakening of the 
extra-parliamentary Left. In the post-’68 period movements like Lotta Continua and Potere 
Operaio had never identified with the armed cells. Even in resisting Fascist street movements 
and police repression, they had not embraced a strategy of escalating military force, at most 
showing a diffuse sympathy for these circles. Yet after the dissolution of these movements and 
the end of the contestation of 1977, several hundred of their militants did turn to the 
‘underground’. As one slogan proclaimed, ‘Enough with speechifying groups, let’s put guns 
in the workers’ hands!’ This meant trying to make up for the decline of the social movements 
through a militarised anti-fascism. The results were disastrous. Hundreds of killings between 
1978 and 1982 fuelled repression even against activists distant from this milieu. To embark 
down the path of terrorism was to doom themselves to perpetual exclusion from democratic 
politics, and a long run from the law. 
 
10.4. The passing of an illusion  
 
 
 
 
 
14 In his memoir, Alberto Franceschini notes that Avanguardia Operaia were the first group to 
condemn his group’s actions. 
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Togliatti’s partito nuovo survived into the 1980s. The militants and legends of the Resistance 
period continued to tie the PCI to a specifically communist tradition. Yet conditions were 
converging in which the Party could contemplate a break from this identity. The breakdown 
of the Historic Compromise pushed it into a stronger oppositional stance, but the defeat of the 
FIAT unions in 1980 and the rise of the Socialists also suggested that the industrial working 
class was waning as a political force. A further social change was the ageing of the PCI’s 
formative generation. With Berlinguer’s death in 1984, the cadres trained in the Resistance 
period no longer headed the Party. The final blow came with the failure of perestroika in the 
Eastern Bloc. Party leaders had long invested their hopes in the Soviet reformers, a last tie to 
their dream of a pluralist communism. But as Gorbachev failed to stem the crisis, they raced to 
distance themselves from the failed experiment. 
 
The end of the PCI spelled the end of the constitutional arch which had emerged from the 
Resistance. The Communists had always occupied an ambiguous place in the Republic, a 
party central to the democratic order yet never able to enter national government. This bore 
the seeds of further ills, for the lack of a regulating exchange of power fed the extension of vast 
links of patronage and corruption within the state. When its loyal opposition collapsed, the 
rotten system crumbled. Its historic rivals now sank into the mutual recriminations of 
‘Bribesville’. After two years of court cases and journalistic exposés, none of the constitutional 
arch parties remained. Silvio Berlusconi appealed once more to the spectre of ‘communism’ as 
he sought again to unite the Right. Dispensing with the old cordon sanitaire, his party now 
welcomed redeemed ‘post-Fascists’ into government. 
 
Former Communists now distanced themselves from the Party’s traditions. In the 
postmodern climate of Second Republic Italy, their new reference point was not so much 
social democracy, as liberalism. There was a belated rerun of the Historic Compromise, on 
a smaller scale, as former elements of the Christian Democrats joined with ex-Socialists 
and ex-Communists in l’Ulivo, and then the Democratic Party. But this was a means of 
breaking with Berlinguer’s Party, rather than fulfilling its ambitions. The new coalition of 
the centrosinistra was not only pro-business or pro-European, but from Massimo D’Alema 
onward drew away from its remaining links to trade union and social movements. Such a 
party could embrace a view of the Resistance based on national unity. More difficult was 
any defence of the PCI’s own record. 
 
Becoming Italy’s first ex-Communist president in 2006, Giorgio Napolitano illustrated what 
the new political times meant for the Resistance legacy. A new identity as a republican centrist 
demanded a break with the old Party’s presentation of its formative struggle. As 
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president Napolitano excoriated the PCI’s ‘ideological blindness’, and blamed its moral 
certainties for its defence of partisan crimes and apologias for Eastern-Bloc socialism. 
Positions of governmental responsibility also distanced him from any focus on the 
Resistance’s enduring social aspirations. This was particularly evident in the ex-
Communist president’s address to mark Liberation Day 2013, as he orchestrated a grand 
coalition government. Napolitano preached the Resistance’s example of ‘national unity’ 
even as he brokered a deal between the Democrats and Silvio Berlusconi. 
 
Seven decades after the Russian Revolution, hope in the communist future crumbled with 
the Berlin Wall. Today, seven decades since the victory over Fascism, the aspirations of 
the Italian Republic seem barely less dilapidated. The propulsive force that began with the 
Resistance is now exhausted, and the Republic’s capacity to reform itself far from certain. 
In the postwar period Resistance history was soon institutionalised, becoming a claim to 
legitimacy for the republican parties. This was a means of resolving Italy’s identity crisis, 
insofar as it helped galvanise different classes, regions and parties behind a promise of 
progress. This myth had limited effect even under the First Republic: the new Italy was 
home to not just the ‘economic miracle’, but also a blocked democracy and ongoing 
political violence. Yet with the collapse of the 1990s, even the promise disappeared. 
 
Myths do sometimes mobilise historical forces, but they do not well explain history. 
Narrow in its social base and divided in its politics, it is not true that the Resistance united 
Italians. The narrative of ‘national unity’ attempted to staunch the wounds the war had 
left open; the myth of the Red Resistance emphasised how little they had healed. Amidst 
the violence of the 1970s, the Resistenza rossa provided inspiration for those who still 
believed in the revolution; it provided a vision of what the partisans might have achieved, 
and what remained to be fought for. Yet those who tried to fight its battles anew reached 
only a historical dead end. An unreflective imitation of anti-fascist militancy could never 
achieve what had not been possible in the Resistance; worse, it doomed those who 
embarked down this path to a war of attrition without end. 
 
Like them, the militants of the MCd’I were driven more by the belief in what they were 
fighting for than a clear idea of how to get there. These Roman proletarians dreamed of 
the sun of the future, the movement of history, of a victory not just worth fighting for, but 
inevitable. This faith provided a coherence that their ramshackle organisation would 
otherwise have lacked, a teleology to make sense of their terrible sacrifices. Yet once the 
end point had disappeared from view, they had no tradition left to defend. Some altered 
their politics to meet the mood of the times; more simply turned their hopes away from 
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politics. There was to be no happy ending, no redemption, not even a newspaper article to 
state why the last disciples had given up. They could claim no vindication and point to no 
wrong turn. Theirs was but a history of faith in the future, and its defeat. 
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Archival sources 
 
ACS/CPC – Archivio Centrale dello Stato (Rome), Casellario Politico 
Centrale ACS/PS – Archivio Centrale dello Stato (Rome), Pubblica Sicurezza 
 
ANPI – Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d’Italia, biographical database 
APC – Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista 
APC/CRM – Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista, Correspondenza 
Roma/Milano 
 
ASR/CAS – Archivio di Stato di Roma, Corte d’Assise Speciale 
ASS/FRB – Archivio storico del Senato, Fondo Rosario Bentivegna 
ASV/FAB – Archivio di Stato di Viterbo, Fondo Angelo la Bella 
BCF/FOT – Biblioteca Comunale di Follonica, Fondo Otello Terzani 
CGB/FAP – Circolo Gianni Bosio (Rome), Fondo Alessandro Portelli 
FB/FGB – Fondazione Basso, Fondo Gerardo Bruni 
 
FGAN – Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Agostino Novella 
FGFM – Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Mosca 
 
MSdL/FSC – Museo Storico della Liberazione (Rome), Fondo Silverio Corvisieri 
 
IPR/AC – Istituto Piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società (Turin), Fondo 
Arturo Colombi 
 
ISEC/V – Istituto per la Storia dell’età contemporanea (Sesto San Giovanni), fondo 
Venegoni 
 
NA - National Archives, Kew 
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